December 7, 2016
EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2016 NY Slip Op 51788(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/emc-health-prods-inc-v-erie-ins-co-of-n-y-2016-ny-slip-op51788u/
- Decided
- December 7, 2016
- Citation
- 2016 NY Slip Op 51788(U)
- Posture
- Default or vacatur
- Outcome
- Split result
- Legal questions
- Vacating a default: excuse and defense (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2016 NY Slip Op 51788(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
Erie Insurance Company of New York, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carol Ruth Feinman, J.), entered July 7, 2014. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate a prior order of the same court (Wavny Toussaint, J.) entered September 24, 2013 which, upon defendant’s default in appearing for oral argument, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and, upon vacatur of the September 24, 2013 order, for a finding that the complaint had been dismissed pursuant to a previously issued, self-executing conditional order or, in the alternative, for “permission to reargue” defendant’s cross motion and its opposition to plaintiff’s motion.
ORDERED that the order entered July 7, 2014 is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the order entered September 24, 2013 is granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for argument and determination of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint; as so modified, the order entered July 7, 2014 is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered July 7, 2014 which denied its motion to vacate a prior order, entered September 24, 2013, which had granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint upon defendant’s default in appearing for oral argument, and, upon vacatur, to find that the complaint had been dismissed pursuant to a previously issued, self-executing conditional order or, in the alternative, for “permission to reargue” its cross motion and its opposition to plaintiff’s motion.
In order to be entitled to vacatur of the entire order entered September 24, 2013, which was issued upon defendant’s failure to appear for oral argument, defendant was required to establish, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a reasonable excuse for its default, a potentially meritorious defense to plaintiff’s motion and the potential merits of the cross motion (see 1158 Props., LLC v 1158 McDonald, LLC, 104 AD3d 658 [2013]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v GLI Corporate Risk Solutions, Inc., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52322[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Here, defendant’s attorney submitted an affirmation in which he explained that he had been late to the calendar call because there had been a major traffic jam due to a car accident, and that he had requested that plaintiff vacate the default upon [*2]his arrival. We find that defendant thereby established a reasonable excuse for its default (see Morales v Marma, 88 AD3d 722, 723 [2011]; Felsen v Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 83 AD3d 656, 656-657 [2011]; Reices v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, 306 AD2d 394 [2003]). Furthermore, defendant demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to plaintiff’s motion and the potential merits of the cross motion. Accordingly, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the prior order should have been granted.
Defendant argues that the complaint had already been dismissed because plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with a conditional, self-executing order dated June 24, 2013. However, defendant has not given any indication that the June 24, 2013 order had been served on plaintiff. Therefore, defendant has not demonstrated that the order became binding (see CPLR 2220; All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 44 Misc 3d 48, 50 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). Consequently, we cannot find, on this record, that the complaint had been dismissed.
In view of the foregoing, we remit the matter to the Civil Court for argument and determination of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Accordingly, the order entered July 7, 2014 is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the order entered September 24, 2013 is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for argument and determination of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Aliotta, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 07, 2016
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did the defaulting party show a reasonable excuse (or lack of notice) and a potentially meritorious defense or claim?
This decision: Excuse (or lack of actual notice under CPLR 317) and potentially meritorious defense or claim shown; default vacated or late answer allowed
Vacated the order entered on the insurer's failure to appear for oral argument because counsel's affirmation that a traffic jam made him late was a reasonable excuse and the insurer showed potentially meritorious opposition and cross motion.
Of the 170 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 67 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. (2014 NY Slip Op 24161) FollowedAn order granting summary judgment binds judges of coordinate jurisdiction without service of notice of entry.
Similar decisions
- EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Geico Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51834(U))The provider's action was premature because requested verification remained outstanding when the action commenced.
- Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Servs. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50067(U))A later summary judgment order cannot establish a meritorious defense while an earlier default summary judgment order remains in effect.
- Longevity Med. Supply, Inc. v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 50118(U))The provider showed an excusable default but a potentially meritorious opposition only for the claim the insurer denied receiving.
- Himalayans Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Cas. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50904(U))The insurer's detailed law-office-failure explanation and motion two days after entry of the default order supported vacatur.
- EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 50475(U))Both sides failed to establish summary judgment entitlement: the provider's denial proof was deficient, and the insurer did not prove EUO nonappearance.