The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered October 4, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In November of 2015, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services it had provided to defendant’s insured as a result of a car accident that occurred on December 21, 2013. Defendant denied the allegations in its answer dated December 24, 2015, and asserted affirmative defenses. By an undated notice of motion, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and, in support thereof, plaintiff submitted its counsel’s undated affirmation. Defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint, relying, in part, on an unsigned and undated affidavit.

By order entered October 4, 2019, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s cross motion. The court stated that “Defendant’s [cross] motion is denied for defective notice/papers. Plaintiff’s motion is denied for defective papers.” Plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as denied its motion.

While a court may disregard procedural irregularities (see CPLR 2001), we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion “for [*2]defective papers,” particularly when the court also denied defendant’s cross motion for the same reason.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

WESTON, J.P., and TOUSSAINT, J., concur.

GOLIA, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order, insofar as appealed from, and remit the matter to the Civil Court for a new determination of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in the following memorandum:

CPLR 2001 provides, in relevant part, that, “if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, [a] mistake, omission, defect or irregularity shall be disregarded” (see Grskovic v Holmes, 111 AD3d 234, 242-243 [2013]; see also Harrington v Brunson, 129 AD3d 1581 [2015]; Henry v Gutenplan, 197 AD2d 608 [1993]). The Civil Court failed to identify the defect in plaintiff’s motion papers or any substantial right of a party that was prejudiced thereby. The majority points out that the notice of motion was undated as was the supporting affirmation. I note, however, that there was a return date on the notice of motion, and even the omission of a return date is not necessarily prejudicial and has been held to have been properly disregarded (see Harrington v Brunson, 129 AD3d at 1581). In any event, under the circumstances presented, the matter should be remitted to the Civil Court for identification of the defect and a determination of whether any substantial right was prejudiced thereby. In the event that it is established that a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, the defect shall be disregarded and the court should decide the motion on its merits.

Accordingly, I vote to reverse the order, insofar as appealed from, and remit the matter to the Civil Court for a new determination of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Darya Klein of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 11, 2019. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, it is undisputed that the vehicle in question was insured by defendant under a Pennsylvania automobile insurance policy and that defendant received notice of plaintiff’s claim more than 30 days after the accident. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting that Pennsylvania substantive law applied, and arguing that, under Pennsylvania law, it was entitled to dismissal of the complaint because it had not received timely notice of either the accident or the claim for insurance benefits, and plaintiff had failed to demonstrate good cause for the lateness of the notice it had provided. In support of its motion, defendant submitted, among other things, a portion of its insured’s automobile insurance policy, which provided, in part: “We must be notified within 30 days, or as soon as practicable, of how, when and where the accident or loss happened.”

Plaintiff opposed the motion in part on the ground that it was untimely because it had been made more than 120 days after a notice of trial had been served. With respect to the substantive portion of the motion, plaintiff agreed that Pennsylvania law controlled, but argued that questions of fact as to whether plaintiff had given notice of the accident or loss as soon as practicable precluded summary judgment, and, in addition, that the governing policy did not require plaintiff or plaintiff’s assignor to provide a reasonable justification for its late notice. The Civil Court deemed the motion to have been timely made, but denied it on the ground that there existed a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant had been notified of the claim as soon as practicable.

We note that the record is devoid of any showing that a notice of trial, the Civil Court equivalent to a note of issue, was filed with the clerk of the Civil Court more than 120 days prior to the time when defendant made its summary judgment motion. Consequently, the motion was not shown to be untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law controls with respect to the substance of this controversy (see T & S Med. Supply Corp. v Ocean Harbor Cas. Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 142[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50665[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; see also Jimenez v Monadnock Constr., Inc., 109 AD3d 514, 516 [2013]). Pennsylvania insurance policies, such as the one at issue in this matter, pursuant to which an insured is required to provide the insurer with notice “as soon as practicable,” are governed by a “notice-prejudice” rule (see Lozado v Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board [Dependable Concrete Work and Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund], 123 A3d 365, 378 [Pa Commw 2015]). Under the notice-prejudice rule, “unless the insurer establishes prejudice resulting from the insured’s failure to give notice as required under the policy, the insurer cannot avoid its contractual obligation” (Ario v Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s of London Syndicates, 996 A2d 588, 598 [Pa Commw 2010]; see Brakeman v Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa 66, 76-77, 371 A2d 193, 198 [1977]). The Civil Court correctly concluded that there was an unresolved issue of fact as to whether defendant had been given notice of the accident or loss as soon as practicable. In any event, as defendant’s motion papers failed to establish that it had been prejudiced by reason of the lateness of the notice it received, the Civil Court properly denied defendant’s motion.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

Decided on January 21, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jill R. Epstein, J.), entered November 7, 2019. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to plaintiff’s only contention with respect to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, defendant established that the independent medical examination scheduling letters had been mailed to plaintiff’s assignor (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Madison Prods. of USA, Inc. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 71 Misc 3d 138[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50446[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists [2021]).

In view of the foregoing, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

Paul Kenny

Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Victoria Tarasova of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Matthew P. Blum, J.), entered February 18, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, in effect, granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment to the extent of (1) dismissing defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath and (2) awarding plaintiff partial summary judgment on liability.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by vacating so much of the order as granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking (1) summary judgment dismissing defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath with respect to the claims received between May 11, 2018 and June 22, 2018 and (2) partial summary judgment on liability with respect to the claims received between May 11, 2018 and June 22, 2018, and by providing that those branches of plaintiff’s cross motion are denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. In an order entered February 18, 2020, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, stating that “Defendant [had] failed to issue the denials within 30 days of the second missed EUO,” and granted plaintiff’s cross motion to the extent of dismissing the affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs and awarding plaintiff partial summary judgment on liability.

With respect to the claims received by defendant between May 11, 2018 through June 22, 2018, the record demonstrates, prima facie, that the EUO scheduling letters were timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) to plaintiff, that plaintiff failed to appear for those EUOs, and that defendant timely denied those claims on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear. However, as we find that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether those EUOs were scheduled to be held at a place that was “reasonably convenient” to plaintiff (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [e]; Parisien v Metlife Auto & Home, 68 Misc 3d 126[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50845[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]), defendant failed to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing so much the complaint as sought to recover upon the claims received between May 11, 2018 through June 22, 2018. Consequently, neither party is entitled to summary judgment upon those claims.

While defendant further contends that the branch of its motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claims it received between March 22, 2018 and April 27, 2018 should have been granted and that the Civil Court erred in granting the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability upon those claims, defendant’s argument lacks merit. The record establishes that defendant failed to timely deny those claims (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, LLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., — Misc 3d &mdash, 2021 NY Slip Op 21340 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 133[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[A] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). Furthermore, here there is no basis to disturb so much of the order as granted plaintiff partial summary judgment as to liability upon these claims.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by vacating so much of the order as granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking (1) summary judgment dismissing defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath, with respect to the claims received between May 11, 2018 and June 22, 2018 and (2) partial summary judgment on liability with respect to the claims received between May 11, 2018 and June 22, 2018, and by providing that those branches of plaintiff’s cross motion are denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair of counsel), for appellant. Gallo, Vitucci & Klar, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Matthew P. Blum, J.), entered March 10, 2020. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that, pursuant to Florida law, there was a lack of coverage due to the valid rescission, ab initio, of the Florida automobile insurance policy in question. According to an affidavit submitted by an employee of defendant’s managing general agent, an investigation conducted after the accident revealed that, at the time the policy was renewed, about three weeks before the accident, the policyholder, who is also the assignor, did not reside, or garage the vehicle, in Florida. Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order entered March 10, 2020, the Civil Court granted the motion. On appeal, plaintiff contends that New York law, which does not permit retroactive rescission, controls and, in any event, that defendant failed to demonstrate that the insurance policy had been properly rescinded in accordance with Florida law.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the Civil Court properly applied Florida law to the substantive issue involved herein (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. [Stolarz-New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.], 81 NY2d 219, 223 [1993]; Auten v Auten, 308 NY 155, 160-161 [1954]; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Singletary, 279 AD2d 56, 60 [2000]). In order to demonstrate that an [*2]automobile insurance policy has been properly rescinded ab initio in accordance with Florida law, an insurer must demonstrate that it gave notice of the rescission to the policyholder and that it returned, or tendered, all paid premiums within a reasonable time after the discovery of the grounds for avoiding the policy (see Fla Stat Ann § 627.728 [5]; Leonardo v State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 675 So 2d 176, 179 [Fla Dist Ct App, 4th Dist 1996]; see also United Auto. Ins. Co. v Salgado, 22 So 3d 594, 600-601 [Fla Dist Ct App, 3d Dist 2009]). Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, in the case at bar, defendant was not required to demonstrate the basis for the retroactive rescission in support of its motion for summary judgment (see Craigg v Infinity Select Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 56, 58 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

As defendant’s motion papers demonstrated that a rescission notice was sent to the policyholder, and that defendant had returned all premiums paid to the policyholder within a reasonable period of time after defendant’s discovery of the grounds for rescinding the policy, defendant established, prima facie, that it had voided the policy ab initio pursuant to Florida law (see Omphil Care, Inc. v Pearl Holding Group Managing Gen. Agent for Ocean Harbor Cas. Ins. Co., 68 Misc 3d 129[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50946[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; W.H.O. Acupuncture, P.C. v Infinity Prop. & Cas. Co., 36 Misc 3d 4, 6-7 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012], citing Leonardo v State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 675 So 2d at 179). Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.