No-Fault Decisions, 2026

The Second Department reiterated that mere errors of law do not permit vacatur of a master arbitrator's award (Nostrand Drugs), and found conclusory claims that missing records hampered opposition, with no described efforts to obtain them, no reasonable excuse for a default (Villanueva). In two RVA Leasing decisions the Appellate Term, First Department, applied the rule that missing initial and follow-up EUOs violates a condition precedent to coverage, one accepting counsel's affidavit of office mailing practices that also swore, on personal knowledge, that they were followed. Civil Court, Kings County, held that Mayzenberg does not govern investigatory-phase verification requests, including those bearing on licensing eligibility (Burke 2 Physical Therapy).

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

All were trial-court rulings. Relying on the Fourth Department's Gepp, Civil Court, Kings County, held that written verification requested after an EUO that left needed information unanswered kept the claim tolled, rejecting reliance on Burke Physical Therapy. The same court held that MVAIC, though exempt from 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (k), failed on summary judgment to establish nonreceipt of bills the provider swore it faxed with an affidavit covering only mailed bills. Another Kings County judge gave res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to a Supreme Court default order declaring no coverage for the same collision (Parisien v ZipCar), and Civil Court, Richmond County, held it cannot issue preliminary injunctions.

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

In 563 Grand Med. the Second Department reiterated that an arbitrator may not raise an unpleaded standing defense, excluded 2003 to 2018 from interest under 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 (d) for unreasonable delay, and denied 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) fees absent any finding of a valid denied or overdue claim. Applying Reyes, it held that a post-collision assault by the uninsured driver did not arise from the vehicle's use (Hereford v Ramirez). Under Pennsylvania law, it held that a rescission within 60 days of issuance barred a third party's recovery under the policy (Newkirk). The First Department held a petition filed within 90 days of the master award timely (Heyligers).

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

In an insurer's de novo action, the Second Department held that awards for other providers had no preclusive effect and that a peer review that neither showed review of the full records nor addressed causation raised no issue on the non-precludable causation defense (Beach Med. Rehabilitation). The Second Department, reversing, stayed a UM arbitration over an unmet accident-reporting condition (Alas); the First Department upheld a stay where the sworn NF-2 reported no hit-and-run contact (Kastor). The Appellate Term, Second Department, held that another insurer's default declaratory judgment had neither res judicata effect, absent proof the insurers were identical, nor collateral estoppel effect against a provider that never appeared (New Image).

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

The Second Department reiterated that review of master arbitration awards is limited to CPLR article 75 grounds, including evidentiary support and rationality, confirming two awards rejecting verification denials (Suh, Sovereign). The Appellate Term, Second Department, held in three appeals that an insurer moving to vacate a CPLR 5003-a (e) judgment must show nonreceipt of a release or stipulation. It reiterated that fraudulent-procurement defenses are precludable, unlike exhaustion and fee-schedule defenses, and that a Civil Court notice of trial starts the 120-day summary-judgment period. Supreme Court, Schenectady County, declined to follow decisions treating premium-lowering misrepresentations as material under Insurance Law § 3105 (b) absent proof the policy would have been refused.

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

The First Department held that a coverage disclaimer filed in a Post-Decision Inquiry divested Arbitration Forums of jurisdiction over a loss-transfer claim and made mandatory arbitration inapplicable under 11 NYCRR 65-4.11 (a) (6). Under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), the Second Department held a confirmation proceeding to be a court appeal carrying additional fees (Integrated Specialty), but upheld refusals where fees were first sought on reargument without documentation (Bay Ridge), sought after a court-ordered deadline (Citimed, applying Miceli and Kihl) or renewed on facts already available (Smart Choice). Twice it reiterated that striking a pleading under CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

Following GEICO v AAAMG Leasing, the Second Department held that an article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master award is a court appeal under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), with fees fixed by the court, not 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d) (John T. Mather Mem. Hosp., YSC Trinity). It remitted fee awards with no stated or evident basis (SCOB, Community Med. Imaging, Barakat PT), but upheld fees fixed without a hearing where the provider neither described counsel's work nor requested one (Baltic Supply, Stand Up MRI, Bay Ridge Surgi-Ctr.). Under CPLR 7511 (e), it confirmed awards whose vacatur had been denied (Patient Care Assoc., Allied Bd. Certified Physicians).

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

The Second Department allowed fees under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for collecting overdue postjudgment interest (Lenox Hill Hosp.) but not for motion practice after the judgment was satisfied (YSC Trinity, MTS Acupuncture). In CPLR 5003-a appeals the Appellate Term, Second Department, following J.D.T. v Chaimowitz, held mailed settlement papers tendered on actual receipt, when interest starts; it found no time limit for entering judgment, and that CPLR 5003-a (e) allows no separate attorney's fee. Seven appeals applied the rule that a timely notice of intention to claim is a condition precedent to payment by MVAIC. Kings County Supreme Court, finding no reported case law, held EUO lost-earnings claims arbitrable.

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.

The Second Department held that 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (b) (3) sets no time frame for a denial after the 120-day verification period, rejecting the Appellate Term's 150-day limit (Chapa Prods. v MVAIC). It held that a limited SUM arbitration clause does not reach a policy exclusion, and stayed arbitration where the insured settled without consent and did not show the release preserved subrogation rights (Progressive v Lai). Five Appellate Term, Second Department, appeals held that MVAIC did not prove exhaustion under 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 without claim-receipt and full-verification dates. Following Northern Med. Care, that court held an insurer need not show objective reasons for EUOs prima facie (Bridgeview Supply).

Our summary of the month’s decisions, not the courts’ words.