District Court Of Nassau County, Third District,

INDEX NO. 003594/03

Steven M. Jaeger, J.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion to compel discovery are decided as follows:

The plaintiff, a health care provider and assignee of no-fault benefits, commenced this action against the defendant, the insurer of the assignor, to recover the first party No Fault Law benefits. In this case, the patient/assignor was injured in a motor vehicle accident on July 19, 2002. Plaintiff submitted the claim on the appropriate forms to defendant on September 9, 2002. Defendant’s denial was dated December 2, 2002.

The defendant’s failure to deny the plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits within thirty (30) days of receipt of the proof of claim, and the amount of loss sustained as required by Insurance Law 5106, and 11 NYCRR 65.15[g][3], precludes the defendant from asserting an affirmative defense of denial of benefits on various grounds. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274 [1997]. Defendant’s late denial form designates assignor’s (Abbott) failure to appear for independent medical examinations on October 25, 2002 and November 8, 2002 as the basis for the claim denial. The first IME was not scheduled until more than 30 days after the claim was received.

In response to this application and in support of defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, defendant contends that the insured owner/operator of the car may have possibly staged this as a fraudulent accident with assignor Abbott as a passenger. Defendant further contends that assignor Abbott’s failure to appear for two scheduled independent medical examinations (as stated on defendant’s denial form) was based on indicia of fraud and was for “Examination under Oath”. The latter examination was not requested until December 10, 2002 and the denial forms provided by each party differs as to riders attached.

Defendant’s position appears to be that, (1) the claim denial, despite its express language, is in fact based on fraud and, (2) a claim arising from an insurance fraud scheme is not a covered accident and therefore, the late denial of same would not necessarily be fatal to defendant’s defense. Metro Med. Diagnostics, P.C. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 (2d Dept 2002). Defendant’s fraud claim or defense is only substantiated by the unsworn reports of investigators that examined the subrogor’s signatures on forms ostensibly signed after each treatment. The [*2]conclusion is that the treatment forms were signed all at once or in groups. No evidentiary proof was provided, however, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The Court also notes that the denial of claim form (NF-10) provided by defendant (and dated March 10, 2003) differs from the one provided by plaintiff (dated December 2, 2002) in that each contains materially different riders. No explanation for this is offered by the defendant. Nor does the defendant explain how alleged fraud in providing medical services constitutes a “non-covered” accident under the applicable no-fault statutes and regulations.

In this case, the defendant notified the plaintiff on or about December 2, 2002 that it was denying benefits based upon a failure to attend IMEs. Pursuant to State Farm v Domotor, 266 AD 2d 219 (2d Dept 1999), the Court finds that this denial excused the plaintiff from further compliance with any further requests or demands from the defendant. “An insurance carrier may not, after repudiating liability, create grounds for its refusal to pay by demanding compliance with proof of loss provisions of its policy. Rather, the insurance carrier ‘must stand or fall upon the defense upon which it based its refusals to pay’.” 266 AD 2d at 220.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has met their burden in demonstrating a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320. Notwithstanding defendant’s late investigations, defendant has not shown the existence of evidentiary facts sufficient to toll the statutory limits for denials of claims. An insurer is required to either pay or deny a claim for medical services rendered under No-Fault within 30 days from receipt of proof of the claim (e.g., the bill), which proof shall include verification (IME) requested by the insurer pursuant to 11 NYCRR §65-3.5, Insurance Law §5106(a); 11 NYCRR §65-3.8(a). This 30 day period may be extended by an insurer’s timely request for further verification of the claim. New York Presbyterian Hospital v. American Transit Insurance Company, 287 AD2d 699, (2d Dept 2001). There is no documentation of timely requests by defendant.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted in the amount of $1,758.40, plus interest at 2% per month from October 9, 2002, together with attorneys’ fees of 20% thereof, not to exceed $850.00. 11 NYCRR §65(17)((b).

Defendant’s cross-motion for an order of preclusion regarding discovery is denied as moot in view of the aforementioned decision.

So Ordered:

Dated: March 29, 2004 District Court Judge

Decision Date: March 29, 2004

—In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated March 5, 2003, which denied their motion for leave to reargue that branch of their prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits for the treatment of Adrienne Corn, which was denied by prior order of the same court dated December 10, 2002.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

We reject the appellant’s contention that the instant appeal was taken from an order denying a motion for leave to renew. The order appealed from decided a motion which the appellant itself denominated as one for leave to reargue that branch of its prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Further, the thrust of the appellant’s motion was that the Supreme Court purportedly overlooked controlling law in making its prior order. In addition, the appellant neither submitted new facts not offered on the prior motion, nor demonstrated a change in the law, that would change the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). Accordingly, the motion was one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Gutierrez v Rockefeller Group, 307 AD2d 335 [2003]; Lapadula v Sang Shing Kwok, 304 AD2d 798 [2003]; Kisswani v Manikis, 303 AD2d 643, 644 [2003]; Misirlakis v East Coast Entertainment Props., 303 AD2d 389 [2003]). Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.

—

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the defendant appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Skelos, J.), dated April 7, 2003, which, upon granting those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on their first, fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action, is in favor of the plaintiff Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Lucretia Hall and Sosamma Johnkutty, and against it in the total sum of $124,035.43, in favor of the plaintiff New York United Hospital, as assignee of Jean A. Cudilio, and against it in the total sum of $6,633.33, and in favor of the plaintiff White Plains Hospital, as assignee of Rashid Chugstai, and against it in the total sum of $116.14.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff hospitals made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidentiary proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms had been mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 498 [2003]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 303 AD2d 743 [2003]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 412 [2002]; see also Matter of Pradip Das/N.Y. Med. Rehab v Allstate Ins. Co., 297 AD2d 321 [2002]). Furthermore, the defendant’s submissions in opposition were insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether it timely issued a partial denial of the claim asserted by the plaintiff Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Lucretia Hall, or paid the claim asserted by the plaintiff New York United Hospital, as assignee of Jean A. Cudilio. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Luciano and Townes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiff from so much of an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (M. Solomon, J.), dated October 10, 2002, as denied its motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted for the principal sum of $1,018.47 and matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff sued to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies it provided to the injured assignor. Plaintiff’s moving papers established a prima facie case for summary

SM-1

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant submitted only a portion of an unsworn letter from its medical expert which as submitted did not set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the rejection of coverage on the ground that it was not medically necessary. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion should be granted and the matter is remanded to the court below for a calculation of the statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [h] [1]; 65.17 (b) (6); see also St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 215 AD2d 641 [1995]).

SM-2

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Queens County (P. Kelly, J.), entered October 23, 2002, denying its motion for partial summary judgment in the sum of $6,418.48.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover $11,251.62 in assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the court below denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on $6,418.48 of its
claims. Plaintiff appeals that order to the extent that it denied $3,897.20 in benefits for
treatment rendered prior to December 28, 2001, conceding, in its brief, that a file-based
peer review and the results of an independent medical examination, conducted December 27, 2001 and December 28, 2001 respectively, created triable issues of fact whether prior diagnostic tests and all subsequent tests and treatments were medically necessary (Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., NYLJ, Dec. 29, 2003 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). In our view, the court properly denied summary judgment.

A no-fault benefits claimant establishes its prima facie case for summary judgment by “proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained” (Insurance Law § 5106 [a]), via the statutory [*2]claim forms (11 NYCRR 65.15 [b] [4]) or their functional equivalent (11 NYCRR 65.15 [d] [5); Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., supra). Defendant timely denied the claim (11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]) on the ground that certain of plaintiff’s treatments were medically unnecessary (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 202 [1997]; Bonetti v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 269 AD2d 413, 414 [2000]) based on peer reviews which, in our view, set forth a sufficient factual foundation and medical rationale for the claims’ rejection (Amaze Med.
Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., supra). With respect to the acupuncture claims, assignor’s
apparent denial that he received such treatment, as recorded in the medical examination report, created a triable issue whether the claim based thereon was appropriate.
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the court below for all further proceedings on the claims.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (L. Baily-Schiffman, J), entered on April 9, 2003, which denied its motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously reversed without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted in the principal sum of $1,685.31 and matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff instituted suit to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies it provided to the injured assignor. In our opinion, plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing that it submitted complete proofs of claims to defendant which defendant did not pay or deny within 30 days (11 NYCRR 65.15 [g]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., NYLJ, Dec. 29, 2003 [App Term,
2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Thus, pursuant to Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co. (90 NY2d 274, 285 [1997]), the insurer is precluded from raising defenses such as lack of medical necessity (see Mingmen Acupuncture v Liberty Mutual, NYLJ, Apr. 10, 2002 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment (Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., NYLJ, Dec. 29, 2003 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).

The matter is accordingly remanded to the court below for a calculation of the statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a];
11 NYCRR 65.15 [h]; 65.17 [b] [6]; St.Clare’s Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 215 AD2d 641 [1995]). [*2]
Decision Date: March 26, 2004

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiff from so much of an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (M. Solomon, J.), dated October 10, 2002, as denied its motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted for the principal sum of $1,018.47 and matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff sued to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies it provided to the injured assignor. Plaintiff’s moving papers established a prima facie case for summary

SM-1

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant submitted only a portion of an unsworn letter from its medical expert which as submitted did not set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the rejection of coverage on the ground that it was not medically necessary. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion should be granted and the matter is remanded to the court below for a calculation of the statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [h] [1]; 65.17 (b) (6); see also St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 215 AD2d 641 [1995]).

SM-2

Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Richmond County

Index No. 40049/03

For Plaintiffs: Joseph Sparacio, Esq. 2555 Richmond Avenue Staten

Island, NY 10314

(718) 966-0055

For Defendants: Richard C. Mulle , Esq. Martin, Fallon & Mulle 100

East Carver Street Huntington, NY 11743 (631) 421-1211

PHILIP S. STRANIERE, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this

MOTIONS TO COMPEL.

Papers Numbered

Notices of Motion and Affidavits Annexed……………………………………..1&2

Order to Show Cause and Affidavits Annexed.………………………………

Answering Affidavits……………………………………………………………………

Replying Affidavits………………………………………………………………………

Exhibits………………………………………………………………………………………..

Other……………………………………………………………………………………………

[*2]Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this Motion is as follows:

“The answer my friend is blowin’ in the wind. The answer is blowin’ in the wind.”

We all are familiar with this refrain from Bob Dylan’s 1960’s protest song. Unfortunately it has become the cry of too many litigants in New York City’s Civil Court. Currently before the Court are three motions made by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. In each motion the defendants sought to compel the plaintiff, Richmond Pain Management, P.C. as assignee of Kenneth Bevel (40049/03); as assignee of Clifford Whaley(40050/03); and as assignee of Lorna Sterling (40051/03) to provide discovery previously requested and to reimburse the defendant the $45.00 defendant had to

expend in each action to purchase an index number. The discovery issues were resolved by a “so ordered”stipulation in each action. The defendant however insisted on submitting the issue of its entitlement to be reimbursed the $45.00 to the Court for decision.

The Court is left to decide the rather novel ^[FN1] issue of whether or not a defendant who purchases an index number in Civil Court can recover that money either by making a motion or in a judgment issued at the end of the litigation.

The civil action part of the Civil Court, like some other courts of limited jurisdiction, retains a system for commencement of an action that is a relic of days gone by. The civil action part is governed by a “commence by service” statute, Civil Court Act Article 4. Not only is this system in conflict with “commence by filing” as provided in CPLR 304, it is also not in conformity with how in Civil Court a summary proceeding is commenced in the landlord-tenant part or a small claims action is started in that part. To commence a suit in either of these parts requires the litigant to purchase an index number from the clerk of the court. More importantly, when a self-represented litigant wants to commence an action, CCA 401(a) requires the clerk to issue the summons if “the plaintiff appears without an attorney” and collect the appropriate fee.^[FN2]

When the CPLR was amended to cover actions commenced in the Supreme and County Court, § 400 was added to the Civil Court Act to specifically preclude the Civil Court from the commence by filing provisions and preserve the out-dated system of commencement by service. This was done even though the civil jurisdiction of the County Court and Civil Court are practically identical (NY State Constitution Article 6 § 11 and 15). CCA 400 also provides that [*3]“a special proceeding is commenced by service of a notice of petition or order to show cause.” The implication of CCA 400 in regard to special proceedings, which are governed by CPLR Article 4, is that they too are commenced by service. However, that contradicts CCA 401 (c) which requires the notice of petition and petition in a summary proceeding to be issued by the Court. This sentence probably should read “a special proceeding, other than a summary proceeding commenced under CCA 204” since summary proceedings are currently commenced by filing the notice of petition and petition with the clerk (CCA 401 (c)).

This case points out the serious deficiency in retaining the current commencement by service system in the Civil Court. CCA 401(b) requires that any summons issued contain language that directs the defendant to file an answer with the clerk within 20 days if personally delivered to the defendant in the city of New York, and if served by a means other than personal delivery within the city if New York the defendant must file an answer within thirty days of the plaintiff filing proof of service with the clerk (CCA 402). Meanwhile CCA 409 requires the plaintiff to file a copy of the summons with proof of service with the clerk within fourteen days after service is made within the city of New York regardless of how it was served. This procedure is seemingly not that complicated. However, this is when theory and practice collide.

For instance, defendant is served on March 1 and on March 2 within the time set forth in the summons, files an answer as directed by the summons. The answer is received by the clerk who determines that there is no index number for the action since the plaintiff has not filed the summons. If the answer is personally delivered to the clerk and the clerk checks the filings immediately, perhaps the defendant can be told to hold onto the answer and file it later after the plaintiff comes in and files the summons. This of course punishes the diligent defendant and may require multiple trips to the courthouse for the defendant to protect his or her rights. What if the answer was filed by mail or the clerk accepts the in person filing of the answer and only later determines no index number has been purchased? Invariably after the clerks check the filing and learn there is no index number, the answer is held in the clerk’s office and as summonses are filed by the plaintiff, the clerk will often attempt to check and see if an answer has been filed. A number of times a match can be made. The problem of course is when the answer is received prior to the plaintiff purchasing an index number; the plaintiff finally purchases an index number and files the summons and proof of service as required by statute; a court file is created and the clerk cannot subsequently locate the filed answer from among hundreds if not thousands of other filed answers. In these cases, a default judgment may be entered against a defendant who timely filed an answer. The judgment might not be discovered until the defendant tries to obtain credit, purchase a house or buy a car. The Court will then be entertaining a motion to vacate a wrongfully entered default judgment against the defendant and possibly have to lift restraining orders and executions. All this is a waste of judicial and legal resources and imperils the rights of diligent defendants.

The Office of Court Administration has proposed eliminating commencement by filing in the Civil Court, District Courts and City Courts. In support of the change in the statute OCA pointed out: “Aside from the expenditure of time and resources, the current system causes a [*4]financial toll. The clerks’ futile searches for filed summonses are expenditures of time for which there is no revenue stream in return….A further concern is that the summonses are being served but intentionally not filed in an effort to harass or frighten defendants. Requiring that an index number be purchased before the service of papers would generate revenue, conserve clerks’s time, and protect defendants from untoward use of the suit commencement system….”

What further complicates these matters are the tens of thousands of “no-fault” reimbursement cases filed under the Insurance Law presently flooding the court system. The plaintiffs in hundreds of these cases, as in this case, may be the same medical service provider while the defendant is the same carrier. An additional problem is that the plaintiff may be the assignee of benefits from the same patient on more than one claim against the same defendant. So even if the clerk matches the parties based on the names from the caption, the complaint and answer may not coincide as the provider may have delivered service on more than one occasion to a particular insured. Why should the clerk of the court be burdened with matching the correct complaint to the correct answer as if it were some huge game of “Concentration?” Especially when the plaintiff is the party that caused the situation. The court system is becoming the uncompensated servant for some attorneys’ collection practices. This is not in the job description.

LEGAL ISSUES:

A. Is the Current System Constitutional?

As outlined above, CCA 400 excluded the Civil Court from the application of the commencement by filing statute of the CPLR. On their face CCA 400 and CCA 409 appear to be constitutional. However, it is apparent that in the implementation of the Civil Court’s commencement by service rules, due process and equal protection rights of individuals are being violated. In regard to civil actions, the statute permits lawyers to issue and serve summons without first purchasing an index number, while at the same time requiring a self-represented plaintiff to expend that money. The statute creates two classes of litigants potentially seeking the same relief with the criteria being the financial ability to retain an attorney. An individual who can afford to retain counsel can issue a summons and perhaps collect money due and owing merely by serving the process on the defendant, while a person too poor or for any other reason unable to retain counsel, such as the amount being sought not warranting the hiring of a lawyer, cannot use the threat of suit to collect the debt; that person must actually commence the suit and expend $45.00 for the suit. A credit card company, commercial collection agencies or other business that provides a large volume of litigation to an attorney obtains a benefit that an individual self-represented plaintiff does not get from the court system. Likewise, the defendant in the self-represented plaintiff commenced suit is incurring court costs that have to be reimbursed to the plaintiff that a represented person or entity might not have to pay. Considering that landlord-tenant summary proceedings and small claims actions both require the prepaying for an index number to commence a law suit, it can only be concluded that the statute as written and the system and practice it engendered create two classes of litigants in the Civil Court civil [*5]actions: paying and non-paying customers. This is a clear violation of the equal protection clause of the New York State Constitution Article 1 § 11. There is no reasonable or rational basis for such a distinction, especially when there exists a system used in all other parts of the Civil Court and in the Supreme and County Courts which eliminates these differences. This is an example as to why the New York Court system may be “unified” but not “uniform.”

It is also apparent that the current system violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitution, Article 1 § 6. The prevailing arrangement punishes a defendant who complies with the statute, takes steps to protect his or her rights and timely files an answer, while at the same time it may potentially reward a procrastinating plaintiff who does not immediately purchase an index number or who in an even worse case, purchases it after the statutory fourteen day period. The plaintiff who actually files the summons with proof of service after fourteen days must make a nunc pro tunc application for the late filing of the summons and then give notice to the defendant and an additional opportunity to answer. However, even in this scenario, why would the defendant think it necessary to re-file an answer, since the defendant would not necessarily know that the answer previously submitted was not linked by the clerk to the proper summons.

The current system suffers too many constitutional problems to continue in effect. It must be replaced. “Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question….(T)he right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals…. (S)o too a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend a particular party’s opportunity to be heard…the State owes to each individual that process, which in light of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due” (Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371, (1971)

B. Is the Defendant Entitled to Reimbursement?

In order to protect its rights, the defendant in these three actions purchased the index number so it could file an answer or otherwise move to take steps to protect its legal interests. In none of these cases did the plaintiff purchase an index number. In each case defendant waited thirty days after service of the process to file an answer and at that time learned that no index number was purchased. The defendant then expended $45.00 on each case in order to file its answer. CCA 1911 requires that the clerk collect as a court fee $45.00 upon the issuance of a summons (CCA 1911(a)) or upon the filing of a summons with proof of service or upon filing of the first paper in that county in any action (CCA 1911(b)). There does not appear to be any statutory or case law dealing specifically with the issue of whether the defendant can recover the $45.00 when it and not the plaintiff files the first paper. [*6]

CCA 1906 provides as follows: “Costs allowed by Court. The Court may in its discretion impose costs not exceeding fifty dollars in the following cases: (a) Upon granting or denying a motion….” Since defendant was required to make a motion to compel the plaintiff to comply with discovery demands and to pay the filing fee, the Court in its discretion could award the defendant “costs” involved in making the motion. But is a filing fee a legitimate “cost?”

CCA 1908 permits a prevailing party or a party to whom costs are awarded to recover “disbursements.” All fees paid to the clerk are recoverable as a disbursement (CCA 1908(a)). Under this statute, the defendant, if a prevailing party, could recover as a disbursement the filing fee that it paid to the clerk. The question remains, can the defendant collect the filing fee at this stage of the litigation, that is, before there is a final judgment on the merits.

If the plaintiff bought the index number and prevailed in the suit, the plaintiff would recover the expense as a taxable disbursement under the statute. If the defendant prevailed, the issue would be moot since the defendant did not incur the expense, there would be no money to recover. If the defendant purchased the index number, and the defendant prevailed, the defendant would recover the filing fee. If the defendant purchased the index number and the plaintiff prevailed, the plaintiff would not be able to recover the fee since the plaintiff did not expend the money initially. Since the plaintiff was the one who instituted the suit, the plaintiff would be obtaining a benefit because the defendant purchased the index number in the action and in doing so, permitted the plaintiff to continue the case. There is something inherently unfair in requiring the defendant to subsidize the plaintiff’s cause of action out of a necessity to protect the defendant’s rights. The Court could award the defendant the $45.00 by labeling it as a reasonable cost to be awarded for the motion; however, that would not deal with the underlying issue of the plaintiffs using the Civil Court as its collection agency by filing suits and not purchasing index numbers. As a matter of public policy and to prevent plaintiffs from abusing the system, the defendant is entitled to be reimbursed at this stage of the litigation.

CONCLUSION:

Defendant’s motion in each action is granted to the extent that the plaintiff is directed to reimburse defendant the sum of $45.00 in each of these actions. Defendant’s application for sanctions of $100.00 on each cause of action is dismissed. If plaintiff continues this practice in the future, the Court will consider entertaining an application for sanctions. If plaintiff’s counsel is not being compensated sufficiently by his clients, then he either should not take the cases or re-negotiate his compensation schedule with them.

Since a consumer is not involved as a litigant, the Court does not address the issue of whether if it is shown that a plaintiff had a continuous pattern of not filing or late filing summonses, would such a pattern constitute a “deceptive business practice” under General Business Law 349.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

[*7]Court Attorney to notify both sides of this Decision/Order.

Dated:

PHILIP S. STRANIERE

Judge, Civil Court

ASN by on

Dated: March 23, 2004

Decision Date: March 23, 2004

Footnotes

Footnote 1: Novel is being used in the sense of unique rather than a reference to a tome by Tolstoy.

Footnote 2: It should also be noted that a name change application in Civil Court requires a filing fee of $65.00. This is another proceeding that is primarily commenced by self-represented individuals. Although CPLR Article 11 provides for access to the courts by persons who qualify as “poor persons” this protection is not relevant to the issues of this case involving two classes of applicants to the Civil Court.

—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Braun, J.), entered May 5, 2003, which denied petitioner insurer’s application to stay arbitration of respondent’s underinsured motorist claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The application to stay arbitration was properly denied on the ground that it was not made within 20 days after service of respondent’s demand (CPLR 7503 [c]). It does not avail petitioner that it timely commenced a proceeding to stay the arbitration in Queens County, which the Queens County court ordered transferred to New York County, and that it instituted the instant stay proceeding only because of ministerial difficulties it encountered in effectuating the transfer (cf. Matter of Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. [Coping], 179 AD2d 499 [1992]). In any event, as the motion court also held, the petition lacks merit. Respondent notified petitioner insurer of the accident immediately after it happened, in connection with a no-fault claim. Neither at this time nor at any other time prior to the grant of summary judgment in the personal injury action respondent had brought, could she have known that the only defendant in that action with significant insurance coverage, the driver of the car in which she was a passenger and also insured by petitioner, would be absolved of liability, and that she therefore had a viable underinsurance claim against petitioner. Under such circumstances, it was the grant of summary judgment to defendant in the personal injury action that marked the commencement of respondent’s obligation to give written notice of claim “as soon as practicable” (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Sala, 226 AD2d 172 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 801 [1996]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiffs from so much of an order of the District Court, Nassau County (J. Asarch, J.), entered January 2, 2003, as denied its motion for summary judgment.

Order insofar as appealed from unanimously affirmed without costs.

Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to their assignor, as well as statutory interest and attorney’s
fees, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5101 et seq. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for consolidation and summary
judgment dismissing the complaint. By order entered January 2, 2003, the court below denied both motions.

In support of its motion, plaintiffs submitted an affidavit in which Bella Safir states that she is the “practice and billing manager” and “an officer of plaintiff,” even though there are three distinct plaintiffs in this matter. We note that A.B. Medical Services, PLLC and Royalton Chiropractic P.C. have different business addresses, and no address is provided for Franklin St. Marks Medical P.C., for which there is also no assignment. The affidavit does not indicate for which “plaintiff” Safir is the billing manager and this court cannot assume that she is acting on behalf of one particular plaintiff, or on behalf of all of the plaintiffs. Consequently, her affidavit in which she states that “plaintiff” provided defendant with complete claim forms is insufficient to establish said fact inasmuch as the affidavit does not lay the necessary foundation for the admissibility of the claim forms as to any of the named plaintiffs (see A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Misc 3d [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, decided Mar. 12, 2004]). Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (cf. Damadian MRI in Elmhurst, P.C. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., NYLJ, Dec. 29, 2003 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. [*2]v Eagle Ins. Co., NYLJ, Dec. 29, 2003 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Assuming, arguendo, that Safir’s affidavit was sufficient and plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we would nonetheless affirm the order of the court below inasmuch as defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to fraud (see A. B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Nos. 2003-469, 470, 471 N C [decided herewith]).
Decision Date: March 17, 2004