November 8, 2010
Olga Bard Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51898(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/olga-bard-acupuncture-p-c-v-geico-ins-co-2010-ny-slip-op-51898u/
- Decided
- November 8, 2010
- Citation
- 2010 NY Slip Op 51898(U) · 29 Misc 3d 132(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Split result
- Later treatment
- Followed in 1 later decision (see Cited by)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Olga Bard Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51898(U))
| Olga Bard Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 51898(U) [29 Misc 3d 132(A)] |
| Decided on November 8, 2010 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through November 4, 2011; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., RIOS and STEINHARDT, JJ
2009-1575 K C.
against
Geico Ins. Co., Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered June 8, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the first three causes of action and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment as to the second and third causes of action and as to claims bearing codes 97810 and 97811 included in the first cause of action is denied, and so much of defendant’s cross motion as sought summary judgment dismissing the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action as well as so much of the first cause of action as sought to recover for claims bearing codes 97810 and 97811 is granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed without costs and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees on the remaining award to plaintiff in the principal sum of $109.34.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant alleged that it had properly paid for the services at issue in the first three causes of action at a rate reduced pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule and that it had denied reimbursement for the services at issue in the fourth and fifth causes of action for lack of medical necessity based upon an independent medical examination (IME). The Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion as to the first three causes of action only and denied defendant’s cross motion in its entirety, finding that the only issue for trial was the medical necessity of the services that are the subject of the fourth and fifth causes of action. The instant appeal by defendant ensued.
Plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). The [*2]burden then shifted to defendant to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).
The affidavit submitted by defendant in opposition to plaintiff’s motion and in support of defendant’s cross motion was sufficient to establish that the denial of claim forms were timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). However, defendant did not proffer sufficient evidence to warrant the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim in the sum of $109.34 for the initial acupuncture visit, which claim was included in plaintiff’s first cause of action (see Raz Acupuncture, P.C. v AIG Indem. Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51177[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). As a result, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment upon so much of the first cause of action as sought to recover the sum of $109.34.
For the reasons stated in Great Wall Acupuncture v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (16 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; see also Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), it was proper for defendant to use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for the acupuncture services rendered by its licensed acupuncturist. Consequently, so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment on the second and third causes of action as well as the remaining portion of the first cause of action should have been denied, and so much of defendant’s cross motion as sought summary judgment dismissing the second and third causes of action and the remaining portion of the first cause of action should have been granted, as these causes of action sought to recover upon claims that were paid pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C., 26 Misc 3d 23; Great Wall Acupuncture, 16 Misc 3d 23).
With respect to the claims at issue in plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action, which were denied on the ground of lack of medical necessity, defendant, in support of its cross motion, annexed a report written by the acupuncturist who had performed the IME, as well as the acupuncturist’s affidavit attesting to the truth of the report, which established, prima facie, a lack of medical necessity for the services performed after the examination took place. In opposition to defendant’s cross motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affidavit of the treating acupuncturist did not meaningfully refer to, let alone rebut, the conclusions set forth in the IME report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Consequently, so much of defendant’s cross motion as sought to dismiss the fourth and fifth causes of action should have been granted (see Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52321[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).
Accordingly, so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment as to the second and third causes of action and as to claims bearing codes 97810 and 97811 included in the first cause of action is denied, so much of defendant’s cross motion as sought summary judgment dismissing the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action as well as so much of the first cause of action as sought to recover for claims bearing codes 97810 and 97811 is granted, and the [*3]matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees on the remaining award to plaintiff in the principal sum of $109.34.
Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 08, 2010
Legal questions (4)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did the insurer’s proof establish lack of medical necessity, and did the provider’s evidence rebut it?
This decision: Insurer's proof established lack of medical necessity and the provider failed to rebut it
Held the IME acupuncturist's sworn report established lack of medical necessity for post-examination services, and the treating acupuncturist's affidavit did not meaningfully refer to or rebut it, so those claims were dismissed.
Of the 617 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 315 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did the insurer prove that the amount billed exceeded the applicable workers’ compensation fee schedule?
This decision: Excess shown for some charges, not for others
Held the insurer properly paid the licensed acupuncturist's codes 97810 and 97811 at the chiropractor acupuncture rate, but it offered insufficient evidence to defeat the claim for the initial visit, which was awarded to the provider.
Of the 285 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
On summary judgment or another pretrial motion, what must a no-fault claimant show to establish its prima facie case?
This decision: Claimant's proof held to make out its prima facie case (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the provider established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, shifting the burden to the insurer, though the outcome rested on the insurer's fee schedule and medical necessity defenses.
Of the 1,065 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 513 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did a party’s evidence establish that it mailed a no-fault claim, denial, verification request or examination notice?
This decision: The insurer's (or its agent's) proof established mailing of its denial, verification request or IME/EUO notice (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the insurer's affidavit sufficed to show the denials were timely mailed in accordance with its standard office practices and procedures.
Of the 1,400 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 809 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 07846)The providers failed to establish a prima facie case because they did not demonstrate the admissibility of their billing records.
- Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 02359)The hospitals established entitlement to summary judgment by proving that statutory billing forms were mailed and received and payment was overdue.
- Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 26483)The provider failed to establish its prima facie case because its corporate officer did not lay a business-records foundation for the claim documents.
- St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 04072)The insurer raised factual issues concerning a proper timely denial and its entitlement to deny the hospital's claim.
- Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins. (2007 NY Slip Op 27345)An insurer may prove mailing by describing its standard procedure for properly addressing and mailing items.
- Raz Acupuncture, P.C. v AIG Indem. Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51177(U)) FollowedAn insurer may use the workers' compensation acupuncture fee schedule for chiropractors to reimburse a licensed acupuncturist.
- Great Wall Acupuncture v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 27164) FollowedThe insurer properly reimbursed the licensed acupuncturist at chiropractor rates because similar services and licensing requirements supported them.
- Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 29467)An insurer may use the chiropractic acupuncture fee schedule to reimburse acupuncture services performed by a licensed acupuncturist.
- Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 51495(U)) FollowedThe provider's conclusory disagreement with the insurer's supported peer review failed to raise a medical-necessity issue of fact.
- Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 52321(U)) FollowedThe insurer established timely denials and lack of medical necessity, and the provider's chiropractor failed to rebut the insurer's showing.
Cited by
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- MIA Acupuncture, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 21480) FollowedThe insurer proved lack of medical necessity for certain acupuncture services but failed to establish late submission or excessive fees.
Similar decisions
- MIA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 51731(U))The insurer proved full payment of fee schedule claims and raised a medical necessity issue on the remaining acupuncture claims.
- Gentle Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 52226(U))An insurer may use the chiropractic acupuncture fee schedule to reimburse acupuncture services performed by a licensed acupuncturist.
- WJJ Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 52377(U))The insurer established full payment under the chiropractic acupuncture fee schedule except for the initial visit claim.
- Acupuncture Healthcare Plaza I, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 51716(U))The insurer proved its acupuncture fee-schedule reductions, but a factual issue over the IME notice address defeated dismissal of two claims.
- Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 52308(U))The insurer's fee-schedule defense was precluded for one claim because it failed to establish a timely denial of the unpaid balance.