October 16, 2017
Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-wide Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 51412(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/shirom-acupuncture-p-c-v-country-wide-ins-co-2017-ny-slip-op51412u/
- Judge
- James F. Matthews, J.
- Decided
- October 16, 2017
- Citation
- 2017 NY Slip Op 51412(U)
- Posture
- Article 75 petition
- Outcome
- Provider prevailed
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-wide Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 51412(U))
Shirom Acupuncture,
P.C., as Assignee of MANUEL PEREZ, Petitioner,
against Country-Wide Insurance Company, Respondent. |
HUCV 2206-16
James F. Matthews, J.
Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 21 read on this petition for an order vacating the decision in part of a master arbitrator; by Notice of Petition /Order to Show Cause and supporting papers 1-3, ; Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers ; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers 10,11 ; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers18,21 ; Filed papers ; Other exhibits: 4-9,12-17,19,20 ; (and after hearing counsel in support of and opposed to the motion), it is
ORDERED that the petition to vacate the part of the award and remand rendered by a Master Arbitrator’s decision dated June 27, 2016, which vacated the lower Arbitrator’s award dated March 8, 2016 for $4,329.19 to petitioner, and then remanded the matter to lower arbitration for consideration of respondent’s Mallela defense of fraudulent incorporation, is granted. That part of the award of the Master Arbitrator dated June 27, 2016, which vacated the lower Arbitrator’s award of $4,329.19 to petitioner, and then remanded the matter to arbitration for consideration of respondent’s Mallela defense, is vacated; and it is further
ORDERED that the remaining part of the award rendered by the Master Arbitrator’s decision dated June 27, 2016, which confirmed the decision of the lower Arbitrator dated March 8, 2016, is confirmed.
Petitioner asks the Court to vacate that part of the award of a Master Arbitrator dated June 27, 2016, which vacated the lower Arbitrator’s award of $4,329.19 to petitioner, and then remanded the matter to lower arbitration for consideration of whether respondent’s Mallela defense of fraudulent incorporation (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]) was appropriate.
The respondent opposes the relief sought by petitioner, and requests that the Master Arbitrator’s award dated June 27, 2016, be confirmed.
The lower arbitration decision dated March 8, 2016, awarded the sum of $4,329.19 to petitioner, based upon a finding that mailing requests for two Examinations Under Oath [*2](“EUO’s”) set for June 24, 2015 and July 16, 2015, respectively, were ignored and unattended by petitioner, but the mailing requests were nonetheless facially untimely, in that the first EUO scheduling request was mailed four and one-half (4 1/2) years after the claim was submitted, thereby rendering the EUO requests a nullity, as related to the billing at issue, and rendering all other issues moot. The lower arbitration also found respondent failed to persuasively support their fee schedule defense and awarded the disputed sum of $4,329.19 to petitioner.
The Master Arbitrator’s decision dated June 27, 2016 leaves only a single issue for determination by the Court: respondent contends the lower arbitrator’s decision did not render a determination concerning respondent’s Mallela defense of fraudulent incorporation, which issue it asserts was raised before the arbitrator and was not precluded due to time constraints.
The Master Arbitrator found that the decision of the lower arbitrator was imperfectly rendered pursuant to CPLR 7511(b) (1)(iii) and 11 NYCRR 65-4.5(s), based upon the lack of a specific determination addressing respondent’s Mallela defense of fraudulent incorporation. It therefore vacated the award of $4,329.19 to petitioner, and remanded the matter back to arbitration for consideration of the Mallela contentions concerning fraudulent incorporation.
Petitioner contends that both the lower arbitration and the Master Arbitration found the EUO scheduling notices to be untimely, thereby precluding respondent’s fee schedule defense due to failure of a timely denial of the claim.
In addition, petitioner asserts that the lower arbitration decision included the statement that “all other issues are moot,” thereby including sufficient language to satisfy respondent’s Mallela contentions. Petitioner argues that respondent failed to provide its Mallela contentions with any type of factual allegations, which is why the lower arbitration decision was written in the manner provided. Respondent’s mere cite to Mallela contentions without factual support is legally insufficient (see generally Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Care Acupuncture, P.C., 2016 NY Slip Op 37157 [NY Supp 2016] [wherein the Court focused on petitioner’ belief that respondent may have been ineligible for benefits as an unlawfully incorporated professional corporation, but “petitioner nowhere specifies how respondent failed to meet that burden at the arbitration”]).
The Master Arbitrator’s decision implies that the lower arbitrator was obligated to disclose the basis for its decision, which is why the matter was remanded to lower arbitration for further consideration on the Mallela contentions. However, in actuality, an arbitrator is not obligated to reveal the basis for its award (see Hausknecht v Comprehensive Med. Care of New York, P.C., 24 AD3d 778 [2nd Dept 2005]; Matter of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Steiner, 227 AD2d 563 [2nd Dept 1996]).
The standard of review for an arbitration award is limited to a determination of whether the award was arbitrary, capricious or incorrect as a matter of law. A master arbitrator’s powers in reviewing an initial arbitrator’s decision are limited to the grounds stated in CPLR 7511, and additionally, under insurance regulations, is limited to whether the initial arbitrator ruled on factual and procedural issues in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, irrational or without a plausible basis (see Matter of Petrofsky v Allstate Ins. Co., 54 NY2d 207, 211 [1981]; In the Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Keegan, 201 AD2d 724 [2nd Dept 1994]).
If a challenge is based upon a factual error in the arbitration, “the master arbitrator must uphold the determination if it has a rational basis” (see In the Matter of Richardson v Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 230 Ad2d 861 [2nd Dept 1996]). Moreover, an arbitrator’s award must be upheld “when the arbitrator ‘offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome [*3]reached'” (see In the Matter of Susan D. Settenbrino. P.C. v Barroga-Hayes, 89 AD3d 1094, 1095 [2nd Dept 2011]). Indeed, for an award to be irrational, there must be “no proof whatsoever to justify the award” (see In the Matter of Gaymon v MTA Bus Co., 117 AD3d 735, 736 [2nd Dept 2014]; In the Matter of Susan D. Settenbrino. P.C. v Barroga-Hayes, supra ). Moreover, “an arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive law or rules of evidence, and may do justice and apply his or her own sense of law and equity to the facts as he or she finds them to be” (Id. at 1095).
Here, the Court finds that the petition before the Court is timely (see CPLR 7511[a]). Furthermore, the Court finds that the record demonstrates there was a rational basis for the initial arbitrator’s decision and the award dated March 8, 2016 was justified. It was supported by sufficient evidence in the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious, irrational or incorrect as a matter of law.
The Court further finds that the Master Arbitration award dated June 27, 2016, prejudiced petitioner by exceeding its powers (see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii]), and is irrational (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530 [2010]). Therefore, the petition is granted, to the extent that the part of the award of the Master Arbitrator dated June 27, 2016, which vacated the lower Arbitrator’s award of $4,329.19 to petitioner, and then remanded the matter to arbitration for consideration of respondent’s Mallela defense, is vacated.
The remaining part of the award rendered by the Master Arbitrator’s decision dated June 27, 2016, which confirmed the decision of the lower Arbitrator dated March 8, 2016, is hereby confirmed (see CPLR 7511[e]).
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: October 16, 2017
J.D.C.
Legal questions (4)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
When does a court vacate, modify or confirm a no-fault arbitrator’s or master arbitrator’s award under CPLR article 75?
This decision: Master arbitrator's award vacated because the master arbitrator went beyond the limited review allowed by 11 NYCRR 65-4.10
Vacated the part of the master award that set aside the provider's award and remanded for the Mallela defense, because the lower award had a rational basis and arbitrators need not state their reasons.
Of the 119 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 4 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did the insurer prove its IME/EUO no-show defense: mailed, compliant scheduling requests and the claimant’s nonappearance?
This decision: Insurer did not show its requests met the regulatory timing, follow-up or justification requirements (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Left standing as rational an arbitrator's finding that EUO requests first mailed four and a half years after the claim were untimely and a nullity, so the no-show did not defeat the claim.
Of the 858 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 102 (this one included) are in the same category.
On the merits, when may a no-fault insurer withhold payment because unlicensed persons own or control the provider (Mallela)?
This decision: Insurer's proof of unlicensed ownership/control insufficient (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Vacated a master arbitrator's remand for consideration of the Mallela defense, holding the arbitrator's award for the provider rational and supported by the record, since an arbitrator need not state the basis for its award.
Of the 61 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 13 (this one included) are in the same category.
May the insurer raise and investigate a Mallela (fraudulent incorporation) defense, or is it precluded, waived or denied discovery?
This decision: Insurer may not pursue or investigate the Mallela defense here (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Vacated the master arbitrator's remand for consideration of the Mallela defense, reinstating the arbitrator's award that declared other issues moot, because arbitrators need not explain awards and the award had a rational basis in the record.
Of the 136 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela (2005 NY Slip Op 02416)Fraudulently incorporated medical providers are ineligible for no-fault reimbursement under 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (a) (12).
- Matter of Falzone (New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.) (2010 NY Slip Op 07417) FollowedAn arbitrator's failure to apply collateral estoppel does not alone permit vacatur of an award under CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iii).
Similar decisions
- Better Health Med. PLLC v Empire/Allcity Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 50571(U))The provider's challenge to the master arbitration award failed because the arbitrators' fraud-based rejection of the claim had a rational basis.
- Matter of Spartan Med. Supply v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 50862(U))The master arbitrator's affirmance of a policy-exhaustion denial was rational despite conflicting appellate authority.
- Acuhealth Acupuncture, PC v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 51256(U))A no-fault arbitrator may subpoena a provider's claimed owner on the arbitrator's own initiative to resolve disputed ownership.
- Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Professional Chiropractic Care P.C. (2015 NY Slip Op 50936(U))A rational master arbitration award is not subject to judicial vacatur for mere errors of substantive law.
- Matter of New Century Acupuncture P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 50919(U))An insurer's licensing-ineligibility defense requires preponderance proof rather than clear and convincing proof of fraud.