November 18, 2020
Blackman Pelham Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2020 NY Slip Op 51406(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/blackman-pelham-med-p-c-v-mvaic-2020-ny-slip-op-51406u/
- Judge
- Mallafre Melendez, J.
- Decided
- November 18, 2020
- Citation
- 2020 NY Slip Op 51406(U) · 69 Misc 3d 1217(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Provider prevailed
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Blackman Pelham Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2020 NY Slip Op 51406(U))
[*1]| Blackman Pelham Med., P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 51406(U) [69 Misc 3d 1217(A)] |
| Decided on November 18, 2020 |
| Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Mallafre Melendez, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on November 18, 2020
Blackman Pelham
Medical, P.C., a/a/o Norquis Pineda, Plaintiff,
against MVAIC, Defendant. |
717938-18/KI
Attorney for Plaintiff: David Landfair, Esq., Kopelevich & Feldsherova, PC 241 37th Street, Ste. B439, Brooklyn, NY 11232
Attorney for Defendant: Jeffrey Kadushin, Esq., on motion, Marshall & Marshall, PLLC 30 Jericho Executive Plaza, Ste. 100W, Jericho, New York 11753
Consuelo Mallafre Melendez, J.
The court’s Decision and Order is based upon consideration of the following papers:
CPLR 2219(a) Recitation
NOTICE OF MOTION & AFFIDAVITS ANNEXED 1
OPPOSITION/CROSS-MOTION 2, 3
REPLY/OPPOSITION TO CROSS-MOTION
SUR REPLY
After oral argument and upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment, is as follows:
As to the fourth bill in Plaintiff’s complaint in the amount of $249.96 for dates of service on April 9, 2015, Plaintiff established through the affidavit of its manager, Ruslan Bogatko, that the bill was submitted and never paid or denied. The affidavit is detailed and not conclusory. Plaintiff’s position is further supported by the provider’s proof of mailing log which includes this bill. However, Defendant, through its submissions failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as to this bill, with statutory interest accruing from the date the bill came due.
As to the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth bills listed in the complaint, which cover dates of service from March 27, 2015 through April 27, 2015, in the total amount of $978.76, Defendant admits receipt of the bills between May 7, 2015, and May 28, 2015. Defendant also admits that the seventh bill for date of service on June 22, 2015 in the amount of $92.97, was received on July 7, 2015.
Defendant claims that they timely sent verification requests to Blackman Medical on [*2]June 10, 2015 and on July 16, 2015. They claim that a year later, on June 21, 2016, they received a response from a Windhaven Insurance Company and MVAIC determined that the assignor was “Qualified” for coverage. The court notes that Defendant did not state when a verification request was sent to Windhaven Insurance Company. On August 9, 2016, Defendant issued a denial of said bills. Defendant relied on their claim that “qualification” requests are outstanding to toll the bills.
The court finds that Defendant’s denials were untimely. The Legislature has made it clear that MVAIC is subject to the same requirements under the No-Fault regulations as insurers (Insurance Law § 5221[b][3]). The Appellate Division has determined that defendant MVAIC maintains the same rights and obligations which are applicable to an insurer subject to Insurance Law Article 51 (NY Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 784 N.Y.S.2d 593 [2nd Dept. 2004], lv appeal denied 825 N.E.2d 1093 [2005]). The Second Department has expressly rejected a “defendant’s contention that the 30-day time requirement contained in 11 NYCRR 65.15(g)(3) does not apply to it until after it has ‘qualified’ an injured party” (New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 12 AD3d 429 [2d Dept 2004]; see also Daily Med. Equip. Dist. Ctr., Inc. v. MVAIC, 53 Misc 3d 148[A] [App Term, 2d Dept 2016]; Active Care Medical Supply Corp. v. MVAIC, 120 N.Y.S.3d 558, [NY Sup. Crt. App Term 2019]).
In Daily Medical Equipment Distribution Center, Inc. v. MVAIC, a case similar to the instant matter, the Appellate Term stated:
“[i]n New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004]), the Appellate Division rejected MVAIC’s contention, which MVAIC similarly asserts here, that the 30—day claim determination period does not begin to run until after MVAIC is satisfied that a claimant is a “qualified person” (see Insurance Law § 5202[b]) who is also a “covered person” (see Insurance Law § 5221[b][2]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 12 AD3d 429). The Appellate Division held that defenses which are subject to preclusion remain subject to the time frames set forth in the regulations applicable to claims which seek to recover first-party no-fault benefits pursuant to Insurance Law article 51″ (Daily Med. Equip. Dist. Ctr., Inc. v. MVAIC, 53 Misc 3d 148[A]).
Recently, in T & S Med. Supply Corp. v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp, the Appellate Term held that “(c)ontrary to MVAIC’s contention, the 30-day period within which MVAIC may timely deny a claim or request verification begins to run upon receipt of the claim without regard to whether MVAIC has determined that plaintiff’s assignor is a qualified person within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5202 (b) (63 Misc 3d 150 [A] [App Term, 2d Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2019]).
In this case, after it deemed the assignor “qualified,” Defendant sent denials of said bills on August 9, 2016. Having received these bills in May of 2015 and June 2015, they were improperly delayed by Defendant and are therefore untimely.
Further, as to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and seventh bills listed in the complaint, the Defendant’s motion is also based on non-cooperation with requests for independent medical examinations which were scheduled for July 21, 2016, July 25, 2016 and August 8, 2016. However, such requests must “compl[y] with Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-3.5(d), which prescribes a 30-calendar-day time frame for the holding of IMEs” (American Transit Ins. Co. v. Longevity Med. Supply, 131 AD3d 841 [1st Dept 2015]). Here, as noted [*3]above, the bills were received between May 7, 2015, and May 28, 2015 and the seventh bill was received on July 7, 2015. However, the first IME was scheduled over a year later, rendering the IME requests void.
In light of Defendant’s untimely denials and the untimely IME requests, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and seventh bills listed in the complaint, with statutory interest accruing from the date that Plaintiff filed the instant action. Plaintiff may also enter judgment as to the fourth bill for the reasons previously noted.
In sum, Plaintiff may enter judgment in the amount of $1321.69, with statutory interest, attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.
November 18, 2020
Brooklyn, NY
CONSUELO MALLAFRE MELENDEZ
Judge, Civil Court
Legal questions (5)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did a party’s evidence establish that it mailed a no-fault claim, denial, verification request or examination notice?
This decision: The provider's or claimant's proof established mailing of its claim form, NF-2 or verification response
Held the provider's manager's detailed affidavit, supported by its mailing log, proved the fourth bill was submitted and never paid or denied, and the defendant raised no triable issue.
Of the 1,400 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 106 (this one included) are in the same category. One decision in other departments that cites or is cited by this one is on the full map.
Is an IME/EUO no-show defense precluded if the insurer did not timely deny the claim on that ground?
This decision: No-show defense is subject to preclusion and fails for want of a timely, proper denial (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held MVAIC's denials, issued over a year after receipt while awaiting qualification, untimely, and together with void late IME requests this defeated its IME no-show defense, so the provider recovered on those bills.
Of the 508 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 166 (this one included) are in the same category.
On summary judgment or another pretrial motion, what must a no-fault claimant show to establish its prima facie case?
This decision: Claimant's proof held to make out its prima facie case (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held on the provider's cross motion that its manager's detailed, non-conclusory affidavit and mailing log established that the fourth bill was submitted and never paid or denied, and MVAIC raised no triable issue.
Of the 1,065 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 513 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did the insurer prove its IME/EUO no-show defense: mailed, compliant scheduling requests and the claimant’s nonappearance?
This decision: Insurer did not show its requests met the regulatory timing, follow-up or justification requirements (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the IME requests void because the first IME was scheduled more than a year after the bills were received, violating the 30-day time frame of 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (d).
Of the 858 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 102 (this one included) are in the same category. One decision in other departments that cites or is cited by this one is on the full map.
Against MVAIC, was the claimant shown to be a qualified, covered person meeting article 52’s conditions?
This decision: MVAIC may not rely on the eligibility objection because of untimely denial/verification or waiver (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held MVAIC's denials untimely because the 30-day period ran from receipt of the bills regardless of when MVAIC deemed the assignor qualified, so outstanding qualification requests did not toll it.
Of the 224 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 16 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2004 NY Slip Op 08087) FollowedMVAIC must comply with the 30-day deadline to pay or deny a no-fault claim before qualifying the injured claimant.
- Daily Med. Equip. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51622(U)) FollowedMVAIC's verification request more than 100 days after receipt of the last claim did not toll its time to deny or render the action premature.
- American Tr. Ins. Co. v Longevity Med. Supply, Inc. (2015 NY Slip Op 06761) FollowedAn insurer seeking summary judgment on an IME no-show must prove compliance with the 30-day period in 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (d).
Similar decisions
- Maxim Orthopaedics PLLC v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 51282(U))The provider failed to justify five late bills to MVAIC but established proper mailing of three bills MVAIC denied receiving.
- Sama Physical Therapy v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 29218)MVAIC's defense that an injured claimant is not a qualified person is subject to preclusion under the no-fault time limits.
- Healthway Med. Care, P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50200(U))MVAIC failed to establish exhaustion or proper fee schedule payment, and claim-submission timeliness remained disputed.
- Bay Ls Med. Supplies, Inc. v Mvaic (2014 NY Slip Op 50417(U))MVAIC's IME nonappearance defense was precluded because its scheduling letters were mailed more than 30 days after receipt of the claim.
- Exclusive Med. Supply, Inc. v MVAIC (2012 NY Slip Op 50616(U))MVAIC's qualification letters did not toll the 30-day claim determination period because they did not seek verification of the claims.