Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Ctr., LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 01350)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Ctr., LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 01350)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Ctr., LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 01350 [247 AD3d 875]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 20, 2022, Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), entered July 18, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition of Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $280.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, an insurer, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award confirming an arbitration award in favor of Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC (hereinafter Surgi-Center), a medical provider. Surgi-Center filed a cross-petition to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for services rendered in this proceeding. In a judgment entered July 18, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award, and, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of $280. Surgi-Center appeals from so much of the judgment as, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $280.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” As applicable here, the superintendent’s regulations provide that “[t]he attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). The term “court appeal” includes a proceeding, such as here, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration [*2]award (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 782-783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]).

“ ’The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court’ ” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924 [2024], quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036 [2015]). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036).

Contrary to Surgi-Center’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err or improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding Surgi-Center an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in the sum of $280 without first conducting a hearing (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d 724, 725 [2025]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d 558, 560 [2025]). As an initial matter, since Surgi-Center failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of its cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725). Moreover, Surgi-Center failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d at 560). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists’ ” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9 [2025], quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505 [2015]), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4).

In light of our determination, Surgi-Center’s remaining contention has been rendered academic. Iannacci, J.P., Chambers, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v SCOB, LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 01352)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v SCOB, LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 01352)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v SCOB, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 01352 [247 AD3d 879]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated September 20, 2022, SCOB, LLC, appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), dated September 21, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, awarded SCOB, LLC, an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in the sum of only $1,000.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of an attorney’s fee to be awarded pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in accordance herewith.

SCOB, LLC (hereinafter SCOB), is a medical provider that made a claim for no-fault benefits from the petitioner, an insurance carrier. The petitioner denied the claim on the ground that the treatment was not medically necessary. SCOB sought arbitration of the claim, and in an arbitration award dated May 21, 2022, the arbitrator awarded SCOB, inter alia, a substantial portion of the amount claimed. The petitioner sought review of the arbitration award by a master arbitrator. In a master arbitration award dated September 20, 2022, the master arbitrator, among other things, confirmed the arbitration award.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. SCOB filed a cross-petition to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for the representation in this proceeding. In opposition to the cross-petition, the petitioner contended, inter alia, that any award of an attorney’s fee was limited by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d) and that the Supreme Court should limit the amount of billing time allowed in light of the repetition of the legal issues in the no-fault area of the law. In an order dated July 26, 2023, the court, among other things, denied the petition, granted the cross-petition, and directed SCOB to file an affirmation of fee request with respect to the amount of an attorney’s fee to be awarded pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4).

Thereafter, SCOB submitted an attorney’s affirmation seeking an award in the sum of $4,600 as an attorney’s fee in connection with this proceeding. In a judgment dated September 21, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, awarded SCOB an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR [*2]65-4.10 (j) (4) in the sum of $1,000. SCOB appeals, contending that the award was inadequate.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the amount of the attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a CPLR article 75 proceeding is not controlled by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d), but rather, “shall be fixed by the court” (id. § 65-4.10 [j] [4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d at 783; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705).

“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is commonly understood to be a fee which represents the reasonable value of the services rendered” (Diaz v Audi of Am., Inc., 57 AD3d 828, 830 [2008]; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839 [2016]). In determining the reasonable value of the services rendered, “the court may consider a number of factors, including . . . the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, the lawyer’s experience, ability, and reputation, the customary fee charged for similar services, and the results obtained” (Diggs v Oscar De La Renta, LLC, 169 AD3d 1003, 1005 [2019]; see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9 [1974]; RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d at 839). “While a hearing is not required in all circumstances, the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” (Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Vidaurre, 155 AD3d 934, 935 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sterling Natl. Bank v Alan B. Brill, P.C., 186 AD3d 515, 520 [2020]).

Here, the Supreme Court awarded SCOB the sum of only $1,000 for an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) without stating the basis for that determination. Nor is the basis for that determination evident from the record. Contrary to SCOB’s contention, the petitioner did, in fact, oppose that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) and argued, among other things, that recovery of such a fee was limited. However, the petitioner did not submit evidence of the customary fee charged for similar services and the reasonable amount of time required to defend the petition and support the cross-petition. Contrary to SCOB’s contention, the court was not obligated to accept SCOB’s representation as to its attorney’s fee, and the court could rely upon its “familiarity with the nature and complexity of the litigation, the time, effort and skill required for its resolution and the fees customarily charged for similar matters” (Ricciuti v Lombardi, 256 AD2d 892, 893 [1998]) to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee. Nonetheless, since the basis for the court’s award is not evident from the judgment appealed from or the record, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of the award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), stating the evidentiary basis for the award (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 706).

SCOB’s remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are improperly raised for the first time in reply. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Ford, Voutsinas and Love, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Community Med. Imaging, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01351)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Community Med. Imaging, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01351)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Community Med. Imaging, P.C.

2026 NY Slip Op 01351 [247 AD3d 877]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated March 26, 2023, Community Medical Imaging, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Anne J. Swern, J.), dated June 27, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the motion of Community Medical Imaging, P.C., for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) only to the extent of awarding an attorney’s fee in the sum of $750.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of an attorney’s fee to be awarded pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in accordance herewith.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated March 26, 2023, which confirmed an arbitration award against the petitioner and in favor of Community Medical Imaging, P.C. (hereinafter Community). Community filed a cross-petition, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In an order dated October 10, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the petition and granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award.

Community then moved for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for services rendered in this proceeding in the sum of $2,200. In support of the motion, Community submitted an affirmation of services by its attorney. The petitioner opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that an award of an attorney’s fee was limited by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d) and that the amount of the attorney’s fee sought was excessive as to the hourly rate and the time purportedly spent on the petition and the cross-petition. In an order dated June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the motion to the extent of awarding Community an attorney’s fee in the sum of $750. Community appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the [*2]overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” The recoverable attorney’s fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the amount of the attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a CPLR article 75 proceeding is not controlled by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d), but rather, “shall be fixed by the court” (id. § 65-4.10 [j] [4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d at 783; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705).

“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is commonly understood to be a fee which represents the reasonable value of the services rendered” (Diaz v Audi of Am., Inc., 57 AD3d 828, 830 [2008]; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839 [2016]). In determining the reasonable value of the services rendered, “the court may consider a number of factors, including . . . the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, the lawyer’s experience, ability, and reputation, the customary fee charged for similar services, and the results obtained” (Diggs v Oscar De La Renta, LLC, 169 AD3d 1003, 1005 [2019]; see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9 [1974]; RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d at 839). “While a hearing is not required in all circumstances, the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” (Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Vidaurre, 155 AD3d 934, 935 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sterling Natl. Bank v Alan B. Brill, P.C., 186 AD3d 515, 520 [2020]).

Here, the parties submitted conflicting evidence as to the customary fee charged for similar services and the reasonable amount of time required to defend the petition and support the cross-petition. Markedly, the evidence submitted by the petitioner suggested that the customary fees were higher than that awarded by the Supreme Court here, and in the order appealed from, the court provided no explanation for the determination of the award of an attorney’s fee, and the basis for that determination is not evident from the record. Under the circumstances, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of the award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), stating the evidentiary basis for the award (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 706).

The parties’ remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are not properly before this Court. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Ford, Voutsinas and Love, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01354)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01354)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C.

2026 NY Slip Op 01354 [247 AD3d 883]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 31, 2022, YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), dated August 27, 2024. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied that branch of the cross-petition of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4).

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the cross-petition of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of the attorney’s fee.

YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter YSC), is a medical provider that made a claim for no-fault benefits from the petitioner, an insurance carrier. The petitioner denied the claim, and YSC sought arbitration of the claim. In an arbitration award dated June 9, 2022, the arbitrator, inter alia, awarded YSC the amount claimed. The petitioner sought review of the arbitration award by a master arbitrator. In a master arbitration award dated August 31, 2022, the master arbitrator, among other things, confirmed the arbitration award.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. YSC filed a cross-petition to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for the representation in this proceeding. In opposition to the cross-petition, the petitioner contended, inter alia, that any award of an attorney’s fee was limited by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d). In a decision dated June 4, 2024, the Supreme Court determined, among other things, that the petition should be denied, the cross-petition should be granted, and YSC was entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), to be determined by the court upon submission of an affirmation of services. Subsequently, YSC submitted an affirmation of services, seeking the sum of $5,020 as an attorney’s fee. In a judgment dated August 27, 2024, the court, inter alia, denied the petition, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award, and, in effect, denied that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR [*2]65-4.10 (j) (4). YSC appeals from so much of the judgment as, in effect, denied that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4).

“The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, an attorney’s fee is not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]; see generally Congel v Malfitano, 31 NY3d 272, 291 [2018]). Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” As applicable here, the superintendent’s regulations provide that an “attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration award . . . shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). A “court appeal from a master arbitration award” includes a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705).

Here, YSC sought an award of an attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with the court proceedings on the petition to vacate the master arbitration award and the cross-petition, among other things, to confirm the master arbitration award. Having prevailed in this CPLR article 75 proceeding, YSC was entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d at 783; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 706). Thus, the Supreme Court erred by, in effect, denying that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4).

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the amount of the attorney’s fee awarded for services rendered in this proceeding is not controlled by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d). The superintendent’s regulations provide that the amount awarded pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) “shall be fixed by the court” (id.; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d at 783; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705).

Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee to which YSC is entitled, stating the evidentiary basis for the award (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 706).

The parties’ remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are without merit. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Ford, Voutsinas and Love, JJ., concur.

Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. (2026 NY Slip Op 50678(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. (2026 NY Slip Op 50678(U))

Elite Psychological Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins.

2026 NY Slip Op 50678(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2024-1184 Q C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 7, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 7, 2024 granting defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement. In its motion, defendant contended, among other things, that it was not in default of paying the settlement as plaintiff had failed to tender a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), and, therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay the settlement had not been triggered.

For the reasons stated in Elite Psychological Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Anel Toussaint-Fils v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-466 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50685(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50685(U))

Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50685(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2025-383 Q C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 8, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered October 10, 2023 pursuant to default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the October 10, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 8, 2024 granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on October 10, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement and implicitly denying, as moot, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking the alternative relief of resettling and recalculating the judgment to eliminate the awards for attorney’s fees and interest.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court should not have granted defendant’s motion on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove that the case had settled or that plaintiff had failed to prove that it had tendered a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action [*2]pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), as defendant did not move on those grounds, and did not deny that the action had settled or claim that it had not received a release or stipulation of discontinuance.

We further find that defendant’s remaining grounds for vacating the judgment lack merit.

However, we find that the clerk improperly awarded $850 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff since CPLR 5003-a (e) does not provide for such an award (see Liss v Bringham Park Coop. Apts. Sec. No. 3, 264 AD2d 717, 718 [1999]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the October 10, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

Orthotics & Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50680(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Orthotics & Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50680(U))

Orthotics & Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50680(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2024-1249 Q C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Andrea S. Ogle, J.), dated October 9, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered November 20, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the November 20, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Andrea S. Ogle, J.) dated October 9, 2024 granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) on November 20, 2023 based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay a settlement and implicitly denying, as moot, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking the alternative relief of resettling and recalculating the judgment to eliminate the awards for attorney’s fees and interest.

For the reasons stated in Biofeedback & Psychological Servs., as Assignee of Chrysoula Karametros v Country-Wide Ins. Co., — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-383 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent [*2]of vacating so much of the November 20, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50681(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50681(U))

Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50681(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2024-1399 K C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered September 23, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and dismiss defendant’s affirmative defenses.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 18, 2024 as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and dismiss defendant’s affirmative defenses. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the order should be reversed, the matter should be remitted to the Civil Court to decide plaintiff’s amended cross-motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, defendant’s motion should be denied and plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and dismiss defendant’s affirmative defenses should be, in effect, remitted for a determination on the merits.

For the reasons stated in Burke 2 Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.[*2](85 Misc 3d 130[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50195[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50684(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50684(U))

Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50684(U) [88 Misc 3d 135(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2025-87 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Lisa S. Ottley, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 9, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered June 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the June 7, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for an accident which occurred in 2000, the parties entered into a settlement in May 2008, which provided that defendant would pay plaintiff the total sum of $1,030.20. Approximately eight years later, plaintiff moved to enter a judgment due to defendant’s failure to pay pursuant to the settlement. Defendant opposed this motion, on the ground that plaintiff was not entitled to recover accrued compound interest. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew this motion. However, on June 7, 2023, pursuant to an ex parte application, a judgment was entered which awarded plaintiff, insofar as is relevant, the principal sum of $1,030.20, plus accrued compound interest, plus $850 in attorney’s fees, for a total sum of $29,087.

Defendant moved to vacate the judgment arguing, among other things, that plaintiff had [*2]failed to provide defendant with 14 days’ notice, as required by an alleged modification of the settlement agreement, before seeking entry of a judgment based upon defendant’s failure to make payment. The motion also sought, in the alternative, to vacate so much of the judgment as awarded compound interest and $850 in attorney’s fees. By order dated July 9, 2024, the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the judgment, finding that plaintiff had accepted defendant’s modification of the settlement agreement and that plaintiff did not establish that it had provided defendant with the requisite 14 days’ notice before entry of the judgment, and denied, as moot, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking alternative relief.

As defendant’s motion concedes, defendant was served with plaintiff’s motion to enter judgment in 2016 due to defendant’s failure to pay in accordance with the settlement. Thus, even if the alleged modification of the settlement agreement is enforceable, the prior motion was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that defendant receive written notice 14 days prior to the entry of judgment. Upon receiving the 2016 motion, defendant could have paid plaintiff in accordance with the settlement, but it apparently chose not to do so. As a result, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 7, 2023 judgment on that ground should have been denied.

Defendant’s contention that plaintiff was not entitled to recover compound accrued interest lacks merit. The claims in this case are “governed by the former regulations providing for compound interest because the accident occurred prior to the effective date of the current regulations, which now provide for a simple rate of interest” (New Life Acupuncture, P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 81 Misc 3d 142[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50120[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]; see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a], effective April 5, 2002; Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144, 155-156 [2021]; Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 127[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

However, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the $850 award of attorney’s fees set forth in the judgment should have been granted, as CPLR 5003-a (e) does not provide for attorney’s fees to be separately awarded in a judgment entered upon a settling defendant’s failure to pay the settlement amount (see Liss v Brigham Park Coop. Apts. Sec. No. 3, 264 AD2d 717 [1999]).

Defendant’s remaining bases to vacate the judgment lack merit (see Mundel v Harris, 199 AD3d 814, 815 [2021]; Arguelles, M.D., P.C. v AIG Natl. Ins. Co., 86 Misc 3d 132[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 62 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion only to the extent of vacating so much of the June 7, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

Health Value Med., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50677(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Health Value Med., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50677(U))

Health Value Med., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50677(U) [88 Misc 3d 134(A)]

Decided on February 27, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

As corrected in part through July 17, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on February 27, 2026

2024-780 Q C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Lisa S. Ottley, JJ

Thomas Torto, Esq., for appellant. Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 9, 2024. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion to the extent of vacating so much of the September 13, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees and by providing that statutory no-fault interest shall accrue from December 1, 2011 at a compound rate; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, a judgment was entered on September 13, 2023, pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e), awarding plaintiff $911.26 as the principal sum, plus $850 in attorney’s fees, $30,415.80 in statutory no-fault interest from October 24, 2008 at a compound rate, and additional costs, for a total of $32,402.06. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 9, 2024 denying the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 13, 2023 judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) and denying the branch of defendant’s motion seeking the alternative relief of resettling and recalculating the judgment to eliminate the awards for [*2]attorney’s fees and interest.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, it did not establish that there was no enforceable settlement between the parties in this action. We further find that defendant’s remaining grounds for vacating the judgment lack merit.

Defendant’s argument that the judgment should be recalculated to toll interest based on plaintiff’s delay in entering judgment after the October 24, 2008 settlement also lacks merit (see CPLR 5003-a [e]; Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; Metro Med. Diagnostics, P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 81 Misc 3d 142[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50119[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). However, we find that the clerk should not have awarded interest from October 24, 2008, the date of settlement, but from December 1, 2011, the date the settlement documents were tendered to defendant (see CPLR 5003-a [e]; J.D.T. v Chaimowitz, 218 AD3d 821, 823 [2023]).

Lastly, we find that the clerk improperly awarded $850 in attorney’s fees to plaintiff since CPLR 5003-a (e) does not provide for such an award (see Liss v Bringham Park Coop. Apts. Sec. No. 3, 264 AD2d 717, 718 [1999]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by granting defendant’s motion to the extent of vacating so much of the September 13, 2023 judgment as awarded plaintiff $850 in attorney’s fees and by providing that statutory no-fault interest shall accrue from December 1, 2011 at a compound rate.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026