September 28, 2015
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v MVAIC (2015 NY Slip Op 51446(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/ultimate-health-prods-inc-v-mvaic-2015-ny-slip-op-51446u/
- Court
- Appellate Term, Second Department
- Decided
- September 28, 2015
- Citation
- 2015 NY Slip Op 51446(U) · 49 Misc 3d 132(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Issues
- MVAIC Discovery and procedure
- Legal questions
- MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v MVAIC (2015 NY Slip Op 51446(U))
[*1]| Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v MVAIC |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 51446(U) [49 Misc 3d 132(A)] |
| Decided on September 28, 2015 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on September 28, 2015
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-1282 Q C
against
MVAIC, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered April 15, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs; and it is further,
ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, counsel for the respective parties are directed to show cause why an order should or should not be made and entered imposing such sanctions and costs, if any, against plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 130-1.1 (c) as this court may deem appropriate, by each filing an affidavit or affirmation on that issue in the office of the clerk of this court and serving one copy of same on each other on or before October 15, 2015; and it is further,
ORDERED that the clerk of this court, or his designee, is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order to show cause by regular mail upon counsel for the respective parties.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted the cross motion by defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Since plaintiff and its assignor were aware of the identity of the owner of the vehicle in which the assignor had been a passenger at the time of the accident, plaintiff, as assignee, was required to exhaust its remedies against the vehicle’s owner before seeking relief from MVAIC (Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528 [1997]; Modern Art Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 22 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52586[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Doctor Liliya Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52453[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Here, plaintiff did not demonstrate that it had exhausted its remedies against the owner of the vehicle.
We conclude that sanctions may be warranted for the conduct of counsel for plaintiff, as that conduct appears to be frivolous (see Gihon, LLC v 501 Second St., LLC, 103 AD3d 840 [2013]; Martin v Burns, 77 AD3d 633, 635 [2010]). As relevant here, frivolous conduct includes the assertion of arguments that are “completely without merit in law and [which] cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” (Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1 [c] [1]), and the [*2]assertion of “material factual statements that are false” in the brief filed by counsel on behalf of plaintiff (Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1 [c] [3]; see Korbel v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Horicon, 28 AD3d 888, 889-890 [2006]).
Counsel for plaintiff asserts in the appellant’s brief submitted to this court that:
“To the extent Defendant proffered a purported police report, within Exhibit G’ to its motion, same was inadmissible. In particular, the document was not certified. Moreover, Defendant did not proffer an affidavit to set forth a foundation for its admissibility, authenticity or accuracy.”
However, a review of the record reveals that the affirmation of defendant’s counsel states that “A copy of the certified Police Accident Report is annexed hereto as Exhibit G’.” In addition, each page of the police report annexed to defendant’s motion at Exhibit “G” bears a stamp which states “This is to certify that this document is a true and complete copy of a record on,” although the remainder of the sentence does not appear on the photocopy of Exhibit “G” in the record on appeal. Exhibit “G” also contains a stamped signature of Barbara J. Fiala, but her title as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does not appear on the photocopy of Exhibit “G” in the record on appeal. Moreover, the appellant’s brief further asserts that the transcript of the examination under oath of plaintiff’s assignor did not demonstrate the existence of potential insurance coverage because it was not in admissible form as it was “unsigned and unsworn.” In fact, the transcript states, at the beginning and at the end, directly above the court reporter’s signature, that plaintiff’s assignor was duly sworn by a notary public.
Accordingly, we direct counsel for the respective parties to show cause why sanctions should or should not be imposed against plaintiff’s counsel (see Martin v Burns, 77 AD3d at 635).
In light of the foregoing, the order is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 28, 2015
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Against MVAIC, was the claimant shown to be a qualified, covered person meeting article 52’s conditions?
This decision: Eligibility is treated as the claimant's burden / condition precedent and the claimant did not prove it; claim fails or is premature
Held the provider had to exhaust its remedies against the known owner of the vehicle in which the assignor rode, and affirmed dismissal because it did not demonstrate exhaustion.
Of the 223 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 99 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Modern Art Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 52586(U)) FollowedThe provider failed to show exhaustion of remedies against the vehicle owner before seeking no-fault benefits from MVAIC. The provider obtained summary judgment and a judgment for assigned benefits, which MVAIC challenged on exhaustion grounds.
- Doctor Liliya Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 52453(U)) FollowedA provider whose assignor knows the vehicle's driver and owner must exhaust remedies against them before seeking relief from MVAIC. MVAIC moved under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the provider's action for assigned no-fault benefits as premature.
Similar decisions
- T & J Chiropractic, P.C. v MVAIC (2015 NY Slip Op 51445(U))The provider failed to exhaust remedies against the known owner of the vehicle that struck the assignor before seeking relief from MVAIC. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed denial of the provider's summary judgment motion and grant of MVAIC's cross motion dismissing the complaint.
- Medical Supply Depot Group Corp. v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 50844(U))MVAIC established that the assignor was ineligible for no-fault benefits because the assignor owned the vehicle involved in the accident.
- Compas Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2017 NY Slip Op 51467(U))The provider failed to demonstrate exhaustion of remedies against the known vehicle owner before seeking no-fault benefits from MVAIC. The provider and assignor knew the identity of the owner of the vehicle in which the assignor had been a passenger.
- Ap Orthopedic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v Mvaic (2011 NY Slip Op 51448(U))The assignor's failure to provide proof of New York residency defeated the provider's claim for no-fault benefits from MVAIC. The Appellate Term, Second Department, found that the assignor was neither a qualified person under Insurance Law § 5202 (b) nor a covered person under Insurance Law § 5221 (b) (2), leaving a condition precedent unsatisfied.
- Lida’s Med. Supply, Inc. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52071(U))The provider failed to demonstrate exhaustion of remedies against a known vehicle owner before seeking no-fault benefits from MVAIC. The assignor knew the identity of the owner of the vehicle the assignor was driving at the time of the accident.