Dakiroks Prods., Corp v United Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51811(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Dakiroks Prods., Corp v United Auto. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51811(U))

Dakiroks Prods., Corp v United Auto. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51811(U)

Decided on September 23, 2026

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Sandra E. Roper, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on September 23, 2026

Index No. CV-734918-24/KI

Sandra E. Roper, J.

[*1]

Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of these Motion:

Papers

Deft’s motion to dismiss 1

Pltf’s opposition and cross motion for various relief 2

Deft’s opposition to cross-motion and reply 3

Upon the foregoing papers, Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; and Plaintiff cross-moves for various relief, including an extension of time for service.

When personal jurisdiction is challenged, Plaintiff bears the initial and ultimate burden of establishing personal jurisdiction (see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 381 [2007]). The presumption of proper service created by an affidavit of service does not apply where such affidavit is facially insufficient (see e.g. Carrasco v Cruz, 139 AD3d 1052 [2d Dept., 2016]). Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit of service, which alleges service pursuant to VTL § 253, fails to establish personal jurisdiction over a No-Fault Insurer and is “void ab initio”, of which Plaintiff’s counsel of record is indeed well aware, or should be well aware, yet continues this pattern and practice of misrepresentation upon the court (see VTL §253; Pedro Torres-Jimenez MD, P.C. v American Access Cas. Co., 2025 NY Slip Op 50358 [U], 85 Misc 3d 1236 [A] [NYC Civ.Ct., 2025], citing Rosa v Allstate Ins. Co., 981 F2d 669, 671 [2d Cir., 1992]). Further, Plaintiff of its own volition without leave of court as required to so do, attempted subsequent service after 120 days from commencement of this action as prohibited by CPLR 306-b. Therefore, This Court does not have jurisdiction over this Defendant Insurer.

This Court admonishes Plaintiff firm’s pattern and practice of continuous misrepresentation upon the court with continuing defective facially insufficient affidavits of service. Plaintiff’s misrepresentation in attempting to obtain jurisdiction on the basis of VTL § [*2]253 is not a litigation tactic. There is no gray area nor precedential case law that can be argued here. The black and white text of the statute is unequivocal, unambiguous and unmistakable. It does not apply to No-Fault Insurers. Under the foregoing circumstances, the court would deny any jurisdictional discretionary equitable relief to the benefit of Plaintiff’s firm in which it presents with unclean hands. Misrepresentation of the law is disqualifying in prayer for relief to invoke judicial discretion for extensions for good cause or in the interests of justice (see Bumpus v NY City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 32 [2d Dept., 2009]).

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s cross-motion is DENIED as moot. This case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Date: September 23, 2026

Hon. Sandra E. Roper

Civil Court Kings County

RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51527(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51527(U))

RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51527(U)

Decided on September 22, 2026

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department

Decided on September 22, 2026

571015/26

Present: James, P.J., Brigantti, Alpert, JJ.

Defendant, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Wendy C. Li, J.), entered August 15, 2024, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

[*1]

Per Curiam.

Order (Wendy C. Li, J.), entered August 15, 2024, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant-insurer’s motion for summary judgment dismissing this action for first-party, no-fault benefits should have been granted. Defendant made a prima facie showing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for examinations under oath [EUO] to plaintiff and that plaintiff failed to appear at the initial and follow-up EUOs (see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Cornerstone Chiropractic, P.C., 185 AD3d 468, 469 [2020]; Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 470 [2016]; Town RX Inc. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 87 Misc 3d 132[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51853[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]). The affidavit of defendant’s attorney sufficiently described the standard practices and procedures of his office for mailing EUO scheduling letters (see Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 757 [2020]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Five Boro Med. Equip., Inc.,130 AD3d 465, 465-466 [2015]), and counsel further represented, under penalty of perjury, that he had personal knowledge that the described practices and procedures were followed (130 AD3d at 466). This represented adequate proof that the EUO letters were mailed to plaintiff.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise any issue of fact. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant provided a specific objective justification for conducting EUOs (see 11 NYCRR 65—3.5 [e]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Mercado, 235AD3d 410, 410-411 [2025]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

I concur I concur concur

Decision Date: September 22, 2026

RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51528(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51528(U))

RVA Leasing Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51528(U)

Decided on September 22, 2026

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department

Decided on September 22, 2026

571016/26

Present: James, P.J., Brigantti, Alpert, JJ.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Edit Shkreli, J.), dated July 28, 2025, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

[*1]

Per Curiam.

Order (Edit Shkreli, J.), dated July 28, 2025, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant-insurer’s unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing this action for first-party, no-fault benefits should have been granted. Defendant made a prima facie showing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for examinations under oath [EUO] to plaintiff and that plaintiff failed to appear at the initial and follow-up EUOs (see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Cornerstone Chiropractic, P.C., 185 AD3d 468, 469 [2020]; Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 470 [2016]; Town RX Inc. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 87 Misc 3d 132(A) [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]). Plaintiff’s failure to attend the EUOs is a violation of a condition precedent to coverage (see Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411, 411 [2015]).

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to establish that the EUO requests were reasonable is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and therefore is unpreserved for our review (see Massaro v Manfredi Auto Cent., LLC, 248 AD3d 514, 514 [2026]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

I concur I concur I concur

Decision Date: September 22, 2026

Grand Plus Supply, Inc. v GEICO Indem. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51588(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Grand Plus Supply, Inc. v GEICO Indem. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51588(U))

Grand Plus Supply, Inc. v GEICO Indem. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51588(U) [90 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on September 18, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on September 18, 2026

2025-102 RI C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Karen Lin, JJ

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Robert J. Helbock, Jr., J.), dated December 31, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Robert J. Helbock, Jr., J.) granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole contention, the affidavits of defendant’s claims supervisor and defendant’s mail facility general manager were sufficient to establish, prima facie, that defendant had timely and properly mailed the EUO scheduling letters and NF-10 denial of claim form (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; First Spine Chiropractic of NY, P.C. v Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., 77 Misc 3d 133[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51252[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; JCC Med., P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 71 Misc 3d 140[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50485[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th [*2]& 13th Jud Dists 2021]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: September 18, 2026

Midwood Metro. Med., P.C. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 51589(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Midwood Metro. Med., P.C. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp. (2026 NY Slip Op 51589(U))

Midwood Metro. Med., P.C. v Permanent Gen. Assur. Corp.

2026 NY Slip Op 51589(U) [90 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on September 18, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on September 18, 2026

2025-190 K C

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., Marina Cora Mundy, Joanne D. Quiñones, JJ

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), dated November 1, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered on June 20, 2023 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered June 20, 2023 is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, a judgment was entered on June 20, 2023 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint. According to the affidavit of service, the summons and complaint were delivered to “John Doe,” the “managing agent” of defendant’s “registered agent” (CSC, located at 80 State Street, Albany, NY 12207) for accepting service of process on defendant’s behalf in the State of New York. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 and CPLR 5015 (a) (1). Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order dated November 1, 2024, the Civil Court (Odessa Kennedy, J.) granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment based on CPLR 5015 (a) (1). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant provided neither a reasonable excuse for its default nor a potentially meritorious defense to the action.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment based on an excusable default is required to demonstrate both that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Codoner v Bobby’s Bus Co., Inc., 85 AD3d 843 [2011]). The process server’s affidavit constituted prima facie evidence of proper service of process upon defendant pursuant to CPLR 311 (a) (1), by serving an agent of defendant authorized to accept service on its behalf (see Hayden v Southern Wine & Spirits of Upstate NY, Inc., 126 AD3d 673 [2015]; Milky Way Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 68 Misc 3d 128[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50935[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). In support of its motion, defendant provided an affidavit from its personal injury protection litigation representative who averred that, based upon her search of defendant’s files and databases, she determined that the summons and complaint was never received by defendant. Defendant’s claim of lack of receipt is insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse. Defendant did not submit an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge who (1) contradicted the allegations in the process server’s affidavit or (2) demonstrated that plaintiff was incorrect to serve CSC by, for example, denying that CSC is its registered agent for service of process in New York, and failed to submit an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge explaining why it could not provide such an affidavit (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Yun Seek Bahk, 227 AD3d 784, 786 [2024]; Berganza v Pecora, 192 AD3d 743, 744 [2021]; Jian Hua Tan v AB Capstone Dev., LLC, 163 AD3d 937, 938 [2018]). Thus, defendant’s motion was improperly granted pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), and it is unnecessary to consider whether defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Hingorani v Venus Enters. 11 Corp., 208 AD3d 1229, 1230 [2022]; Ahava Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v Hertz Co., 72 Misc 3d 138[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50772[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]). Furthermore, CPLR 317 is not a basis to vacate the default judgment, since defendant’s agent was personally served with process (see CPLR 317, 318).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered June 20, 2023 is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: September 18, 2026

Health Value Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51594(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Health Value Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51594(U))

Health Value Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51594(U) [90 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on September 18, 2026

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on September 18, 2026

2025-1317 Q C

Present: : Chereé A. Buggs, J.P., Marina Cora Mundy, Karen Lin, JJ

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Merani Kamara Law Group (Samuel Kamara of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated July 8, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 14, 2023 pursuant to a settlement.

[*1]

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the September 14, 2023 judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated July 8, 2025 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered September 14, 2023 pursuant to a default under a settlement (see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

On appeal, plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court should not have granted defendant’s motion on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to prove that it had tendered a duly executed release and stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (a), since defendant did not demonstrate, prima facie, that it had not received a release or stipulation of discontinuance as was its burden upon its motion (see Biofeedback & Psychological Servs. v Country-Wide Ins. [*2]Co., 88 Misc 3d 135[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50685[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 88 Misc 3d 135[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]; Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). Consequently, contrary to the Civil Court’s determination, plaintiff did not need to establish that it had tendered the foregoing documents in opposition to the motion (see Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]).

Defendant’s remaining arguments for vacating the judgment lack merit (see e.g. Berenblit v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 50683[U]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the judgment entered September 14, 2023 is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: September 18, 2026

Neighborhood Med. Health Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 51600(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Neighborhood Med. Health Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 51600(U))

Neighborhood Med. Health Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PIP/BI Claims

2026 NY Slip Op 51600(U) [90 Misc 3d 1215(A)]

Decided on September 16, 2026

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Sandra Elena Roper, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on September 16, 2026

Index No. CV-733224-20/KI

Sandra Elena Roper, J.

[*1]

Recitation as required by CPLR § 2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Papers:

Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed 1

Notice of Cross Motion and Affidavits Annexed 2

Defendant’s Affirmation in Opposition and Reply 3

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law 4

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law 5

Upon the foregoing cited papers, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, after oral arguments heard September 15, 2026, and July 29, 2026, are decided as follows:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot in its entirety.

The instant claim is in the amount of $196.22 for date of service January 14, 2020, to January 27, 2020, for services rendered to Plaintiff’s assignor, Ramona Del Carmen Peralta, under claim number 52-9025-J24. Plaintiff’s bill included two columns for charges: the “charge [*2]for each procedure,” which totaled $204.34 and was relied upon by State Farm, and the “total charge per day,” which totaled $196.22, and was relied upon by Plaintiff as the “billed amount.”

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Kings County action Declaratory Action, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Neighborhood Med. Health Care, P.C., Index No. 522495/2020 (the “DJ Action”). In that case, the Supreme Court decided:

“Neighborhood Medical Health Care, P.C. has no right to receive payment for the bills submitted to SFMAIC and SFFCC and listed in “Exhibit 1″ of the Summons and Verified Complaint because Neighborhood Medical Health Care, P.C. failed and/or refused to appear for an EUO requested by SFMAIC and SFFCC, and thus breached a condition of coverage and violated its obligations under the No-Fault Laws.”

The Declaratory Action’s Summons and Verified Complaint included a chart of claims, annexed as Exhibit “1,” which included bill amounts, EUO scheduling letters with dates, and claim numbers for each assignor (“EIP”) that it identified by a set of initials.

Under claim number 529025J24, Exhibit “1” contains the following rows (selected columns):

CLAIM NO.	EIP	DATE(S) OF SERVICE	APPROX. MAILING	1ST EUO LTR.	1ST EUO DATE	DENIAL	AMOUNT BILLED
529025J24	RDP	2019-12-10 to 2019-12-10	1/27/2020	2/3/2020	3/6/2020	7/29/2020	$64.31
529025J24	FB	2019-12-10 to 2019-12-10	1/27/2020	2/3/2020	3/6/2020	7/29/2020	$64.65
529025J24	JMR	2019-12-10 to 2019-12-10	1/27/2020	2/3/2020	3/6/2020	7/29/2020	$64.31
[*3]529025J24	EC	2019-12-13 to 2019-12-16	1/27/2020	2/3/2020	3/6/2020	7/29/2020	$129.30
529025J24	EC	2020-01-15 to 2020-01-28	2/24/2020	(blank)	(blank)	7/29/2020	$192.93
529025J24	IMR	2020-01-14 to 2020-01-27	2/24/2020	(blank)	(blank)	7/29/2020	$204.34
529025J24	FB	2020-01-27 to 2020-01-27	2/24/2020	(blank)	(blank)	7/29/2020	$75.72
529025J24	RDP	2020-01-14 to 2020-01-27	2/24/2020	(blank)	(blank)	7/29/2020	$204.34
529025J24	EC	2019-12-04 to 2019-12-04	6/2/2020	6/9/2020	7/22/2020	7/29/2020	$64.65
529025J24	EC	2019-11-04 to 2019-11-13	6/2/2020	6/9/2020	7/22/2020	7/29/2020	$140.03

Plaintiff argues the following:

(1) Claim number 529025J24 appears on Exhibit “1” in association with five (5) different sets of initials: “EC,” “FB,” “JMR,” “IMR” and “RDP.” The NF-10 identifies the policyholder under that claim as Edwin Carrasco (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF], Doc No. 6).

(2) The dates of service in suit, January 14, 2020, to January 27, 2020, appear on two rows of Exhibit “1,” one coded “IMR” and one coded “RDP,” which are identical in [*4]every column shown, including an Amount Billed of $204.34. The rows coded “RDP” and “JMR” for December 10, 2019 are likewise identical, each at $64.31.

(3) No row of Exhibit “1” lists an amount of $196.22.

(4) The line charges on the NF-3 sum to $204.34. The difference between that sum and the $196.22 total stated on the NF-3 is $8.12, attributable to the January 14, 2020, date of service, for which the line charges sum to $75.72, and the stated charge is $67.60. Defendant’s Explanation of Review cites Ground Rule 11 of the Physical Medicine section of the Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule (reason code 133) as to that date of service (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF], Doc No. 6).

(5) For the rows with an approximate date of mailing of February 24, 2020, including the two rows bearing the dates of service in suit, the “1st EUO Letter” and “1st EUO Date” columns are blank.

(6) The EUO letter appendices identify an eligible injured person “IDELMI M RODRIGUEZ,” who appears on Exhibit “1” under “JMR” for the December 10, 2019 date of service and under “IMR” for the January 14-27, 2020. dates of service (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 4, 6).

The assignor in this instant matter is identified in the record by the following forms of names and by the disputed initials of “RDP” contained in Exhibit 1 of the Declaratory Judgment.

Document	Name as stated	NYSCEF Doc. No.
Defendant’s Verified Answer (caption)	PERALTA, RAMONA DEL CARMEN	5
Explanation of Review; NF-10 (item D); NF-10 Attachment A	Ramona Del Carmen Peralta	6
NF-3 claim form	Peralta Ramona C	6
Appendices to EUO letters dated 3/9/2020 and 3/31/2020	RAMONA D PERALTA	6
No-Fault application cover letter; NF-2	Ramona Peralta	31
Police accident report	Ramono DeCarmen Peralta	31
Exhibit “1” to Verified Complaint, Index No. 522495/2020	RDP	4

It is upon this disputed “RDP” initials that Plaintiff argues creates a triable issue of fact to defeat Defendant’s motion for summary judgment premised upon Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel relief. Plaintiff argues that “RDP” is not the initials of the assignor because “D” is not part of her actual name. Whereas Defendant argues that “RDP” sufficiently identifies the assignor in this case, Ramona Del Carmen Peralta, particularly in light of among other identifying connecting markers: the amount included in the Declaratory Judgment is reflective of the total charges identified in Plaintiff’s created bill for this assignor under the “charge for each procedure” column; the identical claim number; the EUO scheduling letter dates; and the denial date (see, Allay Med. Servs., P.C. v Nationwide Ins., 70 Misc 3d 139[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50087[U] [App Term 2021]).

Indeed, a novel issue which turns upon the stylistic rules in which Spanish names may properly be abbreviated as initials. Plaintiff may be correct that “D” in R”D”P which represents Spanish “Del” in assignor’s name, Ramona “Del” Carmen Peralta is not part of her actual name per se.^FN1 However, since there are no strict rules on abbreviated initials of Spanish names containing the preposition “Del” Defendant’s inclusion of “D” in “RDP” is not a fatally defective identifier in Exhibit 1, nor does it establish a triable issue of fact as argued by Plaintiff. “RDP” is but one of the permissible permutations of assignor’s abbreviated name initials in Spanish, with or without the “D”. It is herein opined that insurer’s inartful drafting of the Declaratory Judgment summons and complaint resulted in this avoidable protracted disputed Spanish language naming issue. Nevertheless, Defendant Insurer’s argument: as to the totality of the identifiable information, including consistent claim number, EUO scheduling letter dates, denial dates, bill amount in the record, and a proper permissible permutation of assignor’s Spanish abbreviated initials, provides sufficient corroborating identifying information in order to find that the instant claim and assignor are identical to the claimant in the Declaratory Judgment action; prevails here (see, id.). Plaintiff’s argument as to an alleged discrepancy between the amount listed on Plaintiff’s created bill and the amount listed in the Declaratory Judgment is rejected as mathematically unsound. The total charges listed in the “charge for each procedure” column as listed on Plaintiff’s created bill does in fact mathematically total $204.34, which Defendant properly included in the Declaratory Judgment.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s recovery is barred by the doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion is Denied as moot. This case is dismissed with prejudice.

This constitutes Decision and Order of This Court.

Date: September 16, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

Hon. Sandra Elena Roper, JCC

NR Motion PT, P.C. v Allstate Ins. (2026 NY Slip Op 51460(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at NR Motion PT, P.C. v Allstate Ins. (2026 NY Slip Op 51460(U))

NR Motion PT, P.C. v Allstate Ins.

2026 NY Slip Op 51460(U)

Decided on September 3, 2026

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Sandra Elena Roper, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on September 3, 2026

Index No. CV-034409-15/KI

Sandra Elena Roper, J.

[*1]

Papers

Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed NYSCEF

Exhibits NYSCEF

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is as follows:

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety. An insurer seeking summary judgment based upon the statutory intoxication exclusion bears the burden of establishing, through competent and admissible evidence, both: (1) that the eligible injured person was intoxicated or impaired; and (2) that the person’s injuries resulted from operating a motor vehicle while in that condition (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 77 AD3d 737 [2d Dept 2010]). Defendant has failed to satisfy its burden. The insurer in Westchester Medical Center, upon which Defendant relies, supported its motion with unimpeachable certified hospital records with confirming toxicology report of intoxication. Here, Defendant relies upon uncertified and unauthenticated medical records and a police accident report that were not submitted in admissible form. Defendant failed to provide an affidavit or other admissible competent evidentiary foundation establishing the admissibility of those documents under CPLR § 4518 or any other applicable evidentiary rule. Consequently, those materials are insufficient to establish Defendant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, obviating the shifting of the burden to rebut by Plaintiff.

Moreover, the assignor’s examination-under-oath testimony expressly disputes that she was intoxicated or impaired at the time of the accident. Defendant failed to submit competent [*2]evidence conclusively establishing either the assignor’s intoxication or the requisite causal connection between any alleged intoxication and the accident or resulting injuries. Speculation, suspicion, and unauthenticated documentary evidence cannot satisfy Defendant’s prima facie burden.

Upon Defendant’s failure to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, its motion must be denied regardless of the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s opposing papers. Defendant also failed to establish its fee-schedule defense as a matter of law. Defendant did not submit competent and admissible evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff’s charges exceeded the applicable fee schedule or otherwise identifying a legally sufficient basis for reducing or denying the subject claims.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in its entirety and that no finding is made that the assignor was intoxicated or impaired or that any alleged intoxication or impairment caused or contributed to the accident or resulting injuries. To the extent Defendant continues to pursue intoxication defense at trial, Defendant shall bear the burden of proving, through competent and admissible evidence, both the alleged intoxication or impairment and the required causal connection between that condition and the accident and resulting injuries. Defendant shall likewise bear the burden of establishing any fee-schedule defense through competent and admissible evidence at trial. LH

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Date: September 3, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

Honorable Sandra Elena Roper

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County

Citimed Surgery Ctr. LLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51435(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Citimed Surgery Ctr. LLC v Allstate Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 51435(U))

Citimed Surgery Ctr. LLC v Allstate Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 51435(U)

Decided on August 24, 2026

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

Wendy Changyong Li, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on August 24, 2026

Index No. CV-706493-24/NY

Wendy Changyong Li, J.

[*1]

I. Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a), of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

The following papers read herein: Numbered

Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Exhibits 1

Affirmation in Opposition 2

Affirmation in Reply and Exhibits 3

II. Background

The matter at hand concerns a no-fault benefits reimbursement for medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff, a healthcare provider, from Defendant, arising from an automobile accident that occurred on September 26, 2023, where Plaintiff’s assignor, I. Enninful (“Assignor“) allegedly sustained injuries.

On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendant by filing of a summons and complaint seeking to recover monetary damages in the amount of $1,988.70 plus statutory interest, statutory attorney’s fees, costs and disbursements. Defendant joined the action by interposing an answer.

Thereafter, on March 17, 2025, Defendant moved by motion seeking to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211, or in the alternative, seeking summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was lack of coverage pursuant to CPLR 3212 (“Motion Seq. #1“). Defendant alleged that the insurance policy at issue was not issued by Defendant but by Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company, a separate and distinct company that does not do business or maintain an office in the City of New York (see affirmation of M. Zeleznock, Esq.). Defendant alleged that Plaintiff improperly served Defendant, the incorrect party, and that as such, jurisdiction over Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company was not properly obtained (id.). Plaintiff opposed and Defendant replied.

Motion Seq. #1 was submitted on May 18, 2026 and subsequently assigned to this Court for determination on June 15, 2026.

III. Discussion

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that “there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (see Dallas-Stephenson v Waisman, 39 AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2007] quoting Winegrad v New York Univ Med Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Ostrov v Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 152 [1st Dept 2012]). The movant has the initial burden of coming forward with admissible evidence, such as affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts, reciting the material facts and showing that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit (CPLR 3212[b]; see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]; see also Kershaw v Hospital for Special Surgery, 114 AD3d 75, 81-82 [1st Dept 2013]). “[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Only when the movant meets this burden, does the burden shift to the opposing party to [*2]submit proof in admissible form that establishes a triable issue of fact (CPLR 3212[b]; see Zuckerman, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; Kosson v Algaze, 84 NY2d 1019 [1995]; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 128-129 [2000]).

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted where there are material and triable issues of fact present (see Stillman v Twentieth Century Fox F. Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]; F. Garofalo Elec Co v NY Univ, 300 AD2d 186 [1st Dept 2002]). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including resolving all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor (see Jacobsen v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833 [2014]). Where different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the motion must be denied (see Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540 [1992]; Jaffe v Davis, 214 AD2d 330 [1st Dept 1995]).

In support of the instant motion, Defendant proffered the following: affirmation of M. Zeleznock, Esq.; affirmation of M. Thompson-McKenna (hereinafter, “Thompson-McKenna”), Senior Product and Risk Management Litigation Consultant of Defendant; affirmation of R. Ferreira (hereinafter, “Ferreira“), claims service leader for Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company and Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company and a copy of the relevant insurance policy in question; summons and complaint; Defendant’s answer; Certificate of Compliance; and a list of prior decisions.

Based upon her search of Defendant’s file and records, Thompson-McKenna, Senior Product and Risk Management Litigation Consultant of Defendant, stated that she was unable to locate a policy of insurance covering I. Enninful, the Assignor in this action, on the date of loss, September 26, 2023 (see affirmation of Thompson-McKenna, ¶¶ 3-4). A search for the claim number 0730518826 provided by Plaintiff in the summons and complaint similarly did not render any result identifying a policy covering the Assignor (id. ¶ 5).

The affirmation of Ferreira, claims service leader for Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company and Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company, averred that Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company assigned the forementioned claim number and issued the policy of insurance in question with a policy number of 989 109 129 (see affirmation of Ferreira, ¶ 5). Ferreira further stated that Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company only issues insurance policies in the State of New Jersey and Illinois (id., ¶ 18) and that Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company is not authorized to issue insurance policies in the State of New York (id., ¶ 23).

Based on the submissions, the Court finds that Defendant established its prima facie case that (1) Defendant did not issue a policy of insurance for the Assignor; (2) that it was Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company that issued the policy in question; and (3) that Defendant was not a proper party to this action.

The burden is then shifted to Plaintiff to submit proof in admissible form sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant issued the policy of insurance at issue, as it merely alleged in a conclusory fashion that an issue [*3]of fact existed as to the identity of the policy issuer and the relationship between Defendant and Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty Insurance Company. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant failed to disclose whether it had received the bills at issue for the services rendered to the Assignor and whether it had issued a denial on the ground of lack of coverage is immaterial to the jurisdictional issue presented.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint is granted.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon Plaintiff with notice of entry within thirty (30) days thereof.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.

DATE August 24, 2026

HON. WENDY CHANGYONG LI, J.C.C.

Medical Supply Depot Group Corp v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PI/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 51339(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Medical Supply Depot Group Corp v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PI/BI Claims (2026 NY Slip Op 51339(U))

Medical Supply Depot Group Corp v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. PI/BI Claims

2026 NY Slip Op 51339(U) [89 Misc 3d 1250(A)]

Decided on August 20, 2026

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Sandra E. Roper, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on August 20, 2026

Index No. CV- 764166-19/KI

Sandra E. Roper, J.

[*1]

Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Papers

Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed 1-2

Cross Motion and Affidavit Annexed 3-4

Plaintiff’s Opp/Reply 5

Defendant’s Opp/Reply 6

Upon the foregoing cited papers, pursuant to CPLR §3212, and after oral argument on August 11, 2026, the Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment are as follows:

Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion is denied. The subject bill was received on September 13, 2019. Defendant scheduled an examination under oath (“EUO”) by letter dated September 23, 2019. Plaintiff appeared for the EUO on October 21, 2019. Defendant submits that due to Plaintiff’s insufficient testimony, it requested additional written verification on October 29, 2019. Thereafter, Defendant denied the claim on March 4, 2020, as Plaintiff failed to issue any response within the statutory timeframe of 120 days. Following issuance of the denial, Plaintiff responded on April 17, 2020, and while it did not provide written verification, Plaintiff advised that it intended to provide written verification in the future.

Although Plaintiff is indeed correct in its argument that post-EUO verification is not addressed in the No-Fault Statute, nevertheless, case law has established that post-EUO verification request is permissible as consistent with legislative intent. Where EUO was held but [*2]failed to provide verification responses insurer requires to verify the claim for services, post-EUO requests have been upheld not merely in the written form of verification responses. “If the insurer is unable to garner the information that it needs from the [EUO] of a person submitted by the assignee corporation or partnership, the insurer may request additional examinations of the assignee until a person is submitted for examination by the assignee who can provide the ‘items necessary to verify the claim’?” (Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Gepp, 234 AD3d 1320, 1322 [4th Dept 2025], citing 11 NYCRR .§65-3.5 [c]). The Nationwide Court acknowledged that the time to pay or deny a claim can be tolled by a verification request. An insurer is entitled to receive all items necessary to verify the claim. The Court opined that where the verification is the EUO, verification is deemed complete as of the date of the EUO. However, if verification cannot be deemed complete as all the necessary verification could not be garnered from the EUO, then pursuant to case law, an insurer is permitted to request additional verification through additional EUOs pursuant to Nationwide, or seek post-EUO written verification requests, which Defendant pursued in the case at bar. Thereafter, where verification sought is not provided within 120 days, an insurer is permitted to deny the claim at issue, as done here.

In the instant case, Defendant’s initial request for the EUO tolled its time to pay or deny the claim. Defendant submitted a copy of the transcript and the SIU affidavit in order to demonstrate that it did not obtain all the necessary information from the EUO and was entitled to seek written verification following the EUO. Thereafter, Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff did not respond until after 120 days from Defendant’s first request and demonstrated that Plaintiff failed to provide written verification responses to Defendant’s requests. Plaintiff’s purported response to eventually respond to the specific verification requests in the future is not a response. As a result, Defendant was entitled to deny the claim at issue.

Plaintiff errs in its argument that the EUO being held stops the tolling notwithstanding that post-EUO verification requests were made. Rather, the post-EUO verification requests continue the tolling. Most notably, post-EUO verification requests are the consequence of Plaintiff deponent’s failure to provide verification responses in the first instance at the EUO. Thus, requiring Defendant to serve post-EUO verification requests to address non-responsiveness of the EUO held. Similarly to Nationwide, although there is no specific agreement between the parties, in this instant matter, Plaintiff acknowledges the validity of the post-EUO verification requests, where Plaintiff, although untimely, responded with an intent to respond eventually, not a response, after the expiration of the 120-day period. Further, Plaintiff’s argument in its reliance on Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 3d 41 (App Term 2024) that Defendant’s post-EUO verification request on October 29, 2019, was untimely and that verification regarding the subject claim was received on the date of the EUO (i.e. October 21, 2019) is misplaced and rejected pursuant to Nationwide. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is granted in its entirety and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

DATE August 20, 2026

HON. SANDRA E. ROPER