New York No-Fault Regulations 11 NYCRR Subpart 65-3: Claims for Personal Injury Protection Benefits
11 NYCRR 65-3.16: Measurement of no-fault benefits
Text of 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (Insurance Regulation 68-C) as published by the New York State Department of Financial Services, checked against the Department's list of amendments through October 4, 2026.
This is an unofficial copy. The official text is in the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations. Decisions apply the version in force at the time of the claim, which may differ from the current text.
Decisions citing this section · Plain-text version (Markdown)
(a) Medical expenses.
(1) Payment for medical expenses shall be in accordance with fee schedules promulgated under section 5108 of the Insurance Law and contained in Part 68 of this Title (Regulation 83).
(2) Where an applicant receives treatment from a health maintenance organization, an Insurance Law article 43 corporation, a veterans administration hospital or provider, or any other provider which does not render specific charges for services, or where any such charges are indeterminate, the applicant shall be entitled to payment of benefits equal to the value for equivalent services rendered by a provider as limited by section 5108 of the Insurance Law and Part 68 of this Title (Regulation 83).
(3) Pursuant to section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law, an insurer shall not be liable for the payment of medical and other benefits enumerated in section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if, during a period of one year from the date of the accident, no such expenses have been incurred by the applicant.
(4) The term nursing, as used in section 5102(a)(1)(i) of the Insurance Law, shall include but not be limited to all necessary services rendered to the eligible injured person by a licensed practical nurse.
(5) If the applicant’s injuries warrant occupational therapy or rehabilitation based on an attending physician’s recommendation, or if the injuries have rendered the applicant unable to resume the applicant’s occupation, the insurer shall inform the applicant of the coverage for occupational therapy or rehabilitation required by section 5102(a)(1)(ii) of the Insurance Law, and the insurer shall assist the applicant in obtaining such occupational therapy and rehabilitation.
(6) The term any other professional health services, as used in section 5102(a)(1)(iv) of the Insurance Law, this Part and approved endorsements, shall be limited to those services that are required or would be required to be licensed by the State of New York if performed within the State of New York. Such professional health services should be necessary for the treatment of the injuries sustained and within the lawful scope of the licensee’s practice. Charges for the services shall be covered pursuant to schedules promulgated under section 5108 of the Insurance Law and Part 68 of this Title (Regulation 83). The services need not be initiated through referral by a treating or practicing physician.
(7) The scope of the term religious methods of healing recognized by the laws of this State, as used in section 5102(a)(1)(iii) of the Insurance Law, this Part and approved endorsements, is a method recognized under article 131 of the Education Law. Charges for such services shall be covered pursuant to schedules promulgated under section 5108 of the Insurance Law.
(8) Services rendered to the eligible injured person by a certified or licensed home health care agency shall be considered a medical expense payable under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law.
(9) Pursuant to section 5102(b)(2) of the Insurance Law, when the applicant is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits due to the same accident, the workers’ compensation carrier shall be the sole source of reimbursement for medical expenses.
(10) If a provider of health service requires proof of the applicant’s ability to pay for the services to be rendered as a result of the accident, the insurer shall provide the applicant or the provider (if the applicant is entitled to benefits) with a letter stating that the applicant has coverage under its policy and that the necessary medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident are covered expenses subject to the policy limits and conditions and applicable fee schedules.
(11) Within 30 calendar days of a submission by a dentist or plastic surgeon of a proposal for a course of treatment and charges, an insurer shall review such proposal and notify the provider as to whether or not payment will be made in accordance with the proposal. The foregoing shall apply to nonemergency situations and when the course of treatment is expected to involve covered expenses of $250 or more.
(12) A provider of health care services is not eligible for reimbursement under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in New York or meet any applicable licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in any other state in which such service is performed.
(b) Loss of earnings. In determining loss of earnings from work:
(1) benefits from other sources shall not be considered as an offset against or a deduction from loss of earnings, unless article 51 of the Insurance Law expressly provides for such offset or deduction;
(i) within the meaning of section 5102(a)(2) of the Insurance Law, insurers shall not take a deduction for statutory or contractual wage continuation plans which are diminished or exhausted as payments are made or when accumulated sick leave time is used. In order for an insurer to be entitled to offset or deduct payments received by a claimant under a particular wage continuation plan, the plan must meet all of the following conditions:
(a) the applicant must be entitled to receive the same level of wage continuation benefits for a subsequent unrelated accident or illness when he or she returns to work after recovering from the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident;
(b) benefits for a subsequent unrelated accident or illness must be equal in both time and amount to the wage continuation benefits to which the applicant was entitled as a result of the injuries suffered in the motor vehicle accident; and
(c) wage continuation benefits for a subsequent disability must be immediately available, without any requirement that the applicant work a stated period of time before full benefits are restored;
(ii) within the meaning of section 5102(a)(2) of the Insurance Law, insurers shall take a deduction for any payments made by an employer on a voluntary basis;
(iii) within the meaning of section 5102(a)(2) of the Insurance Law, insurers shall not take a deduction for contractual or voluntary long-term disability plans, which generally become effective six months after the date disability begins;
(2) insureds covered by wage continuation plans which meet the criteria for deduction set forth in subparagraph (1)(i) of this subdivision, are entitled to a premium reduction to reflect the insurer’s reduced exposure to loss, pursuant to section 2330 of the Insurance Law. Insurers shall grant the premium reduction upon receipt of information that indicates the insured is covered by such wage continuation plan;
(3) loss of earnings from work shall not necessarily be limited to the applicant’s actual level of earnings at the time of the accident, but may also include demonstrated future earnings reasonably projected;
(4) an applicant, whose unemployment was the result of the seasonal nature of the work which the applicant usually performed, shall be entitled to receive payments for loss of earnings from work during the claimed period of disability arising from the accident which coincides with the seasonal period of employment;
(5) where the injury renders an unemployed applicant ineligible to receive unemployment benefits, the applicant shall be entitled to receive payments for loss of earnings from work equivalent in value to the unemployment benefits which the applicant would otherwise have received. If an unemployed applicant is eligible for disability benefits pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law, section 207 (sick unemployed fund), the no-fault insurer shall supplement such benefits to bring them up to the level of the lost unemployment benefits. If the unemployed applicant is not eligible for such disability benefits, the insurer shall pay an amount equal to the lost unemployment benefits. Such loss of earnings is eligible basic economic loss, but is not subject to the 20-percent offset from loss of earnings provided for in section 5102(b)(1) of the Insurance Law;
(6) if the applicant, while disabled, is discharged from employment solely because of inability to work due to the injury, benefits for basic economic loss shall continue at the same level while the disability continues;
(7) if an applicant, while disabled, is discharged from employment, benefits shall cease if the position would have been lost had the accident not occurred (e.g., plant shutdown, strike, etc.). However, the insurer shall reimburse the applicant for benefits lost which would have been received had the applicant not been disabled (e.g., union strike benefits, unemployment, etc.);
(8) during the continuance of a disability arising from a covered accident, loss of earnings benefits due and payable must be paid periodically, at least once in every 30 calendar days;
(9) refusal by an eligible injured person to accept reasonable rehabilitative treatment may be the basis for denial of future payment of benefits for loss of earnings from work and may be used as evidence to dispute the reasonableness or necessity of any further expense or loss;
(10) substitute services:
(i) where an applicant sustains expenses in obtaining services in lieu of those such person would have performed for income, but still suffers a net loss of earnings from work which the applicant would have performed, such loss of earnings is eligible basic economic loss and shall be subject to the offsets provided for in section 5102(b) of the Insurance Law; and the cost of substitute services reasonably sustained is also eligible basic economic loss, but shall not be subject to such offsets;
(ii) where an applicant has a claim for both substitute services and loss of earnings from work, the claim for substitute services shall be primary in computing the loss of earnings benefit payable;
(11) monthly work loss limit. The monthly limitation on the aggregate of work loss and substitute services shall not be prorated in the event that one is unable to work or is required to obtain substitute services for a period less than one month. A month shall be each consecutive period of 30 days beginning with the date of the accident unless the injury extends for more than one year, in which case there shall be 12 monthly payment periods for the period from the date of accident to each annual anniversary of the accident date;
(12) the maximum first-party benefit payable for loss of earnings from work under the mandatory coverage is $1,000 per month for claims arising from accidents occurring prior to November 12, 1991 and $2,000 per month for claims arising from accidents occurring on and after November 12, 1991;
(13) lump-sum settlement for loss of earnings:
(i) an insurer may at its option enter into a lump-sum settlement agreement for the payment of first-party benefits, provided that competent medical testimony establishes that:
(a) the period of disability will extend for at least three years beyond the date of the accident; and
(b) the settlement would be of material benefit to the applicant, occupationally and from a rehabilitative standpoint;
(ii) lump-sum settlements shall be permitted only for the payment of loss of earnings from work and may be reduced to the present value of net benefit payments computed on the basis of a six percent annual interest factor and any other applicable offsets; and
(iii) no lump-sum settlement shall be permitted unless the form for lump-sum settlement agreement, Appendix 13-A, infra, is executed by the parties specified thereon and approved by an arbitrator or a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Subpart.
(c) Other reasonable and necessary expenses sustained. Where the applicant sustains other reasonable and necessary expenses, such services must be actually performed for a charge by a person who is not legally obligated to render them and would not ordinarily perform such services as part of a family relationship; provided, however, that if a member of a family or relative suffers pecuniary loss in order to render such services, such person shall be reimbursed to the extent of the reasonable value of such services.
Historical note
Sec. filed Aug. 2, 2001 eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Decisions citing this section (126)
Every decision in our case-law database that cites 11 NYCRR 65-3.16, grouped by the subdivision cited. Within each group, decisions that turn on the provision come first, then those that rely on it, then passing citations; within each of these the highest court comes first. The lists are compiled automatically, and the one-sentence descriptions were written by a language model from the text of each decision: read the decision before relying on one.
Subdivision (a) (120 decisions)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela (2005 NY Slip Op 02416) Court of AppealsHolds that (a) (12) bars reimbursement to fraudulently incorporated providers despite treatment by licensed practitioners and permits insurers to look beyond licensing documents for willful and material violations, with investigatory delay requiring conduct tantamount to fraud rather than technical violations.
- Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 04643) Court of AppealsHolds that (a) (12) permits withholding reimbursement for willful and material licensing violations without proof of common-law fraud or a jury finding of conduct tantamount to fraud; the jury's finding of nonphysician control sufficed to render the provider ineligible.
- Government Employees Ins. Co. v Mayzenberg (2025 NY Slip Op 06527) Court of AppealsHolds that (a) (12) does not permit insurers to deny reimbursement for alleged professional misconduct, including paid patient referrals, short of ceding control to an unlicensed party, deferring to the agency's distinction between foundational licensing requirements and professional discipline.
- Allstate Ins. Co. v Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. (2006 NY Slip Op 07279) Appellate Division, First DepartmentHolds that (a) (12) bars reimbursement to fraudulently incorporated providers even for unpaid claims predating its effective date, while rejecting fraud and unjust-enrichment claims to recover payments made before that date.
- Allstate Ins. Co. v Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. (2010 NY Slip Op 08783) Appellate Division, First DepartmentHolds that Insurance Law section 5109 does not displace the insurer's right under (a) (12) to withhold payment from fraudulently incorporated providers, rejecting the argument that only the insurance regulator may act.
- A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26068) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that an allegedly fraudulent corporate-licensure defense under (a) (12) is not precluded, allowing inquiry into corporate structure and licensing despite the insurer's failure to timely deny the claims.
- Lexington Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26251) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to find corporate discovery into owners' licensing germane to reimbursement eligibility, explaining that insurers may withhold benefits from fraudulently licensed providers despite the preclusion rule.
- Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 27366) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that (a) (12) applies to professional service limited liability companies even for services predating the regulation, granting the insurer summary judgment because the provider falsely listed a psychologist as a member and manager and failed to rebut that proof.
Show all 120 decisions
- Metroscan Imaging, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26319) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that (a) (12) codifies the common-law bar on recovery by fraudulently incorporated providers, so unpaid claims remain barred regardless of when services were rendered, while recoupment becomes available only for payments made after the regulation took effect.
- Midwood Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 50052(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that fraudulent licensing rendering a provider ineligible under (a) (12) is a nonwaivable defense outside the 30-day preclusion rule, making discovery on fraudulent incorporation material and the provider's summary judgment motion premature until that discovery is completed.
- Midborough Acupuncture P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26360) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to find discovery into owners' licensing germane to reimbursement eligibility where fraudulent incorporation is asserted, a defense that survives an untimely denial.
- Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. v State Wide Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 52229(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentApplies (a) (12)'s rule that licensing noncompliance bars reimbursement to affirm a trial judgment for the providers, because the insurer's evidence did not show, even by a preponderance, that a management company rather than the licensed professional owned or controlled them.
- First Help Acupuncture P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51043(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that fraudulent licensing under (a) (12) is a nonwaivable defense outside the 30-day preclusion rule, and denies the provider summary judgment because the insurer's submissions, including an investigator's report, raise a triable issue of fraudulent incorporation.
- Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co. (2013 NY Slip Op 23232) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that ineligibility under (a) (12) concerns actual operation and control by unlicensed individuals, requires no finding of common-law fraud or fraudulent intent, and is not limited to licensing failures at incorporation.
- Quality Med. Care, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50262(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentApplies (a) (12)'s licensing requirement to hold that a professional corporation solely owned by a physician not certified in acupuncture cannot recover for acupuncture services, although a licensed acupuncturist employee rendered them, and dismisses the complaint.
- Devonshire Surgical Facility v GEICO (2007 NY Slip Op 51308(U)) Appellate Term, First DepartmentApplies (a) (12) to the insurer's documentary submissions, finding factual issues concerning the surgical provider's compliance with state licensing requirements and denying that provider partial summary judgment.
- Marc Habif, D.C./Complete Care Chiropractic v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. (2010 NY Slip Op 20219) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentApplies (a) (3)'s requirement that expenses be incurred within one year of the accident, explaining that expenses arise when treatment is received, in reviewing an agreed submission that failed to establish whether treatment occurred within that year.
- Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 52118(U)) Appellate Term, First DepartmentRejects the insurer's claim of ineligibility under (a) (12) because it offered no proof of fraudulent licensing of the duly formed medical corporation whose licensed employees rendered chiropractic and acupuncture services, affirming denial of the insurer's summary judgment motion.
- Veraso Med. Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins. (2021 NY Slip Op 51167(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentApplies (a) (12) to a medical supply provider, finding the insurer's trial proof sufficient to establish noncompliance with local licensing requirements by a preponderance of the credible evidence and affirming dismissal of the complaint.
- First Care Chiropractic of NJ, P.C. v Mvaic (2015 NY Slip Op 50677(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRejects the (a) (12) ineligibility defense based solely on the provider's incorporation in another state: a foreign professional corporation may practice in New York if statutory conditions are met, and the insurer proved no unmet requirement, so its summary judgment motion is denied.
- Physical Performance Testing of NY v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2013 NY Slip Op 50581(U)) Appellate Term, First DepartmentApplies (a) (6) and (a) (12) in affirming dismissal of an unlicensed provider's claims, explaining that professional corporations must be owned and controlled by licensed professionals and their services rendered by licensed professionals.
- Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51531(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentApplies (a) (12) retroactively to psychological services rendered before the regulation took effect, granting the insurer summary judgment dismissing the complaint because the provider performed those services in violation of professional limited liability company licensing requirements.
- Statewide Med. Acupuncture Servs., PC v Travelers Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 51773(U)) Trial courtLimits the corporate-licensing inquiry authorized by (a) (12) to cases with good cause or a reasonable foundation, finding that the insurer's hearsay, conjecture, and speculation do not justify discovery into fraudulent incorporation.
- Manhattan Med. Imaging, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51844(U)) Trial courtRelies on (a) (12)'s licensing exclusion to permit the insurer to raise fraudulent incorporation despite an untimely denial, where the provider was possibly owned by both a physician and a nonphysician.
- Metroscan Imaging P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 25228) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) applies to unpaid claims predating its effective date regardless of whether fraudulent incorporation was raised in a timely denial, distinguishing withholding reimbursement from recovering payments made before the regulation took effect.
- Matter of Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Insurance Cos. Represented by Bruno Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (2009 NY Slip Op 29413) Trial courtHolds that nonphysician ownership or control establishes ineligibility under (a) (12) without proof of common-law fraud, upholding the jury charge and rejecting the provider's contention that licensing violations must exist at incorporation.
- Multiquest, PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 25356) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to claims predating its effective date where uncontroverted EUO testimony establishes false ownership representations, reasoning that limiting the fraudulent-incorporation reimbursement bar to later claims would negate the intent of the prior decision.
- St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co. v Nandi (2007 NY Slip Op 51154(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12), as construed by the Court of Appeals, to limit the insurer's fraud and unjust-enrichment claims against allegedly fraudulently incorporated or unlicensed providers to payments made after the regulation took effect, while enjoining the providers' collection suits.
- A.T. Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 25461) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) applies retroactively to unpaid claims arising before its effective date because it clarified existing licensing requirements and is remedial, granting the insurer summary judgment against a provider that shared revenues with a nonphysician-owned corporation.
- Multiquest, PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 25512) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) has no retroactive application to treatment provided before its effective date, rendering the fraudulent-organization defense unavailable because the regulation contains no language requiring retroactivity.
- CKC Chiropractic v Republic W. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 24351) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) permits reimbursement for services rendered while the provider was registered and licensed even if it later becomes unregistered, granting the provider summary judgment and denying the insurer's cross motion.
- Eastern Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 28109) Trial courtRelies on (a) (12)'s exclusion of fraudulently licensed providers from basic economic loss to reject the provider's contention that the fraudulent-incorporation defense became subject to preclusion for an untimely denial.
- Montgomery Med., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51116(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12)'s bar on reimbursement to fraudulently incorporated providers to deny summary judgment to either side because the insurer's proof raises factual questions about incorporation but does not establish the defense as a matter of law.
- HKP Physical Therapy, P.C. v Government Empls. Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 29381) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to pharmacy licensing requirements as well as medical practices, supporting the insurer's requests for verification of a pharmacy's reimbursement eligibility even though lay ownership is permissible.
- H & H Chiropractic Servs., P.C. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 25132) Trial courtRejects impermissible fee-splitting alone as a licensing-ineligibility defense under (a) (12), where the insurer failed to show fraudulent state filings or control by nonprofessionals, and denies the insurer's summary judgment motion.
- AIU Ins. Co. v Deajess Med. Imaging, P.C. (2009 NY Slip Op 29079) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) addresses licensing compliance beyond the time of incorporation, making a provider controlled by unlicensed persons ineligible regardless of the physician's original intent and permitting denial of unpaid claims for services predating the regulation if current ineligibility is established.
- Utica Natl. Ins. Group v Luban (2008 NY Slip Op 52610(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to permit recovery of payments made after the regulation took effect, granting partial summary judgment where consent orders established that the providers' nominal physician owner lacked control and unlicensed persons controlled them.
- Allstate Ins. Co. v Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. (2006 NY Slip Op 26024) Trial courtApplies (a) (12), as construed by the Court of Appeals, to reinstate insurers' fraud and unjust-enrichment claims for payments made on or after its effective date, and rules that insurers may withhold payment of unpaid claims regardless of when they accrued.
- Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 52071(U)) Trial courtHolds that the reimbursement bar for fraudulently organized providers, recognized by the Court of Appeals under (a) (12), does not apply retroactively to services rendered in 1999, before the regulation's adoption, and denies the insurer's summary judgment motion.
- Multiquest PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 52209(U)) Trial courtRejects retroactive application of (a) (12) to services predating its effective date, reasoning that the prior decision upheld the licensing rule without directing retroactivity and that retroactive enforcement would rewrite the regulation and bypass required rulemaking procedures.
- Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 52069(U)) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) does not retroactively bar a claim accruing before its effective date despite the provider's fraudulent organization, making the licensing-defense preclusion issue academic.
- Harvey Family Chiro PT & Acup, PLLC v Ameriprise Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 20136) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) in denying the insurer summary judgment on its licensing defense, reasoning that fee splitting among licensed owners is not itself a licensing violation, while the chiropractor's 97% ownership raises a triable issue of control over services outside his license.
- Autoone Ins. Co. v Manhattan Hgts. Med., P.C. (2009 NY Slip Op 51662(U)) Trial courtHolds that an insurer cannot recover payments made before (a) (12) took effect on a fraudulent-incorporation theory, dismissing fraud and unjust-enrichment claims to that extent while allowing claims concerning later payments to proceed.
- Citywide Social Work & Psychological Servs., P.L.L.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51831(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to find that evidence of lay ownership raises a triable issue of reimbursement eligibility, defeating the provider's summary judgment motion despite an untimely denial that does not preclude the fraudulent-licensure defense.
- Proscan Radiology of Buffalo v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51242(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to dismiss an unlicensed billing entity's claim, accepting official government website records as proof of its licensing defect and holding that failure to raise the defense in the original denial does not waive it.
- Renelique v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2023 NY Slip Op 51226(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) in denying the provider summary judgment because licensing noncompliance defeats reimbursement eligibility, explaining that the eligibility defense is not precluded by an untimely denial.
- Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 27380) Trial courtHolds that (a) (12) does not reach a provider corporation's failure to obtain a New Jersey certificate of authority where the treating professionals were licensed there, rejecting the insurer's defense and denying that branch of its summary judgment motion.
- Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 51776(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to fraudulently formed professional limited liability companies, including claims for services predating the regulation, and grants the insurer summary judgment where the provider failed to raise a triable issue concerning its formation.
- Devonshire Surgical Facility v Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 52057(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to state agency certifications showing that the surgical provider was not properly licensed or incorporated, supporting partial summary judgment dismissing that provider's claims.
- Montgomery Med., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51003(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12)'s licensing bar to deny both summary judgment motions because fraudulent incorporation remains a factual question: the insurer's proof defeats the provider's motion but does not establish the insurer's entitlement to judgment.
- 563 Grand Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 50127(U)) Trial courtApplies (a) (12) to uphold denial of reimbursement for acupuncture services because the provider offers no proof that its license encompasses acupuncture and its physician owner is neither licensed nor certified to practice it.
- One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C. (2008 NY Slip Op 06813) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) as authority for withholding reimbursement from fraudulently licensed medical corporations and looking beyond licensing documents for willful and material violations, in an action seeking repayment and a declaration concerning outstanding claims.
- A.M. Med. Servs., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 06902) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentDistinguishes (a) (12)'s exclusion of unlicensed or fraudulently licensed providers from an independent-contractor defense involving licensed providers, rejecting the insurer's analogy and holding that the latter defense requires timely denial.
- Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. (2017 NY Slip Op 08007) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) for the rule that insurers may withhold payment from professional corporations whose incorporation permits nonphysicians to share ownership and control, establishing the eligibility standard for the insurers' summary judgment motion.
- Carothers v Progressive Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 02614) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) as the basis for withholding reimbursement from fraudulently incorporated providers and, quoting prior authority, for looking beyond licensing documents to identify willful and material violations of state and local law.
- Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04916) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12)'s licensing bar and professional ownership requirements in finding that the insurers demonstrated likely success on their declaratory judgment claims, supporting a preliminary injunction against the provider's reimbursement proceedings.
- Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Gotham Med., P.C. (2017 NY Slip Op 07538) Appellate Division, First DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to reject the provider's challenge to the insurers' authority to investigate compliance with a public disciplinary order, where unmonitored practice would constitute unauthorized practice of medicine.
- Quick v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2024 NY Slip Op 06268) Appellate Division, Third DepartmentCites (a) (9) in support of reducing no-fault benefits by workers' compensation benefits recovered or recoverable; affirms summary judgment dismissing the claimant's complaint because the claimant had to seek workers' compensation benefits first, despite the employer's lack of coverage.
- Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51338(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on the nonprecluded fraudulent-incorporation defense under (a) (12) to find provider summary judgment premature despite untolled denial deadlines, because essential facts were in the provider's possession and requested discovery remained outstanding.
- Crossbay Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 27135) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12), as construed by the Court of Appeals, in treating fraudulent licensing as a nonwaivable defense, and denies the provider summary judgment pending discovery where the insurer's papers raised issues as to who operated and controlled the provider.
- Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50195(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to permit requests for business records bearing on licensing eligibility during claim verification, rejecting the provider's contention that insurers must obtain those records through discovery after litigation begins.
- Radiology Today, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 21161) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentHolds that a licensing-ineligibility defense under (a) (12) need not be pleaded with particularity, and explains that insurers may look beyond licensing documents for willful and material noncompliance; the insurer showed a potentially meritorious defense warranting discovery.
- Five Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v AutoOne Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 20131) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to identify a fraudulent-incorporation defense for which essential facts remained within the provider's possession, supporting denial of the provider's summary judgment motion and discovery into corporate status.
- Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50196(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to permit business-record requests during claim verification to investigate licensing eligibility, rejecting the provider's objection to requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases.
- RLC Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50642(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) as the basis of a fraudulent-incorporation defense whose essential facts remained with the provider, supporting denial of provider summary judgment pending discovery and compelled responses to demands the provider had not challenged.
- Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50836(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRejects the provider's challenge to verification requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases, finding them proper to determine licensing ineligibility under the section's licensing rule, (a) (12), which the decision cites as (a) (1).
- Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50306(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRejects the provider's challenge to verification requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases, treating them as proper requests to determine reimbursement eligibility under (a) (12).
- RLC Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51962(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) as the basis of a fraudulent-incorporation defense for which essential facts remained with the provider, supporting denial of provider summary judgment pending the owner's deposition and an order compelling that deposition.
- S & B Neurocare, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51450(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) in rejecting the insurer's summary judgment request because it did not establish as a matter of law that the provider was ineligible for reimbursement based on its owner's alleged lack of medical licensure.
- 62-41 Woodhaven Med., P.C. v Adirondack Ins. Exch. (2011 NY Slip Op 50026(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on detailed and specific reasons to suspect licensing ineligibility under (a) (12) to support compelled disclosure of corporate tax returns and professional employees' tax records, with dismissal conditioned on nonproduction.
- Quality Med. Healthcare of NY, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 20493) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) in finding a triable issue concerning the provider's acupuncture certification when services were rendered, requiring vacatur of the order limiting trial to excessive fees and a new trial.
- Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51152(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on the licensing rule in (a) (12) to reject the provider's objection to requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases during claim verification to investigate eligibility for reimbursement.
- Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50845(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on the licensing rule in (a) (12) to uphold claim verification requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases to investigate the provider's eligibility for reimbursement.
- Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50194(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRejects the provider's objection to verification requests for management agreements, W-2 forms, business bank records and leases, relying on (a) (12) to permit investigation of whether the provider meets licensing requirements for reimbursement.
- Parisien v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51081(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on the nonprecludable licensing-eligibility defense under (a) (12) to find that discovery demands directed at it are not palpably improper, so the provider, having failed to object timely, must produce the management, payroll, bank and lease records.
- High Quality Med. Supplies, Inc. v Mercury Ins. Group (2016 NY Slip Op 51444(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentCites (a) in a footnote to explain that durable medical equipment reimbursement is treated like reimbursement for healthcare services under the fee schedules, supporting rejection of the insurer's argument that equipment omitted from the schedule is noncompensable.
- VE Med. Care, P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 50571(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to identify licensing ineligibility as the proposed defense supported by the insurer's detailed, specific suspicions, sustaining leave to amend and tax-document disclosure without deciding the provider's eligibility.
- Queens Brooklyn Med. Rehab, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 52010(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on suspected licensing ineligibility under (a) (12), supported by detailed and specific reasons, as the basis for special circumstances warranting disclosure of the provider's tax documents.
- RLC Med., P.C. v Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 52691(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentRelies on (a) (12) to identify the insurer's fraudulent-incorporation defense, denying the medical provider summary judgment because information essential to that defense remained within its possession and it had not complied with discovery demands.
- Dynamic Med. Imaging, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 20285) Trial courtCites (a) (12) for the rule that only licensed professionals can obtain no-fault payment, the rationale of the fraudulent incorporation defense, while denying the insurer summary judgment because its EUO demand for corporate and financial documents was improper.
- Tahir v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26149) Trial courtCites (a) (12) to distinguish improper provider licensing, which concerns eligibility for reimbursement, from other defenses described as fraud, explaining that the label may actually refer to coverage or reimbursement eligibility.
- Island Chiropractic Testing, P.C. v Nationwide Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 51001(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) as one of the provisions whose violation underlies a fraudulent-incorporation challenge, while holding that corporate-status documents may not be demanded as claim verification and noting the insurer showed no good-faith basis for seeking them.
- Brownsville Advance Med., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 52255(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) to explain that licensing inquiries concern reimbursement eligibility, while requiring a reasonable basis and rational need before an insurer demands corporate and licensing documents the provider has already supplied.
- Jing Huo Lac v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51177(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (9)'s workers' compensation reimbursement rule in considering dismissal based on the assignor's alleged employment, but denies summary judgment because the insurer failed to show potential merit in its workers' compensation defense.
- Travelers Indem. Co. v Parisien (2020 NY Slip Op 51561(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) for insurers' ability to assert licensing ineligibility defenses in reimbursement proceedings without proving fraud upon proof of a willful and material failure to comply with licensing and incorporation statutes, supporting dismissal of the declaratory judgment action.
- Cambridge Med., P.C. v Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 50629(U)) Trial courtApplies the high court's explanation that licensing investigations under (a) (12) justify delaying payment only for good cause, meaning behavior tantamount to fraud, to hold that the provider need not answer verification requests for corporate documents that asserted no such behavior.
- Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 26164) Trial courtDistinguishes denial under (a) (12) for professional misconduct from denial for failure to provide verification within 120 days, rejecting the provider's reliance on limits on misconduct-based denials to defeat investigation of licensing eligibility.
- American Tr. Ins. Co. v North Shore Family Chiropractic PC (2023 NY Slip Op 50208(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (9) to establish workers' compensation as the sole source of medical-expense reimbursement for an applicant entitled to those benefits from the same accident, as the premise for considering the insurer's course-of-employment defense.
- Apazidis, M.D., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50498(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) for the rule that licensing noncompliance defeats reimbursement eligibility, explaining that willful and material violations of licensing and incorporation statutes may make a provider ineligible.
- Total Chiropractic, P.C. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 50977(U)) Trial courtQuotes prior authority that a defense based on licensing noncompliance under (a) (12) need not be pleaded with particularity, in explaining why the insurer may seek pretrial disclosure.
- Urban Radiology, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51554(U)) Trial courtRelies on the Court of Appeals' warning that (a) (12) does not permit abusive licensing investigations absent behavior tantamount to fraud, in denying the insurer a stay of the provider's actions where its fraudulent-incorporation allegation rested on speculation.
- Autoone Ins. Co. v Manhattan Hgts. Med., P.C. (2009 NY Slip Op 51663(U)) Trial courtRelies on (a) (12)'s bar on reimbursement to fraudulently incorporated providers to support preliminary injunctive relief where evidence showed that licensed professionals did not truly own and operate the providers.
- A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Travelers Indem. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 28185) Trial courtNotes that (a) (12) applies to PLLCs and bars reimbursement to fraudulently formed providers, then considers whether suspension of the sole member's license after formation makes the entity ineligible.
- Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 51806(U)) Trial courtRejects the provider's argument that limits on misconduct-based denials under (a) (12) bar licensing verification requests, granting the insurer summary judgment and dismissing the complaint with prejudice because the provider failed to respond within 120 days.
- Jiang Acupuncture PC v State Farm Ins. Co. (2023 NY Slip Op 50961(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) for the rule that licensing noncompliance defeats reimbursement eligibility, explaining that willful and material violations of licensing and incorporation statutes may make a provider ineligible.
- Okslen Acupuncture, PC v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50652(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12) to distinguish possession of a license from reimbursement eligibility, explaining that a fraudulently incorporated provider is not entitled to no-fault reimbursement in the context of discovery sanctions.
- Burke Physical Therapy, PC v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50624(U)) Trial courtRelies on (a) to treat fraudulent incorporation as a nonprecludable defense that the insurer may assert at any time to deny payment.
- Alsaad Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op50532(U)) Trial courtRelies on (a) (12) to reject a bar on EUO document requests concerning provider eligibility, explaining that a licensed but fraudulently incorporated provider is not entitled to reimbursement.
- Arthur Ave. Med. Servs., PC v GEICO Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 21108) Trial courtCites (a) (12), quoting prior authority, to explain that insurers may investigate willful and material licensing violations for good cause, but technical violations cannot justify delaying reimbursement.
- Downtown Acupuncture PC v State Wide Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op25371) Trial courtRelies on (a) (12) to explain that the licensing-ineligibility defense is nonwaivable and may be raised regardless of when services were rendered, but requires the insurer to seek amendment before invoking collateral estoppel on that defense here.
- One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Halima (2008 NY Slip Op 52715(U)) Trial courtCites (a) in sustaining fraud and unjust-enrichment claims alleging that medical corporations were actually owned and controlled by an unlicensed person, finding the allegations sufficiently detailed to withstand dismissal.
- Devonshire Surgical Facility v AIU Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 51034(U)) Trial courtCites (a) (12)'s licensing bar and the rule against recovering payments made before its effective date, when considering the insurer's attempt to characterize a physician's later license revocation as fraudulent incorporation.
- SK Med. Servs., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 50721(U)) Trial courtQuotes another decision's reliance on (a) (12) and corporate ownership restrictions to explain why a medical corporation owned or controlled by nonphysicians cannot recover assigned no-fault benefits.
- Better Health Med. PLLC v Empire/Allcity Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 50571(U)) Trial courtDeclines to resolve the lower-court split over whether (a) (12) reaches unpaid claims for services rendered before it took effect, and upholds as rational and not legally incorrect an arbitration award denying benefits to a dissolved provider accused of fraud.
- Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Valdan Acupuncture, P.C. (2017 NY Slip Op 04068) Appellate Division, First DepartmentQuotes prior authority interpreting (a) (12) to permit withholding payment from fraudulently incorporated providers, while assuming without deciding that the insurer's defense cannot be precluded in reviewing the arbitration award.
- Lexington Acupuncture, P.C. v General Assur. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 22047) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentCites (a) (12) in the concurrence as a licensing condition precedent, supporting the view that the insurer's pleaded conditions-precedent defense permitted discovery into the provider's eligibility.
- Wave Med. Servs., P.C. v Farmers New Century Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50555(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentNotes that a judgment submitted by the insurer declares the provider ineligible under (a) (12) and bars payment in current or future proceedings, in discussing judicial notice of public records.
- Parisien v Avis Car Rental, LLC (2023 NY Slip Op 50891(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentNotes that a prior declaratory judgment barred the provider's claims for unlawful operation under (a) (12), but rejects extending that judgment beyond its express scope to this later action.
- PDG Psychological, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 51757(U)) Appellate Term, Second DepartmentNotes the insurer's argument that improper licensing would bar reimbursement under (a) (12), and that the provider's failure to supply discovery prevented it from establishing that defense, in affirming denial of the provider's summary judgment motion.
- Matter of Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Insurance Cos. Represented by Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano LLP (2006 NY Slip Op 26372) Trial courtQuotes prior authority treating (a) (12) as barring reimbursement to fraudulently licensed providers and allowing insurers to look beyond licensing documents for willful and material violations, in a proceeding seeking discovery into the provider's incorporation.
- Victory Med. Diagnostics, P.C. v Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 22149) Trial courtNotes the provider's reliance on (a) in a letter objecting to corporate-document verification demands and requesting an explanation of their necessity, the insurer's good-cause basis, and acts tantamount to fraud.
- Neomy Med., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 50536(U)) Trial courtCites another decision's treatment of (a) (12) as excluding payments to unlicensed or fraudulently licensed providers from basic economic loss, in discussing the distinction between policy exclusions and lack of coverage for purposes of preclusion.
- New York Cent. Mut. Ins. v McGee (2009 NY Slip Op 52385(U)) Trial courtNotes that another decision relied on (a) (12) to permit insurers to withhold payment from fraudulently incorporated providers, explaining that medical corporations must be owned and controlled by licensed professionals.
- NY Rehab Pain Mgt. & Med. Servs., PC v State Farm Auto Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50821(U)) Trial courtNotes the insurer's argument that suspected nominal ownership supplied a reasonable and objective basis to request an EUO to determine the provider's eligibility under (a) (12).
- Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims (2025 NY Slip Op 50376(U)) Trial courtQuotes another decision citing the section to permit licensing-related business-record requests during verification, addressing the provider's objections that those requests were nullities in an action dismissed for failure to supply verification.
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Garden Med. Care, P.C. (2023 NY Slip Op 50762(U)) Trial courtCites the section in a footnote to explain that post-EUO requests for financial and ownership records concern licensing eligibility, while expressly declining to decide whether the insurers had sufficient cause to seek that information.
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Emote Med. Servs., P.C. (2022 NY Slip Op 50818(U)) Trial courtNotes that the insurers invoke (a) (12) to investigate alleged nonphysician control, but seek relief through asserted EUO nonappearances rather than a declaration directly addressing the provider's reimbursement eligibility.
- Acuhealth Acupuncture, PC v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 51256(U)) Trial courtNotes the insurer's reliance on (a) (12) to deny reimbursement based on alleged ownership and control by an unlicensed person, an issue prompting the arbitrator to dismiss without prejudice so the claimed owner could be subpoenaed.
- Avanguard Med. Group, PLLC(b) v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51940(U)) Trial courtQuotes the insurer's denial invoking (a) (12) to assert that a provider lacking article 28 facility licensure was ineligible to collect a facility fee under the ambulatory surgery fee schedule.
- Chubb Ins. Co. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51985(U)) Trial courtNotes the insurer's argument that (a) (9) makes workers' compensation the sole source of medical reimbursement for the same accident, assuming its correctness without deciding it when addressing vacatur of a default judgment.
Subdivision (b) (4 decisions)
- Sharpe v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 00063) Appellate Division, Third DepartmentRejects reliance on (b) (3) to recover projected earnings from prospective employment where the claimant was unemployed when injured, affirming dismissal of the lost-wage claim as too speculative.
- Ross v GEICO Indem. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 04242) Appellate Division, Third DepartmentApplies (b) (6) in upholding the insurer's denial of continuing lost-wage benefits, because the claimant was discharged for failing to comply with her employer's leave requirements rather than solely because of inability to work due to the injury.
- Freligh v Government Empls. Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 05911) Appellate Division, Third DepartmentApplies (b) (3)'s standard of demonstrated future earnings reasonably projected to dismiss a lost-earnings claim based on a job offer: even crediting the offer testimony, uncontested proof of the prospective employer's failing finances made the projected salary unreasonable as a matter of law.
- Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Picone (2025 NY Slip Op 06604) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentRelies on (b) (3) and (b) (6) as part of the requirement for certainty in lost-wage calculations, finding the insurer's accounting report, financial records and deposition evidence sufficient to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.
Section cited without a subdivision (2 decisions)
- Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Avanguard Med. Group, PLLC (2015 NY Slip Op 01413) Appellate Division, Second DepartmentCites the section's reference to Regulation 83 to trace the fee-schedule framework governing medical reimbursement, in considering whether an office-based surgery provider may recover facility fees.
- Happy Apple Med. Servs., PC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50336(U)) Trial courtCites the section in a footnote for permission to exclude payment for work-related treatment, but declines to rely on an assumed exclusion because the insurer supplied no policy containing it.