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July 1, 2011

Painless Med., P.C. v GEICO (2011 NY Slip Op 21228)

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/painless-med-p-c-v-geico-2011-ny-slip-op-21228/

Court
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Judge
Sweeney, J.
Decided
July 1, 2011
Citation
2011 NY Slip Op 21228 · 32 Misc 3d 715
Posture
Other motion
Outcome
Split result
Issues
Discovery and procedure
Cite as
Painless Med., P.C. v GEICO, 32 Misc 3d 715 (Civ Ct, Kings County 2011)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

A professional corporation's sole shareholder's death does not require substitution where the corporation remains in existence. The Civil Court, Kings County, denied the insurer's dismissal motion under CPLR 1021 and the estate administrator's cross motion to replace the provider corporations, but granted unopposed relief lifting stays and consolidating the actions for the motion. The shareholder was not a party, and no dissolution or receivership triggered CPLR 1017. The actions nevertheless could not proceed because nobody could act for the corporations. Under Business Corporation Law § 1511, the administrator, who was not a physician, could vote inherited shares only for asset disposition or dissolution. The court expressly left open whether the administrator could act for dissolved corporations in winding up their affairs.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Painless Med., P.C. v GEICO (2011 NY Slip Op 21228)

Painless Med., P.C. v GEICO
2011 NY Slip Op 21228 [32 Misc 3d 715]
July 1, 2011
Sweeney, J.
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, September 21, 2011


[*1]
Painless Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Paursmut Anderson, et al., Plaintiffs,
v
GEICO, Defendant.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, July 1, 2011

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Law Office of Teresa M. Spina, Woodbury (Teresa M. Spina and Kylie Higgins of counsel), for defendant. Anna Val, Esq. P.C., Brooklyn, for Estate of Ronald Collins, M.D., plaintiff.

{**32 Misc 3d at 716} OPINION OF THE COURT

Peter P. Sweeney, J.

This decision and order addresses both a motion and a cross motion. The motion was brought by GEICO, a defendant in multiple actions to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, which were commenced by either Painless Medical, P.C., RLC Medical P.C. or Exact Medical P.C. These actions are identified in exhibit “A” to GEICO’s moving papers. Painless Medical, P.C., RLC Medical P.C. and Exact Medical P.C. are professional corporations, organized under the laws of this state, and are licenced to practice medicine. Dr. Ronald Collins, who died on September 15, 2008, was the sole shareholder, officer and director of these corporations. Pursuant to the order of Judge Delores Waltrous dated May 7, 2008, who is now retired, some of these actions have been stayed. On September 9, 2009, Anna Val, an attorney, was appointed the administrator of Dr. Collins’ estate.

In its motion, GEICO seeks the following relief:

(1) an order permitting the motion to be heard and go forward, notwithstanding the fact that some of the actions that are the subject matter of the motion have been stayed;

(2) an order consolidating all the actions identified in exhibit “A” under Civil Court, Kings County, [*2]index number{**32 Misc 3d at 717} 071896/2008, only for the purpose of resolving the issues raised by the motion and having any ruling on the motion applied to all of the consolidated actions;

(3) an order dismissing the actions due to the death of the sole shareholder of the plaintiff professional corporations and the failure to timely and properly effect substitution thereunder; and

(4) an order granting further relief as to the court seems just and proper.

The cross motion was made by Anna Val, an attorney. She seeks an order substituting herself, in her capacity as the administrator of Dr. Collins’ estate, in place of the plaintiff corporations in all of the actions.

The first two branches of GEICO’s motion, to lift the stay and consolidate the cases for the purposes of deciding the motion, are granted without opposition.

The third branch of GEICO’s motion, which seeks an order dismissing the within actions due to plaintiffs’ failure to timely and properly effect substitution, and the cross motion for an order substituting Anna Val, the administrator of Dr. Collins’ estate, for the three plaintiff corporations are denied.

While this court may dismiss an action “[i]f [an] event requiring substitution occurs before final judgment and substitution is not made within a reasonable time” (CPLR 1021), an event requiring substitution has not occurred in any of the actions. Only when “a party dies and the claim for or against him is not thereby extinguished [shall] the court . . . order substitution of the proper parties” (CPLR 1015 [a] [emphasis added]). Dr. Collins was not a party to any of the actions. The fact that he was the sole shareholder of the three plaintiff corporations has no bearing on the issue of whether substitution is required. “A corporation, even when wholly owned by a single individual, has a separate legal existence from its shareholders” (Harris v Stony Clove Lake Acres, 202 AD2d 745, 747 [1994] [citations omitted]; see also Rohmer Assoc., Inc. v Rohmer, 36 AD3d 990, 991 [2007]; Kendall v Venture Dev., 206 AD2d 797, 798 n 1 [1994]) and continues to exist even upon the sole shareholder’s death (see Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 9, 10 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2007]; Business Corporation Law § 1510).

The only authority known to this court requiring substitution for a corporate party is CPLR 1017, which provides: “[i]f a{**32 Misc 3d at 718} receiver is appointed for a party, or a corporate party is dissolved, the court shall order substitution of the proper parties.” Neither Ms. Val nor anyone else has been appointed a receiver for any of the three plaintiff corporations and none of the plaintiff corporations has been dissolved.[FN1]

By denying GEICO’s motion to dismiss and the cross motion for substitution, the court is not [*3]suggesting that the actions may proceed. The fact of the matter is that the actions cannot go forward because there is no one who can now act on behalf of the plaintiff corporations in the actions. While it is true that Dr. Collins’ shares in the three professional corporations vested in his estate at the time of his death (see Matter of Bernfeld, 86 AD3d 244 [2d Dept 2011]; Matter of Fromcheck v Brentwood Pain & Med. Servs., 254 AD2d 485, 486 [2d Dept 1998]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., 15 Misc 3d at 10) and that the fiduciary of an estate can normally vote the decedent’s shares in a corporation for any purpose (EPTL 11-1.1 [b] [14]), this is not the case with respect to professional corporations. Only an individual authorized by law to practice in this state a profession in which the professional corporation is authorized to practice may own, direct or control a professional corporation (Business Corporation Law §§ 1507, 1508). Further, only such individuals may generally come into possession of shares in a professional corporation (Business Corporation Law § 1511). Here, the profession in which the three plaintiff professional corporations are authorized to practice is medicine. Ms. Val is not a licensed physician.

While Business Corporation Law § 1511 generally prohibits a nonprofessional from coming into possession of shares of professional corporations, the statutory language provides for an important exception. The statute, in pertinent part, provides: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the{**32 Misc 3d at 719} transfer of shares by operation of law or by court decree” (Business Corporation Law § 1511). A transferee of shares by operation of law, however, may only vote the shares of a professional corporation for limited purposes. In this regard, the statute provides “no transferee of shares by operation of law . . . may vote the shares [of a professional corporation] for any purpose whatsoever except with respect to corporate action under [Business Corporation Law § 909] and [Business Corporation Law § 1001]” (Business Corporation Law § 1511).

Here, Dr. Collins’ estate became a “transferee by operation of law” upon his death. Accordingly, Ms. Val, as the estate’s fiduciary, may only vote the shares in the three plaintiff corporations for the purposes set forth in Business Corporation Law § 909 and Business Corporation Law § 1001 (id.; see also Matter of Bernfeld, 86 AD3d 244 [2011]; Matter of Fromcheck v Brentwood Pain & Med. Servs., 254 AD2d 485, 486 [1998]).

Business Corporation Law § 909, in essence, permits shareholders, under limited circumstances, to vote to sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all the assets of a corporation. However, if Ms. Val voted to sell substantially all of the assets of the plaintiff corporations, including the outstanding claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the claims might cease to be actionable. It is fairly well settled that an individual or corporation cannot recover assigned no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to an injured party unless the individual or corporation, or one of their employees, actually performed the services (11 NYCRR 65-3.11 [a]; Rockaway Blvd. Med. P.C. v Progressive Ins., 9 Misc 3d 52, 54 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; A.M. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 145[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51147[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). The rationale for this rule is that 11 NYCRR 65-3.11 (a)[FN2] only permits the “provider[ ]” of medical [*4]services to recover payment for those services.{**32 Misc 3d at 720}

Business Corporation Law § 1001 permits the shareholders of a corporation to vote to dissolve the corporation. A dissolved corporation can continue in existence for “the purposes of winding up its affairs” (Business Corporation Law § 1005 [a] [1]). A dissolved corporation is vested with “power to fulfill or discharge its contracts, collect its assets, sell its assets for cash at public or private sale, discharge or pay its liabilities, and do all other acts appropriate to liquidate its business” (Business Corporation Law § 1005 [a] [2]). Further, a dissolved corporation can “continue to function for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the corporation in the same manner as if the dissolution had not taken place” (Business Corporation Law § 1006 [a]) and can “sue or be sued in all courts and participate in actions and proceedings, whether judicial, administrative, arbitrative or otherwise, in its corporate name” (Business Corporation Law § 1006 [a] [4]). Whether Ms. Val would have full authority to act for the three professional corporations in the course of winding up their affairs presents an interesting issue, in light of the statutory prohibitions against nonprofessionals owning, directing and controlling professional corporations. However, since the three corporations involved in Ms. Val’s cross motion have not been dissolved, the court need not address that issue at this time.

For all of the above reasons, it is hereby ordered that the first two branches of GEICO’s motion are granted without opposition; it is further ordered that GEICO’s motion is in all other respects denied; and it is further ordered that the cross motion is denied.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: “With respect to a corporate party that has been dissolved,” as noted by Professor Vincent Alexander in his practice commentaries,

“reference should be made to §§ 1006 and 1117(a) of the N.Y. Business Corporation Law, which govern the survival of remedies by and against dissolved corporations. Subdivision (a) of § 1006 states that a dissolved corporation may continue to function for the purpose of winding up its affairs ‘in the same manner as if the dissolution had not taken place.’ Furthermore, § 1006(a)(4) authorizes a dissolved corporation to sue or be sued in its corporate name” (see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 1017).

For these reasons, Professor Alexander hypothesized that substitution can most likely be avoided in the case of corporate dissolution (id.).

Footnote 2: 11 NYCRR 65-3.11 (a) provides:

“An insurer shall pay benefits for any element of loss other than death benefits, directly to the applicant or, when appropriate, to the applicant’s parent or legal guardian or to any person legally responsible for necessities, or, upon assignment by the applicant or any of the aforementioned persons, shall pay benefits directly to providers of health care services as covered under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law, or to the applicant’s employer for loss of earnings from work as authorized under section 5102(a)(2) of the Insurance Law. Death benefits shall be paid to the estate of the eligible injured person” (emphasis added).

Cited in this decision

  • Rockaway Blvd. Med. P.C. v Progressive Ins. (2005 NY Slip Op 25278)A provider's omission of its relationship with the treating physician from claim forms does not defeat its prima facie case.
  • A.M. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 51147(U))A billing provider cannot correct claim forms identifying treating professionals as independent contractors after litigation has begun.

Similar decisions

  • BR Clinton Chiropractic, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 20291)The provider could pursue claims for services rendered before its sole shareholder's chiropractic license was revoked.
  • Eastern Star Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 22029)A physician's estate administrator need not be medically licensed to authorize prosecution of the professional corporation's claims.
  • A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Travelers Indem. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 28185)A provider PLLC's summary judgment motion was denied because its sole member's suspension left it without authority to prosecute.
  • New York Cent. Mut. Ins. v McGee (2009 NY Slip Op 52385(U))The insurer's common-ownership allegations did not justify joining all provider defendants, and its requested injunction lacked evidentiary support.
  • Multiquest PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 52209(U))A billing provider cannot recover assigned no-fault benefits for services rendered by an independent contractor rather than the provider or its employees.
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