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February 19, 2015

Daimler Chrysler Ins. Co. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 01538)

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/daimler-chrysler-ins-co-v-new-york-cent-mut-fire-ins-co-2015-ny-slipop-01538/

Court
Appellate Division, First Department
Decided
February 19, 2015
Citation
2015 NY Slip Op 01538 · 125 AD3d 518
Posture
Summary judgment
Issues
Statute of limitations
Cite as
Daimler Chrysler Ins. Co. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 AD3d 518 (1st Dept 2015)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

The insurer's common-law subrogation claim for defense costs was barred by its insured's waiver and the three-year limitations period. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed denial of the plaintiff insurer's summary judgment motion and dismissal on the defendant insurer's cross motion. The insured had signed a stipulation discontinuing and waiving all cross claims in the underlying personal injury action without reserving subrogation rights. The subrogee had no greater rights than its insured. Independently, CPLR 214 (5) imposed the underlying personal injury claim's three-year period running from the accident, unlike statutory no-fault subrogation accruing upon payment. Even assuming additional-insured status, the claim was untimely.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Daimler Chrysler Ins. Co. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 01538)

Daimler Chrysler Ins. Co. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
2015 NY Slip Op 01538 [125 AD3d 518]
February 19, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, April 1, 2015

[*1]

 Daimler Chrysler Insurance Company, Appellant,
v
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Respondent.

Buckley Law Group, P.A., New York (Erdal Turnacioglu of counsel), for appellant.

Boeggeman George & Corde, P.C., White Plains (Richard G. Corde of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered April 12, 2013, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its claim for defense costs expended in the underlying personal injury action, and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The underlying personal injury action was discontinued by stipulation, to which plaintiff’s insured was a signatory, agreeing that all cross claims between the defendants in that action were “discontinued and waived.” The stipulation contained no reservation of any insurer’s subrogation rights (see Weinberg v Transamerica Ins. Co., 62 NY2d 379, 381-382 [1984]; Ziegler v Raskin, 100 AD2d 814 [1st Dept 1984], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 925 [1985]). Thus, plaintiff, as subrogee of its insured, standing in its insured’s shoes and having no greater rights than its insured has, may not assert a subrogation claim against defendant (see Progressive Ins. Co. v Sheri Torah, Inc., 44 AD3d 837, 838 [2d Dept 2007]).

Plaintiff’s claim is also time-barred, because plaintiff is seeking common-law subrogation relief, and the statute of limitations on the underlying personal injury cause of action (three years) commenced to run as of the date of the accident (see General Construction Law § 20; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 43 [1995]; CPLR 214 [5]; cf. Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 221 [1996] [subrogation rights created by no-fault statute commenced on date benefits were paid]).

Although defendant informed plaintiff six months before the limitations period expired that the lessee had failed to name plaintiff’s insured as an additional insured on his personal automobile insurance policy and that plaintiff’s insured was afforded coverage under the policy as a loss payee only, plaintiff did not assert a breach of contract claim against the lessee, or bring a declaratory judgment action against defendant or a subrogation action until well after the time to do so had expired (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Stein, 1 NY3d 416, 423 [2004]).

Thus, even if plaintiff were, as it contends, an additional insured solely by operation of [*2]the terms of the policy issued by defendant, and without reference to the terms of the lease, it could not assert a subrogation claim because its time to do so has expired. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Andrias, Moskowitz and DeGrasse, JJ.

Cited in this decision

A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.

  • Allstate Ins. Co. v Stein (2004 NY Slip Op 01057) FollowedAn insurer's APIP subrogation action has a limitation period running from the accident date, not the first APIP payment.

Similar decisions

  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Karpen (2005 NYSlipOp 51032(U))An insurer's subrogation action for payments exceeding no-fault benefits was time-barred because it began over three years after the accident.
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v Yetish Inc. (2006 NY Slip Op 50471(U))The vehicle owner and driver failed to establish that the insurer's subrogation action was barred by the statute of limitations.
  • Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (2016 NY Slip Op 00325)An injured claimant's or assignee's action for first-party no-fault benefits against a self-insurer has a six-year limitations period.
  • Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v NYC Tr. Auth. (2009 NY Slip Op 29229)An action to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a self-insurer is governed by the six-year limitation period in CPLR 213 (2).
  • Eagle Chiropractic, P.C. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 50525(U))An insurer need not prove a policy contains the mandatory 45-day claim deadline when an older endorsement could no longer apply.
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