Reported in New York Official Reports at New Life Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50688(U))
| New Life Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50688(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
New Life Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Steven Vullanueva, Appellant,
v
Country-Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2025-467 Q C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 7, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 7, 2024 granting defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement. In its motion, defendant contended, among other things, that it was not in default of paying the settlement as plaintiff had failed to tender a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), and, therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay the settlement had not been triggered.
For the reasons stated in Elite Psychological Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Anel Toussaint-Fils v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-466 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50674(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50674(U))
| Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50674(U) [88 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Caraballo, Joshua, Appellant,
v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2024-333 K C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant.
Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the matter should be remitted to the Civil Court for consideration of what plaintiff denominated as amended opposition to defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, that defendant’s cross-motion should be denied.
For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (86 Misc 3d 128[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50836[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
We note that, at oral argument, plaintiff argued for the first time that the bill underlying the [*2]third cause of action, for $475 based upon services rendered on February 11, 2019, was never denied. While plaintiff is correct, a denial was not warranted under the circumstances. In opposition to defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not respond to, let alone rebut, defendant’s proof that the claim had been paid, which included an Explanation of Review showing payment for that bill and a copy of the check showing that it had been deposited.
BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50673(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50673(U))
| Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50673(U) [88 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Springer, John, Appellant,
v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2023-1126 K C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant.
Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s cross-motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through eighth causes of action.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted the branches of defendant’s cross-motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through eighth causes of action. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the matter should be remitted to the Civil Court for consideration of what plaintiff denominated as amended opposition to defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint or, in the alternative, that the branches of defendant’s cross-motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through eighth causes of action should be denied.
For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (86 Misc 3d 128[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50836[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists [*2]2025]), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Biotech Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50679(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Biotech Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50679(U))
| Biotech Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50679(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Biotech Surgical Supply, Inc., as Assignee of Minnie Floyd, Appellant,
v
Country Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2024-1197 Q C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 7, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 7, 2024 granting defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement. In its motion, defendant contended, among other things, that it was not in default of paying the settlement as plaintiff had failed to tender a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), and, therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay the settlement had not been triggered.
For the reasons stated in Elite Psychological Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Anel Toussaint-Fils v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-466 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50683(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50683(U))
| Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50683(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Dr. Alexander Berenblit, M.D., as Assignee of Albert Floyde, Appellant,
v
Country Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2025-85 Q C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Lisa S. Ottley, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 9, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the September 13, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for an accident which occurred in 1999, the parties entered into a settlement in May 2002, which provided that defendant would pay plaintiff the principal sum of $2,597.74, plus attorney’s fees in the sum of $519.54 and filing fees in the sum of $105. Over 21 years later, plaintiff moved to enter judgment due to defendant’s failure to pay pursuant to the stipulation. A judgment was entered on September 13, 2023 which awarded plaintiff, insofar as is relevant, the principal sum of $3,222.28, plus accrued compound interest, plus $850 in attorney’s fees, for a total sum of $507,988.45.
Defendant moved to vacate the judgment arguing, among other things, that there was no enforceable settlement between the parties as defendant had not signed the settlement documents, that the statute of limitations had expired on plaintiff’s claim for breach of a settlement agreement, [*2]and that plaintiff had failed to provide a five-day notice to defendant prior to entering judgment as required by CPLR 3215 (g) (1). The motion also sought, in the alternative, to vacate so much of the judgment as awarded compound interest and $850 in attorney’s fees. By order dated July 9, 2024, the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the judgment, finding that defendant had sufficiently established that it did not receive tender of the duly executed release and the stipulation of discontinuance executed by the settling plaintiff, and that plaintiff failed to rebut this showing. The court denied, as moot, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking alternative relief.
Contrary to the Civil Court’s finding, defendant did not demonstrate that it had not received a duly executed release and stipulation of discontinuance. Thus, plaintiff did not need to establish that it mailed the duly executed release to defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested (see CPLR 5003-a [g]).
We further find that defendant did not demonstrate that there was no enforceable settlement between the parties in this action. While plaintiff’s proof of the settlement has no signature on defendant’s behalf, the judgment entered September 13, 2023 stated that it was entered “per stipulation of the parties” and there is a note in the court record that the matter was settled at the time of the scheduled trial. “A presumption of regularity attaches to official court proceedings” (People v Pichardo, 168 AD2d 577, 577 [1990]), and an unsigned settlement may be enforceable (see CPLR 2104; Flores v Lower E. Side Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 NY3d 363, 369 [2005]; Friedman v Garey, 8 AD3d 129 [2004]). Here, defendant, on its motion to vacate the judgment, had the burden to prove that the matter was not settled, but failed to do so. Indeed, defendant initially did not move to vacate the judgment on the basis that the settlement was not enforceable; instead, defendant admitted that the matter had been settled in court prior to trial.
Next, we find that defendant’s contention that the judgment should be vacated because its entry was subject to a six-year statute of limitations for breach of a contract, here a settlement agreement, to be without merit. “Entry of a default judgment for failure to comply with a stipulation of settlement is specifically provided for by CPLR 3215 (i) (1), which contains no time limit for entering such judgment” (Marine Midland Bank v Worldwide Indus. Corp., 307 AD2d 221, 222 [2003]; compare CPLR 3215 [c]). Moreover, here the stipulation referenced CPLR 5003-a and expressly permitted, without any time limit, an application for judgment based upon any future default in payment, CPLR 5003-a (e) similarly has no time limit, and courts have rejected the contention that enforcement of a stipulation, including entry of a default judgment, is barred by the statute of limitations (see Cook v Greenbaum, 18 AD3d 416 [2005]; Marine Midland Bank v Worldwide Indus. Corp., 307 AD2d 221; Arguelles, M.D., P.C. v AIG Natl. Ins. Co., 86 Misc 3d 132[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).
With respect to defendant’s contention that, pursuant to CPLR 3215 (g) (1), plaintiff was required to notice defendant before judgment could be entered, we find this contention to similarly be without merit. As set forth in the settlement, any judgment was to be entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) which provides that no notice need be given to a settling defendant who has not paid. [*3]Consequently, the clerk was entitled to enter judgment without further notice to defendant.
Defendant’s remaining arguments in support of the branch of its motion seeking to vacate the entire judgment lack merit (see Mundel v Harris, 199 AD3d 814, 815 [2021]; Arguelles, M.D., P.C. v AIG Natl. Ins. Co., 86 Misc 3d 132[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).
Defendant’s contention that plaintiff was not entitled to recover compound accrued interest lacks merit. The claims in this case are “governed by the former regulations providing for compound interest because the accident occurred prior to the effective date of the current regulations, which now provide for a simple rate of interest” (New Life Acupuncture, P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 81 Misc 3d 142[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50120[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]; see Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144, 155-156 [2021]; Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 127[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; compare former 11 NYCRR 65.15 [h], with 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a], effective April 5, 2002; see also Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 62 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).
However, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the $850 award of attorney’s fees set forth in the judgment should have been granted, as CPLR 5003-a (e) does not provide for attorney’s fees to be separately awarded in a judgment entered upon a settling defendant’s failure to pay the settlement amount (see Liss v Brigham Park Coop. Apts. Sec. No. 3, 264 AD2d 717 [1999]).
Accordingly, the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the September 13, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees.
BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50676(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50676(U))
| Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50676(U) [88 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Volimar Louis, Appellant,
v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2024-450 K C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant.
Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Inga M. O’Neale, J.), entered February 9, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Inga M. O’Neale, J.) entered February 9, 2024 as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the order, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Civil Court to decide what plaintiff denominates an amended cross-motion for summary judgment, which the court declined to consider. The court rejected that submission as “procedurally improper,” citing CPLR 2214. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion should be denied.
For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (85 Misc 3d 130[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50196[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50687(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50687(U))
| Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50687(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Elite Psychological Services, P.C., as Assignee of Anel Toussaint-Fils, Appellant,
v
Country-Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2025-466 Q C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 7, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 7, 2024 granting defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement. In its motion, defendant contended, among other things, that it was not in default of paying the settlement as plaintiff had failed to tender a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), and, therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay the settlement had not been triggered.
CPLR 5003-a (a) requires a settling defendant to “pay all sums due to any settling plaintiff within twenty-one days of tender, by the settling plaintiff to the settling defendant, of a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff.” In the context of CPLR 5003-a (a), “[w]here mailing is utilized, tender is defined as occurring upon the [*2]defendant’s actual receipt of the general release and stipulation of discontinuance, and not on the date of mailing” (J.D.T. v Chaimowitz, 218 AD3d 821, 823 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit detailing defendant’s counsel’s practices and procedures for the receipt of mail (see Treka Med., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d 133[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51411[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]), and, based thereon, explicitly denying that its office ever received a release and discontinuance in this case. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, this was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that defendant never received the documents required by CPLR 5003-a (a) and, thus, that its obligation to pay the settlement had never been triggered (cf. Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 86 Misc 3d 133[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51150[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). In its opposition, plaintiff failed to rebut that showing or submit any proof that it had tendered the requisite documents.
Plaintiff’s remaining contentions lack merit.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50686(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50686(U))
| Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50686(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on February 27, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Health Value Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Solomon Davydov, Appellant,
v
Country Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on February 27, 2026
2025-385 Q C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 7, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 7, 2024 granting defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement. In its motion, defendant contended, among other things, that it was not in default of paying the settlement as plaintiff had failed to tender a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), and, therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay the settlement had not been triggered.
For the reasons stated in Elite Psychological Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Anel Toussaint-Fils v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-466 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: February 27, 2026
Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lenox Hill Hosp. (NSUH) (2026 NY Slip Op 01052)Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lenox Hill Hosp. (NSUH) (2026 NY Slip Op 01052)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lenox Hill Hosp. (NSUH) |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01052 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on February 25, 2026 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-04107
(Index No. 535871/22)
v
Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH), etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Short & Bill, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award, Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heela D. Capell, J.), dated February 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) which were to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine upon the petitioner, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and granted that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena.
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the petitioner, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) (hereinafter Lenox Hill). Lenox Hill cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In a judgment dated May 24, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded Lenox Hill attorneys’ fees in the sum of $500. In August and September 2023, American Transit paid the sums owed to Lenox Hill, except for postjudgment interest in the sum of $192.
Lenox Hill served American Transit with an information subpoena. Thereafter, Lenox Hill moved, inter alia, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine upon American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. American Transit cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. In an order dated February 15, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of Lenox Hill’s motion and granted that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion. Lenox Hill appeals.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. “An application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious . . . or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 331-332; 8206 N. Blvd, LLC v Ai Qiu Qu, 232 AD3d 833, 834). Here, American Transit established that the requested information in the information subpoena was irrelevant and that Lenox Hill served the information subpoena to harass American Transit.
However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Lenox Hill’s motion which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). As Lenox Hill sought payment of postjudgment interest in the sum of $192 that was overdue, Lenox Hill was entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees for the services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue postjudgment interest. However, Lenox Hill was not entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees for the remainder of the services performed by its attorneys in connection with preparing and serving the information subpoena and prosecuting this appeal, which were not part of a legitimate attempt to collect payment of an overdue claim or portion of a claim.
Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of the additional attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) to which Lenox Hill is entitled.
Lenox Hill’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v MTS Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01053)Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v MTS Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01053)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v MTS Acupuncture, P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01053 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on February 25, 2026 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-06668
(Index No. 536898/22)
v
MTS Acupuncture, P.C., etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Larkin Farrell, LLC, New York, NY (William Larkin and Melissa A. Marano of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm a master arbitration award, MTS Acupuncture, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated July 3, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the petitioner’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment, denied, as academic, those branches of the motion of MTS Acupuncture, P.C., which were to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against the petitioner, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and denied, as academic, that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as denied, as academic, that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena is dismissed, as MTS Acupuncture, P.C., is not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156-157); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying, as academic, that branch of the motion of MTS Acupuncture, P.C., which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion on the merits; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that with one bill of costs is awarded to the petitioner.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of MTS Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter MTS), for no-fault benefits. MTS cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In a judgment dated March 21, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded MTS attorneys’ fees. In April and May 2023, American Transit paid the sums owed.
Thereafter, MTS served American Transit with an information subpoena. MTS moved, inter alia, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. American Transit cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. American Transit also moved, inter alia, to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. In an order dated July 3, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of American Transit’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment, denied, as academic, those branches of MTS’s motion which were to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and denied, as academic, that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. MTS appeals.
The Supreme Court properly determined that American Transit issued payments satisfying the judgment and directed the entry of a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to CPLR 5021(a)(2) (see Breck Contr. Corp. v Vecchione, 73 Misc 2d 1002, 1004 [Suffolk Dist Ct, 2d Dist]). Since the judgment was satisfied, MTS was not entitled to any additional discovery (see CPLR 5223). Moreover, the court properly denied, as academic, those branches of MTS’s motion which were to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena and to impose a $50 fine against American Transit.
However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of MTS’s motion which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees on the merits, not as academic. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). MTS was not entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for its postjudgment motion practice, as no claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits was overdue.
MTS’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court