January 23, 2026

New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50202(U))

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/new-millennium-med-imaging-p-c-v-mvaic-2026-ny-slip-op-50202u/

Court: Appellate Term, Second Department
Decided: January 23, 2026
Citation: 2026 NY Slip Op 50202(U) · 88 Misc 3d 129(A)
Posture: Summary judgment
Outcome: Provider prevailed
Issues: MVAIC Policy issues
Legal questions: MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person (see the maps)

Cite as

New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC, 88 Misc 3d 129(A), 2026 NY Slip Op 50202(U) (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2026)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

MVAIC failed to establish that the assignor was a vehicle owner disqualified from recovering no-fault benefits as a qualified person. MVAIC sought summary judgment against the provider under Insurance Law § 5202 (b) and § 5102 (e), relying on the ownership definition in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128. Its proof did not establish exclusive use as a lessee or bailee for more than 30 days, or entitlement to use and possession of a vehicle subject to another person's security interest. The Appellate Term, Second Department, reversed the order and denied MVAIC's motion. Because the Civil Court, Kings County, had implicitly denied the provider's cross motion as moot, the matter was remitted for determination of that cross motion.

Reported in New York Official Reports at New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50202(U))

[*1]

New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC

2026 NY Slip Op 50202(U) [88 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on January 23, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on January 23, 2026

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-428 K C

New Millennium Medical Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Elijah Moise, Appellant,

against

MVAIC, Respondent.

Law Office of Damin J. Toell, P.C. (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and David Gierasch of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), entered December 3, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and implicitly denied, as moot, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court to determine plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Odessa Kennedy, J.) entered December 3, 2024 granting a motion by defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and implicitly denying, as moot, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, MVAIC asserted that plaintiff’s assignor is not a “qualified person” (Insurance Law § 5202 [b]) because, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128, he was deemed to be an “owner” of the vehicle (see Insurance Law § 5102 [e]). Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128 provides that an “owner” is

“A person, other than a lien holder, having the property in or title to a vehicle or vessel. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle or vessel subject to a security interest in another person and also includes any lessee or bailee of a [*2]motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.”

Here, MVAIC’s motion failed to make a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s assignor had the exclusive use of the vehicle, either as a bailee or as a lessee, for a period greater than 30 days, or that he was entitled to the use and possession of the vehicle that was subject to a security interest in another person (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128; UCC 1-201 [b] [35]). Consequently, the Civil Court improperly deemed plaintiff’s assignor to be an “owner” of the vehicle and, thus, defendant’s motion should have been denied, as MVAIC failed to establish that the assignor was not a “qualified person” (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128; Insurance Law §§ 5102 [e]; 5202 [b]).

As the Civil Court implicitly denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment as moot, in view of the foregoing, the matter must be remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of plaintiff’s cross-motion.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court to determine plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: January 23, 2026

Legal questions

A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.

MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person

Open the full map

Against MVAIC, was the claimant shown to be a qualified, covered person meeting article 52’s conditions?

This decision: MVAIC bore the burden on its eligibility / lack-of-coverage defense and did not meet it; claimant prevails on this point

Held MVAIC failed to show prima facie that the assignor was a VTL 128 owner of the vehicle, lacking proof of exclusive use for over 30 days or a security-interest arrangement, so it did not establish he was not a qualified person.

Found not eligibleClaimant's proof lackingMVAIC failed to proveFound eligibleUnresolved / for trialDefense precluded/waivedThis decision

Of the 223 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 23 (this one included) are in the same category.

Similar decisions

Medical Supply Depot Group Corp. v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 50844(U))MVAIC established that the assignor was ineligible for no-fault benefits because the assignor owned the vehicle involved in the accident.
Longevity Med. Supply, Inc. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 51164(U))MVAIC established that the assignor was not a qualified person because the assignor owned the vehicle operated at the time of the accident.
Masigla v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 51515(U))The assignor's stipulated exclusive possession of the uninsured vehicle for over 30 days defeated eligibility for MVAIC benefits.
T & S Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2017 NY Slip Op 51755(U))MVAIC established nonreceipt of a notice-of-intention affidavit, and the record did not establish the assignor's qualified-person status.
Maiga Prods. Corp. v MVAIC (2020 NY Slip Op 50993(U))The provider failed at trial to establish that its assignor was not the owner of the uninsured vehicle, defeating eligibility for MVAIC benefits.