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January 17, 2020

Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Servs. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50067(U))

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/gentlecare-ambulatory-anesthesia-servs-v-geico-ins-co-2020-ny-slip-op50067u/

Court
Appellate Term, Second Department
Decided
January 17, 2020
Citation
2020 NY Slip Op 50067(U)
Posture
Default or vacatur
Issues
Defaults and vacatur Discovery and procedure
Legal questions
Vacating a default: excuse and defense (see the maps)
Cite as
Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Servs. v GEICO Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 50067(U) (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

A later summary judgment order cannot establish a meritorious defense while an earlier default summary judgment order remains in effect. The provider obtained summary judgment on the insurer's default; the Civil Court subsequently granted the insurer summary judgment without first vacating the provider's award. The Civil Court then relied on that later order to vacate the default order and judgment and reinstate the insurer's award. The Appellate Term, Second Department, reversed and remitted for a new determination of the insurer's vacatur motion and requested summary judgment relief. Under CPLR 5015 (a) (1), the insurer had to show a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense. The Civil Court was required to assess the vacatur papers independently before considering summary judgment.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Servs. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50067(U))

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Services; Lyonel F. Paul, M.D., as Assignee of Lumene, Erick, Appellant,

against

GEICO Ins. Co., Respondent.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Ruzhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (J’Naia L. Boyd of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered November 3, 2017. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate an order of that court (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.) dated August 12, 2016 granting plaintiff’s prior unopposed motion for summary judgment, and upon such vacatur, to deny plaintiff’s prior motion and grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, to the extent of vacating the August 12, 2016 order and the judgment entered January 10, 2017 pursuant thereto, and, in effect, denying plaintiff’s prior motion and “reinstat[ing]” an October 27, 2016 order of that court (Robin S. Garson, J.) granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order entered November 3, 2017 is reversed, with $30 costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new determination of defendant’s motion to vacate the August 12, 2016 default order, and, upon such vacatur, to deny plaintiff’s prior motion for summary judgment and grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff served a motion for summary judgment on October 7, 2015, returnable on November 9, 2015, which, by stipulation, was adjourned to August 12, 2016. On December 23, 2015, while [*2]plaintiff’s motion was pending, defendant served a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, returnable on January 25, 2016, which, by stipulation, was adjourned to October 26, 2016. On August 12, 2016, despite defendant’s request for an adjournment of plaintiff’s motion to the return date of defendant’s own pending motion for summary judgment, presumably so that the motions could be decided together, the Civil Court (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.) granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment. Three days later, on August 15, 2016, plaintiff served opposition papers to defendant’s still-pending motion for summary judgment, which plaintiff denominated as “Defendant’s cross-motion”; those papers also referenced and purported to further support “plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.”

By order to show cause signed on October 20, 2016, defendant moved to vacate the August 12, 2016 order granting plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment and, upon such vacatur, to deny plaintiff’s prior motion and grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint. While that motion was pending, the Civil Court (Robin S. Garson, J.), by order entered October 27, 2016, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. On January 10, 2017, a default judgment was entered awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $2,418.95, based upon the August 12, 2016 order. On August 18, 2017, plaintiff served opposition papers to defendant’s October 20, 2016 motion. Defendant subsequently served reply papers, attaching the October 27, 2016 order granting its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. By order entered November 3, 2017, the Civil Court (Richard J. Montelione, J.) granted defendant’s motion to the extent of vacating the August 12, 2016 order and the January 10, 2017 judgment entered pursuant thereto, and, in effect, denying plaintiff’s prior motion and “reinstat[ing]” the October 27, 2016 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, giving it “full force and effect.”

In order to vacate a default order or judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a defendant must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Li Fen Li v Cannon Co., Inc., 155 AD3d 858 [2017]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Ahmed, 122 AD3d 557 [2014]). Here, in the November 3, 2017 order, the Civil Court relied on the October 27, 2016 order, which awarded summary judgment to defendant, to find that defendant had a potentially meritorious defense to the action sufficient to warrant the vacatur of the August 12, 2016 order.

A grant of summary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a trial (see Falk v Goodman, 7 NY2d 87, 91 [1959]; News Am. Mktg., Inc. v Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 16 AD3d 146 [2005]), and an order granting such relief is as final and as conclusively determinative of all issues in an action as is a judgment after trial (see Engel v Aponte, 51 AD2d 989 [1976]; Riley v Southern Transp. Co., 278 App Div 605 [1951]). Here, the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff by order dated August 12, 2016 was a final determination of the action. Therefore, the Civil Court should not have issued its October 27, 2016 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, since it should not even have entertained that motion, as that motion did not seek to vacate the August 12, 2016 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment upon defendant’s default. Consequently, it was error for the Civil Court, in its November 3, 2017 order, [*3]to rely on the October 27, 2016 order—which purported to award defendant summary judgment after plaintiff had already been awarded summary judgment on August 12, 2016—and to find, by virtue of the October 27, 2016 order, that defendant had established a meritorious defense, in order to grant the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the August 12, 2016 order (and, in effect, the January 10, 2017 judgment entered pursuant thereto). Rather, the Civil Court should have made its own independent assessment of the merits of the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the August 12, 2016 order based on the facts submitted in those motion papers in order to determine whether the default should be vacated and, if so, whether upon such vacatur, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment should be granted.

Accordingly, the order entered November 3, 2017 is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new determination of defendant’s motion to vacate the August 12, 2016 default order and, upon such vacatur, to deny plaintiff’s prior motion for summary judgment and grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.



ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: January 17, 2020

Legal questions

A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.

Vacating a default: excuse and defense

Open the full map

Did the defaulting party show a reasonable excuse (or lack of notice) and a potentially meritorious defense or claim?

This decision: Excuse or defense cannot be decided on this record: hearing ordered or matter remitted

Held the lower court erred in finding a potentially meritorious defense by relying on a later summary judgment order it should not have entertained, and remitted for an independent determination of the motion to vacate on the moving papers.

  • Appellate DivisionApp Div 34
  • Appellate TermApp Term 127
  • Trial courtsTrial 9
2022, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2019, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse)2018, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2017, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 No meritorious defense)2014, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2012, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2011, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2010, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Neither shown)2009, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (2 Default excused, 1 No meritorious defense)2008, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse)2007, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (3 Default excused)2006, Appellate Division: 7 decisions (7 Default excused)2005, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2004, Appellate Division: 4 decisions (2 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse, 1 Neither shown)2003, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2026, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2015, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Neither shown)2023, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse)2022, Appellate Term: 4 decisions (3 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse)2021, Appellate Term: 6 decisions (3 Default excused, 2 No reasonable excuse, 1 Neither shown)2020, Appellate Term: 10 decisions (2 Default excused, 7 No reasonable excuse, 1 Hearing or remittal)2019, Appellate Term: 18 decisions (5 Default excused, 11 No reasonable excuse, 2 No meritorious defense)2018, Appellate Term: 4 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse, 2 Neither shown)2017, Appellate Term: 14 decisions (5 Default excused, 6 No reasonable excuse, 2 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2016, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (2 Default excused, 2 No reasonable excuse, 1 Neither shown)2015, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (1 No reasonable excuse, 2 Neither shown)2014, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 No reasonable excuse, 1 No meritorious defense)2013, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 No meritorious defense)2012, Appellate Term: 8 decisions (2 Default excused, 5 No reasonable excuse, 1 Neither shown)2011, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (1 Default excused, 2 No reasonable excuse, 1 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2010, Appellate Term: 12 decisions (4 Default excused, 4 No reasonable excuse, 1 No meritorious defense, 3 Neither shown)2009, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (2 Default excused, 2 No reasonable excuse, 1 No meritorious defense)2008, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (1 Default excused, 4 No reasonable excuse, 1 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2007, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2006, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (3 Default excused, 1 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2005, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (2 Default excused)2004, Appellate Term: 4 decisions (1 No reasonable excuse, 2 No meritorious defense, 1 Neither shown)2024, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 No reasonable excuse)2025, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (3 Default excused)2026, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (3 No reasonable excuse)2003, Appellate Term: 1 decision (1 Neither shown)2023, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2011, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 No reasonable excuse)2009, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2007, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2004, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 No meritorious defense)2026, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Default excused)2006, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 Default excused, 1 Neither shown)2024, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Default excused)This decision
20052010201520202025
Default excusedNo reasonable excuseNo meritorious defenseNeither shownHearing or remittalThis decision

Of the 170 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 1 (this one included) is in the same category.

Similar decisions

  • Himalayans Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Cas. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50904(U))The insurer's detailed law-office-failure explanation and motion two days after entry of the default order supported vacatur.
  • Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 50321(U))The provider failed to establish a reasonable excuse or potentially meritorious opposition when seeking vacatur of a default summary judgment order.
  • SS Med. Care, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 52057(U))The provider's premature judgment was vacated, but its summary judgment order survived because the insurer lacked a reasonable default excuse.
  • Hand By Hand, PT, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50774(U))The insurer failed to establish a reasonable excuse for default because it did not explain mailing both answers to counsel's prior address.
  • Freedom Chiropractic, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50686(U))The provider's default judgment was vacated because its mailed motion gave the insurer less than the required 13 days' notice.
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