Reported in New York Official Reports at Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50809(U))
| Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc. v Country Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50809(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on May 22, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Air Plus Surgical Supply, Inc., as Assignee of Chi Le, Appellant,
v
Country Wide Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 22, 2026
2025-197 Q C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.
Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (David M. Hawkins, J.), entered January 7, 2025. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $512.50 pursuant to a stipulation of settlement, failed to award statutory compounded no-fault interest. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order of the same court dated August 1, 2018 denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest.
[*1]ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, the August 1, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.
For the reasons stated in Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co. (85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the August 1, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s motion to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest using a compound, not simple, rate and, sua sponte, tolling the accrual of all such interest is vacated, plaintiff’s motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.
BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 22, 2026
Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U))
| Metropolitan Med. P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50811(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on May 22, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Metropolitan Medical P.C., as Assignee of Bhoodnarine Bisson, Appellant,
v
Allstate Insurance Co., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 22, 2026
2025-1316 Q C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Samuel A. Kamara of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 7, 2023 judgment is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).
For the reasons stated in Paramount Med. Group, P.C., as Assignee of Jainan Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-1319 Q C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 7, 2023 judgment is denied.
BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 22, 2026
Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U))
| Paramount Med. Group, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50812(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on May 22, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Paramount Medical Group, P.C., as Assignee of Jainan Singh, Appellant,
v
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 22, 2026
2025-1319 Q C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Merani Kamara Law Group (Peter C. Merani and Samuel A. Kamara of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered June 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 7, 2023 judgment is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered June 7, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).
On appeal, plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court should not have granted defendant’s motion on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to prove that it had tendered a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), since defendant did not demonstrate, prima facie, that it had not received a release or stipulation of discontinuance as was its burden upon its motion (see Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 50685[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). Consequently, contrary to the Civil Court’s determination, plaintiff did not need to establish that it had tendered the foregoing documents in opposition to the motion (see Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]).
Defendant’s remaining arguments for vacating the judgment lack merit (see e.g. Berenblit [*2]v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 7, 2023 judgment is denied.
BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 22, 2026
Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U))
| Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50810(U) [89 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on May 22, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Medtech Medical Supply, Inc., as Assignee of Sabni Khalil, Appellant,
v
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 22, 2026
2025-1258 Q C
Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Wavny Toussaint, Karen Lin, JJ
Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Merani Kamara Law Group (Samuel A. Kamara and Peter C. Merani of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement.
[*1]ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 13, 2023 judgment is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 13, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).
For the reasons stated in Paramount Med. Group, P.C., as Assignee of Jainan Singh v Allstate Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2025-1319 Q C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 13, 2023 judgment is denied.
BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and LIN, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 22, 2026
Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 03160)Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 03160)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Sovereign Med. Servs., P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 03160 [249 AD3d 1039] |
| Decided on May 20, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected through Wednesday, July 8, 2026 |
In the Matter of American Transit Insurance Company, Respondent,
v
Sovereign Medical Services, P.C., Appellant.
May 20, 2026
HEADNOTES
Arbitration — Confirming or Vacating Award — Application of Collateral Estoppel
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Roman Kravchenko, Garden City, NY, for appellant.
Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated March 25, 2022, Sovereign Medical Services, P.C., appeals from a clerk’s judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered April 18, 2024. The clerk’s judgment, upon an order of the same court (Robin S. Garson, J.) dated July 6, 2023, granting the petition to vacate the master arbitration award and denying the cross-petition, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award, granted the same relief to the petitioner, denied the same relief to Sovereign Medical Services, P.C., and vacated the master arbitration award.
Ordered that the clerk’s judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the master arbitration award is confirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements.
Sovereign Medical Services, P.C. (hereinafter Sovereign), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits. After the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer), denied the claim, Sovereign submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Sovereign the full amount of the claim. The insurer appealed, and the master arbitrator affirmed the award. The insurer then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. Sovereign cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements. In an order dated July 6, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition and denied the cross-petition. A clerk’s judgment was entered April 18, 2024, granting the petition, denying the cross-petition, and vacating the master arbitration award. Sovereign appeals.
“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]). “A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis” (Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., [*2]176 AD3d 832, 833 [2019]; see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). A “master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law” (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, 802 [2019]). By contrast, “courts ‘generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982]).
Here, the master arbitrator determined that the arbitrator properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in concluding, based upon a prior arbitration determination, that the failure to comply with additional verification requests was not a valid basis for the insurer’s denial of the claim. The master arbitrator’s determination was rational, supported by evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the master arbitrator’s determination was not subject to vacatur by the courts (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 535; Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 833; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802). Accordingly, the petition to vacate the master arbitration award should have been denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award should have been granted, and the master arbitration award should have been confirmed.
We remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 [h]; 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). Barros, J.P., Wooten, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.
Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh (2026 NY Slip Op 03161)Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh (2026 NY Slip Op 03161)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Suh |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 03161 [249 AD3d 1041] |
| Decided on May 20, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected through Wednesday, July 8, 2026 |
In the Matter of American Transit Insurance Company, Respondent,
v
Jungman Michael Suh, M.D., Appellant.
May 20, 2026
HEADNOTES
Arbitration — Confirming or Vacating Award — Basis for Denial of Insurance Claim
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Roman Kravchenko, Garden City, NY, for appellant.
Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 29, 2022, Jungman Michael Suh appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated September 29, 2023. The judgment granted the petition, denied the cross-petition, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award, and vacated the master arbitration award.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award is granted, the master arbitration award is confirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements.
Jungman Michael Suh is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment he rendered to a patient who allegedly was involved in an automobile accident. After the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer), denied the claim, Suh submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Suh the full amount of the claim. The insurer appealed, and the master arbitrator affirmed the award. The insurer then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award. Suh cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitration award and for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements. By judgment dated September 29, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition, denied the cross-petition, and vacated the master arbitration award. Suh appeals.
“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]). “A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis” (Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 832, 833 [2019]; see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). A “master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law” (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, [*2]802 [2019]). By contrast, “courts ‘generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982]).
Here, the master arbitrator’s determination that the insurer’s additional verification requests were improper and Suh’s purported failure to comply with them was not a proper basis for denial of the claim was rational, supported by evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the master arbitrator’s determination was not subject to vacatur by the courts (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 535; Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 833; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802). Accordingly, the petition to vacate the master arbitration award should have been denied, that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm the master arbitration award should have been granted, and the master arbitration award should have been confirmed.
We remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination with respect to those branches of the cross-petition which were for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, other fees, and costs and disbursements (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 AD3d 782, 783 [2025]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]).
Suh’s remaining contention is without merit. Barros, J.P., Wooten, Taylor and McCormack, JJ., concur.
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50794(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50794(U))
| Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50794(U) [89 Misc 3d 126(A)] |
| Decided on May 15, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp., as Assignee of Amadou Ndiaye, Appellant,
v
Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation of New York, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 15, 2026
2025-527 RI C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., ChereÉ A. Buggs, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella (Sam M. Rizzitelli, III of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Michael J. Pinto, J.), dated March 11, 2025. The order granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant’s motion.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the equipment provided by plaintiff to its assignor was not medically necessary, that the equipment was not billed in accordance with the applicable fee schedule, and that the policy limits had been exhausted. By order dated March 11, 2025, the Civil Court (Michael J. Pinto, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment on the ground of lack of medical necessity, without reaching the other two grounds for dismissal. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish timely and proper mailing of the denial of claim forms.
Upon a review of the record, we find that defendant failed to establish that the denials had been properly and timely mailed. In describing defendant’s standard office mailing practices and procedures, defendant’s litigation specialist did not set forth, among other required details, how proper postage is affixed, or how and when envelopes are delivered to the care and custody of the United States Postal Service or other carrier (see Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Infinite Ortho Prods., Inc., 127 AD3d 1050 [2015]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Contemporary Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 51 Misc 3d [*2]132[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50464[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]). Thus, defendant failed to establish that it is not precluded from raising its defense of lack of medical necessity. Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of medical necessity should have been denied.
As the failure to issue a denial of the claim within 30 days does not preclude a defense “that the coverage limits of the subject policy have been exhausted” (New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 579, 580 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]) or a defense that plaintiff is seeking to recover amounts that are in excess of the fee schedule (see Oleg’s Acupuncture, P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 151[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50095[U] [App Term 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]), we remit the matter to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant’s motion.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 15, 2026
Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50797(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50797(U))
| Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50797(U) [89 Misc 3d 127(A)] |
| Decided on May 15, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| As corrected in part through May 28, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
Prompt Medical Group, Inc., as Assignee of Taisha Brockenbaugh, Appellant,
v
Erie Insurance Company of New York, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 15, 2026
2025-540 RI C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Chereé A. Buggs, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Mura Law Group, PLLC, for respondent (no brief filed).
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), dated March 31, 2025. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff filed its notice of trial on May 7, 2024. Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on September 23, 2024, which motion plaintiff opposed, arguing, among other things, that the motion should be denied as untimely. By order dated March 31, 2025, the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) found that, although the motion “was late,” “there was no prejudice to the plaintiff” and granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of fraudulent procurement of the insurance policy.
Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), courts have “considerable discretion to fix a deadline for filing summary judgment motions,” so long as the deadline is not “later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown” (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 651 [2004]; see Schmidt v Capone, 243 AD3d 709 [2025]). “[S]tatutory time frames—like court-ordered time frames (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999])—are not options, they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties” (Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; see Brill, 2 NY3d at 652-653). “Absent a ‘satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness,’ constituting good cause for the delay, an untimely summary judgment motion must be denied without consideration of the merits” (Schmidt, 243 AD3d at 712, quoting Brill, 2 NY3d at 652; see Miceli, 3 NY3d at 727).
We note that a notice of trial is the Civil Court equivalent of a note of issue (see Castro v Omni Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 127[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50057[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). The record on appeal indicates that defendant did not move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint within 120 days of the filing of the notice of trial. Since defendant failed to address this delay in its moving papers, it did not demonstrate good cause for its failure to file its motion within the mandated time frame (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866, 869 [2016]; BQE Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 152[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51887[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Consequently, the Civil Court should have denied defendant’s motion without reaching its merits.
Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 15, 2026
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 50793(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 50793(U))
| Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50793(U) [89 Misc 3d 126(A)] |
| Decided on May 15, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp., as Assignee of Shatima Hemingway, Appellant,
v
Permanent General Assurance Corp., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 15, 2026
2025-226 RI C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), dated February 3, 2025. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff was ineligible to recover no-fault benefits due to the cancellation of the Pennsylvania automobile insurance policy as a result of the insured’s nonpayment of premiums. By order dated February 3, 2025, the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) granted defendant’s motion, finding that “Defendant established that the Pennsylvania policy was properly canceled prior to the date of the accident. Therefore, coverage did not exist.” On appeal, plaintiff contends, among other things, that defendant’s motion should have been denied because defendant failed to establish that the notice of cancellation had been mailed to the insured.
At the outset, we note that, in the Civil Court, plaintiff argued that Pennsylvania law did not control; however, on appeal, plaintiff appears to have abandoned this argument (see New Way Med. Supply Corp. v Infinity Group, 50 Misc 3d 128[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51880[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).
In order to prevail on its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant was required to demonstrate that the insurance policy was validly canceled in accordance with Pennsylvania law (see Great Health Care Chiropratic, P.C. v Infinity Group, 50 Misc 3d 144[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50257[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In Pennsylvania, in order for an insurance policy to be canceled due to the nonpayment [*2]of premiums, the “insurer has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements for cancellation of an automobile policy of insurance . . . . An insurance policy may be cancelled by mailing to the named insured, at the address shown in the policy, a written notice of cancellation” (Nationwide Ins. Co. v Pennsylvania Ins. Dept., 779 A2d 14, 17 [Pa Commw Ct 2001]; see 40 P.S. § 991.2006; Parnell v Dept. of Transp., Bur. of Driver Licensing, 90 A3d 840 [Pa Commw Ct 2014]).
Here, the affidavit of defendant’s personal injury protection litigation representative conclusorily states that defendant mailed a notice of cancellation to the insured on June 1, 2023, which informed the insured that the policy would be canceled as of June 19, 2023. The affidavit, however, provided no information regarding defendant’s standard office practices and procedures for the mailing of such a notice. In addition, although the back of the notice states that “U.S. Postal Service Proof of Mailing of this Document is on file,” no such proof was included with defendant’s motion papers. Consequently, defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the insurance policy had been canceled as of June 19, 2023 in accordance with Pennsylvania law and that, therefore, no coverage existed when the accident took place in August 2023.
Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 15, 2026
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50795(U))Reported in New York Official Reports at Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. (2026 NY Slip Op 50795(U))
| Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp. v Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp. of N.Y. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50795(U) [89 Misc 3d 126(A)] |
| Decided on May 15, 2026 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Big Apple Delivery Supply Corp., as Assignee of Amadou Ndiaye, Appellant,
v
Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation of New York, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts
Decided on May 15, 2026
2025-528 RI C
Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Chereé A. Buggs, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella (Sam M. Rizzitelli, III of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Michael J. Pinto, J.), dated March 11, 2025. The order granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary.
[*1]ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the equipment provided by plaintiff to its assignor was not medically necessary and that the policy limits had been exhausted. By order dated March 11, 2025, the Civil Court (Michael J. Pinto, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment on the ground of lack of medical necessity, without reaching the other ground for dismissal. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish timely and proper mailing of the denial of claim form.
Upon a review of the record, we find that defendant failed to establish that the denial had been properly and timely mailed. In describing defendant’s standard office mailing practices and procedures, defendant’s litigation specialist did not set forth, among other required details, how proper postage is affixed, or how and when envelopes are delivered to the care and custody of the United States Postal Service or other carrier (see Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Infinite Ortho Prods., Inc., 127 AD3d 1050 [2015]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Contemporary Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 51 Misc 3d 132[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50464[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]). Thus, [*2]defendant failed to establish that it is not precluded from raising its defense of lack of medical necessity. Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of medical necessity should have been denied.
As the failure to issue a denial of the claim within 30 days does not preclude a defense “that the coverage limits of the subject policy have been exhausted” (New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 579, 580 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]), we remit the matter to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 15, 2026