March 10, 2010
Nursing Personnel Homecare v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50450(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/nursing-personnel-homecare-v-new-york-cent-mut-fire-ins-co-2010-ny-slip-op50450u/
- Decided
- March 10, 2010
- Citation
- 2010 NY Slip Op 50450(U) · 26 Misc 3d 145(A)
- Posture
- Default or vacatur
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Nursing Personnel Homecare v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50450(U))
| Nursing Personnel Homecare v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 50450(U) [26 Misc 3d 145(A)] |
| Decided on March 10, 2010 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through November 4, 2011; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and STEINHARDT, JJ
2009-290 K C.
against
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered December 18, 2008. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment.
ORDERED that the order is reversed without costs and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment is granted.
In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion to vacate a default judgment.
In order to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a defendant is required to establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333 [1994]). A motion to vacate a default judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court (see Matter of Gambardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494 [2000]), and its determination will generally not be disturbed unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised its discretion (see Levy Williams Constr. Corp. v United States Fire Ins. Co., 280 AD2d 650 [2001]).
Plaintiff’s affidavit of service established that plaintiff had effectuated service upon
defendant through the delivery of the summons and complaint to the Superintendent of Insurance
(see Insurance Law § 1212; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Lincoln Gen. Ins.
Co., 55 AD3d 543 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d
968 [2006]; Kaperonis v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 AD2d 334 [1998]; see also
CPLR 311 [a] [1]). In support of defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment, there was
more than a “mere denial” of [*2]receipt of the summons and
complaint (see Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Auto One Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 958, 959 [2008]).
Defendant submitted an affidavit from one of its no-fault litigation examiners, who had personal
knowledge regarding defendant’s practices and procedures in retrieving, opening and filing its
mail and in maintaining its files on existing claims. In said affidavit, the no-fault litigation
examiner stated that defendant had never received the summons, the complaint or the motion for
a default judgment (cf. Westchester Med. Ctr. v Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 69
AD3d 613 [2010]). Accordingly, pursuant to CPLR 317, defendant met its burden of showing
that it did not receive actual notice of the summons in time to defend the action.
Furthermore, defendant established the existence of a meritorious defense to the action.
Defendant submitted an affidavit from its litigation examiner in which he stated that the assignor
had cancelled her insurance policy with defendant prior to the date of the accident and had not
subsequently taken out another insurance policy with defendant.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion
in denying defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment. Accordingly, the order is reversed
and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment is granted.
Pesce, P.J., Weston and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 10, 2010
Legal questions (2)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did the defaulting party show a reasonable excuse (or lack of notice) and a potentially meritorious defense or claim?
This decision: Excuse (or lack of actual notice under CPLR 317) and potentially meritorious defense or claim shown; default vacated or late answer allowed
Held the insurer showed under CPLR 317 that it did not receive actual notice in time to defend, through a litigation examiner's detailed mail-procedure affidavit, and a meritorious defense that the policy was cancelled before the accident.
Of the 170 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 67 (this one included) are in the same category.
Was the insurer validly served with process, and does the court have personal jurisdiction over it?
This decision: Insurer validly served and subject to the court's jurisdiction, or service defect cured/excused (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the affidavit of service established service on the insurer by delivery to the Superintendent of Insurance under Insurance Law § 1212, before granting CPLR 317 relief for lack of actual notice.
Of the 129 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 31 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Hospital for Joint Diseases v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 07619)The insurer obtained vacatur of its default by showing that it lacked actual notice in time to defend and might have a meritorious defense.
- New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 04260)The insurer obtained default vacatur under CPLR 317 by showing untimely actual notice of the summons and meritorious defenses.
- Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Auto One Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 10596) FollowedThe insurer failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its default, and its denial of receipt did not rebut proof of proper service.
- Westchester Med. Ctr. v Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 00138) Contrasted (cf., but see)The insurer failed to justify vacating its default because its affidavit established neither a reasonable excuse nor a meritorious defense.
Similar decisions
- Nyack Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 52233(U))The insurer lacked a meritorious defense to vacate its default because a completed hospital facility form replaced the requested no-fault application.
- City Wide Social Work & Psychological Servs., P.L.L.C. v State-Wide Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 50909(U))The insurer failed to establish a meritorious defense warranting vacatur of a judgment entered on an unopposed summary judgment motion.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 06188)The insurer's clerical-oversight affidavit and potentially meritorious defense justified vacating its default judgment.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Insurance Co. of State of Pa. (2005 NY Slip Op 01691)The insurer failed to establish a meritorious defense required to vacate the provider's default judgment.
- Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 00528)The insurers showed an excusable default and a potentially meritorious defense based on partial exhaustion of policy limits.