Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01054)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01054 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on February 25, 2026 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-02481
2024-04108
(Index No. 502863/22)
v
YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award, YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rupert V. Barry, J.), both dated November 1, 2023. The first order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the motion of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., which was to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena and granted that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. The second order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the petitioner’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment and denied the cross-motion of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees.
ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter YSC), on YSC’s claim for no-fault benefits. YSC cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. A proposed judgment was prepared, among other things, awarding YSC attorneys’ fees, plus additional attorneys’ fees “in the sum of 20% of the sum of principal and interest.” In July 2022, American Transit paid YSC the sums owed. In a judgment dated November 22, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded YSC attorneys’ fees in the sum of $1,000, plus additional attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the sum of principal and interest.
YSC served American Transit with an information subpoena. Thereafter, YSC moved, among other things, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena. American Transit cross-moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. American Transit also moved, among other things, to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. YSC cross-moved pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. In an order dated November 1, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that [*2]branch of YSC’s motion which was to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena and granted that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was to quash the information subpoena. In a second order dated November 1, 2023, the court, among other things, granted that branch of American Transit’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment and denied YSC’s cross-motion pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. YSC appeals from both orders.
The Supreme Court properly determined that American Transit issued payments satisfying the judgment and directed the entry of a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to CPLR 5021(a)(2) (see Breck Contr. Corp. v Vecchione, 73 Misc 2d 1002, 1004 [Suffolk Dist Ct, 2d Dist]). Since the judgment was satisfied, YSC was not entitled to any additional discovery (see CPLR 5223).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. “An application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious . . . or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 331-332; 8206 N. Blvd, LLC v Ai Qiu Qu, 232 AD3d 833, 834). Here, American Transit established that the judgment had been satisfied and, as such, there was no reason for postjudgment discovery in an effort to collect the judgment. Moreover, the requested information in the information subpoena was irrelevant, and the information subpoena was served to harass American Transit.
The Supreme Court properly denied YSC’s cross-motion pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). YSC was not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees for its postjudgment motion practice, as no claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits was overdue.
YSC’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Royal Rehab, Inc. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50672(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Royal Rehab, Inc. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50672(U))
| Royal Rehab, Inc. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50672(U) [88 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on February 20, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Royal Rehab, Inc., as Assignee of Joann Castro, Respondent,
v
MVAIC, Appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 20, 2026
2025-989 K C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC, for respondent (no brief filed).
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated March 19, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated March 19, 2025 as denied defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no coverage due to the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to provide MVAIC with notice of intention to file a claim.
“The filing of a timely affidavit providing the MVAIC with notice of intention to file a claim is a condition precedent to the right to apply for payment from [MVAIC]. Compliance with the statutory requirement of timely filing a notice of claim must be established in order to demonstrate [*2]that the claimant is a covered person, within the meaning of the statute, entitled to recover no-fault benefits from the MVAIC” (Avicenna Med. Arts, P.L.L.C. v MVAIC, 53 Misc 3d 142[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51535[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Insurance Law § 5221 [a] [1], [3]; [b] [2]). MVAIC established that it had not received such an affidavit. In opposition, plaintiff failed to establish that such an affidavit had been submitted to MVAIC. Consequently, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint (see Oleg’s Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 75 Misc 3d 140[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50593[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; Lantsman Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 75 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50568[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 20, 2026
Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50215(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50215(U))
[*1]| Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50215(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-991 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered March 11, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) as denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the reasons stated in Harmonized Acupuncture, as Assignee of Hopkins, Jadiah v MVAIC (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-984 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50214(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50214(U))
[*1]| Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50214(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-00987 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated March 18, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) as denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the reasons stated in Harmonized Acupuncture, as Assignee of Hopkins, Jadiah v MVAIC (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-984 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50216(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50216(U))
[*1]| Grand Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50216(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-1001 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated March 19, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) as denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the reasons stated in Harmonized Acupuncture, as Assignee of Hopkins, Jadiah v MVAIC (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-984 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50213(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50213(U))
[*1]| Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50213(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-986 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered March 13, 2025. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) which denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the reasons stated in Harmonized Acupuncture, as Assignee of Hopkins, Jadiah v MVAIC (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-984 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50211(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50211(U))
[*1]| Harmonized Acupuncture v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50211(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-984 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered March 11, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) as denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
“The filing of a timely affidavit providing the MVAIC with notice of intention to file a claim is a condition precedent to the right to apply for payment from [MVAIC]. Compliance with the statutory requirement of timely filing a notice of claim must be established in order to demonstrate that the claimant is a covered person, within the meaning of the statute, entitled to recover no-fault benefits from the MVAIC” (Avicenna Med. Arts, P.L.L.C. v MVAIC, 53 Misc 3d 142[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51535[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Insurance Law §§ 5208 [a] [1], [3]; 5221 [b] [2]). MVAIC established that it had not received such an affidavit. In opposition, plaintiff failed to establish that such an affidavit had been submitted to MVAIC. Consequently, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint (see Oleg’s Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 75 Misc 3d 140[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50593[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th [*2]& 13th Jud Dists 2022]; Lantsman Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 75 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50568[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50212(U))
Reported in New York Official Reports at Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50212(U))
[*1]| Summer P.T., P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50212(U) [88 Misc 3d 130(A)] |
| Decided on February 13, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 13, 2026
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2025-985 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard F. Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered March 3, 2025. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) which denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the reasons stated in Harmonized Acupuncture, as Assignee of Hopkins, Jadiah v MVAIC (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-984 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 13, 2026Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 00501)
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 00501)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 00501 [246 AD3d 722] |
| February 4, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| In the Matter of American Transit Insurance Company,
Respondent, v M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C., As Assignee of Carol McGee, Appellant. |
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.
Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
HEADNOTES
Appeal
– Appeal as of Right
– Order Not Deciding Motion Made on Notice
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 10, 2022, M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated March 18, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the application of M EL Sayed Physical Therapy, P.C., for an additional award of attorneys’ fees.
Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal must be dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right from the portion of the order appealed from, which does not decide a motion made on notice, and we decline to grant leave to appeal (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2]; Kelsey v Rutledge, 214 AD3d 862, 862 [2023]; Gamman v Silverman, 135 AD3d 814, 815 [2016]). Genovesi, J.P., Brathwaite Nelson, Dowling and Hom, JJ., concur.
Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 00342)Reported in New York Official Reports at Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 00342)
| Chapa Prods., Corp. v MVAIC |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 00342 [245 AD3d 880] |
| January 28, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| Chapa Products, Corp., as Assignee of Emmanuel Vidal,
Respondent, v MVAIC, Appellant. |
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC, Jericho, NY (David A. Gierasch of counsel), for appellant.
HEADNOTES
Insurance
– Health and Accident Insurance
– Denial of Claim
– Failure to Include Time Limit to Issue Denial
In an action to recover no-fault benefits, the defendant appeals, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts dated November 1, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, modified an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), dated March 17, 2017, by providing that the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied and, upon searching the record, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Ordered that the order dated November 1, 2019, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and so much of the order dated March 17, 2017, as granted the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
The plaintiff, a medical provider, commenced this action against the defendant insurer to recover assigned no-fault benefits for medical services provided to an insured. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the complaint. The defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to provide requested verification within 120 days of the defendant’s initial verification request in violation of 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (b) (3). In an order dated March 17, 2017, the Civil Court, among other things, denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted the defendant’s cross-motion.
In an order dated November 1, 2019, the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts modified the order dated March 17, 2017, by providing that the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied and, upon searching the record, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Appellate Term determined that the defendant, in failing to deny the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the plaintiff failed to provide requested verification within 120 days of the defendant’s initial verification request, within 30 days of the expiration of the 120-day period, was precluded from asserting that defense. By order of the Appellate Term dated May 1, 2020, the defendant was granted leave to appeal to this Court.
11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (b) (3), the relevant regulation, unambiguously states that “an insurer may issue a denial if, more than 120 calendar days after the initial request for verification, the applicant has not submitted all such verification under the applicant’s control or possession or written proof providing reasonable justification for the failure to comply.” The regulations do not [*2]specify a time frame under which the insurer must issue a denial following the 120-day period. Had the New York State Department of Financial Services intended to impose a mandatory 150-day time limit to issue a denial for failure to provide the requested verification, it would have included such language in the regulations (see Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 209 [1976]). Under these circumstances, the Appellate Term improperly determined that the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim was untimely because it was not within 150 days of the initial verification request. Accordingly, the Appellate Term should have affirmed so much of the Civil Court’s order as granted the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Genovesi, J.P., Ford, Wan and Love, JJ., concur.