March 1, 2024
J.C. Healing Touch Rehab, P.C. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 50393(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/j-c-healing-touch-rehab-p-c-v-mvaic-2024-ny-slip-op-50393u/
- Court
- Appellate Term, Second Department
- Decided
- March 1, 2024
- Citation
- 2024 NY Slip Op 50393(U) · 82 Misc 3d 128(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Issues
- Statute of limitations MVAIC
- Legal questions
- No-fault statute of limitations (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at J.C. Healing Touch Rehab, P.C. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 50393(U))
[*1]| J.C. Healing Touch Rehab, P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2024 NY Slip Op 50393(U) [82 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on March 1, 2024 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on March 1, 2024
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, PHILLIP HOM, JJ
2023-835 K C
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (Angelique Evangelista and David Gierasch of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jill R. Epstein, J.), dated February 1, 2023. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (sued herein as MVAIC) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action had been commenced after the statute of limitations had expired, and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order dated February 1, 2023, the Civil Court denied MVAIC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross-motion.
MVAIC’s motion papers established, prima facie, that the action had been commenced after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations (see Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC, 19 Misc 3d 69 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; see also 6D Farm Corp. v Carr, 63 AD3d 903 [2009]; Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 815 [2008]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to [*2]the action’s timeliness (see Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC, 34 Misc 3d 126[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52274[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). To the extent that the Civil Court sua sponte held that MVAIC was estopped from interposing its defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, the record is bereft of facts to support such a determination (see Airco Alloys Div. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 76 AD2d 68 [1980]).
In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and HOM, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: March 1, 2024
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Which limitations period governs a first-party no-fault claim against an insurer, self-insurer or MVAIC: six or three years?
This decision: Claim against MVAIC carries the three-year statutory period (CPLR 214 [2]) (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Applied the three-year limitations period to the claim against MVAIC and granted dismissal because the action was commenced after three years and nothing in the record supported estopping MVAIC.
Of the 56 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 28157) FollowedA provider's claim against MVAIC was time-barred because untimely verification did not postpone accrual.
- Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 52274(U)) FollowedMVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because it established that the provider's action was commenced after the limitations period expired.
Similar decisions
- Cautious Care Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 50279(U))MVAIC established that the provider commenced its no-fault action after the three-year statute of limitations expired.
- Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52073(U))MVAIC established that the provider commenced its action after the three-year statute of limitations expired.
- Right Aid Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2022 NY Slip Op 50786(U))MVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because the provider's action was brought after the three-year limitations period expired.
- Clinton Place Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2017 NY Slip Op 51893(U))MVAIC established that the provider's action was commenced after the three-year statute of limitations expired.
- Compas Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 51687(U))MVAIC established that the provider's action was commenced after the three-year statute of limitations expired.