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October 24, 2006

Mid Atl. Med. P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 52039(U))

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/mid-atl-med-p-c-v-victoria-select-ins-co-2006-ny-slip-op-52039u/

Court
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Judge
Thomas, J.
Decided
October 24, 2006
Citation
2006 NY Slip Op 52039(U) · 13 Misc 3d 1228(A)
Posture
Motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211)
Outcome
Insurer prevailed
Issues
Policy issues
Legal questions
Claimant's prima facie case on motions (see the maps)
Cite as
Mid Atl. Med. P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 1228(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 52039(U) (Civ Ct, Kings County 2006)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

Virginia law governed the policy's retroactive rescission because Virginia had the most significant contacts with the insurance contract. The provider sought summary judgment for unpaid no-fault benefits, and the insurer cross-moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (5), relying on a Virginia default declaratory judgment rescinding the policy for material misrepresentations. Although the provider established its prima facie case under Insurance Law § 5106 (a), the policy was issued in Virginia based on the insured's residence, vehicle registration, and intended garaging there. Applying the grouping-of-contacts analysis and following Eagle Insurance Co. v Singletary, the Civil Court, Kings County, denied the provider's motion and granted the insurer's cross motion.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Mid Atl. Med. P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 52039(U))

[*1]
Mid Atl. Med. P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co.
2006 NY Slip Op 52039(U) [13 Misc 3d 1228(A)]
Decided on October 24, 2006
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Thomas, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Decided on October 24, 2006

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County



Mid Atlantic Medical P.C. a/a/o REGINALD SMALLS, KEVIN JOHNSON, Plaintiff,

against

Victoria Select Ins. Co., Defendant.

112247/04

Delores J. Thomas, J.

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this motion and cross-motion is as follows:

In this action brought by a health care provider to recover first-party no-fault benefits for services rendered to its assignors, Reginald Smalls and Kevin Johnson, plaintiff moves for an order granting summary judgment in its favor in the sum of $3,673.07 as to each assignor plus statutory interest and attorney’s fees. Defendant cross-moves for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) dismissing the action.

To establish a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, plaintiff must demonstrate that it submitted a proper proof of claim setting forth the fact and amount of losses sustained and that payment of no-fault benefits is overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2d Dept]). The court finds plaintiff has established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.

Defendant contends the issue of timeliness of payment is immaterial in this dispute since [*2]plaintiff treated injuries did not arise from a covered accident. On April 4, 2005, Hon. L.A. Harris, Jr., of the Circuit Court for the County of Henrico, Virginia, granted defendant’s Petition for a Declaratory Judgment awarding it a default judgment and retroactively rescinding an insurance policy it had issued to Anthony Lindo (see Exhibit A annexed to cross-motion). Defendant states that it sought cancellation of the policy after it discovered Lindo made material misrepresentations on the insurance application. Plaintiff seeks to recover benefits under Lindo’s policy. Based on the retroactive cancellation of the policy, defendant asserts the thirty-day rule does not apply and the lack of coverage defense survives (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195). Therefore, defendant argues it is entitled to an order granting its cross-motion dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff counters that defendant admits coverage existed at the time the assignments were made in July, 2004. It was not until November, 2004 that the policy was rescinded. Furthermore, plaintiff argues defendant has failed to lay a foundation for the documents submitted in support of its position. Plaintiff states that defendant has failed to attach an affidavit by someone with personal knowledge who can “corroborate and lay a foundation for the documents.” Moreover, plaintiff argues New York law, which does not provide for retroactive cancellation of an insurance policy, should apply as it has “a greater interest in protecting its innocent victims against motorists covered by an out of state insurance policy.”

Plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s cross-motion should not be granted because defendant has failed to lay a proper foundation for its evidence is unpersuasive. Defendant’s counsel indicates in her affirmation in support that she possesses knowledge of the facts based on a review of the files and that the documents submitted are true and correct copies. Defendant has submitted sufficient relevant documentary evidence to warrant consideration of its cross-motion.

Therefore, determination of the motion and cross-motion rests in a resolution of the conflict of law dispute between the two jurisdictions. Defendant claims that it properly canceled the policy retroactively under Virginia law. The policy was issued in Virginia based on factors which included that the insured was a Virginia resident, that the vehicle was registered in Virginia, and that it would be garaged in Virginia.

“Where there is a conflict of law relating to an insurance policy, the conflict must be resolved by application of the conflict of law rules relevant to contracts.” (Integon Insurance Company v Garcia, 281 AD2d 480.) Generally, courts now apply the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” inquiry to determine which state has the most significant contacts to the dispute. In Eagle Insurance Co. v Singletary, et al. (279 AD2d 56 [2d Dept]), an action with a similar fact pattern to the instant action, defendant Singletary was injured in New York by a vehicle owned by a Mr. Suleiman who was insured by Integon Insurance Company. Integon did not dispute that there was coverage at the time of the accident. However, Integon denied coverage based on the retroactive cancellation of the policy it obtained under Virginia law after it determined the insured had made material misrepresentation on its insurance application. The Court found: “In sum, on the facts presented, New York’s governmental interests, when balanced against Virginia’s significant

contacts with the contract and legitimate governmental interest in protecting its honest policyholders from bearing the burden of paying claims incurred by dishonest policyholders, is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the application of New York law.” (Id., at 60; citation omitted.) Here too, the Court finds the application of Virginia law is proper. [*3]

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross-motion for an order dismissing the complaint is granted.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated:Brooklyn, New York

October 24, 2006

DELORES J. THOMAS

Judge Civil Court

Legal questions

A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.

Claimant's prima facie case on motions

Open the full map

On summary judgment or another pretrial motion, what must a no-fault claimant show to establish its prima facie case?

This decision: Claimant's proof held to make out its prima facie case (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)

Held the provider established prima facie entitlement by showing submission of proper claims and overdue payment, though its motion failed on the insurer's coverage defense.

  • Court of AppealsCt App 2
  • Appellate DivisionApp Div 81
  • Appellate TermApp Term 843
  • Trial courtsTrial 139
2015, Court of Appeals: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2007, Court of Appeals: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2022, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2019, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2014, Appellate Division: 10 decisions (9 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2013, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2012, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2011, Appellate Division: 11 decisions (11 Proof sufficient)2010, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2009, Appellate Division: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Other element missing)2008, Appellate Division: 8 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Appellate Division: 16 decisions (13 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2006, Appellate Division: 5 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Other element missing)2005, Appellate Division: 5 decisions (5 Proof sufficient)2004, Appellate Division: 11 decisions (10 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2026, Appellate Division: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2003, Appellate Division: 2 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown)2022, Appellate Term: 14 decisions (2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 12 Overdue not shown)2021, Appellate Term: 5 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 4 Overdue not shown)2020, Appellate Term: 13 decisions (13 Overdue not shown)2019, Appellate Term: 23 decisions (22 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2018, Appellate Term: 26 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 22 Overdue not shown)2017, Appellate Term: 38 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 34 Overdue not shown)2016, Appellate Term: 41 decisions (7 Proof sufficient, 34 Overdue not shown)2015, Appellate Term: 44 decisions (12 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 30 Overdue not shown, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2014, Appellate Term: 22 decisions (10 Proof sufficient, 12 Overdue not shown)2013, Appellate Term: 34 decisions (17 Proof sufficient, 11 Overdue not shown, 6 Business-record foundation lacking)2012, Appellate Term: 32 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 11 Overdue not shown, 16 Business-record foundation lacking)2011, Appellate Term: 29 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 13 Overdue not shown, 9 Business-record foundation lacking)2010, Appellate Term: 36 decisions (22 Proof sufficient, 3 Mailing/receipt not shown, 10 Business-record foundation lacking, 1 Other element missing)2009, Appellate Term: 52 decisions (28 Proof sufficient, 3 Mailing/receipt not shown, 21 Business-record foundation lacking)2008, Appellate Term: 49 decisions (16 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 32 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Appellate Term: 104 decisions (8 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 94 Business-record foundation lacking)2006, Appellate Term: 112 decisions (76 Proof sufficient, 26 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown, 6 Business-record foundation lacking, 3 Other element missing)2005, Appellate Term: 90 decisions (84 Proof sufficient, 5 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2004, Appellate Term: 57 decisions (43 Proof sufficient, 10 Mailing/receipt not shown, 4 Other element missing)2003, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (7 Proof sufficient)2023, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (3 Overdue not shown)2024, Appellate Term: 7 decisions (1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 6 Overdue not shown)2025, Appellate Term: 3 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown)2026, Appellate Term: 2 decisions (2 Mailing/receipt not shown)2023, Trial courts: 2 decisions (2 Proof sufficient)2022, Trial courts: 4 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 2 Overdue not shown)2021, Trial courts: 11 decisions (6 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 2 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2020, Trial courts: 5 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2019, Trial courts: 6 decisions (5 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2018, Trial courts: 2 decisions (2 Overdue not shown)2017, Trial courts: 3 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2016, Trial courts: 4 decisions (4 Proof sufficient)2013, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2012, Trial courts: 5 decisions (4 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2011, Trial courts: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2010, Trial courts: 3 decisions (2 Proof sufficient, 1 Business-record foundation lacking)2009, Trial courts: 7 decisions (7 Proof sufficient)2008, Trial courts: 14 decisions (8 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown, 1 Overdue not shown, 4 Business-record foundation lacking)2007, Trial courts: 7 decisions (5 Proof sufficient, 2 Business-record foundation lacking)2006, Trial courts: 16 decisions (13 Proof sufficient, 2 Overdue not shown, 1 Other element missing)2005, Trial courts: 22 decisions (14 Proof sufficient, 5 Mailing/receipt not shown, 3 Business-record foundation lacking)2004, Trial courts: 15 decisions (9 Proof sufficient, 2 Mailing/receipt not shown, 4 Other element missing)2025, Trial courts: 2 decisions (1 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2026, Trial courts: 4 decisions (3 Proof sufficient, 1 Mailing/receipt not shown)2014, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2015, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)2024, Trial courts: 1 decision (1 Proof sufficient)This decision
20052010201520202025
Proof sufficientMailing/receipt not shownOverdue not shownBusiness-record foundation lackingOther element missingThis decisionCites it or cited by itCited or followed

Of the 1,065 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 513 (this one included) are in the same category.

Cited in this decision

  • Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 02359)The hospitals established entitlement to summary judgment by proving that statutory billing forms were mailed and received and payment was overdue.

Similar decisions

  • Mid Atl. Med., P.C. v Victoria Select Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51758(U))The insurer waived its CPLR 3211 (a) (5) defense, but the Virginia rescission papers raised a triable coverage issue.
  • Li-elle Serv. Inc. v AIU Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 50719(U))The insurer failed to establish material reliance on the assignor's residency misrepresentations to justify rescission under Virginia law.
  • MZ Med. Care, PC v Selective Ins. Co. of Am. (2009 NY Slip Op 51093(U))The insurer obtained summary judgment because New Jersey law permitted rescission for the insured's material misrepresentation of residence.
  • Stracar Med. Servs. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 51761(U))The provider was not bound by a Virginia rescission order because it was not a party and privity with the assignor was unproved.
  • Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. (2005 NY Slip Op 50326(U))The insurer's unsworn EUO report and hearsay submissions failed to support a founded belief that the injuries arose outside an insured accident.
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