City Chiropractic, P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50730(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at City Chiropractic, P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50730(U))

Monroe v Omni Indem. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51258(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Monroe v Omni Indem. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51258(U))

[*1]

Monroe v Omni Indem. Co.

2018 NY Slip Op 51258(U) [60 Misc 3d 1229(A)]

Decided on May 18, 2018

Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County

Kennedy, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 18, 2018

Harry Keith Monroe M.D. a/a/o OLAVERRIA, EDUARDO, Plaintiff, against Omni Indemnity Company, Defendant.

734014/16



The Ryback Firm PLLC

Attorneys for plaintiff

1810 Voorhies Avenue

3rd Fl., Suite 7

Brooklyn, New York 11235

Friedberg, Peck & Kang LLP

Attorneys for defendant

49 West 37th Street, 9th Floor

New York, New York 10018
Odessa Kennedy, J.

RECITATION, AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 2219(A), OF THE PAPERS CONSIDERED IN THE REVIEW OF THIS MOTION:

Notice of Motion 1

Notice of Cross-Motion 2

Answering Affidavit 3

Replying Affidavit 4

In an action to recover assigned first-party no fault insurance benefits, plaintiff moves for an order granting plaintiff summary judgment dismissing defendant’s affirmative defenses or finding that the billing forms were mailed to and received by defendant, and that payment of the benefits are overdue. Defendant cross moves for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the action on the ground of lack of coverage.

On April 8, 2016, the insured Eimy Peguero applied for a Pennsylvania automobile insurance policy for a total of three vehicles affirming that she resided and garaged the vehicles in Pennsylvania. Based upon these representations, defendant issued the insured an automobile insurance policy effective for the three vehicles April 8, 2016 through April 8, 2017.

On June 3, 2016, the assignor Eduardo Olaverria was allegedly injured in an automobile accident which occurred in New York because of which, plaintiff allegedly rendered treatment to the assignor.

On October 10, 2016, defendant conducted an Examination Under Oath, which defendant contends revealed that the insured does not reside, pay rent or utility bills in Pennsylvania, and rather lives in New York with her children. Defendant further claims that the insured garaged the insured vehicles in New York, and falsely represented that one of the vehicles was registered to a person who does not own the vehicle.

On November 4, 2016, defendant retroactively rescinded the policy based on the insured’s material misrepresentation. Defendant claims that the rescission of the policy is permissible under Pennsylvania law, and denied all coverage for the alleged loss. Defendant thereafter issued a check, fully refunding the premiums, which the insured cashed on December 9, 2016.

CONFLICT OF LAW

There is no dispute that conflicts exist between New York law and Pennsylvania law regarding the issues raised herein. Plaintiff claims that the matter is governed under New York law, and defendant contends that the law of Pennsylvania applies.

In New York, an insurer may not deny coverage based on an insured’s fraudulent misrepresentation, without issuing a denial detailing the basis within 30 days of the receipt of a claim. In Pennsylvania, there are no such requirements.

Under New York law, an insured or assignee of an insured may be denied benefits, where an insurer establishes that the insured had fraudulently procured the insurance policy. In Pennsylvania, challenge to the validity of an insurer’s rescission of a policy, may be made only in accordance with the restrictions set forth in the Insurance Company Law of 1921, commonly known as ‘Act 68.’

At the outset, this Court must determine whether to apply the law of the State of New York or the law of the State of Pennsylvania to this matter.

New York utilizes the ‘grouping of contacts’ or ‘center of gravity’ analysis as the appropriate approach to resolve choice of law questions, in cases premised on breach of contract. The ‘grouping of contacts’ approach seeks to determine which state has the most significant relationship to the contract or the parties. (See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 [1981]; Matter of Arbitration between Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 NY2d 219, 597 N.Y.S.2d 904 [1993], revg 178 AD2d 899 [3d Dept 1991]. The court must consider the spectrum of significant contacts, rather than a single possible gratuitous event, in its determination as to which state has the most significant relationship to the parties or the contract. (See Matter of Arbitration between Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 NY2d 219, 597 N.Y.S.2d 904 [1993], revg 178 AD2d 899 [3d Dept 1991]; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v. Singletary, 279 AD2d 56, 717 N.Y.S.2d 351 [2d Dept 2000]). Among the contacts to be considered are the state where the parties entered into the contract, negotiated and performed the contract, the domicile of the parties, and the place of subject matter of the contract. See Matter of Midland Ins. Co., 16 NY3d 536, 923 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2011), revg 71 AD3d 221 (1st Dept 2010).

In the case at bar, the insured, a Pennsylvania resident, obtained a Pennsylvania policy in Pennsylvania for vehicles registered and garaged in Pennsylvania. In applying the ‘grouping of contacts’ standards, Pennsylvania clearly has the most significant contacts with the parties, and [*2]the contract. (See Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v. Infinity Group, 49 Misc 3d 42, 18 N.Y.S.3d 816 [App. Term, 2nd Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud. Dists., 2015], holding that under New York law Pennsylvania law applies to cases where the insured, a resident of Pennsylvania, obtained a Pennsylvania insurance policy for vehicles registered and stored in Pennsylvania).

LACK OF COVERAGE DEFENSE

In its cross motion for summary judgment, defendant argues that (1) Pennsylvania law permits retroactive rescission of a policy based upon the insured’s material misrepresentations; (2) defendant met its burden by establishing the policy was properly rescinded ab initio; and (3) plaintiff cannot challenge the rescission of the Pennsylvania policy in New York.

In the insurance policy issued by defendant, coverage was effective from April 8, 2016 until April 8, 2018. The motor vehicle incident occurred on June 3, 2016. The insured’s Examination Under Oath was conducted on October 10, 2016. Defendant mailed the insured notice of policy rescission on November 4, 2016.

Defendant correctly contends that under Pennsylvania law, the insurer may rescind an automobile policy freely up until 60 days after issuance. (See Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 528 Pa. 1, 595 A.2d 1 [1991]; Erie Ins. Exchange v. Lake, 543 Pa. 363, 671 A.2d 681 [1996]). If the insurer does not rescind the policy within 60 days immediately following the issuance, it may still rescind the policy, if the basis of rescission is the insured’s material misrepresentation, which could not have been reasonably discovered within 60 days following the issuance. (Id. Erie, 543 Pa. 363)

In the instant matter, the insurer served the policy rescission beyond 60 days following the issuance of the policy. The Court must determine whether defendant met its burden that the policy was properly rescinded ab initio under the laws of Pennsylvania.

Section § 991.2006 of Pennsylvania’s Act 68 provides that an insurer may effectively cancel the policy by mailing the rescission notice to the insured. Defendant mailed the notice of rescission to the insured, and thus, complied with this section.

Plaintiff argues that even if this Court applies the laws of Pennsylvania to the instant matter, to grant defendant summary judgment, it must first determine that defendant demonstrated as a matter of law, that the insured perpetrated fraud, or misrepresentations in the insurance application.

This Court however, has no authority under New York law, to assess whether the basis of defendant’s rescission of the policy was valid. Defendant’s burden is merely to demonstrate that the policy was validly rescinded pursuant to the law of Pennsylvania. (See W.H.O Acupuncture, P.C. v. Infinity Prop. & Cas. Co., 36 Misc 3d 4, 947 N.Y.S.2d 758 [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th and 13th Jud. Dists, 2012]).

Under § 991.2008″any insured” may within 30 days of notice of cancellation challenge the rescission in writing to the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner. Other than the insured, the statute does not grant any other person or entity, including the provider, the right to challenge the rescission. If the insured does not challenge “the termination of insurance, the insured has waived that issue.” (See O’Hara v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 691 A.2d 1001 [Pa. Commonwealth Court, 1997], “[W]e recognize that, where an insured believes that an insurer has improperly terminated insurance coverage, the insured has an exclusive remedy to challenge the cancellation under the Insurance Act. If the insured does not challenge the termination of insurance, the insured has waived that issue.”)

In the case at bar, the insured did not challenge the rescission of the insurance policy within the 30-day period, and accordingly, waived this issue. As the right to challenge the rescission has elapsed, the policy was effectively and retroactively rescinded on October 10, 2016, and this Court has no power to reinstate the policy.

Plaintiff further argues that summary judgment must be denied, based on New York’s application of Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff cites a New York decision, which denied insurer’s motion for summary judgment, which defendant had based on proper rescission of the automobile policy under Pennsylvania law. (See Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v. Infinity Group, 50 Misc 3d 144(A), 2016 NY Slip Op. 50257(U) [App. Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists., 2016]).

Great Healthcare Chiropractic, however is distinguished from the case at bar. In that case, although defendant’s motion papers purported to include an affidavit by defendant’s litigation specialist, said affidavit was in fact not included. In lacking the requisite affidavit, the Court found that defendant did not meet its prima facie burden of entitlement to summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, as defendant failed to prove that the policy had been rescinded. In the case at bar, the affidavit of defendant’s claim examiner does establish the rescission of the policy.

Plaintiff also cites a decision by a Pennsylvania court which found that the defendant insurer failed to prove that the policy was void due to insured’s material misrepresentation. (See Tudor Ins. Co. v. Township of Stowe, 697 A.2d 1010 [Pa. Super. Ct., 1997]). In Tudor, however, the insurer had not rescinded the policy pursuant to Art. 68, and as such, had the burden to prove the insured’s malpresentation before a jury to vitiate the policy.

Finally, plaintiff relies on Powell v. Walker, which arises out of a declaratory judgment action in Pennsylvania, which is distinguished from the case at bar. In Walker, the court held that the insurer cannot rescind a policy beyond 60 days of issuance, where the claim was instituted by an innocent third party injured in a motor vehicle accident, as opposed to, an insured who perpetrated the fraud. (See Powell v. Walker, 428 Pa. Super. 31, 630 A.2d 16 [1993]).

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint is granted.

DATE: May 18, 2018

______________________________

ODESSA KENNEDY

Judge of the Civil CourtActive Care Med. Supply, Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51408(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Active Care Med. Supply, Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51408(U))

All Healthy Style Med., P.C. v ELRAC, Inc. (2018 NY Slip Op 51333(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at All Healthy Style Med., P.C. v ELRAC, Inc. (2018 NY Slip Op 51333(U))

[*1]

All Healthy Style Med., P.C. v ELRAC, Inc.

2018 NY Slip Op 51333(U) [61 Misc 3d 1203(A)]

Decided on May 16, 2018

Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County

Kennedy, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 16, 2018

All Healthy Style Medical, P.C., a/k/a All Healthy Style, P.C. a/a/o Maria Batista, Plaintiff, against ELRAC, Inc., Defendant.

46060/14



For plaintiff:
David Landfair Esq.
Kopelovich & Feldsherova, PC
3rd Fl., Suite NE1
Brooklyn, NY 11323

For defendant:
Paul A. Barrett Esq.
Carman, Callahan & Ingham LLP
266 Main St.
Farmingdale, NY 11735
Odessa Kennedy, J.

RECITATION, AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 2219(A), OF THE PAPERS CONSIDERED IN THE REVIEW OF THIS MOTION:

Notice of Motion 1

Affirmation in Opposition 2

In an action to recover assigned first-party no fault insurance benefits, defendant moves for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the basis that defendant properly denied bills which exceeded the permissible amount under the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule, and bills received after the policy had been exhausted.

FEE SCHEDULE DEFENSE

Defendant received a bill on July 29, 2013 in the amount of $359.35 for services provided on June 20, 2013, and issued partial payment in the sum of $180.73. On August 19, 2013, defendant denied plaintiff’s remaining claim for $178.62 as exceeding the permitted amount under the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule.

On August 19, 2013, defendant received a bill in the amount of $180.73 for services provided on July 18, 2013, and issued partial payment in the sum of $135.02. On September 6, [*2]2013, it denied plaintiff’s remaining claim of $45.71 as exceeding the permitted amount under the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule.

An insurer is only required to pay for claimed services in the amounts prescribed by the fee schedule (Oleg’s Acupuncture, P.C. v. Hereford Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 151(A), 2018 NY Slip Op. 50095(U) [App. Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. [2018]), and has the burden to establish that the amounts charged exceeded the permitted amounts (Rogy Med., P.C. v. Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132(A), 2009 NY Slip Op. 50732(U) [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). To establish entitlement to summary judgment, insurer must demonstrate that all sums paid to a provider were pursuant to the fee schedule, even if less than the amount billed (Z.M.S. & Y Acupuncture, P.C. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 143(A), 2017 NY Slip Op. 51891(U) [App. Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2017]).

To substantiate that the bills exceeded the permitted amount under the fee schedule, defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of portions of the fee schedule annexed to its moving papers.

Defendant further submits an affidavit of Corinne Garner, a claims representative employed by ELCO Administrative Services Company (“ELCO”), who states that she has personal knowledge of the subject claims as she is the assigned adjuster in the matter.

While the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the Workers Compensation fee schedule, the fee schedule in and of itself does not establish that a defendant properly utilized the codes within the fee schedule to calculate the amount a plaintiff is entitled to recover (Acupuncture Healthcare Plaza I, P.C. v. Metlife Auto & Home, 54 Misc 3d 142(A), 2017 NY Slip Op. 50207(U) [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud. Dists., 2017]). An insurer may establish that the fees charged for medical services exceeded the rates in the fee schedule, through an affidavit of an employee with personal knowledge of the claim, in conjunction with excerpts from the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule. See, (Natural Acupuncture Health, P.C. v. Praetorian Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 132(A), 2011 NY Slip Op. 50040(U) [App. Term, 1st Dept, 2011]).

In the case at bar, Garner’s affidavit is insufficient to establish that the bills exceeded the permissible amount under the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule.

Garner’s claim to have personal knowledge of the file based on her assignment to the file is inadequate. The affiant does not specify when she was assigned to the file, or whether there were any preceding adjusters assigned to the claim. Notably, the NF-10 lists someone other than Garner as the adjuster on the matter, which Garner does not address.

Garner’s knowledge of the file is further undermined by her inconsistent accounts of the claim. Paragraph 20 of her affidavit states that the second bill at issue with the date of service of July 18, 2013 was paid in full in the sum of $180.73 while paragraph 23 states that only $135.02 of the bill was paid.

Moreover, Garner fails to demonstrate in any details that she has sufficient training or experience regarding the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule. Nor does she explain the basis that the bills exceeded the permitted amount under the Worker’s Compensation fee schedule, the nature of the services billed, the specialty of the provider, nor the section(s) of the code mandating the reductions of the bills.

The affiant claims that her review of the file and computer notes for the subject claims indicate that the bills at issue were reduced by defendant pursuant to the fee schedule which is conclusory, and without probative value (East Coast Acupuncture, P.C. v. Hereford Ins. Co., 51 [*3]Misc 3d 441, 26 N.Y.S.3d 684 [Civ. Ct., N.Y.C., Kings Cty, 2016]).

EXHAUSTION OF BENEFITS DEFENSE

On December 3, 2013, December 17, 2013, and December 30, 2013, defendant denied three of plaintiff’s claims based on the defense of policy exhaustion.

Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.15, when an insurer receives claims for more than $50,000, payments for claims that are submitted prior to the exhaustion of the $50,000, shall be made in the order in which each service was rendered or each expense was incurred. Claims are payable in the order they are received (Alleviation Medical Services, P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 44, 49 N.Y.S.3d 814 [App. Term, 2nd Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists., 2017]). The term “claims” in the priority of payment regulation excludes claims that are incomplete because verification requests are outstanding (Nyack Hospital v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294, 832 N.Y.S.2d 880, 864 N.E.2d 1279 [2007], affg, modfg and remanding 27 AD3d 96 [2d Dept 2005]). Consequently, while an insurer is awaiting verification of a claim not verified, it may pay subsequently received verified claims, even if that will result in exhaustion of the policy before the requested verification is finally received (id.).

An insurer is not required to pay a claim where the policy limits have been properly exhausted (Hospital for Joint Diseases v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533, 779 N.Y.S.2d 534 [2nd Dept., 2004]). Insurer’s payment of full monetary limits set forth in the policy, terminates its duties under the contract (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 AD2d 448, 628 N.Y.S.2d 396 [2nd Dept., 1995]).

To demonstrate that the policy had been exhausted when defendant received the bills at issue, Garner refers to a ledger created by an unnamed employee of defendant.

Garner does not explain the substance of the ledger. She identifies the ledger as the “custodian of the no fault file” and the source containing the details of defendant’s policy exhaustion defense.

The ledger however, does not specify when defendant received or paid any of the prior bills leading to the exhaustion of the policy. The ledger contains ambiguous headings such as ‘posting date,’ ‘invoice date’ and ‘service date’ without any evidence to establish that any of the headings represent the date that defendant in fact received or paid the bills prior to the exhaustion of the policy. Accordingly, defendant fails to establish as a matter of law that the policy was exhausted at the time of defendant’s receipt of the bills at issue.

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Dated: May 16, 2018
ODESSA KENNEDY
Judge of the Civil CourtGlobal Liberty Ins. Co. v New Century Acupuncture, P.C. (2018 NY Slip Op 03444)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Global Liberty Ins. Co. v New Century Acupuncture, P.C. (2018 NY Slip Op 03444)

Neuro Rehab Med. Servs. of S.I., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50671(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Neuro Rehab Med. Servs. of S.I., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50671(U))

T & S Med. Supply Corp. v Ocean Harbor Cas. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50665(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at T & S Med. Supply Corp. v Ocean Harbor Cas. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50665(U))

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Hillside Comprehensive Pain Mgmt., P.C. v MVAIC (2018 NY Slip Op 50663(U))

Reported in New York Official Reports at Hillside Comprehensive Pain Mgmt., P.C. v MVAIC (2018 NY Slip Op 50663(U))

[*1]

Hillside Comprehensive Pain Mgmt., P.C. v MVAIC

2018 NY Slip Op 50663(U) [59 Misc 3d 142(A)]

Decided on May 4, 2018

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 4, 2018

PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2016-2412 Q C

Glinkenhouse, Floumanhaft & Queen by Glinkenhouse Queen (Alan Queen of counsel), for Appellant. Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered June 10, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon denying a motion by defendant to vacate a default judgment of that court entered March 5, 2007 and to dismiss the complaint, sua sponte, modified the judgment by tolling the accrual of interest from March 5, 2007 through March 1, 2016.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced this action in 2001 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant served an answer, but failed to appear for trial on March 5, 2007. An inquest was conducted on the trial date, and a default judgment awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $6,930.43 and interest in the amount of $14,801.32 was entered on March 1, 2016. Shortly thereafter, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, stay enforcement of the judgment, stay the restraint of any of its bank accounts or release any bank accounts that may have been restrained, and to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion. By order entered June 10, 2016, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion but, sua sponte, modified the judgment by tolling the accrual of interest from March 5, 2007 through March 1, 2016 on the ground that an “inordinate amount of time” had passed, without explanation, between the inquest in 2007 and the entry of the judgment in 2016. Plaintiff appeals only from the part of the order which, sua sponte, modified the judgment by tolling the accrual of interest from March 5, 2007 through March 1, 2016.

The portion of the order which tolled the accrual of interest did not address a demand for relief made on notice to plaintiff and was, therefore, sua sponte. Thus, that portion of the order is not appealable as of right (see CCA 1702 [a] [2]; Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333 [2003]; [*2]Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v Delos Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 144[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50650[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]), and we decline to grant leave to appeal. Plaintiff “could properly have moved to vacate the order and appealed as of right” to this court in the event that the motion was denied (Sholes, 100 NY2d at 335; Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 55 Misc 3d 144[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50650[U]; see CCA 1702 [a] [3]), but plaintiff failed to make such a motion.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: May 04, 2018Hereford Ins. Co. v Lida’s Med. Supply, Inc. (2018 NY Slip Op 03226)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Hereford Ins. Co. v Lida’s Med. Supply, Inc. (2018 NY Slip Op 03226)

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (2018 NY Slip Op 03093)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (2018 NY Slip Op 03093)

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth.

2018 NY Slip Op 03093 [31 NY3d 187]

May 1, 2018

Fahey, J.

Court of Appeals

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, June 27, 2018

[*1]

Contact Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Girtha Butler, Respondent, v New York City Transit Authority, Appellant.

Argued March 21, 2018; decided May 1, 2018

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 135 AD3d 804, reversed.

Fahey, J.

This appeal presents the question whether the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) applies to no-fault claims against a self-insurer. We conclude that it does.

In January 2001, Girtha Butler sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident involving a bus on which she was a passenger. The bus was owned by defendant, New York City Transit Authority. It did not have no-fault coverage and instead was self-insured with respect to that risk.^[FN1] Plaintiff, Contact Chiropractic, P.C., subsequently provided health services to{**31 NY3d at 193} Butler for the personal injuries she sustained in the accident. Butler assigned to plaintiff her right to recover first-party benefits from the self-insured defendant. To that end, plaintiff submitted its claims, bills, and no-fault verification forms to defendant between March 14, 2001 and August 27, 2001.

[*2]

On January 8, 2007, plaintiff commenced this action seeking, among other things, reimbursement for allegedly outstanding invoices. After joining issue, defendant moved for an order to, among other things, dismiss the complaint “based on [plaintiff’s] failure to commence the action within the three-year statute of limitations.” Defendant contended that the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (2), which applies to actions to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute, governs this case because defendant was self-insured at the time of the subject accident and therefore had no contract for insurance with respect to that loss, as opposed to CPLR 213 (2), which establishes a six-year period of limitations for an action based upon a contractual obligation or liability. Defendant relied upon authority of the Appellate Division, First Department, providing that a self-insured’s “obligation to provide no-fault benefits arises out of the no-fault statute,” and that “the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2)” applies to disputes with respect to the payment of such benefits by a self-insured (M.N. Dental Diagnostics, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 82 AD3d 409, 410 [1st Dept 2011]).

In opposition to the motion, plaintiff maintained that the six-year statute of limitations controls this case. For its part, plaintiff relied upon authority of the Appellate Division, Second Department, providing that an injured person’s “claim for uninsured motorist benefits against a self-insured vehicle owner, while statutorily mandated, remains contractual rather than statutory in nature and, as such, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations” (Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v Suero, 38 AD3d 544, 545 [2d Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 9 NY3d 811 [2007]).

Civil Court denied the motion, holding that a six-year statute of limitations applies to no-fault benefit claims against both insurers and self-insurers. The court reasoned that “[n]either self-insured nor governmental status supports a shortened {**31 NY3d at 194}statute of limitations”; in support of that point, the court noted that the Second Department has applied a six-year statute of limitations to no-fault claims, regardless of whether the prospective payor has an insurance policy or is self-insured (see Suero, 38 AD3d at 544).

Defendant subsequently moved for leave to renew the motion, and the court granted renewal but adhered to the prior determination. In this order, the court acknowledged the “split of authority” in the Appellate Division with respect to this statute of limitations question, and deemed controlling the Second Department case law applying a six-year statute of limitations in cases such as this one on the ground that “no-fault matters . . . are arguably contractual in nature, even when dealing with a self-insured entity such as [defendant].”

On appeal, the Appellate Term affirmed the order determining the motion to renew and applying the six-year statute of limitations to this matter (42 Misc 3d 60 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), reasoning “that the intent of the legislature was not to impose a lesser duty on a public carrier which posts a bond than the duty imposed upon an owner who purchases insurance” (id. at 62). On further appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, concluding that the Appellate Term had “correctly determined that an action by an injured claimant, or his or her assignee, to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a defendant who is self-insured, is subject to a six-year statute of limitations, since the claim is essentially contractual, as opposed to statutory, in nature” (135 AD3d 804, 805 [2d Dept 2016]).

The Appellate Division granted defendant’s subsequent application for leave to appeal to this Court and certified this question for our review: “Was the decision and order of [the Appellate Division], which determined that an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a party which is self-insured is subject to a six-year statute of limitations, properly made?” We now answer that question in the negative.

[*3]

This case arises from the No-Fault Law, which “is aimed at ensuring ‘prompt compensation for losses incurred by accident victims without regard to fault or negligence, to reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings{**31 NY3d at 195} to New York motorists’ ” (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 504-505 [2015], quoting Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860 [2003]). We previously have recognized the complex “nature of the statutory and regulatory scheme of the No-Fault Law” (id. at 505), characterizing it as a “Rube-Goldberg” like maze (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 286 [1997]). This matter is another illustration of the intricacy of that law.

Our review begins with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 312 (1) (a), which provides, in pertinent part, that

“[n]o motor vehicle shall be registered in this state unless the application for such registration is accompanied by proof of financial security which shall be evidenced by proof of insurance or evidence of a financial security bond, a financial security deposit or qualification as a self-insurer under [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 316].”

Inasmuch as the registrant of a motor vehicle may prove “financial security” through, among other things, evidence of a “financial security bond” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 312), it follows that registration of a motor vehicle in this state is not contingent upon proof of insurance. To the extent a registrant elects to forgo insurance, the alternative form of financial security chosen (be it self-insurance under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 316 or the financial security bond referenced in section 312) must satisfy Insurance Law § 5103, which generally requires the payment of no-fault benefits (minimum amounts of which are specified in 11 NYCRR 65-1.1) and which applies its provisions to any contract for insurance that does not meet the demands of that article (Insurance Law § 5103 [h]; see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw, 52 NY2d 818, 820 [1980]).

In matters involving questions with respect to no-fault claims against insurance companies liable for no-fault benefits due to the issuance of an insurance policy, the Appellate Division has applied a six-year statute of limitations (see Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v Glenwood Med., P.C., 48 AD3d 319, 319 [1st Dept 2008]; Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775, 776 [2d Dept 2007]; Benson v Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 214, 215 [1st Dept 1987]; Micha v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 835, 835 [3d Dept 1983]; see also Flatlands Acupuncture, P.C. v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 32{**31 NY3d at 196} Misc 3d 17, 18 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Chester Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 1108[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52009[U], *2 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2008] [collecting Appellate Division cases]). This dispute, however, arises from an instance in which the party responsible for the payment of no-fault benefits is self-insured and, as noted, the law is unsettled regarding what statute of limitations applies to no-fault benefit claims involving such entities.

We conclude that the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2), which governs disputes with respect to liabilities created by statute, should control this case. There is no dispute “that it is the gravamen or essence of the cause of action that determines the applicable Statute of Limitations” (Western Elec. Co. v Brenner, 41 NY2d 291, 293 [1977]), or that a three-year limitations period applies to “an action to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214 [2]; cf. CPLR 213 [2] [imposing a six-year statute of limitations upon actions involving contractual obligations and liabilities]). Moreover, although the three-year period of limitations in “CPLR 214 (2) does not automatically apply to all causes of action in which a statutory remedy is sought” (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 208 [2001]), that condition does attach to instances in which “liability would not exist but for a statute” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The no-fault benefits in dispute are not provided by a contract with a private insurer. Instead defendant has met its statutory obligation by self-insuring. No-fault is a creature of statute (see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986] [“the No-Fault Law does not codify common-law principles; it creates new and independent statutory rights and obligations in order to provide a more efficient means for adjusting financial responsibilities arising out of automobile accidents”]). Our holding in Aetna Life & Cas. Co. is directly applicable here. As we stated in that case, “first-party benefits are a form of compensation unknown at common law, resting on predicates independent of the fault or negligence of the injured party” (id. at 175). In the absence of private law requiring defendant to pay first-party benefits (that is, in the absence of a contract for insurance), the only requirement that defendant provide such remuneration to the assignee as a result of the accident appears in relevant [*4]parts of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Insurance Law. Consequently, the source of{**31 NY3d at 197} this claim is wholly statutory, meaning that the three-year period of limitations in CPLR 214 (2) should control this case.^[FN2]

Finally, we note that our holding here does not reduce the no-fault liability or obligations of self-insurers, or curtail the substantive no-fault rights of injured parties or their assignees as against such self-insurers. “[S]tatutes of limitations are considered procedural because they are deemed as pertaining to the remedy rather than the right” (Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC v King, 14 NY3d 410, 416 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Therefore, applying the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) does not alter the substantive protections afforded under the No-Fault Law to those with a claim against a self-insurer.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed, with costs, that branch of defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred granted, and the certified question answered in the negative.

Stein, J. (concurring). I concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusion. However, I write separately to point out that, on this appeal, we do not resolve the question of whether insurance companies who issue contractual insurance policies covering no-fault claims are subject to a three- or six-year statute of limitations, as that question is not before us.

Garcia, J. (dissenting). [*5]I would hold that an action to recover no-fault benefits—whether from insurers or self-insurers—is subject to the six-year statute of limitations. As the majority acknowledges, the lower courts have, for decades, held that a no-fault claim against an insurance company is subject to the six-year limitation (majority op at 195-196 [collecting cases]). And this Court has cited to the “applicable six-year Statute of Limitations” for such claims (Gurnee v Aetna Life &{**31 NY3d at 198} Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 193 [1982]). Despite accepting that premise, the majority holds that the same claim against a self-insurer—on the same theory of liability—is subject to the three-year statute of limitations. By electing to be self-insured, defendant stands in the same position as any other insurer under the No-Fault Law. A different statute of limitations for self-insurers, essentially providing a shorter limitations period for those who demonstrate “financial security,” is an unfortunate result and one not required by our precedent. Accordingly, I dissent.

As the name suggests, New York’s “Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act,” commonly referred to as the “No-Fault Law” (see Insurance Law § 5101 et seq.), requires that “every owner of a motor vehicle provide himself [or herself], members of [the owner’s] household, operators, occupants and pedestrians with compensation for ‘basic economic loss’ resulting from injuries occasioned by the use or operation of that vehicle in this State, regardless of fault” (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 46 [1975]). “[T]he no-fault legislation foreclosed recovery for pain and suffering by persons who had suffered relatively minor injuries in automobile accidents, but balanced this by providing a means of obtaining prompt and full recovery for certain economic losses” (Gurnee, 55 NY2d at 193). The No-Fault Law imposes equal liability for the payment of no-fault benefits on insurers and self-insurers alike (see Insurance Law § 5103 [a] [1]; Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 224 [1986]).^[FN1]

Reimbursement payments for basic economic loss, known as “first-party benefits” (Insurance Law § 5102 [b]), must be made “as the loss is incurred” and benefits become “overdue if not paid within thirty days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained” (id. § 5106 [a]). Accordingly, the accrual date for a cause of action against an insurer or self-insurer based on its failure to pay first-party benefits is the date when the payments became overdue (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 222 [1996]).

{**31 NY3d at 199}The No-Fault Law does not provide a statute of limitations for actions to recover first-party benefits from insurers or self-insurers. Accordingly, in determining the appropriate limitations period, “it is necessary to examine the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought” (Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438, 443-444 [1995], quoting Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229 [1980]). The touchstone is “the gravamen or essence of the cause of action” rather than the form in which it is pleaded (Western Elec. Co. v Brenner, 41 NY2d 291, 293 [1977]).

A claim in contract is subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (2), which “includes a cause of action for indemnification, whether the obligation to indemnify arises expressly or by operation of law” (David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 35 at 46 [5th ed 2011]). By contrast, the three-year statute of limitations applies to “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as provided in sections 213 and 215” (CPLR 214 [2]). The three-year limitations period “does not automatically apply to all causes of action in which a statutory remedy is sought, but only where liability ‘would not exist but for a statute’ ” (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 208 [2001], quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 174 [1986]).

The majority’s application of the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2) forecloses any recovery here, despite the fact that defendant made no payments or adjustments whatsoever with respect to the claims, bills, and no-fault verification forms submitted by plaintiff. I would apply the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (2) and hold that plaintiff’s action was timely.

[*6]As the majority notes, it is well settled that an action to recover first-party benefits from an insurance company is premised on the terms of the insurance contract and so subject to CPLR 213 (2)’s six-year statute of limitations (see majority op at 195-196). The First, Second, and Third Departments have long held that a no-fault claim asserted by an insured against an insurer is contractual in nature and therefore subject to the six-year statute of limitations (see Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775, 776 [2d Dept 2007] [holding “that a no-fault claimant’s right (or that of his or her assignee) to recover{**31 NY3d at 200} first-party benefits derives primarily from the terms of the relevant contract of insurance”]; Benson v Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 214, 215 [1st Dept 1987]; Micha v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 835, 836 [3d Dept 1983]). This Court has also recognized that the six-year limitation applies to claims seeking withheld or overdue first-party benefits (Gurnee, 55 NY2d at 193).^[FN2] In an analogous context, we applied the six-year statute of limitations to an uninsured motorist claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) under the relevant insurance policy (see Matter of De Luca [Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.], 17 NY2d 76, 79 [1966]).

There is no dispute that a no-fault action against an insurer is subject to the six-year statute of limitations governing contractual obligations.^[FN3]

The issue then is whether a self-insurer should have a different limitations period than an insured who pays a premium for coverage. Considerations of public policy and fundamental fairness militate against that outcome. Those considerations should control given that application of a uniform six-year limitations period finds support in our case law.

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the absence of a contract does not necessarily mean that an action against a self-insurer is fundamentally statutory in nature. The term “insurer” is defined in the No-Fault Law as “the insurance company or the self-insurer, as the case may be” (Insurance Law § 5102 [g]). Although technically a self-insurer, defendant is nonetheless considered the functional equivalent of an “insurer” for the {**31 NY3d at 201}purposes of administering no-fault coverage. Indeed, self-insurance is different from insurance only insofar as “the self-insurer has assumed the risk of personally satisfying any tort judgments against it” (ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, 96 NY2d 58, 74 [2001]). But, in this context, the obligation to provide no-fault benefits is functionally the same for insurers and self-insurers. We therefore “attach no legal significance to whether the [defendant] is self-insured or carries insurance coverage” (Ryder Truck Lines v Maiorano, 44 NY2d 364, 372 [1978]). As a corporation carrying passengers for hire, defendant “may . . . choose one method or the other to make economic provision to assure discharge of its financial obligations. Its liability, however, is unaffected by the implementing mechanism it selects” (id.).

The lack of a meaningful difference between insurers and self-insurers is confirmed by settled precedent. In Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw (52 NY2d 818 [1980]), this Court resolved the question whether self-insured entities were required to provide uninsured motorist benefits. We answered that question in the affirmative, holding that self-insurers had to provide the same minimum coverage as insured entities with insurance policies. We then extended the [*7]rationale in Shaw to hold that Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 does not bar an employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from his self-insured employer in connection with an accident that occurred while the employee was driving the employer’s vehicle (see Matter of Elrac, Inc. v Exum, 18 NY3d 325, 327-328 [2011]). In so holding, we noted that “[a]n action against a self-insurer to enforce the liability recognized in Shaw is, in our view, essentially contractual. The situation is as though the employer had written an insurance policy to itself, including the statutorily-required provision” (id. at 328 [emphasis added]).

By electing to be self-insured, defendant assumes the obligation to provide no-fault and uninsured motorist coverage and “[w]ith that, [defendant] undertook all the duties and responsibilities of an insurer” (Ward, 96 NY2d at 77). Defendant, in other words, is in the same position as any other insurer for the purposes of providing coverage. The instrumentality of no-fault coverage—whether a certificate of self-insurance or a policy of insurance—is immaterial to the obligation to indemnify. Plaintiff’s claim against a self-insurer is therefore properly{**31 NY3d at 202} viewed as a breach of contract governed by the six-year statute of limitations.^[FN4]

Citing our decision in Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson (67 NY2d 169 [1986]), the majority nonetheless posits that no-fault coverage is a creature of statute. In Nelson, we observed that the “no-fault concept . . . modifies the common-law system of reparation for personal injuries under tort law . . . and that first-party benefits are a form of compensation unknown at common law, resting on predicates independent of the fault or negligence of the injured party” (id. at 175 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In short, “the No-Fault Law does not codify common-law principles; it creates new and independent statutory rights and obligations in order to provide a more efficient means for adjusting financial responsibilities arising out of automobile accidents” (id.). We therefore applied CPLR 214 (2)’s three-year statute of limitations to an insurance company’s action to enforce a statutory lien, pursuant to a specific provision of the No-Fault Law, on a judgment awarded to a plaintiff who had already been paid first-party benefits (see Nelson, 67 NY2d at 174-175; Insurance Law § 5104 [b]). That third-party claim, which did not exist at common law, “could not properly be viewed as arising out of any contract” (Mandarino, 37 AD3d at 777). The present case, involving a direct claim for indemnification by an injured party or the party’s assignee, is readily distinguishable. That self-insurers may avoid purchasing an insurance policy does not alter the basis of their liability.

As we have consistently recognized, a defendant “may not, merely because it is a self-insurer, decrease the obligations that it owes to its insureds” (Ward, 96 NY2d at 77; see Shaw, 52 NY2d at 820). Giving self-insurers, based on no substantive difference in their obligation to pay, a shorter limitations period than those who obtain insurance policies, leads to arbitrary and inequitable outcomes in the provision of no-fault benefits. Consider the scenario of a private automobile, insured through a policy of insurance, colliding with a public bus,{**31 NY3d at 203} insured through a certificate of self-insurance. The driver of the car and a passenger on the bus suffer relatively minor injuries requiring medical treatment. They both seek payment for first-party medical benefits from those obligated to pay. Under the majority’s holding, the injured driver will have six years to file suit based on the failure to pay first-party benefits, but the injured passenger will have only three years. By the mere fortuity that a public bus company is “self-insured,” the injured passenger is put at significant disadvantage. From an injured claimant’s perspective, however, the right to recover benefits from a self-insurer is no different than the equivalent right under a contract of insurance issued to a private automobile owner (see Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. [Manning], 96 AD2d 471, 472 [1st Dept 1983], affd 62 NY2d 748 [1984]). The rule now put forward by the majority raises the troubling appearance that an equally-deserving claimant could be barred from recovering benefits merely because the offending party effectively “bought” self-insured status. In making insurers and self-insurers equally liable for no-fault benefits, I do not believe the legislature ever contemplated such an outcome.^[FN5][*8]

An action to recover no-fault benefits from an insurer is subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (2). Applying the same six-year limitation to self-insurers would make the limitations period consistent across all no-fault claims. Our precedent supports this outcome and it is consistent with the public policy underlying no-fault liability. Allowing six years for bringing claims against an insured but only three years for bringing claims against a self-insurer is both unfair and unnecessary. Accordingly, I dissent.

Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Stein and Feinman concur, Judge Stein in a concurring opinion; Judge Garcia dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Judges Rivera and Wilson concur.

Order reversed, with costs, that branch of defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred granted and certified question answered in the negative.

Footnote 1:Vehicle and Traffic Law § 321 (1) excepts vehicles owned by a political subdivision of any state from the no-fault insurance procurement and security requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 (1). Vehicle and Traffic Law § 321 (2), in turn, provides that any such motor vehicle shall be subject to the provisions of article 51 of the Insurance Law, including Insurance Law § 5103 (a) (1), which establishes minimum no-fault insurance and security requirements.

Footnote 2:Here we make two somewhat tangential points. First, as a general matter, we disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the substance of the responsibility to provide no-fault benefits, rather than the source of that obligation, controls this statute of limitations analysis.

Second, we note that Matter of Elrac, Inc. v Exum (18 NY3d 325 [2011]) does not compel a result different from that which we have reached herein. In Elrac, Inc., we interpreted the Workers’ Compensation Law and determined that the phrase “any other liability whatsoever” could not be interpreted literally to bar an employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from an employer (id. at 328). Our reasoning did not address, and does not bind us in, the context of interpreting the No-Fault Law or CPLR 214 (2).

Footnote 1:There are various ways to qualify as a “self-insurer” under the relevant statutes, including by demonstrating “financial security” (11 NYCRR 65-2.1 [a] [1]-[2]). In lieu of providing an insurance policy or surety bond, corporations engaged in the business of transporting passengers for hire, such as defendant, may file a certificate of self-insurance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370).

Footnote 2:Gurnee involved the retroactive application of our decision in Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (49 NY2d 451 [1980]), which interpreted the Insurance Law as it related to no-fault insurance protection to cap lost earnings at $1,000 per month rather than the $800 per month proposed by the Superintendent of Insurance. Plaintiffs brought suit against the insurance companies seeking to recover the difference on prior claims. We held that our earlier decision should apply to all claims not barred by the statute of limitations. In doing so, we specifically “noted that the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations has already extinguished a portion of the insurers’ potential liability,” citing CPLR 213 (Gurnee, 55 NY2d at 193).

Footnote 3:To suggest otherwise would make uncertain the viability of thousands of no-fault claims against insurance companies that could otherwise be timely asserted under this well-established, and much relied-upon, six-year rule.

Footnote 4:The Appellate Division, Second Department has applied the same limitation to self-insurers in the analogous context of uninsured motorist benefits (see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Powell, 126 AD3d 705, 706 [2d Dept 2015]; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Hill, 107 AD3d 897, 898 [2d Dept 2013]; Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v Suero, 38 AD3d 544, 545 [2d Dept 2007]).

Footnote 5:Nothing in the legislative history of the No-Fault Law suggests that the legislature intended self-insurers to have a different statute of limitations than private insurers.