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May 13, 2011

Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY (2011 NY Slip Op 50848(U))

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/motor-veh-acc-indem-corp-v-physical-medicine-rehab-of-ny-2011-ny-slip-op-50848u/

Court
Supreme Court, Queens County
Judge
Markey, J.
Decided
May 13, 2011
Citation
2011 NY Slip Op 50848(U) · 31 Misc 3d 1225(A)
Posture
Summary judgment
Outcome
Provider prevailed
Issues
Policy issues MVAIC Timeliness and preclusion
Legal questions
MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person · Claimant's prima facie case on motions · Attorney's fees: article 75 and appeals (see the maps)
Cite as
Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY, 31 Misc 3d 1225(A), 2011 NY Slip Op 50848(U) (Sup Ct, Queens County 2011)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

Florida law permitted rescission of the policy for a material garaging misrepresentation, leaving MVAIC liable for the provider's claim. In a de novo action under Insurance Law § 5106 (c), MVAIC and the provider sought summary judgment after arbitrators awarded benefits. Applying the grouping-of-contacts analysis, the Supreme Court, Queens County, found Florida's contacts and interests controlling and upheld retroactive rescission under Florida Statutes § 627.409. The provider proved submission of billing forms and overdue payment. MVAIC failed to show timely action on the claims; its further verification request was untimely, and it did not establish lack of MVAIC coverage. The court granted the provider's cross motion, with interest and fees under Insurance Law § 5106 (a), and denied MVAIC's motion as academic.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY (2011 NY Slip Op 50848(U))

[*1]
Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY
2011 NY Slip Op 50848(U) [31 Misc 3d 1225(A)]
Decided on May 13, 2011
Supreme Court, Queens County
Markey, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on May 13, 2011
Supreme Court, Queens County


Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation

against

Physical Medicine & Rehab of NY, PC, as assignee of Sylvia Iturralde




4722/09



For the Plaintiff:

Marshall & Marshall, by Craig B. Marshall, Esq., 30 Jericho Executive Plaza, Jericho, New York 11753

For the Defendant:

Law Office of Gewurz & Zaccaria, PC, by Dayva Zaccaria, Esq., 50 Charles Lindbergh Blvd., Uniondale, New York 11553-9850

Charles J. Markey, J.



This action presents an interesting issue of conflicts of law concerning a policy of insurance, on the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” analysis, in order to determine whether New York or Florida law governs the resolution of this action, where the owner of a vehicle made a material misrepresentation on her insurance application concerning in which state the vehicle would be garaged, and the driver of the vehicle who sought medical treatment for her injuries in an accident, occurring in Queens County, New York, was a New York resident. Even more interesting is that none of the counsel discussed or briefed the conflict of law issue that is at the heart of this dispute.

Silvia Iturralde (“Iturralde”) was injured in an automobile accident on November 3, 2005, while driving a vehicle owned and registered to Gloria Perez (“Perez”), who purportedly was a resident of Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida, for the vehicle that was registered in Florida. Infinity Insurance Co. (“Infinity”) issued an insurance policy in Florida to Perez.

Iturralde sought treatment for her physical injuries from defendant Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation of NY, PC (“Physical Med”), located in Queens County, New York. Physical Med made a claim for reimbursement to Infinity.

Infinity issued a denial of claim form, known as a NF-10, alleging that, on the date of the accident, there was no insurance in place. The Infinity policy was revoked for material misrepresentation. Infinity cancelled the policy on January 16, 2006, after it discovered Perez made a material misrepresentation on the insurance application. The material [*2]misrepresentation was that Perez resided and garaged her vehicle in Florida. Infinity’s investigation revealed that Perez’s representation was untrue, and that the vehicle was actually kept, operated, and garaged in New York.

Iturralde then submitted a claim to plaintiff Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (“MVAIC”),[FN1] on December 2, 2005, based on absence of insurance.

On February 1, 2006, claimant Iturralde provided to plaintiff MVAIC the requested affidavit of claimant’s household members over the age of 18 on the date of the accident, of which there were none. Thereafter, on February 10, 2006, claimant Iturralde provided the following requested documents to plaintiff MVAIC: a completed and executed application for no-fault benefits; a copy of a letter from Infinity indicating that the policy of Insurance for Perez was not in effect at the time of the accident; a copy of the police report; and a copy of the Elmhurst Hospital record. On March 10, 2006, plaintiff MVAIC requested information regarding “Non Resident Revocation of the owners [sic] drivers License.”

On November 10, 2005, Iturralde assigned her right to reimbursement under the no-fault law to defendant Physical Med, which submitted medical bills to plaintiff MVAIC. Defendant Physical Med thereafter applied for arbitration claiming plaintiff MVAIC did not issue a delay letter, denial, or payment within 30 days of submission. An affidavit of no insurance availability, an NF-2, an MV104, and the Infinity NF-10 were submitted with the application for arbitration.

The Arbitrator found that there was no indication from the evidence submitted that plaintiff MVAIC took any action in response to defendant Physical Med’s claims. MVAIC did not pay, deny, or seek further verification. MVAIC also did not act to evaluate defendant Physical Med’s right to be reimbursed. The Arbitrator noted that the only defense offered by plaintiff MVAIC was in a letter from MVAIC to the conciliator, stating that the applicant never provided MVAIC with “an affidavit of no insurance from the vehicle owner or Non Resident Revocation of the owners [sic] drivers license.”

After conducting a hearing and taking evidence, the Arbitrator found that plaintiff MVAIC was precluded from opposing claimant’s prima facie case on its claim for payment since it failed to pay, deny, or seek further verification within the 30-day period. See, Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11NYCRR 65-3.8[a][1]; [c]; see also, New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v MVAIC, 12 AD3d 429 [2nd Dept. 2004], lv. to appeal denied, 4 NY3d 705 [2005]. The Arbitrator awarded the applicant, defendant Physical Med, $7,842.82. This award was affirmed by the Master Arbitrator upon its review. [*3]

Since the Master Arbitrator’s award exceeded $5,000.00, plaintiff MVAIC had the right, under Insurance Law section 5106(c), to institute a court action to adjudicate this dispute de novo, and MVAIC has exercised that right by bringing this lawsuit. Plaintiff MVAIC commenced the action, pursuant to Insurance Law section 5106(c), for a trial de novo from Master Arbitrator Victor J. Hershdorfer’s decision, dated November 17, 2008, affirming the decision of the lower Arbitrator, Martin Schulman, dated July 17, 2008, that granted applicant defendant Physical Med’s claim for no-fault insurance benefits in the amount of $7,842.82. In this action, plaintiff MVAIC disputes reimbursement of a claim submitted by defendant Physical Med, a medical or health services provider, pursuant to Article 51 of the New York Insurance Law, the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, commonly referred to as the “No-Fault Law.”

Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff MVAIC moves and defendant Physical Med cross-moves for summary judgment.

The purpose and objective of Article 51 of the New York Insurance Law is to “assure claimants of expeditious compensation for their injuries through prompt payment of first-party benefits without regard to fault and without expense to them.” New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v MVAIC,12 AD3d at 430, supra, quoting Dermatossian v New York City Transit Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 225 [1986].

Section 5106 of article 51 is entitled “Fair Claims Settlement” and provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Payments of first party benefits and additional first party benefits shall be made as the loss is incurred. Such benefits are overdue if not paid within thirty days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained. If proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount which is supported by proof is overdue if not paid within thirty days after such proof is supplied. All overdue payments shall bear interest at the rate of two percent per month. If a valid claim or portion was overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.

Pursuant to the statutory and regulatory framework governing the payment of no-fault benefits, insurance companies are required to either pay or deny a claim for first-party benefits within 30 days of receipt of the claim. See, Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8[a][1] & [c]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556 [2008]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v MVAIC, 12 AD3d 429, supra. Within 10 business days after receipt of the claim notice, the insurer may send an initial request for verification of the claim. See, 11 NYCRR 65-3.5[a]. After receipt of verification, any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt. See, 11 NYCRR 65-3.5[b].

The30-day period in which to either pay or deny a claim is extended where the insurer [*4]makes a request for additional verification within the requisite 15-day time period. See, Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2nd Dept. 2007]; see also, Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 34 AD3d 771 [2nd Dept. 2006]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 31 AD3d 512 [2nd Dept. 2006]. Thus, a timely additional verification request tolls the insurer’s time within which to pay or deny a claim. See, Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, supra; see also, Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903, supra; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729 [2nd Dept. 2007].

In the present action, the medical or health services provider, defendant Physical Med, has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidentiary proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms had been mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue. See, Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15[g][3]; see also, Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2nd Dept. 2004]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 498 [2nd Dept. 2003].

Such showing shifts the burden to the insurer, who, to defeat summary judgment, must submit proof in admissible form raising a triable issue of fact.

Plaintiff MVAIC failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff MVAIC failed to present evidence showing that it took action in response to defendant Physical Med’s claims or that it acted to evaluate said claimant’s right to reimbursement within the 30-day period. Plaintiff MVAIC’s further verification request for “Non-Resident Revocation of the owners [sic] drivers License” was untimely. Moreover, although plaintiff MVAIC is correct that there is an exception to the 30-day deadline for defenses based on lack of coverage (see, Matter of MVAIC v Interboro Med. Care & Diagnostic PC, 73 AD3d 667 [1st Dept. 2010]), plaintiff MVAIC failed to demonstrate a lack of coverage with MVAIC for defendant Physical Med’s assignor, Iturralde.

Plaintiff MVAIC, in this action, has taken a shotgun approach. MVAIC challenges the conclusion by the Infinity investigator as to Perez’s material misrepresentation or fraud. MVAIC, asserting that defendant Physical Med’s assignor, Iturralde, is covered under the Infinity policy, contends that there are unresolved “coverage questions” between MVAIC and Infinity. MVAIC next contends that Infinity’s retroactive cancellation of the policy based on Perez’s material misrepresentation is prohibited under New York law. MVAIC argues that it is not “fall back” position for health or medical providers. MVAIC’s bottom line is that Iturralde is an “innocent party” and, “even if there was fraud on the part of the insured [Perez],” Infinity should not be able to rescind its policy of insurance.

As mentioned at the outset of this memorandum decision, neither party discusses the conflict of law issues that surround this controversy and must determine it.

This dispute poses a conflict of laws between that New York law, prohibiting retroactive cancellation of an insurance contract (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313; see also, Matter of Insurance Co. of North America v Kaplun, 274 AD2d 293 [2nd Dept. 2000]; [*5]Olivio v Government Employees Insurance Co. of Washington, D.C., 46 AD2d 437 [2nd Dept. 1975]), and Florida Statutes Annotated, title 37, section 627.409, permitting retroactive cancellation of an insurance contract where there has been a material misrepresentation in the application for insurance concerning where the vehicle will be kept or garaged (see, Penaranda v Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 747 So 2d 953 [Fla 1999]).

First, type of misrepresentation that will constitute grounds for the rescission of a policy of insurance must be material and deceptive designed to induce the insurer to provide a contract of insurance. See, TIG Ins. Co. v Reliable Research Co., 334 F3d 630, 636 [7th Cir. 2003] [Wood, J.] [“(A) misrepresentation standing alone is not enough for rescission: the misrepresentation must either be material or intentionally deceptive”]; Home Ins. Co. of Illinois v Spectrum Info. Tech., Inc., 930 F Supp 825, 835 [EDNY 1996]). As recently observed by the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, in Varshavskaya v Metropolitan life Ins. Co., 68 AD3d 855 [2009], lv. to appeal denied, 14 NY3d 710 [2010]:

“A misrepresentation is material if the insurer would not have issued the policy had it known the facts misrepresented.” 68 AD3d at 856; accord, Barkan v New York Schools Ins. Reciprocal, 65 AD3d 1061, 1064 [2nd Dept. 2009].

Cindy J. Greene, Infinity’s claim representative, states, in her properly prepared out-of-state affidavit: “The [Infinity] policy, a Florida policy, would not have been issued to Gloria Perez if she had truthfully reported that the vehicle had been garaged in New York.” This Court agrees that the misrepresentation committed by Perez was material and was done deceptively to induce Infinity to issue the policy, when Perez intended her car to be garaged in New York, and not Florida.

The conflict of law issues relating to an insurance policy must be resolved by application of the conflict of law rules relevant to contracts. See, Allstate Ins. Co. v Hague, 449 US 302, 324 n.11 [1981]; Specialty Surfaces Intern., Inc. v Continental Cas. Co., 609 F3d 223 [3rd Cir. 2010]); Matter of Integon Insurance Co. v Garcia, 281 AD2d 480 [2nd Dept. 2001]; Careplus Med. Supply, Inc. v Selective Ins. Co. of America, 25 Misc 3d 48 [App T. 2nd Dept. 2009]; George Blum, Annot., “Conflict of laws in Determination of Coverage Under Automobile Liability Insurance Policy,” 110 ALR5th 465 [2003]).

Courts apply the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” inquiry to determine which State has the most significant contacts to a contract dispute. The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., ___ NY3d ____ , 2011 WL 1233571, 2011 NY Slip Op 02716 [2011], stated:

It is well-settled that New York has long recognized “the use of center of gravity’ or grouping of contacts’ as the appropriate analytical approach to choice-of-law questions in contract cases” (Zurich Ins. Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 84 NY2d 309, 317 [1994]; see also, Auten v Auten, 308 NY 155, 160-161 [1954]). “The purpose of grouping of contacts is to establish which State has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties’ ” (Zurich Ins. Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 84 NY2d at 317, quoting Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 188[1]). In Auten, we held that the [*6]“grouping of contacts” theory to choice-of-law disputes “gives [. . .] the place having the most interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation” (308 NY at 161) [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted] ).

In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., ___ NY3d at ____ , 2011 WL 1233571 [2011]; see, Matter of Eagle Insurance Co. v Singletary, 279 AD2d 56 [2nd Dept. 2000]; accord, In re Payroll Express Corp., 2005 WL 2438444 [Bankr. SDNY 2005]).

Significant contacts in a case involving a contract, in addition to the place of contracting, are the place of negotiation and its performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile or place of business of the contracting parties. See, Zurich Insurance Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 84 NY2d 309 [1994]; see also, Matter of Integon Insurance Co. v Garcia, 281 AD2d 480, supra; Matter of Eagle Insurance Co. v Singletary, 279 AD2d 56, supra).

Several helpful precedents guide this Court’s determination. In Government Employees Insurance Company v Nichols, 8 AD3d 564 [2nd Dept. 2004], the Appellate Division, Second Department ruled that the law of Florida, rather than that of New York, applied, and that a retroactive disclaimer of automobile insurance coverage after an accident was permissible on the ground of the motorist’s material misrepresentation. Under New York’s conflict of law rules, Florida law governed. Id. at 565-566.

A material misrepresentation concerning in which state a vehicle would be garaged was the focus of the federal court’s attention in American Centennial Ins. Co. v Sinkler, 903 F Supp 408 [EDNY 1995] [Weinstein, J.]. In that case, defendant Sinkler misrepresented that his car would be garaged in South Carolina, when actually he garaged it in Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 409-410. Despite New York State’s policy of preventing rescission of insurance contracts by insurers, the court determined:

South Carolina has a strong interest in regulating insurance contracts formed within the state covering predominantly in-state risks. It also has an interest in preventing the kind of misrepresentation employed by the insured. In permitting ab initio rescission of insurance contracts, South Carolina holds the insured accountable for material misrepresentations.

Id. at 413-414. The court applied New York State’s “Grouping of Contacts” choice of law analysis and held that South Carolina law controls. Id. Application of New York substantive law would undermine South Carolina’s rights and interests by placing the burden on that state’s insurers to uncover the misrepresentations that New York insurers bear. Id. at 414.

The court further noted that the existence of MVAIC in New York to compensate uninsured third persons injured by uninsured motorists shows that New York State has a [*7]lesser interest in enforcing its public policy. The court continued addressing the same arguments made by MVAIC in the case at bar:

While the uninsured motorist provisions are not “intended to be a sop for insurance risks dumped on New York by its neighbors,” [quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v Sullam, 76 Misc 2d 87, 102 [Sup Ct Nassau County 1973], South Carolina is surely not to be deemed a “dumper” where it allows rescission based upon a New York motorist’s fraud. The New York legislature can apply ample pressure on cheats like Sinkler by using civil sanctions of license and registration revocation or even criminal penalties if its present statutes do not suffice to protect the injured.

American Centennial Ins. Co. v Sinkler, 903 F Supp at 415-416. Accord, Northland Ins. Co. v Imperial Car Sales, Inc., 2009 WL 2143565, slip op. at 4 [EDNY 2009] [Amon, D.J., & Reyes, M.J.] [New York’s choice-of-law principles, under a “grouping of contacts” analysis, required application of New Jersey law and New Jersey’s “strong public policy toward deterring insurance fraud by allowing retroactive cancellation.”]; MZ Med. Care, PC v Selective Ins. Co. of America, 23 Misc 3d 1134[A], 2009 WL 1546947 [NYC Civ Ct Kings County 2009] [same]; Mid Atlantic Med. P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 1228[A], 2006 WL 3025660 [NYC Civ Ct Kings County 2006] [applying Virginia law where insurance policy required that vehicle be garaged in Virginia], rev’d on other grounds, 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 WL 3865849 [App T 2nd Dept. 2008] [collateral estoppel defense could not be raised in a post-answer motion when not preserved in answer].

In the present case, applying the “grouping of contacts” analysis, the State of Florida has the most significant contacts with the contracting parties and the contract. Infinity issued its insurance policy to Perez in Florida, who purportedly was a resident of Florida, for a vehicle registered in Florida, and the terms of that insurance policy incorporated Florida law. The only connection between the policy and New York is that Iturralde was driving Perez’s vehicle in New York at the time of the accident. Thus, Florida law is controlling under New York’s conflict of law rules.

In addition, Florida’s significant contacts with the subject contract and legitimate governmental interest in protecting its honest policyholders from bearing the burden of paying claims incurred by dishonest policyholders outweighs New York’s governmental interest in protecting innocent third parties from being deprived of insurance coverage, especially since New York statutes provide the means to ensure compensation to persons injured as a result of the fault of uninsured motorists within the state by requiring New York policyholders to purchase uninsured motorist coverage (see, Insurance Law § 3420[f]) and establishing and providing insurance through MVAIC (see, Insurance Law § 5201 et seq.; American Centennial Ins. Co. v Sinkler, 903 F Supp at 415-416, supra; see also, Matter of Eagle Insurance Co. v Singletary, 279 AD2d 56, supra).

Applying Florida law, Infinity’s retroactive cancellation of the insurance policy as [*8]a result of Perez’s material misrepresentation in her application for insurance was valid. Since the subject policy was void ab initio, Infinity’s denial of Iturralde’s no-fault claim was proper. Thus, as there was no coverage with Infinity, plaintiff MVAIC’s assertion that defendant Physical Med’s assignor, Iturralde, is not a “covered person” with MVAIC is without merit.

Accordingly, the cross motion by defendant Physical Med for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiff MVAIC shall pay defendant Physical Med its no-fault law claim of $7,842.82, plus statutory interest and fees, including attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Insurance Law section 5106(a) and its associated regulations.

Plaintiff MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment is denied as academic.

As stated in the defendant Physical Med’s reply to the cross-motion, the claim submitted to MVAIC is now five and a half years old. Upon submission of appropriate proof, the request by defense counsel for reasonable attorneys fees is granted consistent with the Master Arbitrator’s decision.

Settle judgment on notice.

______________________________________

J.S.C.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The MVAIC is a statutory creation designed to compensate injured parties or their assignees where they suffer injuries in accidents involving uninsured vehicles. MVAIC v Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 89 NY2d 214, 221 [1996]; Pinnacle Open MRI, P.C. v republic Western Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 626, 632-633 [Dist Ct Nassau County 2008]; Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 14 Misc 3d 405 [Dist Ct Nassau County 2006].

Legal questions (3)

Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.

MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person

Open the full map

Against MVAIC, was the claimant shown to be a qualified, covered person meeting article 52’s conditions?

This decision: Court finds the claimant qualified/covered, or the condition met or excused, on the claimant's own proof

Held the assignor was a covered person because, under Florida law, the owner's insurer validly rescinded the policy ab initio for a material garaging misrepresentation, so no other coverage existed and MVAIC's objection lacked merit.

  • Appellate DivisionApp Div 3
  • Appellate TermApp Term 193
  • Trial courtsTrial 28
2004, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Defense precluded/waived)2011, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (2 MVAIC failed to prove)2019, Appellate Term: 24 decisions (10 Found not eligible, 11 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 Unresolved / for trial, 2 Defense precluded/waived)2025, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (2 Found not eligible, 1 Claimant's proof lacking, 2 MVAIC failed to prove)2026, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (3 Found not eligible, 2 MVAIC failed to prove)2005, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2006, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 Found not eligible)2007, Appellate Term: 4 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 1 MVAIC failed to prove, 2 Defense precluded/waived)2008, Appellate Term: 11 decisions (6 Claimant's proof lacking, 3 MVAIC failed to prove, 1 Unresolved / for trial, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2009, Appellate Term: 4 decisions (3 Found not eligible, 1 MVAIC failed to prove)2010, Appellate Term: 8 decisions (3 Found not eligible, 5 Claimant's proof lacking)2011, Appellate Term: 16 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 11 Claimant's proof lacking, 2 MVAIC failed to prove, 1 Found eligible, 1 Unresolved / for trial)2012, Appellate Term: 26 decisions (10 Found not eligible, 10 Claimant's proof lacking, 4 MVAIC failed to prove, 2 Unresolved / for trial)2013, Appellate Term: 9 decisions (2 Found not eligible, 6 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 Unresolved / for trial)2014, Appellate Term: 14 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 9 Claimant's proof lacking, 2 Found eligible, 1 Unresolved / for trial, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2015, Appellate Term: 13 decisions (2 Found not eligible, 10 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 MVAIC failed to prove)2016, Appellate Term: 15 decisions (2 Found not eligible, 10 Claimant's proof lacking, 2 Unresolved / for trial, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2017, Appellate Term: 17 decisions (8 Found not eligible, 9 Claimant's proof lacking)2018, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 4 Claimant's proof lacking)2020, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 Claimant's proof lacking)2021, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 2 Defense precluded/waived)2022, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (4 Found not eligible, 2 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2023, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 Unresolved / for trial)2024, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 1 MVAIC failed to prove)2006, Trial courts: 5 decisions (2 Found not eligible, 2 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2026, Trial courts: 2 decisions (2 Found not eligible)2004, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Found eligible)2007, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 1 Unresolved / for trial)2009, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 MVAIC failed to prove, 1 Unresolved / for trial)2011, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Found eligible)2012, Trial courts: 3 decisions (1 MVAIC failed to prove, 1 Unresolved / for trial, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2013, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Found not eligible)2015, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Found not eligible)2018, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Found not eligible)2019, Trial courts: 3 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 1 Claimant's proof lacking, 1 Defense precluded/waived)2020, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Defense precluded/waived)2021, Trial courts: 3 decisions (1 Found not eligible, 2 MVAIC failed to prove)2022, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Claimant's proof lacking)2024, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Unresolved / for trial)This decision
20052010201520202025
Found not eligibleClaimant's proof lackingMVAIC failed to proveFound eligibleUnresolved / for trialDefense precluded/waivedThis decisionCites it or cited by itCited or followed

Of the 224 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 5 (this one included) are in the same category. One decision in other departments that cites or is cited by this one is on the full map.

Claimant's prima facie case on motions

Open the full map

On summary judgment or another pretrial motion, what must a no-fault claimant show to establish its prima facie case?

This decision: Claimant's proof held to make out its prima facie case (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)

Held the provider, cross-moving for payment in the insurer's de novo action, made a prima facie showing that its billing forms were mailed and received and payment was overdue.

  • Court of AppealsCt App 2
  • Appellate DivisionApp Div 81
  • Appellate TermApp Term 843
  • Trial courtsTrial 139
2015, Court of Appeals: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2007, Court of Appeals: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2022, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2019, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2014, Appellate Division: 10 decisions (9 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2013, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2012, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2011, Appellate Division: 11 decisions (11 Proof sufficient)2010, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2009, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Other element missing)2008, Appellate Division: 8 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Appellate Division: 16 decisions (13 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2006, Appellate Division: 5 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Other element missing)2005, Appellate Division: 5 decisions (5 Proof sufficient)2004, Appellate Division: 11 decisions (10 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2026, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2003, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2022, Appellate Term: 14 decisions (2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 12 Overdue not shown)2021, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 4 Overdue not shown)2020, Appellate Term: 13 decisions (13 Overdue not shown)2019, Appellate Term: 23 decisions (22 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2018, Appellate Term: 26 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 22 Overdue not shown)2017, Appellate Term: 38 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 34 Overdue not shown)2016, Appellate Term: 41 decisions (7 Proof sufficient, 34 Overdue not shown)2015, Appellate Term: 44 decisions (12 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 30 Overdue not shown, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2014, Appellate Term: 22 decisions (10 Proof sufficient, 12 Overdue not shown)2013, Appellate Term: 34 decisions (17 Proof sufficient, 11 Overdue not shown, 6 Business-record foundation lacking)2012, Appellate Term: 32 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 11 Overdue not shown, 16 Business-record foundation lacking)2011, Appellate Term: 29 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 13 Overdue not shown, 9 Business-record foundation lacking)2010, Appellate Term: 36 decisions (22 Proof sufficient, 3 Mailing/receipt not shown, 10 Business-record foundation lacking, 1 Other element missing)2009, Appellate Term: 52 decisions (28 Proof sufficient, 3 Mailing/receipt not shown, 21 Business-record foundation lacking)2008, Appellate Term: 49 decisions (16 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 32 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Appellate Term: 104 decisions (8 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 94 Business-record foundation lacking)2006, Appellate Term: 112 decisions (76 Proof sufficient, 26 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown, 6 Business-record foundation lacking, 3 Other element missing)2005, Appellate Term: 90 decisions (84 Proof sufficient, 5 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2004, Appellate Term: 57 decisions (43 Proof sufficient, 10 Mailing/receipt not shown, 4 Other element missing)2003, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (7 Proof sufficient)2023, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (3 Overdue not shown)2024, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 6 Overdue not shown)2025, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2026, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (2 Mailing/receipt not shown)2023, Trial courts: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2022, Trial courts: 4 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 2 Overdue not shown)2021, Trial courts: 11 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 2 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2020, Trial courts: 5 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2019, Trial courts: 6 decisions (5 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2018, Trial courts: 2 decisions (2 Overdue not shown)2017, Trial courts: 3 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2016, Trial courts: 4 decisions (4 Proof sufficient)2013, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2012, Trial courts: 5 decisions (4 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2011, Trial courts: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2010, Trial courts: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2009, Trial courts: 7 decisions (7 Proof sufficient)2008, Trial courts: 14 decisions (8 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown, 4 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Trial courts: 7 decisions (5 Proof sufficient, 2 Business-record foundation lacking)2006, Trial courts: 16 decisions (13 Proof sufficient, 2 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2005, Trial courts: 22 decisions (14 Proof sufficient, 5 Mailing/receipt not shown, 3 Business-record foundation lacking)2004, Trial courts: 15 decisions (9 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 4 Other element missing)2025, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2026, Trial courts: 4 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2014, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2015, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2024, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)This decision
20052010201520202025
Proof sufficientMailing/receipt not shownOverdue not shownBusiness-record foundation lackingOther element missingThis decisionCites it or cited by itCited or followed

Of the 1,065 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 513 (this one included) are in the same category.

Attorney's fees: article 75 and appeals

Open the full map

How is the applicant’s attorney’s fee fixed for no-fault article 75 proceedings, de novo actions and appeals?

This decision: Applicant is entitled to a court-fixed fee for the proceeding or appeal; granted, or remitted to set the amount (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)

Granted the provider, which defeated the de novo action on summary judgment, its request for reasonable attorneys' fees upon submission of appropriate proof, leaving the amount to be fixed later.

  • Appellate DivisionApp Div 44
  • Appellate TermApp Term 3
  • Trial courtsTrial 11
2019, Appellate Division: 4 decisions (3 Fee due; court to fix, 1 No fee recoverable)2018, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 No fee recoverable)2017, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Fee due; court to fix)2016, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Limited to regulatory schedule)2025, Appellate Division: 13 decisions (4 Fee due; court to fix, 9 Amount fixed or upheld)2026, Appellate Division: 24 decisions (11 Fee due; court to fix, 3 Amount fixed or upheld, 4 Amount set aside, 6 No fee recoverable)2020, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 Fee due; court to fix)2025, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 Fee due; court to fix, 1 Amount set aside)2023, Trial courts: 7 decisions (2 Amount fixed or upheld, 5 Limited to regulatory schedule)2024, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 Amount fixed or upheld, 1 No fee recoverable)2026, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 No fee recoverable)2011, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Fee due; court to fix)This decision
201520202025
Fee due; court to fixAmount fixed or upheldAmount set asideLimited to regulatory scheduleNo fee recoverableThis decision

Of the 58 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 22 (this one included) are in the same category.

Cited in this decision

A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.

  • New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2004 NY Slip Op 08087)MVAIC must comply with the 30-day deadline to pay or deny a no-fault claim before qualifying the injured claimant.
  • Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 04946) FollowedAn insurer's defense that billed supplies were never delivered is subject to preclusion for an untimely denial.
  • Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 08038) FollowedThe hospital's claim was premature because unrebutted proof showed that it ignored timely verification and follow-up requests.
  • Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Government Empls. Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 08953)An insurer's additional verification request following an N-F5 submission need not use a prescribed form to toll the payment deadline.
  • New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 05602)The insurer proved a timely denial but failed to establish that the provider's treatment was unrelated to the accident.
  • New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 07675)The insurer raised verification and billing-date issues on one claim, but failed to rebut proof of receipt of verification on another.
  • Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 02359)The hospitals established entitlement to summary judgment by proving that statutory billing forms were mailed and received and payment was overdue.
  • St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2003 NY Slip Op 18448)The providers' summary judgment motion for no-fault payments was granted because the insurer raised no triable issue.
  • Matter of MVAIC v Interboro Med. Care & Diagnostic PC (2010 NY Slip Op 04522) FollowedMVAIC's lack-of-coverage defense is not precluded by failure to pay or deny a no-fault claim within 30 days.
  • Careplus Med. Supply, Inc. v Selective Ins. Co. of Am. (2009 NY Slip Op 29109)New Jersey law governed the claim because the insurance contract and relevant residence and vehicle contacts centered in that state.
  • Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2006 NY Slip Op 26503)MVAIC established lack of coverage because the assignor failed to satisfy the statutory reporting requirements.

Similar decisions

  • Sama Physical Therapy v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 29218)MVAIC's defense that an injured claimant is not a qualified person is subject to preclusion under the no-fault time limits.
  • Akita Med. Acupuncture P.C. v MVAIC (2006 NY Slip Op 52340(U))MVAIC obtained summary judgment because the assignor failed to establish compliance with the statutory accident-reporting requirements.
  • Vision Rehab PT PC v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 51206(U))MVAIC may assert lack of coverage based on an untimely notice of claim despite an untimely denial of benefits.
  • Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs. P.C. v MVAIC (2006 NY Slip Op 52343(U))MVAIC obtained dismissal because the provider failed to establish the assignor's eligibility for benefits under Insurance Law article 52.
  • Exclusive Med. Supply, Inc. v MVAIC (2012 NY Slip Op 50616(U))MVAIC's qualification letters did not toll the 30-day claim determination period because they did not seek verification of the claims.
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