August 27, 2021
A.C. Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50841(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/a-c-med-p-c-v-new-york-cent-mut-fire-ins-co-2021-ny-slip-op50841u/
- Decided
- August 27, 2021
- Citation
- 2021 NY Slip Op 50841(U)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Split result
- Legal questions
- Outstanding verification and premature actions · Proof of mailing (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at A.C. Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50841(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.
Nightingale Law, P.C. (Michael S. Nightingale and Bryan Melnick of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt and Jamin Koo of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered November 20, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted the branch of plaintiff’s amended cross motion seeking leave to amend its summons and endorsed complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover the principal sum of $3,268.16 representing assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action is premature. Defendant alleged that, on November 28, 2016, it received two bills dated November 21, 2016 from plaintiff totaling $3,268.16, for medical services provided to plaintiff’s assignor, Alan Bailey, on November 18, 2016. Each bill included a $241.50 electromyography service. Defendant further alleged that it timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for additional verification, and that plaintiff had not provided the requested verification with respect to the electromyography services.
On September 20, 2018, plaintiff served an amended cross motion seeking summary judgment and, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), leave to amend the summons and endorsed complaint such that it now sought to recover $2,785.16 for services rendered on November 18, 2016. Plaintiff claimed, in the papers submitted in support of its amended cross motion, that, in March [*2]2017, it had submitted two bills dated March 29, 2017 to defendant, for services rendered to Mr. Bailey on November 18, 2016, in the total amount of $2,785.16. The sole explanation for the submission of what plaintiff characterized as “amended bills” was a sworn statement by plaintiff’s medical billing supervisor that she “was made aware that the defendant was addressing bills with the incorrect amount and requesting verification for services that were mistakenly added to the bill.” Copies of the March 2017 bills were attached to plaintiff’s amended cross motion, which reflect all of the services billed for in the November 2016 submissions, with the exception of the two electromyography services. They are not labeled “amended bills,” nor is there any indication in this record that plaintiff communicated to defendant at the time that it intended to replace the November bills with the March bills. Defendant opposed the branch of plaintiff’s amended cross motion seeking summary judgment, but defendant’s papers were silent with respect to the branch of plaintiff’s amended cross motion seeking leave to amend its summons and endorsed complaint. Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted the branch of plaintiff’s amended cross motion seeking leave to amend the summons and endorsed complaint.
To the extent that defendant argues that the branch of plaintiff’s amended cross motion seeking leave to amend its summons and endorsed complaint should not have been granted because defendant was not served with it prior to a November 20, 2018 court appearance, the record does not support defendant’s contention. Plaintiff’s affidavit of service demonstrates that the amended cross motion was served on September 20, 2018. Defendant’s affidavit of service demonstrates that it served its papers a month later, on October 22, 2018. By failing to make any arguments in opposition to plaintiff’s request to amend the summons and endorsed complaint in those papers, defendant waived them and we do not consider them (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Mind & Body Acupuncture, P.C. v Elrac, Inc., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51219[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).
With respect to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which sought dismissal of the original complaint prior to its amendment, defendant demonstrated that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification upon receipt of plaintiff’s bills on November 28, 2016 (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), and that its 30-day period to pay or deny those bills (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]) did not begin to run because verification remained outstanding. Defendant thus demonstrated, prima facie, that this action is premature.
Plaintiff has not raised an issue of fact precluding summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is premature. Whereas this action was commenced to recover the principal sum of $3,268.16 (the amount sought in the November bills), plaintiff has now elected not to pursue payment for the $483 electromyography services that were the subject of the outstanding verification requests, but it cannot retroactively create an obligation for defendant to have paid or denied the remaining claims totaling $2,785.16, thereby providing a basis for this action (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492, 493 [2005]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v A Cent. Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 146[A], 2014 NY Slip Op [*3]50347[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]). Under the circumstances presented, the submission of the March 2017 bills did not create a new obligation for defendant to pay or deny plaintiff’s duplicate claims for the remaining services, totaling $2,785.16, within 30 days, nor did it give defendant a new opportunity to request additional verification with respect to those services (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 441 [2004]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v A Cent. Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 146[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50347[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]), and plaintiff has not demonstrated that these bills were anything other than a nullity.
In view of the foregoing, we need not decide whether plaintiff could have ended the toll of defendant’s time to pay or deny the November 2016 claims by withdrawing the claims for electromyography services during claims processing, prior to the commencement of this action. Consequently, plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and TOUSSAINT, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: August 27, 2021
Legal questions (2)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did unanswered verification requests make the provider’s claim premature, or justify denying it for nonresponse?
This decision: Timely requests went unanswered; the claim is not overdue and the action is premature
Dismissed the action as premature because verification on the original bills remained outstanding, and the provider's later bills omitting the disputed services were a nullity that created no new obligation to pay or deny.
Of the 385 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 153 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did a party’s evidence establish that it mailed a no-fault claim, denial, verification request or examination notice?
This decision: The insurer's (or its agent's) proof established mailing of its denial, verification request or IME/EUO notice (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the insurer showed timely mailing of its initial and follow-up verification requests after receiving the bills.
Of the 1,400 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 809 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Mind & Body Acupuncture, P.C. v Elrac, Inc. (2015 NY Slip Op 51219(U)) FollowedThe insurer established full fee-schedule payment, and the provider's challenge to the IME letters' address was unpreserved.
- St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 04072) FollowedThe insurer raised factual issues concerning a proper timely denial and its entitlement to deny the hospital's claim.
- Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2005 NYSlipOp 09484) FollowedAn insurer need not pay or deny a no-fault claim until it receives all relevant verification requested.
- Westchester Med. Ctr. v A Cent. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 50347(U)) FollowedResubmission of an identical claim does not restart the insurer's 30-day period to pay or deny it.
- Hospital for Joint Diseases v Allstate Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 01546) FollowedResubmission of a previously denied no-fault claim does not restart the insurer's 30-day period to deny it.
Similar decisions
- Jodi Jacobs, D.C., PLLC v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of NY (2021 NY Slip Op 50445(U))The insurer proved IME nonappearances and nonreceipt of one claim, but failed to establish its fee-schedule defense to a partially paid claim.
- Compas Med., P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51857(U))The insurer proved lack of medical necessity for one claim but failed to establish its payment, late-submission and fee-schedule defenses.
- Englinton Med., P.C. v Ameriprise Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 50715(U))An insurer's adversarial treatment of a provider was not a basis to deny summary judgment on an EUO nonappearance defense.
- Choice Health Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50185(U))Disputed mailing of verification requests prevented summary judgment on one IME nonappearance claim because denial timeliness remained unresolved.
- Rockland Family Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50766(U))The insurer's own affidavits established the provider's entitlement to $97.14 on a fully denied claim billed under CPT code 99205.