Decided on March 8, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Petre and Zabokritsky, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered August 17, 2016. The order denied defendant’s motion to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Shavkat Djalilov from the remaining causes of action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion, which had sought, pursuant to CPLR 603, to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Shavkat Djalilov from the remaining causes of action. Defendant’s counsel asserted that the causes of action had arisen out of five accidents and that multiple defenses had been interposed in the answer. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

For the reasons stated in Himalayans Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Davron Khuseynov, et al. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of NY (___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2016-2225 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on March 8, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Petre and Zabokritsky, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered August 17, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Victor Agnest from the remaining causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion, which had sought, pursuant to CPLR 603, to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Victor Agnest from the remaining causes of action. Defendant’s counsel asserted that the causes of action had arisen out of four accidents and that multiple defenses had been interposed in the answer. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

For the reasons stated in Himalayans Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Davron Khuseynov, et al. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of NY (___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2016-2225 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Petre and Zabokritsky, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered August 17, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Davron Khuseynov from the remaining causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion, which had sought, pursuant to CPLR 603, to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Davron Khuseynov from the remaining causes of action. Defendant’s counsel asserted that the causes of action had arisen out of two accidents and that multiple defenses had been interposed in the answer. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

The decision to grant severance (see CPLR 603) is an exercise of judicial discretion which, in the absence of a party’s showing of prejudice to a substantial right, should not be disturbed on appeal (see City Chiropractic, P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 144[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50730[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; King’s Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50232[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In the instant matter, while the assignors were injured in separate accidents and defendant interposed 48 defenses in its answer, these two facts do not [*2]demonstrate that resolution of the claims for services rendered to each assignor will involve different questions of law and fact. As such, the record does not establish that the Civil Court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an improvident exercise of discretion.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Sharon A. Brennan of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered May 11, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on the second through fifth causes of action and granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second and fifth causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing: (1) the second cause of action on the ground that defendant had never received the underlying claim form; (2) the third cause of action on the ground that defendant had fully paid plaintiff in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule; and (3) the fourth and fifth causes of action on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court also denied the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on those causes of action.

Plaintiff correctly argues that it made a prima facie showing that the claim underlying the second cause of action had been mailed to defendant in accordance with plaintiff’s standard [*2]mailing practice and procedure (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). However, defendant’s showing that it had not received the claim form at issue underlying the second cause of action demonstrated that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this claim form was timely mailed to defendant (see Irina Acupuncture, P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 147[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50781[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 [App Term, 2d, Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). As a result, neither party is entitled to summary judgment upon the second cause of action.

Plaintiff’s contention that defendant is not entitled to summary judgment upon the third cause of action will not be considered, as it is being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]).

Plaintiff argues that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment upon the fourth and fifth causes of action because the follow-up EUO scheduling letters were sent more than 10 calendar days after plaintiff had failed to appear for separately scheduled EUOs with respect to the claims underlying the fourth and fifth causes of action. The record establishes that, with respect to the claim underlying the fourth cause of action, after plaintiff failed to appear for the first scheduled EUO, defendant timely mailed a second EUO scheduling letter (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b]).

However, with respect to the claim underlying the fifth cause of action, the record establishes that, after plaintiff failed to appear for the first scheduled EUO, defendant’s follow-up scheduling letter for that EUO was mailed more than 10 days later. As a result, this follow-up scheduling letter was untimely (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b]) and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the fifth cause of action due to plaintiff’s failure to appear for EUOs should have been denied. However, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon this cause of action was properly denied, as the proof submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion failed to establish either that the claim had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second and fifth causes of action are denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on March 8, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Law Offices of Aloy O. Ibuzor (William P. Kleen of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered January 22, 2016. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate a notice of trial and certificate of readiness.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant’s answer, served in January 2015, was accompanied by a notice to take deposition upon oral examination. After plaintiff served a notice of trial and certificate of readiness in February 2015, defendant moved to vacate same, asserting that, contrary to plaintiff’s representation, discovery was not complete. The Civil Court denied defendant’s unopposed motion.

Defendant’s timely motion to vacate the notice of trial (see Uniform Rules for NY City Civ Ct [22 NYCRR] § 208.17 [c]) should have been granted since it was based upon a certificate of readiness which contained the erroneous statement that discovery was complete or that it had been waived (see Savino v Lewittes, 160 AD2d 176 [1990]; Queens Chiropractic Mgt., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51073[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As it is undisputed that plaintiff never appeared for a deposition in this action despite being served with a notice to take deposition upon oral examination, the notice of trial and certificate of readiness should be vacated (see Queens Chiropractic Mgt., P.C., 23 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51073[U]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on March 8, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Law Office of Aloy O. Ibuzor (William P. Kleen of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered January 22, 2016. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate a notice of trial and certificate of readiness.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant’s answer, served in January 2015, was accompanied by a notice to take deposition upon oral examination. After plaintiff served a notice of trial and certificate of readiness in February 2015, defendant moved to vacate same, asserting that, contrary to plaintiff’s representation, discovery was not complete. The Civil Court denied defendant’s unopposed motion.

For the reasons stated in Fu-Qi Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Gomez, Osiris v Travelers Ins. Co. (__ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2016-301 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

[*1]

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, March 8, 2019

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Johnnie Gordon, plaintiff pro se.

After an inquest held on December 1, 2017, upon defendant Geico Insurance Company’s failure to appear for a conference,{**63 Misc 3d at 622} the court dismissed plaintiff Johnnie Gordon’s complaint for failure to meet the burden of proof (22 NYCRR 208.14 [b] [1] [“At any scheduled call of a calendar or at a pretrial conference . . . (i)f the plaintiff appears but the defendant does not, the judge may grant judgment by default or order an inquest”]; 22 NYCRR 208.32).^[FN*] Plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal and sought settlement of the transcript. Because the proposed changes did not accurately transcribe what occurred at the inquest, the court declined to sign the Clerk’s return on appeal (see CIV-GP-44 [2000]).

Plaintiff has now submitted a second errata sheet dated January 10, 2019, again proposing changes to the transcript which would not reflect statements made at inquest and, in some instances, alter the meaning of what was said on the record. For the reasons below, the court memorializes its first denial and denies the second set of proposed amendments.

CPLR 5525 (c) (1) provides that

“[w]ithin fifteen days after receiving the transcript from the court reporter . . . , the appellant shall make any proposed amendments and serve them and a copy of the transcript upon the respondent. Within fifteen days after such service the respondent shall make any proposed amendments or objections to the proposed amendments of the appellant and serve them upon the appellant. At any time thereafter and on at least four days’ notice to the adverse party, the transcript and the proposed amendments and objections thereto shall be submitted for settlement to the judge or referee before whom the proceedings were had if the parties cannot agree on the amendments to the transcript. The original of the transcript shall be corrected by the appellant in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the direction of the court and its correctness shall be certified to thereon by the parties or the judge or referee before whom the proceedings were had. When he [*2]serves his brief upon the respondent the appellant shall also serve a conformed copy of the transcript or deposit it in the office of the clerk of the court of original instance who shall make it available to respondent.”

CPLR 5525 (c) (3) provides that an appellant{**63 Misc 3d at 623}

“shall serve on respondent together with a copy of the transcript and the proposed amendments, a notice of settlement containing a specific reference to subdivision (c) of this rule, and stating that if respondent fails to propose amendments or objections within [15 days of service], the provisions of [CPLR 5525 (c) (2)] shall apply.”

CPLR 5525 (c) (2), in turn, provides that

“[i]f the appellant has timely proposed amendments and served them with a copy of the transcript on respondent, and no amendments or objections are proposed by the respondent within the time limited by paragraph 1, the transcript, certified as correct by the court reporter, together with appellant’s proposed amendments, shall be deemed correct without the necessity of a stipulation by the parties certifying to its correctness or the settlement of the transcript by the judge or referee. The appellant shall affix to such transcript an affirmation, certifying to his compliance with the time limitation, the service of the notice provided by paragraph 3 and the respondent’s failure to propose amendments or objections within the time prescribed.”

With respect to both the first and second errata sheets, the court is unable to discern the reason for defendant having failed to object. It may be because defendant did not receive a copy of the transcript; that is, plaintiff sent a copy of the transcript to defendant; that is, plaintiff’s affiant Robert Wilson, in affidavits dated December 14, 2018, and January 22, 2019, only testifies to actually serving the transcript on the earlier date. Moreover, both list defense counsel’s service address as 2 Huntington Quadrangle, Suite 2N01, Melville, New York 11747, not the address of record, 170 Froehlich Farm Boulevard, Woodbury, New York 11797. Finally, it is unclear what defendant would be able to object to—indeed, the very reason that the inquest went forward was defendant’s absence.

In any event, however, even if plaintiff complied with all of CPLR 5525 (c)’s technical requirements, the court would nevertheless be compelled to deny the proposed amendments. CPLR 5525 (c) invokes, at multiple junctures, the “correctness” of the record—in the context of a stenographic record, the accuracy for the purposes of appellate review (see e.g. Ayton v Bean, 92 AD2d 577, 578 [2d Dept 1983] [“by permitting the affidavit of service and the acknowledgement of service to be included in{**63 Misc 3d at 624} the record, Special Term was not correcting or reforming an old record in order to indicate the true facts appearing before it at the time of its original determination but it was, in fact, making an entirely new record. To allow this type of amendment at this stage of the proceeding ‘would be setting a precedent which would lead to great embarrassment in our practice and injustice to parties’ ”]; Yaretsky v Blum, 629 F2d 817, 822-823 [2d Cir 1980] [“The chief purpose of the state statutory requirement that a complete electronic or stenographic record of the hearing be kept appears to be to allow judicial review in a proceeding under (CPLR article 78)”], revd on other grounds 457 US 991 [1982]; cf. Van Valkenburgh v Bourne, 26 AD2d 727, 727 [3d Dept 1966] [permitting addition of statement made in unrecorded summation to the effect that plaintiff had “flunked his driver’s test” where defendant’s counsel conceded that the summation language was “similar in import to the quoted words”]). The very purpose of appellate review is the correction of any errors based on the record; to that end, CPLR 5525 must ensure that the appellate court is reviewing the record as it actually occurred, not as a party believes it should have.

When plaintiff first proposed amendments on or about December 17, 2018, plaintiff’s “Notice of Settlement of Transcript,” apparently sent to respondent/appellee Geico, was accompanied by a five-page errata sheet listing numerous proposed amendments. Numerous amendments materially changed not only plaintiff’s testimony, but the court’s statements and conclusions on the record. For example:

“Transcript (2:1): You have an order to show cause that was granted on default. You wanted to amend the complaint to include some medical service and alleged days out of work. So, this is an inquest.

“(Plaintiff) Okay.

“(Court) Apparently, this case was on for a conference and now I’m told it’s an inquest. During an inquest you can present your evidence as you would like the court to hear it.

“Proposed change: A Conference is on the calendar. The Defendant is a No show. The court will proceed instead on an Inquest. Later a default judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff . . .

“Transcript (5:17-23): (Plaintiff) This is based on—initially, I was paid for during the time I was{**63 Misc 3d at 625} injured for medical treatment up until May 4th of 2013. This is being submitted because I continued treatment, it was necessary to have further treatment up until December 29th, I mean, December 29th of 2015.

“Proposed change: (Gordon) I was not paid for Medical Treatments during the time I was injured in an auto accident. My medical treatments were not paid for at all by my No-Fault auto insurer, Geico (not paid from date of accident to the date of last treatments which is 12/01/2012 through 12/29/2015).”

The second errata sheet proposed similar amendments (proposed change underlined):

“Transcript (6:24): (Plaintiff) This document [from the social security administration] shows that they’re demanding income to be reimbursed from Geico for the treatment periods that I was—it does establish the times that I was treated and had loss of income.

“Proposed change: (Plaintiff) This document [from the social security administration] shows that they’re demanding medical costs to be reimbursed from Geico for the treatment periods that I was—it does establish the times that I was treated and had loss of income . . .

“Transcript (6:24): (Court) You can appeal my decision once you get a decision from me based on this inquest.

“Proposed change: (Court) You can appeal my decision once you get a decision from me based on this conference.”

In the case of both the first and second errata sheets, the other proposed amendments are similar. Even if they do not, as in the examples above, profoundly alter the meaning of the statements made on the record, the proposed changes nevertheless fail to accurately reflect what was said. Accordingly it is hereby ordered that amendment of the transcript of the December 1, 2017 court proceedings (Vanessa M. Castillo, Court Reporter) pursuant to plaintiff’s November 24, 2018, and January 10, 2019, errata sheets is hereby denied; and it is further ordered that said transcript shall be settled as currently transcribed.

Footnotes

Footnote *:The court also denied several subsequent orders to show cause to reargue and/or renew.