December 13, 2019
Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52049(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/charles-deng-acupuncture-p-c-v-mvaic-2019-ny-slip-op-52049u/
- Decided
- December 13, 2019
- Citation
- 2019 NY Slip Op 52049(U) · 66 Misc 3d 129(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Later treatment
- Followed in 1 later decision (see Cited by)
- Legal questions
- Proof of mailing · No-fault statute of limitations · Exhaustion of policy limits (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52049(U))
[*1]| Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 52049(U) [66 Misc 3d 129(A)] |
| Decided on December 13, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 13, 2019
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2018-1174 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Barbara Carabell of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damien Toell of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Rosemarie Montalbano, J.), entered May 10, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action are granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a hearing in accordance with the decision herein and a new determination thereafter on the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the fifth through seventh causes of action; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied MVAIC’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired, that MVAIC never received the claim forms underlying the fifth through seventh causes of action, and that the limits of any available coverage had already been exhausted.
MVAIC’s motion papers established, prima facie, that the action had been commenced after the three-year statute of limitations had expired with respect to the claims underlying the first through fourth causes of action (see Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC, 19 Misc 3d 69 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; see also 6D Farm Corp. v Carr, 63 AD3d 903 [2009]; Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 815 [2008]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the action’s timeliness (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 12 AD3d 429 [2004]; Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC, 34 Misc 3d 126[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52274[U] [*2][App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).
With respect to the fifth through seventh causes of action, contrary to MVAIC’s argument, it failed to establish, as a matter of law, an exhaustion of the available coverage limits, as it did not demonstrate that the available limits had been exhausted at the time the claims at issue were complete (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15; Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; see also Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]). Nevertheless, MVAIC did demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing these causes of action; however, the record does not establish, as a matter of law, whether the dismissal should be with prejudice or without prejudice. While MVAIC made a prima facie showing that it had not received the claim forms underlying these causes of action, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s owner was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that those claim forms had been timely mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). If the subject claim forms were mailed by plaintiff and received by MVAIC, the branch of MVAIC’s motion which asserts that the statute of limitations had expired before plaintiff commenced this action upon such claim forms should be granted, and such a dismissal would be with prejudice. However, if MVAIC sufficiently establishes that it never received them, the branch of MVAIC’s motion which asserts that these causes of action are premature should instead be granted (see Veraso Med. Supply Corp. v NY City Tr. Auth., 63 Misc 3d 152[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50754[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]), which dismissal would be without prejudice. As a result, we are of the opinion that, under the unique circumstances presented, a hearing is necessary pursuant to CPLR 2218, on the limited issue of whether plaintiff mailed and MVAIC received the claim forms underlying the fifth through seventh causes of action (see Med-Tech Prods., Inc. v Statewide Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 128[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50584[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 131[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50650[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; see also Uniform Rules for NY City Civ Ct [22 NYCRR] § 208.11 [b] [4]), as the findings made after such a hearing will prove dispositive.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action are granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a framed issue hearing (see CPLR 2218) to determine whether MVAIC received the claim forms which are the subject of the fifth through seventh causes of action and thus, the ground upon which the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing such causes of action shall be granted.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 13, 2019
Legal questions (3)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Did a party’s evidence establish that it mailed a no-fault claim, denial, verification request or examination notice?
This decision: The mailing proof (of either party) left only a triable issue of fact on whether or when the item was mailed or received
Held that the provider owner's affidavit raised a presumption that the claim forms were mailed and received despite MVAIC's prima facie showing of non-receipt, so a framed-issue hearing on mailing and receipt was required.
Of the 1,400 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 103 (this one included) are in the same category.
Which limitations period governs a first-party no-fault claim against an insurer, self-insurer or MVAIC: six or three years?
This decision: Claim against MVAIC carries the three-year statutory period (CPLR 214 [2]) (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held MVAIC showed the action on four causes of action was commenced after the three-year limitations period expired, and the provider raised no issue of fact on timeliness.
Of the 56 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did the insurer prove the policy’s no-fault limits were properly exhausted before it became obligated to pay the claim?
This decision: Insurer's proof did not establish exhaustion (or compliance with 65-3.15); defense fails on this record (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the insurer failed to establish exhaustion of the available limits because it did not show they had been exhausted when the claims at issue were complete under 65-3.15.
Of the 68 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 34 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 28157) FollowedA provider's claim against MVAIC was time-barred because untimely verification did not postpone accrual.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2004 NY Slip Op 08087) FollowedMVAIC must comply with the 30-day deadline to pay or deny a no-fault claim before qualifying the injured claimant.
- Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 52274(U)) FollowedMVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because it established that the provider's action was commenced after the limitations period expired.
- Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 27097) FollowedAn insurer cannot establish policy exhaustion through payments made after it denied a fully verified claim.
- Veraso Med. Supply Corp. v NY City Tr. Auth. (2019 NY Slip Op 50754(U)) FollowedThe provider's owner's affidavit raised a triable issue as to timely submission of the claim despite the transit authority's denial of receipt.
- Med-Tech Prods., Inc. v Statewide Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 50584(U)) FollowedThe provider's challenge to allegedly stamped signatures on peer reviews required a hearing to determine the reports' admissibility.
- Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50650(U)) FollowedThe provider's medical affirmation required a hearing on whether its allegedly stamped signature was valid.
Cited by
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2021 NY Slip Op 50450(U)) FollowedMVAIC was entitled to dismissal, but conflicting proof of claim receipt required a hearing to determine whether dismissal would be with prejudice.
- SK Prime Med. Supply v MVAIC (2021 NY Slip Op 51200(U))The provider's proof of mailing and MVAIC's proof of nonreceipt required a hearing to determine the ground for dismissal.
Similar decisions
- Healthway Med. Care, P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50198(U))MVAIC's payment log failed to establish exhaustion of available coverage because it omitted claim receipt and full verification dates.
- Bronx Community Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 51538(U))MVAIC obtained dismissal without prejudice because it had not received the provider's claim forms and the action was premature.
- Schottenstein Pain & Neuro, PLLC v MVAIC (2021 NY Slip Op 50643(U))The provider failed to establish reasonable justification for submitting five claims to MVAIC beyond the 45-day deadline.
- Bronx Chiropractic Rehabilitation, P.C. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 50799(U))MVAIC's time to deny or seek verification runs from claim receipt, regardless of whether it has determined covered-person status.
- Harvey Family Chiropractic, Physical Therapy & Acupuncture, PLLC v MVAIC (2025 NY Slip Op 51971(U))MVAIC failed to establish noncompliance with the notice-of-intention requirement or entitlement to dismissal on EUO and fee-schedule defenses.