September 10, 2008
Odessa Medical Supply, Inc. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51868(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/odessa-medical-supply-inc-v-kemper-auto-home-ins-co-2008-ny-slip-op51868u/
- Decided
- September 10, 2008
- Citation
- 2008 NY Slip Op 51868(U) · 20 Misc 3d 145(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Later treatment
- Contrasted (cf., but see) in 1 later decision (see Cited by)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Odessa Medical Supply, Inc. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51868(U))
| Odessa Medical Supply, Inc. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 51868(U) [20 Misc 3d 145(A)] |
| Decided on September 10, 2008 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., RIOS and STEINHARDT, JJ
2007-1594 Q C.
against
Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered September 4, 2007. The order denied a motion by plaintiff for summary judgment and granted a cross motion by “Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company i/s/h/a Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company” for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Order modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint are denied without prejudice; as so modified, affirmed without costs.
In this action, plaintiff, a provider, seeks to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the named defendant, Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company (Kemper). In June 2005, plaintiff submitted its no-fault claim to Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company (Unitrin). During the claims process, a law firm representing Kemper scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) of the assignor’s physician. “Unitrin Kemper Auto and Home” sent plaintiff a letter stating that there would be a delay in the consideration of its claim pending the completion of the scheduled EUOs. After the physician failed to appear for the EUOs, Unitrin issued a denial of claim form in September 2005. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced the instant action against Kemper. Unitrin served and filed an answer in which it stated that it was “i/s/h/a [incorrectly sued herein as] Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company.” After receiving the answer, plaintiff did not move to amend the caption or join Unitrin as a party; rather, it moved for summary judgment, with Kemper still listed in the caption as the lone defendant. Plaintiff’s attorney stated in the moving papers that his affirmation was “in support of the within motion seeking summary judgment against the defendant, Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company.” Plaintiff, however, served this motion upon Unitrin’s attorneys. A cross motion for summary [*2]judgment dismissing the complaint was served and filed by “Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company i/s/h/a Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Company,” asserting, inter alia, that plaintiff had sued the wrong insurer. By order entered September 4, 2007, the court below denied plaintiff’s motion and granted Unitrin’s cross motion. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against Kemper must be denied since its motion papers were served upon Unitrin, the action was based upon a claim submitted to Unitrin, and there has been no showing that Kemper and Unitrin are effectively a single entity. Moreover, given the fact that Unitrin is not currently a formal party to this action, and its cross motion seeks to dismiss the complaint which is asserted against a different entity, its cross motion is similarly denied.
Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 10, 2008
Cited by
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- ENS Med., P.C. v Nationwide Ins. Co. (2026 NY Slip Op 26033) Contrasted (cf., but see)A provider may arbitrate a claim for lost earnings incurred in attending an insurer-demanded EUO. Insurance Law § 5106 (b) encompasses reimbursement disputes arising from claim verification, and 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (e) requires reimbursement.
Similar decisions
- 563 Grand Med., P.C. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50582(U))The provider failed to establish a business-record foundation through its outside billing company's employee and was denied summary judgment.
- Parisien v Kemper Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 51240(U))The provider's claims were barred by res judicata because recovery would impair a no-coverage declaration obtained by the proper insurer.
- King’S Med. Supply v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 50401(U))An insurer cannot deny a claim for EUO nonappearance under the former regulation by invoking a policy's cooperation clause.
- Brownsville Advance Med., P.C. v Kemper Independence Ins. Co. (2012 NY Slip Op 51629(U))The insurer's IME report established lack of medical necessity, and the provider offered no opposing sworn evidence from a medical professional.
- First Care Med. Equip., LLC v Kemper Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 51326(U))The provider failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, and the insurer raised a triable issue of medical necessity.