February 23, 2006
Parker v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2006 NYSlipOp 01352)
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/parker-v-state-farm-mut-auto-ins-co-2006-nyslipop-01352/
- Decided
- February 23, 2006
- Citation
- 2006 NY Slip Op 01352
- Posture
- Default or vacatur
- Outcome
- Provider prevailed
- Legal questions
- Vacating a default: excuse and defense (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Parker v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2006 NYSlipOp 01352)
| Parker v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
| 2006 NYSlipOp 01352 |
| February 23, 2006 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| Margaret M. Parker, Respondent, v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant. |
—[*1]
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Malone, Jr., J.), entered June 23, 2005 in Albany County, which, inter alia, granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate an order dismissing the complaint.
In this action for payment of no-fault benefits for medical expenses arising from injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident, defendant moved for dismissal of the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3126, claiming plaintiff’s willful failure to respond to certain discovery demands. Upon plaintiff’s default in responding to that motion, Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in February 2005. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to vacate that order. Supreme Court (1) granted plaintiff’s request, finding a reasonable excuse for the default in responding to the motion and a potentially meritorious claim, and (2) upon consideration of the merits of the underlying motion, taking into account plaintiff’s response, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126. This appeal by defendant ensued.
The sole issue raised by defendant on this appeal is its contention that Supreme Court erred in providing relief to plaintiff because she failed to appeal the February 2005 order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 and, therefore, a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) was not appropriate. In our view, the court proceeded properly under the particular circumstances herein. While there is no question that, in a properly contested motion[*2]“predicated upon CPLR 3126, an appeal of [the resulting] order or judgment is the proper and sole remedy for the defaulting party” (Pinapati v Pagadala, 244 AD2d 676, 677 [1997]; see Schwenk v St. Peter’s Hosp. of City of Albany, 215 AD2d 906, 908 [1995], lv dismissed 86 NY2d 838 [1995]), here, the default that plaintiff sought to vacate was her default in opposing defendant’s motion to preclude in the first instance. Therefore, Supreme Court did not err in entertaining her motion to vacate (see generally Sik Bun Yuen v Huang, 18 AD3d 460 [2005]; State Empls. Fed. Credit Union v Starke, 274 AD2d 656, 657-658 [2000]; 10 Carmody-Wait 2d § 70:33 [2005]).
Mercure, Peters, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did the defaulting party show a reasonable excuse (or lack of notice) and a potentially meritorious defense or claim?
This decision: Excuse (or lack of actual notice under CPLR 317) and potentially meritorious defense or claim shown; default vacated or late answer allowed (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Upheld vacatur of the dismissal entered on the plaintiff's default in opposing a CPLR 3126 motion, holding a CPLR 5015 (a) (1) motion, rather than an appeal, was proper because the default was in opposing the motion.
Of the 3 decisions on this question in the Third Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 3 (this one included) are in the same category.
Similar decisions
- V.S. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 29226)The provider's conclusory claim that counsel failed to calendar the trial date did not reasonably excuse its default.
- Prompt Med. Supply, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 50503(U))The insurer's default was excused based on possible withdrawal and the provider's assurance that no default proceedings would be commenced.
- Pierre J. Renelique Physician, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 29225)The insurer failed to establish a reasonable excuse for default by citing the absence of a record of receiving process.
- City Wide Social Work & Psychological Servs., P.L.L.C. v State-Wide Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 50909(U))The insurer failed to establish a meritorious defense warranting vacatur of a judgment entered on an unopposed summary judgment motion.
- SZ Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50497(U))The provider failed to establish a reasonable excuse or a meritorious claim warranting vacatur of its dismissal for failure to proceed at trial.