American Tr. Ins. Co. v MZY Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 02236)

Reported in New York Official Reports at American Tr. Ins. Co. v MZY Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 02236)

American Tr. Ins. Co. v MZY Acupuncture, P.C.

2026 NY Slip Op 02236 [248 AD3d 972]

Decided on April 15, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, June 10, 2026

April 15, 2026

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of a claim for no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated November 6, 2024. The order granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint, which had been granted in an order of the same court (Rachel E. Freier, J.) dated June 12, 2023, and, upon renewal and reargument, vacated so much of the order dated June 12, 2023, as granted that branch of the defendant’s prior motion, and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant’s prior motion.

Ordered that the order dated November 6, 2024, is affirmed, with costs.

In October 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of the defendant’s claim for no-fault insurance benefits. In May 2023, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a prior order of the Supreme Court to produce an entire no-fault claims file. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated June 12, 2023 (hereinafter the June 2023 order), the court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and, upon renewal and reargument, to vacate the June 2023 order and to deny that branch of the defendant’s prior motion. The defendant opposed the motion. In an order dated November 6, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. The defendant appeals.

“The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court” (Bernardis v Town of Islip, 95 AD3d 1050, 1050 [2012]; see 101CO, LLC v Sand Land Corp., 189 AD3d 942 [2020]), as is “[t]he determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure” (Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 AD3d 1079, 1081 [2009]; see Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 AD3d 922, 923 [2012]), as well as the “nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed” (Roug Kang Wang v Chien-Tsang Lin, 94 AD3d 850, 852 [2012]; see Dokaj v Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership, 91 AD3d 812, 814 [2012]; Quinones v Long [*2]Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 90 AD3d 632, 632 [2011]). However “ '[p]ublic policy strongly favors the resolution of actions on the merits whenever possible’ ” (Krause v Lobacz, 131 AD3d 1128, 1129 [2015], quoting Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d 201, 210 [2012]; see Negro v St. Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 AD3d 727, 728 [2007]), and “ '[t]he striking of a party’s pleading is a drastic remedy only warranted where there has been a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious’ ” (Krause v Lobacz, 131 AD3d at 1129, quoting Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d at 210; see New York Timber, LLC v Seneca Cos., 133 AD3d 576, 577 [2015]; Mangione v Jacobs, 121 AD3d 953, 954 [2014]).

Here, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff’s conduct was willful or contumacious (see Edwards v Freedom Church of Revelation, 230 AD3d 740, 742 [2024]; Ferjuste v 437 BMW, LLC, 219 AD3d 1308, 1310 [2023]; PAL Envtl. Servs., Inc. v LJC Dismantling Corp., 157 AD3d 808, 809-810 [2018]; Singer v Riskin, 137 AD3d 999, 1001 [2016]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and, upon reargument, properly vacated so much of the June 2023 order as granted that branch of the defendant’s prior motion and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant’s prior motion.

In light of our determination, we need reach the defendant’s remaining contention. Barros, J.P., Warhit, Landicino and Love, JJ., concur.

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Hackensack Surgery Ctr., LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 02235)

Reported in New York Official Reports at American Tr. Ins. Co. v Hackensack Surgery Ctr., LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 02235)

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Hackensack Surgery Ctr., LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 02235 [248 AD3d 970]

Decided on April 15, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, June 10, 2026

(April 15, 2026)

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of a claim for no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated November 6, 2024. The order granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint, which had been granted in an order of the same court dated August 11, 2023, and, upon renewal and reargument, vacated so much of the order dated August 11, 2023, as granted that branch of the defendant’s prior motion, and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant’s prior motion.

Ordered that the order dated November 6, 2024, is affirmed, with costs.

In April 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of the defendant’s claim for no-fault insurance benefits. In June 2023, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a prior order of the Supreme Court to produce an entire no-fault claims file. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated August 11, 2023 (hereinafter the August 2023 order), the court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and, upon renewal and reargument, to vacate the August 2023 order and to deny that branch of the defendant’s prior motion. The defendant opposed the motion. In an order dated November 6, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. The defendant appeals.

“The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court” (Bernardis v Town of Islip, 95 AD3d 1050, 1050 [2012]; see 101CO, LLC v Sand Land Corp., 189 AD3d 942 [2020]), as is “[t]he determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure” (Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 AD3d 1079, 1081 [2009]; see Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 AD3d 922, 923 [2012]), as well as the “nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed” (Roug Kang Wang v Chien-Tsang Lin, 94 AD3d 850, 852 [2012]; see Dokaj v Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership, 91 AD3d 812, 814 [2012]; Quinones v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 90 AD3d 632, 632 [2011]). However “ '[p]ublic policy strongly favors the resolution [*2]of actions on the merits whenever possible’ ” (Krause v Lobacz, 131 AD3d 1128, 1129 [2015], quoting Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d 201, 210 [2012]; see Negro v St. Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 AD3d 727, 728 [2007]), and “ '[t]he striking of a party’s pleading is a drastic remedy only warranted where there has been a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious’ ” (Krause v Lobacz, 131 AD3d at 1129, quoting Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d at 210; see New York Timber, LLC v Seneca Cos., 133 AD3d 576, 577 [2015]; Mangione v Jacobs, 121 AD3d 953, 954 [2014]).

Here, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff’s conduct was willful or contumacious (see Edwards v Freedom Church of Revelation, 230 AD3d 740, 742 [2024]; Ferjuste v 437 BMW, LLC, 219 AD3d 1308, 1310 [2023]; PAL Envtl. Servs., Inc. v LJC Dismantling Corp., 157 AD3d 808, 809-810 [2018]; Singer v Riskin, 137 AD3d 999, 1001 [2016]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and, upon reargument, properly vacated so much of the August 2023 order as granted that branch of the defendant’s prior motion and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant’s prior motion.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant’s remaining contention. Barros, J.P., Warhit, Landicino and Love, JJ., concur.

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC (2026 NY Slip Op 01750)

Reported in New York Official Reports at American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC (2026 NY Slip Op 01750)

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC

2026 NY Slip Op 01750

Decided on March 25, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 25, 2026 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
CARL J. LANDICINO
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-03963
(Index No. 521651/22)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY, for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(c) for a de novo determination of claims for no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), dated April 10, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, without a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR § 65-4.10(j)(4) to the extent of awarding the defendant attorneys’ fees in the sum of only $1,300.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR § 65-4.10(j)(4) to be awarded to the defendant in accordance herewith.

After a master arbitrator upheld an arbitration award in favor of the defendant on its claims for no-fault insurance benefits (hereinafter the master arbitration award), the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(c) for a de novo determination of the defendant’s claims. The defendant answered the complaint and served combined demands for discovery, including a notice of inspection. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel compliance with its discovery demands. The motion was denied but, upon renewal and reargument, the Supreme Court issued a conditional order directing the plaintiff to provide certain discovery documents within 30 days of the filing of the conditional order on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing System and stating that failure to comply with the conditional order will result in the plaintiff being sanctioned pursuant to CPLR 3126. Upon the plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with the conditional order, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint. The court granted that branch of the motion. Thereafter, the defendant moved, among other things, for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $13,940. In support of that branch of the motion, the defendant submitted an affirmation of services by its attorney. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that an award of attorneys’ fees was limited by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6(d), and that the amount of attorneys’ fees requested was excessive as to the hourly rate and the time purportedly spent defending this action. In an order dated April 10, 2024 (hereinafter the April 2024 order), the court, among other things, without a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for an award of reasonable [*2]attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) to the extent of awarding the defendant attorneys’ fees in the sum of $1,300. The defendant appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” As applicable here, the superintendent’s regulations provide that “[t]he attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a court adjudication of a dispute de novo, as provided in section 5106(c) of the Insurance Law, . . . shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15).

“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is commonly understood to be a fee which represents the reasonable value of the services rendered” (Diaz v Audi of Am., Inc., 57 AD3d 828, 830; see RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 839). In determining the reasonable value of the services rendered, “the court may consider a number of factors, including, inter alia, the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, the lawyer’s experience, ability, and reputation, the customary fee charged for similar services, and the results obtained” (Diggs v Oscar De La Renta, LLC, 169 AD3d 1003, 1005; see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9; RMP Capital Corp. v Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d at 839). “While a hearing is not required in all circumstances, the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” (Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Vidaurre, 155 AD3d 934, 935 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sterling Natl. Bank v Alan B. Brill, P.C., 186 AD3d 515, 520). Here, the parties submitted conflicting evidence as to the customary fee charged for similar services and the reasonable amount of time required to defend this action. In the April 2024 order, the Supreme Court provided no explanation for its determination of the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4), and the basis for that determination is not evident from the record. Under the circumstances, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) to be awarded to the defendant, stating the evidentiary basis for the award (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 706).

The defendant’s remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, LANDICINO and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC (2026 NY Slip Op 01751)

Reported in New York Official Reports at American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC (2026 NY Slip Op 01751)

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC

2026 NY Slip Op 01751

Decided on March 25, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 25, 2026 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
CARL J. LANDICINO
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-13392
(Index No. 521651/22)

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.

Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Christopher E. O’Donnell and Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(c) for a de novo determination of claims for no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated November 6, 2024. The order granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint, which had been granted in an order of the same court (Leon Ruchelsman, J.) dated August 9, 2023, and, upon renewal and reargument, vacated the order dated August 9, 2023, and thereupon, denied that branch of the defendant’s prior motion.

ORDERED that the order dated November 6, 2024, is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint is denied, and the order dated August 9, 2023, is reinstated.

The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(c) for a de novo determination of the defendant’s claims for no-fault insurance benefits. In an order dated April 21, 2023 (hereinafter the April 2023 order), the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to provide certain discovery documents within 30 days of the filing of the April 2023 order on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing System and stated that failure to comply with the April 2023 order will result in the plaintiff being sanctioned pursuant to CPLR 3126. The defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint for failure to comply with the April 2023 order. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated August 9, 2023 (hereinafter the August 2023 order), the court granted that branch of the defendant’s motion. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint and, upon renewal and reargument, to vacate the August 2023 order and to deny that branch of the defendant’s prior motion. The defendant opposed motion. In an order dated November 6, 2024, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion. The defendant appeals.

“A motion for reargument is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which determined the original motion, and leave to reargue may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the law, or otherwise mistakenly arrived at the original decision” (Christopulos v Christopulos, 209 AD3d 968, 969; see US Bank N.A. v Cimino, 212 AD3d 683, 684). “A motion for leave to reargue . . . shall not include any matters of fact not offered on [*2]the prior motion” (Sokolnik v Voronova, 221 AD3d 1036, 1037 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 2221[d][2]). “Further, even where a motion for reargument is technically untimely under CPLR 2221(d)(3), a court has discretion to reconsider its prior ruling” (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Halls, 98 AD3d 718, 720-721; see Kugel v Reynolds, 228 AD3d 743, 746-747).

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint, “as there is no indication that the court misapprehended the facts or law, or mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision” (Matter of Butler v City of Rye Planning Commn., 114 AD3d 937, 938; see CPLR 2221[d][2]). The plaintiff’s contention that the court overlooked the fact that the defendant was required to serve the plaintiff with a copy of the April 2023 order with notice of entry to enforce the April 2023 order against the plaintiff was improperly raised for the first time on reargument (see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Bermeo, 230 AD3d 1141, 1143; Rangel v Target Corp., 216 AD3d 683, 685).

A motion for leave to renew “shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” (CPLR 2221[e][2]) and “shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion” (id. § 2221[e][3]). Here, the plaintiff did not offer a reasonable justification for failing to submit the purported new facts in opposition to the defendant’s prior motion (see id.; Robert v Azoulay Realty Corp., 209 AD3d 781, 786; Incorporated Vil. of Cove Neck v Petrara, 47 AD3d 885, 887).

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and reargue its opposition to that branch of the defendant’s prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to strike the complaint.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, LANDICINO and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Allied Bd. Certified Physicians (2026 NY Slip Op 01782)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Allied Bd. Certified Physicians (2026 NY Slip Op 01782)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Allied Bd. Certified Physicians

2026 NY Slip Op 01782 [247 AD3d 1176]

Decided on March 25, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 25, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated January 30, 2022, in which Allied Board Certified Physicians, as assignee of Chong Sok So, cross-petitioned, among other things, to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, Allied Board Certified Physicians appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated January 16, 2024. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon so much of an order of the same court dated March 3, 2023, as denied that branch of the cross-petition of Allied Board Certified Physicians which was to confirm the master arbitration award, upon an order of the same court dated July 31, 2023, denying the motion of Allied Board Certified Physicians to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, and upon so much of an order of the same court dated November 22, 2023, as denied those branches of the separate motion of Allied Board Certified Physicians which were to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, denied those branches of the cross-petition which were to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the master arbitration award is confirmed, that branch of the cross-petition of Allied Board Certified Physicians which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, that branch of the motion of Allied Board Certified Physicians which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, that branch of the separate motion of Allied Board Certified Physicians which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the orders dated March 3, 2023, July 31, 2023, and November 22, 2023, are modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, if any, to be awarded to Allied Board Certified Physicians and the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter.

In April 2022, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the petitioner) commenced this proceeding against Allied Board Certified Physicians (hereinafter Allied), as assignee of Chong Sok So, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated January 30, 2022, entered in favor of Allied. Allied cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master [*2]arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. In an order dated March 3, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the master arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious, and denied the cross-petition. In an order dated July 31, 2023, the court denied Allied’s motion, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In an order dated November 22, 2023, the court denied those branches of Allied’s separate motion which were to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Thereafter, in a judgment dated January 16, 2024, the court, among other things, denied those branches of the cross-petition which were to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Allied appeals.

Upon denying a motion to vacate or to modify an arbitration award, the court must confirm the award (see CPLR 7511 [e]; Matter of Klein v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 109 AD3d 825, 826 [2013]; Matter of Mercury Cas. Co. v Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C., 67 AD3d 1017, 1017-1018 [2009]; Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]). As the petitioner concedes, given the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition to vacate the master arbitration award, the award must be confirmed (see CPLR 7511 [e]).

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” “[T]he superintendent’s regulations provide that an attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a ‘court appeal from a master arbitration award . . . shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter’ ” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017], quoting 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]).

The petitioner’s contention that Allied is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because a claim submitted by Allied exceeded the fee schedule in violation of 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (h) is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, is not properly before this Court (see Matter of Wydra v Brach, 203 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2022]; Matter of Dedvukaj v Shkreli, 180 AD3d 895, 897 [2020]). Allied did not have an opportunity to refute this contention, which is not solely an issue of law (see generally Matter of Matarrese v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 247 AD2d 475 [1998]). Under the circumstances, remittal is necessary to determine the issue of whether, and in what amount, an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) should be awarded to Allied (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]).

Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, if any, to be awarded to Allied and the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter (see id.). Barros, J.P., Christopher, Warhit and Voutsinas, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Patient Care Assoc. (2026 NY Slip Op 01783)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Patient Care Assoc. (2026 NY Slip Op 01783)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Patient Care Assoc.

2026 NY Slip Op 01783 [247 AD3d 1179]

Decided on March 25, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 25, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated January 23, 2022, Patient Care Associates appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated April 9, 2024. The order and judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated September 20, 2023, denying those branches of the motion of Patient Care Associates which were to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (4) (j) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, denied the same relief to Patient Care Associates.

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the master arbitration award dated January 23, 2022, is confirmed, that branch of the motion of Patient Care Associates which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the order dated September 20, 2023, is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, if any, to be awarded to Patient Care Associates and the entry of an appropriate amended order and judgment thereafter.

In April 2022, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the petitioner) commenced this proceeding against Patient Care Associates (hereinafter Patient Care) pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated January 23, 2022, entered in favor of Patient Care. In an order dated March 30, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the master arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious. Thereafter, Patient Care moved, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (4) (j) for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. In an order dated September 20, 2023, the court, among other things, denied those branches of Patient Care’s motion. Thereafter, the court issued an order and judgment dated April 9, 2024, among other things, denying the same relief to Patient Care. Patient Care appeals.

Upon denying a motion to vacate or to modify an arbitration award, the court must confirm the award (see CPLR 7511 [e]; Matter of Klein v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 109 AD3d 825, 826 [2013]; Matter of Mercury Cas. Co. v Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C., 67 AD3d 1017, 1017-1018 [2009]; Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]). As the petitioner [*2]concedes, given the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition to vacate the master arbitration award, the award must be confirmed (see CPLR 7511 [e]).

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” “[T]he superintendent’s regulations provide that an attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with ‘a court appeal from a master arbitration award . . . shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter’ ” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017], quoting 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]).

The petitioner’s contention that Patient Care is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because a claim submitted by Patient Care exceeded the fee schedule in violation of 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (h) is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, is not properly before this Court (see Matter of Wydra v Brach, 203 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2022]; Matter of Dedvukaj v Shkreli, 180 AD3d 895, 897 [2020]). Patient Care did not have an opportunity to refute this contention, which is not solely an issue of law (see Matter of Matarrese v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 247 AD2d 475 [1998]). Under the circumstances, remittal is necessary to determine the issue of whether, and in what amount, an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) should be awarded to Patient Care (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]).

Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, if any, to be awarded to Patient Care and the entry of an appropriate amended order and judgment thereafter (see id.). Barros, J.P., Christopher, Warhit and Voutsinas, JJ., concur.

Matter of John T. Mather Mem. Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 01788)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of John T. Mather Mem. Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 01788)

Matter of John T. Mather Mem. Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 01788 [247 AD3d 1188]

Decided on March 25, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 25, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to confirm a master arbitration award dated June 26, 2023, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated June 12, 2024. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated January 12, 2024, denying that branch of the petition which was for an award of attorneys fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), did not award such attorney’s fees.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the petition which was for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) is granted, the order is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to the petitioner and the entry of an appropriate judgment thereafter.

The petitioner, John T. Mather Memorial Hospital, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm a master arbitration award dated June 26, 2023, and for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). The respondent did not oppose the petition. In an order dated January 12, 2024, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award but denied that branch of the petition which was for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). In a judgment dated June 12, 2024, the court, upon the order, inter alia, did not award attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). The petitioner appeals.

“The attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a court adjudication of a dispute de novo, as provided in section 5106 (c) of the Insurance Law, or in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]). The term “court appeal” applies to CPLR article 75 proceedings to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]; see Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 179 AD3d 414, 414 [2020]).

[*2]Here, the petitioner sought an award of attorney’s fees for services rendered in connection with this CPLR article 75 proceeding to confirm the master arbitration award. As a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award is a court appeal for the purposes of 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), the petitioner was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees (see Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168 [2019]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705). Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees and the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter (see Matter of Lam Quan MD, P.C. v LM Gen. Ins. Co., 239 AD3d 654 [2025]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d at 783).

The petitioner’s remaining contention is without merit.

Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Ford, Dowling and Goldberg Velazquez, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Stand Up MRI of Manhattan (2026 NY Slip Op 01353)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Stand Up MRI of Manhattan (2026 NY Slip Op 01353)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Stand Up MRI of Manhattan

2026 NY Slip Op 01353 [247 AD3d 881]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated September 2, 2022, Stand Up MRI of Manhattan appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), entered November 17, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition of Stand Up MRI of Manhattan which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $300.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, an insurer, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award confirming an arbitration award in favor of Stand Up MRI of Manhattan (hereinafter Stand Up), a medical provider. Stand Up filed a cross-petition to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) for services rendered in this proceeding. In an judgment entered November 17, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award, and, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of $300. Stand Up appeals from so much of the judgment as, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $300.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” As applicable here, the superintendent’s regulations provide that “[t]he attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). The term “court appeal” includes a proceeding, such as here, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 782-783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]).

“ ’The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within [*2]the sound discretion of the Supreme Court’ ” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924 [2024], quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036 [2015]). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036).

Contrary to Stand Up’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err or improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding Stand Up an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in the sum of $300 without first conducting a hearing (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d 724, 725 [2025]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d 558, 560 [2025]). As an initial matter, since Stand Up failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of its cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725). Moreover, Stand Up failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d at 560). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists’ ” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9 [2025], quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505 [2015]), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). Iannacci, J.P., Chambers, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Baltic Supply Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 01349)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Baltic Supply Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 01349)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Baltic Supply Corp.

2026 NY Slip Op 01349 [247 AD3d 873]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated September 30, 2022, Baltic Supply Corp. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), entered November 17, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition of Baltic Supply Corp. which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $300.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, an insurer, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award confirming an arbitration award in favor of Baltic Supply Corp. (hereinafter Baltic), a medical provider. Baltic filed a cross-petition to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). In a judgment entered November 17, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award, and, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of $300. Baltic appeals from so much of the judgment as, in effect, granted that branch of the cross-petition which was for an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) to the extent of awarding the sum of only $300.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or a portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” As applicable here, the superintendent’s regulations provide that “[t]he attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). The term “court appeal” includes a proceeding, such as here, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 782-783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]).

[*2]“ ’The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court’ ” (Hershfield v Davidoff, 233 AD3d 923, 924 [2024], quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036 [2015]). “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d at 1036).

Contrary to Baltic’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err or improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding Baltic an attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) in the sum of $300 without first conducting a hearing (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d 724, 725 [2025]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d 558, 560 [2025]). As an initial matter, since Baltic failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of its cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court’s discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney’s fee (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725). Moreover, Baltic failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Integrated Medicine of S.I., P.C., 244 AD3d at 725; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d at 560). Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists’ ” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 9 [2025], quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 505 [2015]), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). Iannacci, J.P., Chambers, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bruno Med. Supply, Inc. (2026 NY Slip Op 01332)

Reported in New York Official Reports at American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bruno Med. Supply, Inc. (2026 NY Slip Op 01332)

American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bruno Med. Supply, Inc.

2026 NY Slip Op 01332 [247 AD3d 827]

Decided on March 11, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026

March 11, 2026

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of claims for no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sharon A. Bourne-Clarke, J.), dated November 28, 2023. The order, in effect, denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate an order and judgment (one paper) of the same court dated May 30, 2023, entered upon its failure to appear or answer the complaint, and pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept its late answer.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, a no-fault insurance carrier, commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo adjudication of a dispute regarding its denial of the defendant’s claim for no-fault insurance benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor. Prior thereto, an arbitrator had determined that the defendant was entitled to no-fault compensation in the amount of $5,454.80, plus interest and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff appealed the award to a master arbitrator, who affirmed the award.

After the defendant failed to timely appear or answer the complaint in this action, the plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment. By order and judgment dated May 30, 2023, the Supreme Court, in effect, granted the plaintiff’s motion and issued a default judgment.

Thereafter, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order and judgment and pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept its late answer. In an order dated November 28, 2023, the Supreme Court, in effect, denied the motion. The defendant appeals.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the record does not show that the defendant’s appeal is untimely, as the record does not contain proof of service of the order with notice of entry upon the defendant (see CPLR 5513 [a]; Hart v New York City Hous. Auth., 161 AD3d 724, 724-725 [2018]; Matter of Oliver v City of New York, 76 AD3d 1017, 1018 [2010]).

“A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint on the basis of excusable default (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]) and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer (see CPLR 3012 [d]) must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense” (Nurhan v Harley, 237 AD3d 728, 730-731 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Allstate Ins. Co. v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 163 AD3d 745, 746 [2018]).

Here, the defendant was not entitled to relief pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and 3012 (d), as it failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default. The defendant’s allegations of law office failure were contradictory and conclusory and did not constitute a reasonable excuse (see Saleh v Hudson 418 Riv. Rd., Ltd., 225 AD3d 812, 814 [2024]; Giotis v Besser, 207 AD3d 526, 528 [2022]).

[*2]

In light of the defendant’s failure to set forth a reasonable excuse for its default, it is not necessary to determine whether the defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to this action (see Saleh v Hudson 418 Riv. Rd., Ltd., 225 AD3d at 814; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Hutchinson, 215 AD3d 645, 647 [2023]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order and judgment and pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept its late answer. Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Wan and McCormack, JJ., concur.