No-Fault Case Law

The court considered the fact that the plaintiff sued the defendant insurance company to recover unpaid first party No-Fault benefits for medical services provided to the plaintiff's assignor, as well as the fact that the defendant had commenced an action in Supreme Court against the plaintiff and other nonparty medical service providers. The main issue decided was whether the action was barred by res judicata, and the holding of the court was that the action was indeed barred by res judicata. The court found that the parties and subject matter in the instant matter and the Supreme Court Action were identical, and that any judgment in the plaintiff's favor would adversely affect the rights and interests created by the judgment in the Supreme Court Action. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.

The relevant facts the court considered were that a medical provider, A.C. Medical, P.C., was seeking to recover $3,268.16 in first-party no-fault benefits from New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The insurance company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action was premature due to outstanding verification requests. The medical provider submitted amended bills seeking to recover $2,785.16 for services rendered on November 18, 2016. The main issue decided was whether the submission of amended bills created a new obligation for the insurance company to pay or deny the claims within 30 days, and whether the action was premature. The holding of the case was that the insurance company's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint was granted, as the submission of amended bills did not create a new obligation for the insurance company to pay or deny the claims within 30 days, and the action was deemed premature.

The court considered the fact that the plaintiff failed to file a notice of trial within 90 days after receiving a written demand from the defendant pursuant to CPLR 3216. The main issue decided was whether the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for want of prosecution should be granted. The court held that the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 should be granted because the plaintiff failed to comply with the 90-day demand by filing a notice of trial, and the plaintiff's claim of law office failure did not rise to the level of a justifiable excuse. Therefore, the court reversed the order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the motion.

In this case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was seeking a judgment declaring that they had no obligation to pay certain insurance claims for no-fault insurance. The company had alleged that certain professional corporations were not entitled to collect no-fault payments from them as they were unlawfully formed pursuant to New York law. Specifically, one of the defendants was found guilty of health care fraud and mail fraud and was operating acupuncture clinics via professional corporations which were not owned and controlled by a licensed acupuncturist as required by New York law. As a result, State Farm moved for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing against them any judgments obtained from related actions. The courts affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction and held that State Farm met its burden of demonstrating that the defendants obtained the judgment as part of "a larger fraudulent scheme" and that the exception to the general rule barring collateral attack applied in this case.

The main issue in this case was whether the defendant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for its default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action in order to vacate a default judgment. The court considered an affidavit by the person alleged to have received service of process, who stated that she always follows defendant's practices and procedures for receipt of process. This person's practices and procedures would have created a record of the instant lawsuit, and the defendant demonstrated that it does not have any such record. The court held that the defendant had established a reasonable excuse for its default and affirmed the order granting the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment and enlarge its time to serve and file an answer.

The court considered whether 21st Century Insurance Company was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint brought by Noel E. Blackman, M.D., as the assignee of Barnes, Omari, in their action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether 21st Century Insurance Company had a duty to pay any no-fault benefits to Noel E. Blackman in any current or future proceeding, and whether the provider was ineligible to collect no-fault benefits. The court held that 21st Century Insurance Company was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on a declaratory judgment that declared they had no duty to pay any no-fault benefits to Noel E. Blackman, as the provider was ineligible to collect no-fault benefits. The court also found that the doctrine of res judicata applied, as any judgment in favor of the plaintiff would destroy or impair rights established by the judgment in the declaratory judgment action. Therefore, the court affirmed the order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The court considered the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, who argued that the plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. The plaintiff, a provider seeking first-party no-fault benefits, cross-moved for summary judgment. The main issue decided by the court was whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. The court ultimately denied the defendant's motion and cross-motion, but found that the claims at issue were mailed by the plaintiff and received by the defendant. The holding of the case was that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

The relevant facts considered by the court were that the defendant insurance company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the plaintiff medical services provider had failed to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The main issue decided was whether the defendant had timely denied the plaintiff's claim after the plaintiff had failed to appear at both an initial and a follow-up EUO. The holding of the case was that the defendant insurance company's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied because the defendant did not demonstrate that it was not precluded from raising its proffered defense, and therefore the order was affirmed.

The court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff failed to appear for an examination under oath (EUO) scheduled by the defendant, and whether the defendant had demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage. The court held that the insurer must schedule the EUO within a reasonable time frame and as "expeditiously as possible," and that the plaintiff had attempted to delay the claim over nine months by claiming it needed two months' notice for each scheduled EUO. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to rebut the defendant's showing, and therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.

The relevant facts of the case were that Solution Bridge, Inc. brought an action to recover no-fault benefits from GEICO Insurance Company. GEICO moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the action was barred by a declaratory judgment entered in a previous action in Supreme Court, Nassau County. They also argued that Solution Bridge had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The main issues decided by the court were whether the action was barred by the previous declaratory judgment and whether Solution Bridge had failed to appear for EUOs. The court held that GEICO's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, as any judgment in favor of Solution Bridge would impair rights or interests established by the previous declaratory judgment and that GEICO had established that Solution Bridge failed to appear for the EUOs. Therefore, the court reversed the order and granted GEICO's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.