September 2, 2008
Island Surgical Supply Co., Inc. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51860(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/island-surgical-supply-co-inc-v-mvaic-2008-ny-slip-op-51860u/
- Decided
- September 2, 2008
- Citation
- 2008 NY Slip Op 51860(U) · 20 Misc 3d 144(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Issues
- MVAIC
- Legal questions
- MVAIC eligibility: qualified covered person (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Island Surgical Supply Co., Inc. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51860(U))
[*1]| Island Surgical Supply Co., Inc. v MVAIC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 51860(U) [20 Misc 3d 144(A)] |
| Decided on September 2, 2008 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., RIOS and STEINHARDT, JJ
2007-1367 Q C.
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lee A.
Mayersohn, J.), entered May 9, 2007. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
Order reversed without costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) moved for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the action was premature since
plaintiff and its assignor failed to exhaust all remedies against the owner of the vehicle that
plaintiff’s assignor was driving before seeking relief
from MVAIC. MVAIC also asserted that the action was premature since plaintiff’s assignor
failed to provide sufficient information so that MVAIC could determine whether she was a
qualified person. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The court granted plaintiff’s cross
motion for summary judgment, rejecting MVAIC’s argument that plaintiff’s assignor was not a
“qualified person.” This appeal by defendant ensued.
Since plaintiff and its assignor were aware of the identity of the owner of the vehicle which
plaintiff’s assignor was driving at the time of the accident, plaintiff, as assignee, was required to
exhaust its remedies against the vehicle’s owner before seeking relief from MVAIC
(Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528 [1997]; Complete Med. Servs. of N.Y., P.C. v
MVAIC, 20 Misc 3d 137[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51541[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Dists
2008]). If plaintiff unsuccessfully exhausts its remedies against the owner of the vehicle, plaintiff
may assert a claim against MVAIC.
[*2]
However, until plaintiff exhausts its remedies, its claim
against MVAIC is premature (id.). Consequently, MVAIC’s motion for summary
judgment should have been granted and plaintiff’s cross motion denied.
In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.
Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 02, 2008
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Against MVAIC, was the claimant shown to be a qualified, covered person meeting article 52’s conditions?
This decision: Eligibility is treated as the claimant's burden / condition precedent and the claimant did not prove it; claim fails or is premature
Held the claim premature because the provider and assignor knew the owner of the vehicle the assignor was driving and had not exhausted remedies against that owner before seeking benefits from MVAIC.
Of the 224 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 99 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Complete Med. Servs. of N.Y., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51541(U)) FollowedA provider that knows the identities of the driver and vehicle owner must exhaust its remedies against them before seeking relief from MVAIC. The assignor was struck by a taxicab whose driver and owner were known, making the provider's claim against MVAIC premature.
Similar decisions
- Complete Med. Servs. of NY, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51864(U))A provider that knows the owner of the vehicle that struck its assignor must exhaust remedies against that owner before seeking MVAIC benefits.
- Staten Is. Chiropractic Assoc., PLLC v MVAIC (2010 NY Slip Op 50698(U))A provider's claim against MVAIC is premature until remedies against a known vehicle owner have been exhausted.
- Metropolitan Med. Supplies, LLC v MVAIC (2013 NY Slip Op 51583(U))A provider aware of the owner of the vehicle that struck its assignor must exhaust remedies against that owner before seeking MVAIC benefits.
- Medcare Supply, Inc. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51414(U))A provider aware of the vehicle owner's identity must exhaust remedies against that owner before seeking benefits from MVAIC. The provider and assignor knew the identity of the owner of the vehicle in which the assignor had been a passenger at the time of the accident.
- South Nassau Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Medicine, P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 50028(U))A provider must exhaust remedies against the owner of the vehicle carrying the assignor before seeking no-fault benefits from MVAIC. The Appellate Term, Second Department, reversed the denial of MVAIC's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint.