Legal Questions

Did the defaulting party show a reasonable excuse (or lack of notice) and a potentially meritorious defense or claim?

Short answer: Settled statewide by the Court of Appeals. The rule is the Court of Appeals' (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 [1986], not in the database but cited by 86 decisions in it): CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense; CPLR 317 requires no excuse, only that a defendant not served by personal delivery did not receive actual notice in time to defend and has a meritorious defense; service through the Secretary of State is not personal delivery. The Appellate Division, Second Department applies the same to insurers served through the Superintendent of Insurance (Insurance Law § 1212) (NY & Presbyt. v Allstate 2006; Montefiore v Auto One 2008). The decisions differ only in application: what affidavit rebuts proof of service, how detailed law office failure must be, and what counts as a meritorious no-fault defense (a timely, non-defective denial or a non-precludable coverage defense; for a provider in a de novo action, its arbitration award). One point differs between departments: under CPLR 3012 (d), before a default judgment, the First Department does not require a meritorious defense (Interboro v Perez 2013), while the Second Department does (State Farm v Austin Diagnostic 2017; App Term 2d Rockaway Blvd. 2003, Trinity 2025). That point is narrow and does not change the 5015/317 test.

Scope. Deciding this question means ruling on whether a party to a no-fault action or proceeding (insurer, provider, assignor or MVAIC) is relieved of its own default: a motion to vacate a judgment or order entered on its failure to appear, answer, oppose a motion or appear at a trial, calendar call or conference (CPLR 5015 [a] [1], also an intrinsic-fraud motion under CPLR 5015 [a] [3] where the court requires an excuse), a motion under CPLR 317 by a party not served by personal delivery (no actual notice in time to defend plus a meritorious defense; service through the Superintendent/DFS under Insurance Law § 1212 or the Secretary of State is not personal delivery), or a motion or cross motion to compel acceptance of a late answer or extend the time to answer (CPLR 3012 [d], 2004) including opposition to a default-judgment motion on that basis. It covers both elements: the excuse (law office failure under CPLR 2005, clerical error, nonreceipt of process and the affidavit needed to rebut the process server's affidavit) and the potentially meritorious defense or cause of action (for an insurer, usually a timely denial or a non-precludable coverage defense; for a provider in an insurer's de novo action, its arbitration award). Categories record which element the court found shown or lacking.

Based on 185 decisions in our database, the most recent decided September 18, 2026.

Leading authorities · Governing regulations · Authority map · Decisions by court · Plain-text version (Markdown)

Leading authorities

  • New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 04260) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2006CPLR 317: insurer served via Superintendent needs no excuseAn insurer served by delivery to the Deputy Secretary of Insurance under Insurance Law § 1212 was not served by personal delivery, so its CPLR 5015 (a) (1) motion could be treated under CPLR 317, which requires no reasonable excuse; the insurer showed it did not receive actual notice in time to defend and had meritorious defenses, and vacatur was affirmed.
    A defendant served with a summons other than by personal delivery or to an agent designated under CPLR 318 may obtain relief pursuant to CPLR 317 upon a showing that it did not receive notice of the summons in time to defend, and has a meritorious defense
  • Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Auto One Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 10596) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2008Mere denial of receipt neither excuses default nor proves no noticeWhere the provider proved service on the Superintendent of Insurance and the insurer did not claim its address on file was wrong, the insurer's bare denial of receipt was no reasonable excuse under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and did not show lack of actual notice under CPLR 317; denial of vacatur affirmed.
    The defendant did not contend that the address on file with the Superintendent of Insurance was incorrect, and the mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service created by the affidavit of service
  • Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc. (2004 NY Slip Op 07140) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2004Law office failure excuses default only with detailed explanationThe insurer's default in answering was excused as law office failure because the attorney responsible gave a detailed affirmation explaining his oversights, the default was not willful, it was promptly cured and caused no prejudice; a claims representative's affidavit based on business records showed a meritorious defense.
    The defendant established a reasonable excuse for the default attributable to law office failure by submitting an affirmation from the offending attorney with a detailed explanation of his oversights. There was nothing willful or deliberate about the default
  • Westchester Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 00377) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2011Clerical delay forwarding summons is a reasonable excuseAn employee's affidavit attesting to a clerical oversight in forwarding the summons and complaint to counsel was a reasonable excuse for a short default; with a potentially meritorious defense, no willfulness and no prejudice, denying vacatur was an improvident exercise of discretion and the late answer was deemed timely.
    The defendant established through an employee’s affidavit, which attested to a clerical oversight regarding the delay in forwarding the summons and complaint to its attorney, a reasonable excuse for the short period of time following service of the complaint in which it failed either to appear or answer the complaint
  • Interboro Ins. Co. v Perez (2013 NY Slip Op 08347) Appellate Division, First Department, 2013First Department: CPLR 3012 (d) needs no meritorious defenseIn an insurer's EUO no-show declaratory judgment action, the providers' minimal delay in answering, caused by a computer inputting error in their attorney's office, was excused under CPLR 3012 (d); a meritorious defense is not required for that relief, though the providers showed one (no proof the EUO letters were mailed).
    Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, a meritorious defense is not required to obtain relief under CPLR 3012 (d)
  • Pierre J. Renelique Physician, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 29225) Appellate Term, Second Department, 2019No-record affidavit does not rebut service on insurer's agentAgainst a process server's affidavit of service on the insurer's general agent, a claim representative's affidavit that the insurer had no record of receiving process was not a reasonable excuse; the insurer needed an affidavit from the person served (or an explanation of its absence), so vacatur under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) was reversed.
    absent from defendant’s moving papers was any affidavit by the person who had allegedly been served denying service or, for example, setting forth whether that person recalled having received the service in issue and, if he did, what had happened to those papers
  • Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co. 67 NY2d 138Source of both tests: CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense; CPLR 317 requires no excuse; service on the Secretary of State is not personal delivery, and a 5015 motion may be treated as one under 317. Cited by 86 decisions in the database.Not in our database.
  • Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky 283 AD2d 553Law office failure must be supported by facts in evidentiary form sufficient to justify the default (13 decisions).Not in our database.
  • Kaperonis v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 254 AD2d 334Service on an insurer through the Superintendent of Insurance (Insurance Law § 1212); cited with the 317 cases (5 decisions).Not in our database.
  • Hayden v Southern Wine & Spirits of Upstate N.Y., Inc. 126 AD3d 673Process server's affidavit is prima facie evidence of service on an agent authorized to accept service; cited by App Term 2d when rejecting nonreceipt excuses (8 decisions).Not in our database.
  • Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. 15 AD3d 353Second Department: CPLR 3012 (d) relief and vacatur both require a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense (9 decisions).Not in our database.
  • Smoke v Windermere Owners, LLC 109 AD3d 742First Department: no meritorious defense required under CPLR 3012 (d); followed in Interboro v Perez.Not in our database.

Governing regulations

Governed by the CPLR (5015 (a) (1), 317, 2005, 3012 (d)) and the case law, not by Part 65. Service on an insurer through the Superintendent under Insurance Law § 1212 is not personal delivery, so CPLR 317 is available to it.

Chosen by us from the regulation text and the decisions on this question that cite it. Each link opens our copy of the regulation, which is unofficial; the official text is in the NYCRR.

Authority map

Each circle is a decision on this question, placed by court and date; its colour is the position it took. Lines are citations between them. Select a circle (or find a decision by name) to see its links and summary. The same decisions are listed by court below the map.

Excuse (or lack of actual notice under CPLR 317) and potentially meritorious defense or claim shown; default vacated or late answer allowedRelief denied because no reasonable excuse (or, under CPLR 317, no lack of actual notice) was shown; meritorious defense accepted or not reachedRelief denied because no potentially meritorious defense or cause of action was shown; excuse accepted or not reachedRelief denied because the party showed neither a reasonable excuse nor a potentially meritorious defense or claimExcuse or defense cannot be decided on this record: hearing ordered or matter remittedRing: rules on the question, but another ground decided the caseContrasted, distinguished or limitedDeclined to follow, questioned, overruled or reversedCited
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How the rule was applied, by court

Decisions (185)

Every decision in our database that rules on this question: highest court first, then by department, newest first. 174 turn on it; the others rule on it alongside a different main ground (marked "also decides"). The one-sentence summaries describe what each court said on this question.

How this page is made: the decisions are those in our case-law database that cite this question's leading cases or were tagged with its subject. A language model read each one in full and recorded whether it rules on the question, the position it took and a one-sentence summary; a second, independent reading checked every entry. Court, department, date and the citation links come from the database. Read the decision before relying on it.