Legal Questions

On the merits, when may a no-fault insurer withhold payment because unlicensed persons own or control the provider (Mallela)?

A decision decides this question when it rules whether a billing provider is ineligible for reimbursement under 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (a) (12) because of how it is owned, controlled or formed: a licensed owner who is a mere nominee, unlicensed persons who are de facto owners, exercise substantial control or take the profits (for example through inflated leases or management fees), or an entity not lawfully formed or owned to practice the profession it bills for (Business Corporation Law art 15, Limited Liability Company Law art 12, Education Law § 6507 [4] [c]). It also covers legal rulings on what the defense requires and how far it reaches on the merits: that no fraud or fraudulent intent is required, the burden of proof, and that conduct short of ceding control (fee-splitting, kickbacks, other professional misconduct, technical filing lapses, billing fraud) is not a ground for it. Procedural rulings about the defense (whether it is precluded by an untimely denial or waived, may be pleaded or added by amendment, may be investigated through discovery, depositions, an EUO or claim verification, reaches bills for pre-April 2002 services, or may be heard by an arbitrator) are not this question: they belong to the topic fraudulent-incorporation-procedure.

Settled statewide by the Court of Appeals. The rule is set by three Court of Appeals decisions in the database. Mallela (2005, certified question): carriers may withhold payment from providers that are ineligible under 65-3.16 (a) (12) because nonphysicians own or control them, looking beyond the licensing documents for a willful and material failure to abide by licensing law; technical violations do not suffice. Carothers (2019): no common-law fraud or fraudulent intent is required; a material breach of the rule that the corporation be controlled by licensed professionals is enough, and the ultimate inquiry is control. Mayzenberg (2025, certified question, 6-1): professional misconduct short of ceding control to an unlicensed party (there, paying for referrals) is not a ground under the regulation. Lower courts therefore differ only in applying the rule to the evidence. Questions the Court of Appeals has not decided: the burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence was charged in Carothers and applied by some arbitrators and trial courts; the First Department and the Appellate Term have declined to decide between that and a preponderance). Before Carothers some trial courts required fraud-like conduct (e.g. 4522, 2017). Procedural questions (preclusion, waiver, discovery, verification, pre-April 2002 reach) are on the topic fraudulent-incorporation-procedure.

Leading authorities · Authority map · Decisions by court · Plain-text version (Markdown)

Leading authorities

  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela (2005 NY Slip Op 02416) Court of Appeals, 2005Fraudulently incorporated providers are ineligible; insurers may look behind licensing papersUnder 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (a) (12), a medical corporation fraudulently incorporated so that nonphysicians own or control it is not entitled to no-fault reimbursement even if licensed practitioners rendered proper care; carriers may look behind licensing documents, but only behavior tantamount to fraud, not technical violations, gives good cause to withhold. No fraud or unjust-enrichment claim lies for payments made before the regulation's April 4, 2002 effective date.
    We hold that on the strength of this regulation, carriers may look beyond the face of licensing documents to identify willful and material failure to abide by state and local law.
  • Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 04643) Court of Appeals, 2019No fraud or intent required; control by unlicensed persons sufficesMallela does not require common-law fraud, fraudulent intent or conduct 'tantamount to fraud'; a jury finding that the professional corporation was in material breach of the requirement that it be controlled by licensed professionals is enough to make it ineligible. Control by nonprofessionals is distinct from mere fee-splitting. Admission of nonparties' Fifth Amendment invocations was at most harmless error.
    Today we clarify that Mallela does not require a finding of fraud for the insurer to withhold payments to a medical service corporation improperly controlled by nonphysicians.
    Later history: No later history found. It affirmed Carothers v Progressive (4566, App Div 2d Dept 2017), which affirmed the Appellate Term (6490, 2013).
  • Government Employees Ins. Co. v Mayzenberg (2025 NY Slip Op 06527) Court of Appeals, 2025Misconduct short of ceding control (referral payments) is not a groundAnswering a Second Circuit certified question, the Court deferred to DFS's reading of 65-3.16 (a) (12) as reaching only foundational licensing requirements: an insurer may not deny claims because a properly licensed provider paid for patient referrals or committed other professional misconduct that falls short of ceding control to an unlicensed party. It did not decide when a kickback scheme amounts to such a cession of control, as that argument was not raised.
    an insurer may not deny a provider’s claim for reimbursement based on alleged professional misconduct that falls short of ceding control of a professional services corporation to an unlicensed party
  • One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C. (2008 NY Slip Op 06813) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2008Second Department: PCs must be owned and controlled by licenseesA professional corporation actually controlled by a management company owned by unlicensed individuals is ineligible; the insurer's evidence of such control raised a triable issue defeating the physician owner's summary judgment motion.
    State law mandates that professional service corporations be owned and controlled only by licensed professionals (see Business Corporation Law § 1503 [a]; §§ 1507, 1508), and that licensed professionals render the services provided by such corporations
    Later history: Also an anchor of fraudulent-incorporation-procedure for its holding that Mallela discovery needs no 'good cause'.
  • Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. (2017 NY Slip Op 08007) Appellate Division, Second Department, 2017Second Department: what proof shows control; guilty plea alone insufficientReversing a declaration for the insurers, the court held that a nonphysician's guilty plea to a general mail and health care fraud information, and forfeitable funds in the providers' accounts, did not show prima facie that he exercised dominion and control over the providers, shared their profits and losses, or had a significant role in managing them.
    this evidence did not demonstrate, prima facie, that Anikeyev exercised dominion and control over the defendants and their assets and shared the risks, expenses, and interest in their profits and losses, or that he had a significant role in the guidance, management, and direction of their business
  • Matter of Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v New Way Massage Therapy P.C. (2015 NY Slip Op 09184) Appellate Division, First Department, 2015First Department: fee-sharing arrangement is not a no-fault defenseA fee-sharing arrangement, whether or not it is unprofessional conduct, is not a defense to a no-fault claim (contrasting Mallela's fraudulent incorporation); it is a matter for the state licensing board, so the master arbitrator's award for the provider was confirmed.
    Whether or not the fee-sharing arrangement at issue constitutes unprofessional conduct (see 8 NYCRR 29.1 [b] [4]), it does not constitute a defense to a no-fault action
    Later history: Leave to appeal denied, 28 NY3d 909 (2016), as noted in Carothers (3315), which distinguished it because control, not mere fee-splitting, was found there.
  • Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio 100 NY2d 854Upheld the 2001-2002 no-fault regulations, including 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (a) (12), as within the Superintendent's authority; relied on in Mallela (footnote 3).Not in our database.
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela 372 F3d 500Certified the question answered in Mallela (10202).Not in our database.
  • Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Mayzenberg 121 F4th 404Certified the question answered in Mayzenberg (12932).Not in our database.
  • Business Corporation Law §§ 1503, 1507, 1508; Limited Liability Company Law §§ 1203, 1207; Education Law § 6507 (4) (c) statutesThe ownership, control and formation requirements whose willful and material breach makes a provider ineligible.Not in our database.

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Each circle is a decision on this question, placed by court and date; its colour is the position it took. Lines are citations between them. Select a circle (or find a decision by name) to see its links and summary. The same decisions are listed by court below the map.

Provider held ineligible: unlicensed ownership/control or improper formation provedEvidence of unlicensed ownership/control enough to proceed, but not resolvedInsurer's proof of unlicensed ownership/control insufficientAlleged conduct legally cannot support the ineligibility defenseRing: rules on the question, but another ground decided the caseContrasted, distinguished or limitedDeclined to follow, questioned, overruled or reversedCited
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How the rule was applied, by court

Decisions (74)

Every decision in our database that rules on this question: highest court first, then by department, newest first. 44 turn on it; the others rule on it alongside a different main ground (marked "also decides"). The one-sentence summaries describe what each court said on this question.

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