New Image Chiropractic, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51306(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at New Image Chiropractic, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51306(U))

New Image Chiropractic, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51306(U) [89 Misc 3d 131(A)]

Decided on June 17, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on June 17, 2026

2025-494 K C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Chereé A. Buggs, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ

Goldberg, Miller & Rubin, P.C. (Zachary Whiting of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated January 9, 2025, as amended by an order of that court dated July 15, 2025. The order, as amended and insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied “defendant’s” motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (5) and “granted” plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment to the extent of finding that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case of timely mailing the bills to Kemper.”

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, as amended and insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied and by striking the provision thereof that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case of timely mailing the bills to Kemper”; as so modified, the order, as amended and insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In April 2021, plaintiff New Image Chiropractic, P.C. commenced this action against Kemper Insurance Company (Kemper) to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services it rendered to its assignor, who was allegedly injured in an automobile accident on or about May 18, 2020. Plaintiff asserted that it timely furnished Kemper with claim forms, that Kemper assigned claim number 1052953401 to this claim, and that Kemper had failed to [*2]properly deny or pay the claim within 30 days of its receipt. Unitrin Safeguard Insurance Company (Unitrin), alleging that it was sued herein as Kemper Insurance Company, served an answer. In April 2021, Unitrin brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, New York County, against New Image Chiropractor, P.C. and its assignor herein, Krystal Hayes, among other parties, pertaining to a May 18, 2020 accident. Thereafter, Unitrin moved in the Supreme Court to enter a default judgment against New Image Chiropractor, P.C., among others, when they failed to appear or answer. In a default judgment dated July 27, 2022, the Supreme Court declared that “UNITRIN owes no duty to provide No-Fault reimbursements to” New Image Chiropractic, P.C. “relating to the alleged May 18, 2020 loss (UNITRIN claim number C109887NY20).”

Subsequently, “defendant” moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata or collateral estoppel, based on the aforementioned July 27, 2022 Supreme Court default declaratory judgment. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had provided medically necessary services to its assignor, that the relevant claim forms were mailed to Kemper and that Kemper had failed to pay or deny the claims. Kemper appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated January 9, 2025, as amended by an order of that court dated July 15, 2025, as denied “defendant’s” motion for summary judgment and “granted” plaintiff’s cross-motion to the extent of finding that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case of timely mailing the bills to Kemper” (see CPLR 3212 [g]).

The doctrine of res judicata generally requires a final adjudication of a claim on the merits and precludes relitigation of that claim and all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions (see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304 [1929]; Ciraldo v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 140 AD3d 912 [2016]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v Hertz Co., 68 Misc 3d 131[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50996[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). It is well settled that default judgments, which have not been vacated, can have res judicata effect (see Lazides v P & G Enters., 58 AD3d 607 [2009]; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Williams, 29 AD3d 688 [2006]; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Facey, 272 AD2d 399 [2000]). Moreover, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue where “the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” (Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349 [1999]; see D’Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659 [1990]; Manko v Gabay, 175 AD3d 484 [2019]). While “[a]n issue is not actually litigated if, for example, there has been a default” (Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456-457 [1985]), collateral estoppel may be applied to default judgments where the party against whom preclusion is sought appears in the prior action and then defaults (see Miller v Falco, 170 AD3d 707 [2019]).

Unitrin’s default declaratory judgment against New Image Chiropractic, P.C. has no res judicata effect on this case, as there has been no demonstration that Kemper is, in fact, Unitrin, or [*3]even that Unitrin, and not Kemper, is “the proper insurer” (see Quality Health Supply Corp. v Hertz Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 50996[U]). Indeed, both Kemper and Unitrin appear to have two different claim numbers for this claim without any explanation. Moreover, as New Image Chiropractic, P.C. did not appear in the declaratory judgment action, it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether Unitrin owes a duty to provide no-fault reimbursements to it and, therefore, there is no collateral estoppel effect against it based on the default declaratory judgment (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d at 456-457). Thus, the Civil Court properly denied “defendant’s” motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment should have been denied as plaintiff did not submit any evidence of an address for Kemper, and thus failed to establish that the prescribed statutory claim form had been received by Kemper (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]). In any event, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Kemper was the insurer for this accident.

Accordingly, the order, as amended and insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied and by striking the provision thereof that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case of timely mailing the bills to Kemper”; as so modified, the order, as amended and insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: June 17, 2026

Big Apple Med. Group Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 51298(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Big Apple Med. Group Corp. v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 51298(U))

Big Apple Med. Group Corp. v MVAIC

2026 NY Slip Op 51298(U) [89 Misc 3d 130(A)]

Decided on June 12, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on June 12, 2026

2025-993 K C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ

Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and Frank D’Esposito of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sherveal R. Mimes, J.), dated March 18, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sherveal R. Mimes, J.) dated March 18, 2025 as denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to MVAIC’s contention, its motion papers do not demonstrate, prima facie, that the vehicle in which plaintiff’s assignor was a passenger at the time of the subject accident was covered by an insurance policy issued by State Farm Insurance Company. While the certified New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles abstract, relied on by MVAIC, indicates that the vehicle was insured at the time of the registration, it does not show that the vehicle was insured [*2]at the time of the subject accident, which was two months later, as plaintiff correctly contends. Plaintiff further notes that the police accident report, annexed to defendant’s own motion, indicates that the subject vehicle was uninsured at the time of the accident. Consequently, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see NY Wellness Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 86 Misc 3d 134[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51165[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; cf. Bell Air Med. Supply, LLC v MVAIC, 77 Misc 3d 131[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51233[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: June 12, 2026

Matter of Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v Alas (2026 NY Slip Op 03439)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v Alas (2026 NY Slip Op 03439)

Matter of Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v Alas

2026 NY Slip Op 03439 [250 AD3d 735]

Decided on June 3, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2026

June 3, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Lizette Colon, J.), dated October 1, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration is granted.

The petitioner, Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits arising out of an alleged hit-and-run accident, on the ground, among others, that its insured, the respondent, Roberto Antonio Escobar Alas, failed to satisfy a condition precedent to arbitration as required by the insurance policy (hereinafter the subject policy). The subject policy required the insured to report an accident to a police, peace, or judicial officer, or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, within 24 hours or as soon as reasonably possible. In an order dated October 1, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the petition. The petitioner appeals.

“Where, as here, ‘an insurance policy requires that notice of an occurrence be given as soon as practicable, notice must be given within a reasonable time in view of all of the circumstances’ ” (Matter of Travelers Personal Ins. Co. v Dratch, 219 AD3d 1526, 1527 [2023], quoting Ortiz v Fage USA Corp., 105 AD3d 720, 721 [2013]). Alas’s failure to comply with this condition precedent, absent a valid excuse, vitiates coverage under the subject policy (see Matter of Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v Ostapenko, 176 AD3d 1068, 1069 [2019]; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Bartlett, 112 AD3d 826, 827 [2013]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration (see Matter of Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v Ostapenko, 176 AD3d at 1069; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Bartlett, 112 AD3d at 827).

[*2]The parties’ remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are without merit. Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Landicino and Hom, JJ., concur.

Pacific Med. Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50808(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Pacific Med. Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50808(U))

Pacific Med. Servs., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50808(U) [89 Misc 3d 127(A)]

Decided on May 22, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on May 22, 2026

2025-196 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (David M. Hawkins, J.), entered January 6, 2025. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,705 pursuant to a stipulation of settlement, and failed to award statutory compounded no-fault interest. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order of the same court dated April 3, 2018 denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest.

[*1]

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, the April 3, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in the principal sum of $3,156.88 and in accordance with this decision and order.

This action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits was marked as “Settled” at a November 30, 2009 court appearance. Defendant did not pay the settlement amount and a judgment was subsequently entered entered in favor of plaintiff on January 12, 2017, pursuant to CPLR 5003-a, in the principal amount of $3,156.88 and awarding plaintiff statutory no-fault interest at a simple rate. Plaintiff then moved, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a), to, in effect, correct the judgment by recalculating the statutory no-fault interest from a simple rate to a compound rate. In an order dated April 3, 2018, the Civil Court (David M. Hawkins, J.) denied plaintiff’s motion and, sua sponte, vacated the judgment and tolled the accrual of interest. A judgment was entered on March 12, 2024 pursuant to the order, awarding plaintiff the total sum of $2,705.

Plaintiff correctly argues on appeal that the principal sum of the judgment does not accurately reflect the amount agreed upon in the settlement, which was $3,156.88, and that the [*2]Civil Court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion and sua sponte tolling the interest (see Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the April 3, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: May 22, 2026

Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50809(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50809(U))

Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50809(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)]

Decided on May 22, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on May 22, 2026

2025-197 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (David M. Hawkins, J.), entered January 7, 2025. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $512.50 pursuant to a stipulation of settlement, failed to award statutory compounded no-fault interest. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order of the same court dated August 1, 2018 denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest.

[*1]

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, the August 1, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

For the reasons stated in Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. (85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the August 1, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: May 22, 2026

Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U))

Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)]

Decided on May 22, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on May 22, 2026

2025-1316 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Samuel A. Kamara of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 7, 2023 judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

For the reasons stated in Paramount Med. Group, P.C., as Assignee of Jainan Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-1319 Q C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 7, 2023 judgment is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: May 22, 2026

Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U))

Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)]

Decided on May 22, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on May 22, 2026

2025-1319 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Merani Kamara Law Group (Peter C. Merani and Samuel A. Kamara of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered June 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 7, 2023 judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered June 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

On appeal, plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court should not have granted defendant’s motion on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to prove that it had tendered a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), since defendant did not demonstrate, prima facie, that it had not received a release or stipulation of discontinuance as was its burden upon its motion (see Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 50685[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). Consequently, contrary to the Civil Court’s determination, plaintiff did not need to establish that it had tendered the foregoing documents in opposition to the motion (see Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]).

Defendant’s remaining arguments for vacating the judgment lack merit (see e.g. Berenblit [*2]v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 7, 2023 judgment is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: May 22, 2026

Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U))

Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)]

Decided on May 22, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on May 22, 2026

2025-1258 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Merani Kamara Law Group (Samuel A. Kamara and Peter C. Merani of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 13, 2023 judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

For the reasons stated in Paramount Med. Group, P.C., as Assignee of Jainan Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-1319 Q C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 13, 2023 judgment is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: May 22, 2026

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 03160)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 03160)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C.

2026 NY Slip Op 03160 [249 AD3d 1039]

Decided on May 20, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, July 8, 2026

May 20, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated March 25, 2022, Sovereign Medical Services, P.C., appeals from a clerk’s judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered April 18, 2024. The clerk’s judgment, upon an order of the same court (Robin S. Garson, J.) dated July 6, 2023, granting the petition to vacate the master arbitration award and denying the cross-petition, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award, granted the same relief to the petitioner, denied the same relief to Sovereign Medical Services, P.C., and vacated the master arbitration award.

Ordered that the clerk’s judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the master arbitration award is confirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements.

Sovereign Medical Services, P.C. (hereinafter Sovereign), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits. After the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer), denied the claim, Sovereign submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Sovereign the full amount of the claim. The insurer appealed, and the master arbitrator affirmed the award. The insurer then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. Sovereign cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements. In an order dated July 6, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition and denied the cross-petition. A clerk’s judgment was entered April 18, 2024, granting the petition, denying the cross-petition, and vacating the master arbitration award. Sovereign appeals.

“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]). “A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis” (Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., [*2]176 AD3d 832, 833 [2019]; see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). A “master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law” (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, 802 [2019]). By contrast, “courts ‘generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982]).

Here, the master arbitrator determined that the arbitrator properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in concluding, based upon a prior arbitration determination, that the failure to comply with additional verification requests was not a valid basis for the insurer’s denial of the claim. The master arbitrator’s determination was rational, supported by evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the master arbitrator’s determination was not subject to vacatur by the courts (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 535; Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 833; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802). Accordingly, the petition to vacate the master arbitration award should have been denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award should have been granted, and the master arbitration award should have been confirmed.

We remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 [h]; 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). Barros, J.P., Wooten, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh (2026 NY Slip Op 03161)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh (2026 NY Slip Op 03161)

Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh

2026 NY Slip Op 03161 [249 AD3d 1041]

Decided on May 20, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, July 8, 2026

May 20, 2026

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 29, 2022, Jungman Michael Suh appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated September 29, 2023. The judgment granted the petition, denied the cross-petition, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award, and vacated the master arbitration award.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the master arbitration award is confirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements.

Jungman Michael Suh is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment he rendered to a patient who allegedly was involved in an automobile accident. After the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer), denied the claim, Suh submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Suh the full amount of the claim. The insurer appealed, and the master arbitrator affirmed the award. The insurer then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. Suh cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements. By judgment dated September 29, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition, denied the cross-petition, and vacated the master arbitration award. Suh appeals.

“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]). “A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis” (Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 832, 833 [2019]; see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). A “master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law” (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, [*2]802 [2019]). By contrast, “courts ‘generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982]).

Here, the master arbitrator’s determination that the insurer’s additional verification requests were improper and Suh’s purported failure to comply with them was not a proper basis for denial of the claim was rational, supported by evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the master arbitrator’s determination was not subject to vacatur by the courts (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 535; Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 833; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802). Accordingly, the petition to vacate the master arbitration award should have been denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award should have been granted, and the master arbitration award should have been confirmed.

We remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]).

Suh’s remaining contention is without merit. Barros, J.P., Wooten, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.