August 18, 2017
B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 51091(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/b-z-chiropractic-p-c-v-allstate-ins-co-2017-ny-slip-op-51091u/
- Decided
- August 18, 2017
- Citation
- 2017 NY Slip Op 51091(U)
- Posture
- Other motion
- Outcome
- Split result
- Later history
- Overruled by Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 04484)
- Later treatment
- Followed in 2 later decisions (see Cited by)
- Legal questions
- When no-fault interest is tolled (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2017 NY Slip Op 51091(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent-Appellant.
B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Tony Dance, Appellant,
against
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Amos Weinberg, Esq., for appellant. Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Eric M. Wahrburg, Esq.), for respondent.
Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.), entered November 19, 2015 (appeal No. 2015-2956 Q C). Separate appeal from an order of the same court entered July 7, 2016 (appeal No. 2016-1958 Q C). The order entered November 19, 2015 granted defendant’s motion to, among other things, toll the accrual of postjudgment interest on the amount of a default judgment of the same court entered November 15, 2001 only to the extent of tolling the accrual of interest on the judgment from November 1, 2005 through June 19, 2015. The order entered July 7, 2016 granted defendant’s motion to, among other things, compel plaintiff to file a satisfaction of judgment, to direct the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment and for a protective order to the extent of directing the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment and lifting restraints on defendant’s funds.
ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, appeal No. 2015-2956 Q C and appeal No. 2016-1958 Q C are consolidated for purposes of disposition; and it is further,
ORDERED that the cross appeal from the order entered November 19, 2015 is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order entered November 19, 2015, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion to, among other things, toll the accrual of postjudgment interest on the amount of a default judgment of the same court entered November 15, 2001 is denied; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order entered July 7, 2016 is modified by providing that defendant’s motion to, among other things, direct the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment is granted only to the extent of directing the clerk to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $22,999.70; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action, commenced on November 7, 2000 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved on April 9, 2001 for summary judgment. Defendant failed to oppose the motion, and, by order entered November 2, 2001, the Civil Court (Duane A. Hart, J.) granted plaintiff’s motion on default. Plaintiff served a copy of the order and a “statement for judgment” on defendant’s then attorney on November 13, 2001. A judgment in the amount of $8,847.49, including the principal sum of $5,077.49 and interest in the amount of $2,775, was entered on November 15, 2001.
There was no action by either party until June 2015, when plaintiff’s attorney wrote a letter to defendant, demanding payment, or proof of payment, of the 2001 judgment and advising defendant that interest as of the date of the letter was $221,134.17, as interest had been accruing at 2% per month (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a]). By order to show cause dated August 25, 2015, defendant moved to, among other things, toll the accrual of postjudgment interest and to release defendant’s funds that were being held pursuant to restraining notices. In support of its motion, defendant proffered proof that it had paid $8,842.49 on the judgment in July 2015. By order entered November 19, 2015, the Civil Court (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.) granted defendant’s motion to the extent of tolling the accrual of interest from November 1, 2005 through June 19, 2015. Plaintiff appeals and defendant cross-appeals from the order. As the cross appeal has not been perfected, it is dismissed as abandoned.
Thereafter, defendant moved to, among other things, compel plaintiff to file a satisfaction of judgment and to direct the clerk to enter a satisfaction of the judgment on the ground that defendant had paid plaintiff the total amount of $22,999.70, which sum, defendant alleged, was the full amount of the judgment in accordance with the November 19, 2015 order of the Civil Court. Plaintiff opposed the motion and appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.), entered July 7, 2016, which granted defendant’s motion to the extent of directing the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment and lifting restraints on defendant’s funds.
A money judgment bears interest from the date of its entry (see CPLR 5003), and, generally, the interest accrues until the judgment is paid (see Matter of Matra Bldg. Corp. v [*2]Kucker, 19 AD3d 496 [2005]; Martin v Tafflock, 166 AD2d 635 [1990]). “Postjudgment interest is awarded as a penalty for the delayed payment of a judgment” (ERHAL Holding Corp. v Rusin, 252 AD2d 473, 474 [1998]). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no evidence of actions or conduct by plaintiff which prevented defendant from paying the judgment (see ERHAL Holding Corp., 252 AD2d at 474; cf. Danielowich v PBL Dev., 292 AD2d 414 [2002]). Since plaintiff, as the prevailing party, was not required to make a demand for the money (see e.g. Feldman v Brodsky, 12 AD2d 347, 351 [1961]; Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 5003.01 [2d ed 2009]) and did not cause the delay in paying the judgment, the Civil Court erred in tolling the accrual of interest on the judgment. However, defendant demonstrated, through the submission of checks to plaintiff, which plaintiff had endorsed “without prejudice,” that defendant had partially paid the judgment and is, therefore, entitled to the entry of a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $22,999.70 (see CPLR 5021 [a]). We note that, contrary to plaintiff’s position, postjudgment interest should be calculated pursuant to CPLR 5004 and not at the two percent per month rate provided for in 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 (a) (see e.g. Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, 149 AD3d 692 [2017]; NYCTL 1998-2 Trust v Wagner, 61 AD3d 728, 729 [2009]).
Accordingly, the order entered November 19, 2015, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion to, among other things, toll the accrual of postjudgment interest is denied. The order entered July 7, 2016 is modified by providing that defendant’s motion to, among other things, direct the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment and for a protective order is granted only to the extent of directing the clerk to enter a partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount of $22,999.70.
WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: August 18, 2017
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
When is 2% no-fault interest tolled because the claimant delayed suing, arbitrating, prosecuting or collecting?
This decision: Interest runs without suspension: the toll was not triggered or the delay was not unreasonable or not the claimant's
Reversed a toll of postjudgment interest for the years of inactivity, because nothing the provider did prevented the insurer from paying and a prevailing party need not demand payment of a judgment.
Of the 73 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 30 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited by
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 04484) OverruledDicta do not have preclusive effect under res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.
- Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 50918(U)) FollowedThe insurer failed to justify tolling no-fault interest because it did not show that the provider prevented settlement payment.
- Trans Med. Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 20364) FollowedThe provider's appeal from a sua sponte stay of no-fault interest was dismissed because that ruling was not appealable as of right.
- Craniofacial Pain Mgt. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51825(U))A no-fault money judgment bears simple interest at nine percent annually from entry until payment under CPLR 5003 and 5004.
- Biotech Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 52143(U))The provider's appeal from a sua sponte stay of no-fault interest was dismissed because the ruling was not appealable as of right.
- Berenblit v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 50505(U))The provider's enforcement delay did not justify tolling postjudgment interest because it had not caused the insurer's payment delay.
- Family One Chiropractor, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 52142(U))The provider's appeal from a sua sponte interest stay was dismissed because no appeal lay as of right and leave was declined.
Similar decisions
- Orthotics & Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 51221(U))The provider's 17-year delay in seeking judgment on a summary judgment order required tolling statutory no-fault interest during that delay.
- Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50487(U))The provider's delay in entering judgment on an unpaid settlement did not justify tolling statutory no-fault interest.
- GC Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50835(U))An appellate undertaking under CPLR 5519 does not stop no-fault interest from accruing until the judgment is satisfied.
- Herman v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50916(U))The provider's delay of more than 20 years in seeking judgment after an inquest warranted tolling interest during that period.
- New Generation Wellness Chiropractic, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 22171)No-fault interest on claims governed by former 11 NYCRR 65.15 (h) is compounded rather than calculated under CPLR 5004.