April 14, 2008
Boulevard Multispec Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 50872(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/boulevard-multispec-med-p-c-v-mvaic-2008-ny-slip-op-50872u/
- Decided
- April 14, 2008
- Citation
- 2008 NY Slip Op 50872(U) · 19 Misc 3d 138(A)
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Later treatment
- Followed in 2 later decisions (see Cited by)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Boulevard Multispec Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 50872(U))
[*1]| Boulevard Multispec Med., P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 50872(U) [19 Misc 3d 138(A)] |
| Decided on April 14, 2008 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ
2007-572 Q C.
against
MVAIC, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Diane A.
Lebedeff, J.), entered February 8, 2007. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
Order reversed without costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant MVAIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff mailed the claims in question to MVAIC on October 9, 2001. The claims are therefore presumed to have been received (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679, 680 [2001]). In addition, MVAIC took the position that it received the claims on October 12, 2001. We note that neither side has shown the existence of a verification request that would have postponed the payment due date, and that plaintiff’s allegations in its opposition papers did not provide ground to believe that discovery might have revealed one. Accordingly, the payment due date must be deemed to have been in November 2001 that is, 30 days after receipt of the claims (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65.15 [g], now Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8).
We reject plaintiff’s assertion in its opposing papers that MVAIC’s verification request of March 3, 2003 postponed the payment due date. It was submitted beyond the date when payment became overdue, and therefore could not toll the payment due date (see Insurance [*2]Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65.15 [d], [g], now Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5, 65-3.8; see generally Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294, 300-301 [2007]). We disagree with plaintiff’s position that its gratuitous compliance with a verification request issued beyond the payment due date, or its apparent willingness now to unilaterally waive the time limit for the sending of a verification request, can render a belated verification request timely and, ultimately, postpone the accrual date of its cause of action. Neither the relevant statute nor the applicable regulations provide for such a waiver.
In view of the foregoing, we find that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in November 2001 (see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]). Because plaintiff did not commence this action until January of 2006, it was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; cf. Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]).
Plaintiff contends, in effect, that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from taking the position that its own verification requests were untimely. Plaintiff also takes the more general position that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense here. These arguments are best understood in the context of MVAIC’s stated position and its practice at the time plaintiff’s claim was being processed, which were that neither the 30-day time period for payment or denial nor the time limit for verification requests (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65.15 [d], [g], now Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5, 65-3.8) began to run until an injured person was “qualified” by MVAIC pursuant to Insurance Law § 5202 (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 12 AD3d 429, 430 [2004] [noting MVAIC’s position]). Hence, in MVAIC’s view at the time, since the assignor was not qualified until February 21, 2003, its request for additional verification of March 3, 2003, was timely. Under this line of reasoning, since plaintiff did not provide requested additional verification until December of 2005, its cause of action would not have accrued before January of 2006, and its lawsuit would have been timely.
In New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004], supra), the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected MVAIC’s position that its obligations only began upon qualification of the injured person (id. at 430). Thus, under New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in November 2001. Plaintiff argues, in effect, that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from disavowing its own prior position. MVAIC’s conduct was deceptive, plaintiff maintains, because MVAIC’s administrative process led plaintiff erroneously to believe that it had an active pending claim up until it provided additional verification in December of 2005. Plaintiff contends that this mistaken belief on its part was the pivotal factor in its delay in bringing the instant suit.
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that plaintiff’s contention raises some sympathy for its
plight, this does not mean that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied against
MVAIC. In Airco Alloys Div. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (76 AD2d 68 [1980]), the
Court said:
“The elements of estoppel are with respect to the party estopped: (1) conduct which
amounts to a false representation or [*3]concealment of material
facts; (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon by the other party; and (3) knowledge of
the real facts” (id. at 81).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that MVAIC had “knowledge of the real facts” in
particular, knowledge of the fact that plaintiff’s cause of action was going to accrue before the
qualification process was completed. Indeed, it seems obvious that MVAIC was not aware of this
fact.
Plaintiff has demonstrated no attempt on MVAIC’s part to make false representations or
conceal. Rather, MVAIC simply and openly followed its interpretation of the applicable law and
regulations. Indeed, plaintiff could have challenged this interpretation at any time, as did the
plaintiff in New York Hosp. Med. Ctr.
of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004], supra).
General Stencils v
Chiappa (18 NY2d 125 [1966]), relied upon heavily by plaintiff in its brief, is
readily distinguishable. In General Stencils, the Court held that “the admitted thievery of
defendant entitle[d] plaintiff to litigate the issue of equitable estoppel” (id. at 128).
MVAIC’s administrative process here, although ultimately held inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, did not amount by any stretch of the imagination to “thievery.” Thus, we reject plaintiff’s
argument that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense.
Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Golia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 14, 2008
Legal questions (2)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Which limitations period governs a first-party no-fault claim against an insurer, self-insurer or MVAIC: six or three years?
This decision: Claim against MVAIC carries the three-year statutory period (CPLR 214 [2])
Held the provider's action against MVAIC, accruing in November 2001 and commenced in January 2006, barred by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (2), and refused to estop MVAIC from asserting it.
Of the 56 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did unanswered verification requests make the provider’s claim premature, or justify denying it for nonresponse?
This decision: Defense rejected because the insurer's requests or proof were deficient (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held that MVAIC's verification request, sent after the payment due date had passed, could not toll that date, and the provider's gratuitous compliance could not make the belated request timely, so the claim accrued 30 days after receipt.
Of the 385 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 82 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 01693) Contrasted (cf., but see)A provider's action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance policy is governed by the six-year contractual limitations period.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2004 NY Slip Op 08087) FollowedMVAIC must comply with the 30-day deadline to pay or deny a no-fault claim before qualifying the injured claimant.
Cited by
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 51304(U)) FollowedA no-fault claim accrues 30 days after the insurer receives it; a later denial does not postpone accrual.
- A.M. Med., P.C. v Continental Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 50389(U)) FollowedThe provider's action against the appealing insurer was untimely because it began more than six years after the no-fault claims accrued.
- Shtarkman v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51447(U))The provider's claim against MVAIC was barred by the three-year limitations period measured from the pleaded payment due date.
- Acupuncture Works, P.C. v MVAIC (2010 NY Slip Op 50646(U))The provider's action against MVAIC was barred by the three-year limitation because later denials did not postpone the payment due date.
- Cautious Care Med., P.C. v Omni Indem. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 51384(U))A first-party no-fault cause of action accrues 30 days after the insurer receives the claim and carries a six-year limitations period.
- Sheepshead Bay Oral Surgery, PLLC v Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51058(U))The provider's no-fault action was untimely because it was commenced more than six years after accrual.
Similar decisions
- Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 28157)A provider's claim against MVAIC was time-barred because untimely verification did not postpone accrual.
- Sama Physical Therapy v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 29218)MVAIC's defense that an injured claimant is not a qualified person is subject to preclusion under the no-fault time limits.
- Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 52274(U))MVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because it established that the provider's action was commenced after the limitations period expired.
- Turnpike Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 51717(U))An assignor's status as a qualified person does not depend on MVAIC's receipt of written proof that insurance was unavailable.
- Daily Med. Equip. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51622(U))MVAIC's verification request more than 100 days after receipt of the last claim did not toll its time to deny or render the action premature.