April 14, 2008
Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 28157)
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/kings-highway-diagnostic-imaging-p-c-v-mvaic-2008-ny-slip-op-28157/
- Decided
- April 14, 2008
- Citation
- 2008 NY Slip Op 28157 · 19 Misc 3d 69
- Posture
- Summary judgment
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Later treatment
- Followed in 21 later decisions (see Cited by)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 28157)
| Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v MVAIC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 28157 [19 Misc 3d 69] |
| Accepted for Miscellaneous Reports Publication |
| AT2 |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected through Wednesday, June 25, 2008 |
[*1]
| Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Guadalupe Amado, Respondent, v MVAIC, Appellant. |
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, April 14, 2008
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Marshall & Marshall, Jericho (Jeffrey D. Kadushin of counsel), for appellant. Israel, Israel & Purdy, LLP, Great Neck (William M. Purdy of counsel), for respondent.
Memorandum.
Order reversed without costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant MVAIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint alleged that the subject claim form was submitted to defendant on or about June 12, 2000. Moreover, both defendant and plaintiff took the position in the lower court that the claim form was submitted and received in June 2000 and that payment became overdue on July 13, 2000. We note that neither side has shown the existence of a verification request on or before July 12, 2000 that would have postponed the payment due date (see Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] former § 65.15 [d], [g], now Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5, 65-3.8).
We reject plaintiff’s argument that MVAIC’s first denial of claim form, dated December 12, 2000, postponed the payment due date. Even if this denial of claim form is considered a request for verification, it was submitted beyond the date when payment became overdue, and therefore could not toll the payment due date (see Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] former § 65.15 [d], [g], now Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5, 65-3[*2].8; see generally Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294, 300-301 [2007]). We disagree with plaintiff’s position that its gratuitous compliance with a verification request issued beyond the payment due date, or its apparent willingness now to unilaterally waive the time limit for the sending of a verification request, can render the “verification request” of December 12, 2000 timely and, ultimately, postpone the accrual date of its cause of action. Neither the relevant statute nor the applicable regulations provide for such a waiver.
In view of the foregoing, we find that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on July 13, 2000 (see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson,{**19 Misc 3d at 71} 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]). Because plaintiff did not commence this action until November of 2004, it was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; cf. Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]).
Plaintiff contends, in effect, that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from taking the position that its own verification requests were untimely. Plaintiff also takes the more general position that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense here. These arguments are best understood in the context of MVAIC’s stated position and its practice at the time plaintiff’s claim was being processed, which were that neither the 30-day time period for payment or denial nor the time limit for verification requests (see Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] former § 65.15 [d], [g], now Insurance Dept Regs [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5, 65-3.8) began to run until an injured person was “qualified” by MVAIC pursuant to Insurance Law § 5202 (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 12 AD3d 429, 430 [2004] [noting MVAIC’s position]). Hence, in MVAIC’s view at the time, its denial of claim form of December 12, 2000—treated by the parties as a request for information needed to determine whether the assignor was “qualified”—was timely. Similarly, in MVAIC’s view, when the assignor was finally “qualified” by MVAIC on March 25, 2003, that marked the date on which MVAIC’s obligation to pay or deny the claim (or, if it chose, to toll the payment period by a timely verification request) began to run. Accordingly, still in MVAIC’s view at the time, its denial on the merits of April 11, 2003 was timely. Under this line of reasoning, plaintiff’s cause of action would have accrued in April 2003 and its lawsuit would have been timely.
In New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected MVAIC’s position that its obligations only began upon qualification of the injured person (id. at 430). Thus, under New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, plaintiff’s cause of action here accrued 31 days after MVAIC received the claim—that is, on July 13, 2000. Plaintiff argues, in effect, that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from disavowing its own prior position. MVAIC’s conduct was deceptive, plaintiff maintains, because MVAIC’s administrative process led plaintiff erroneously to believe that it had an active pending claim up until the{**19 Misc 3d at 72} date of the final denial—April 11, 2003. Plaintiff contends that this mistaken belief on its part was the pivotal factor in its delay in bringing the instant suit.
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that plaintiff’s contention raises some sympathy for its plight, this does not mean that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied against MVAIC. In Airco Alloys Div. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (76 AD2d 68, 81 [1980]), the Court said:[*3]“The elements of estoppel are with respect to the party estopped: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon by the other party; and (3) knowledge of the real facts.”
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that MVAIC had “knowledge of the real facts”—in particular, knowledge of the fact that plaintiff’s cause of action was going to accrue before the qualification process was completed. Indeed, it seems obvious that MVAIC was not aware of this fact.
Plaintiff has demonstrated no attempt on MVAIC’s part to make false representations or conceal. Rather, MVAIC simply and openly followed its interpretation of the applicable law and regulations. Indeed, plaintiff could have challenged this interpretation at any time, as did the plaintiff in New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (12 AD3d 429 [2004]). General Stencils v Chiappa (18 NY2d 125 [1966]), relied upon heavily by plaintiff in its brief, is readily distinguishable. In General Stencils, the Court held that “the admitted thievery of defendant entitle[d] plaintiff to litigate the issue of equitable estoppel” (id. at 128). MVAIC’s administrative process here, although ultimately held inconsistent with the statutory scheme, did not amount by any stretch of the imagination to “thievery.” Thus, we reject plaintiff’s argument that MVAIC should be equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense.
Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Golia, JJ., concur.
Legal questions (2)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Which limitations period governs a first-party no-fault claim against an insurer, self-insurer or MVAIC: six or three years?
This decision: Claim against MVAIC carries the three-year statutory period (CPLR 214 [2])
Held the provider's claim against MVAIC, which accrued 31 days after MVAIC received it, barred by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (2), and rejected equitable estoppel against MVAIC.
Of the 56 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 24 (this one included) are in the same category.
Did unanswered verification requests make the provider’s claim premature, or justify denying it for nonresponse?
This decision: Defense rejected because the insurer's requests or proof were deficient (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held that MVAIC's denial-of-claim form, even if treated as a verification request, came after payment was already overdue and so could not toll the payment due date or postpone accrual of the claim.
Of the 385 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 82 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 01693) Contrasted (cf., but see)A provider's action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance policy is governed by the six-year contractual limitations period.
- New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2004 NY Slip Op 08087) FollowedMVAIC must comply with the 30-day deadline to pay or deny a no-fault claim before qualifying the injured claimant.
Cited by (25)
A label shows how the later decision treated this one.
- DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2011 NY Slip Op 51304(U)) FollowedA no-fault claim accrues 30 days after the insurer receives it; a later denial does not postpone accrual.
- Shtarkman v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 51447(U)) FollowedThe provider's claim against MVAIC was barred by the three-year limitations period measured from the pleaded payment due date.
- Acupuncture Works, P.C. v MVAIC (2010 NY Slip Op 50646(U)) FollowedThe provider's action against MVAIC was barred by the three-year limitation because later denials did not postpone the payment due date.
- A.M. Med., P.C. v Continental Ins. Co. (2015 NY Slip Op 50389(U)) FollowedThe provider's action against the appealing insurer was untimely because it began more than six years after the no-fault claims accrued.
- Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52049(U)) FollowedMVAIC established that the provider's first four causes of action were time-barred, but disputed receipt required a hearing on three others.
- Linden Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 52188(U)) FollowedAn arbitration claim against MVAIC is governed by the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214 (2), rather than a six-year period.
- J.C. Healing Touch Rehab, P.C. v MVAIC (2024 NY Slip Op 50393(U)) FollowedMVAIC established that the provider's action was commenced after the three-year limitations period expired.
- J.C. Healing Touch Rehab, P.C. v MVAIC (2022 NY Slip Op 51256(U)) FollowedThe provider's sole appellate contention concerning the statute of limitations was improperly raised for the first time on appeal.
- Right Aid Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2022 NY Slip Op 50786(U)) FollowedMVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because the provider's action was brought after the three-year limitations period expired.
- Performance Plus Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2022 NY Slip Op 50592(U)) FollowedMVAIC obtained summary judgment dismissing the provider's action as commenced after the three-year statute of limitations expired.
Show all 25 citing decisions
- Milky Way Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2022 NY Slip Op 50590(U)) Followed
- Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2021 NY Slip Op 50450(U)) Followed
- Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 52073(U)) Followed
- Compas Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 51687(U)) Followed
- Compas v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 51246(U)) Followed
- Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 51159(U)) Followed
- Cautious Care Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 50279(U)) Followed
- Sama Physical Therapy v MVAIC (2019 NY Slip Op 29218) Followed
- Clinton Place Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2017 NY Slip Op 51893(U)) Followed
- Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 51416(U)) Followed
- Reliable Physical Therapy, P.C. v MVAIC (2016 NY Slip Op 50919(U)) Followed
- Cautious Care Med., P.C. v Omni Indem. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 51384(U))
- Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v Mvaic (2016 NY Slip Op 51522(U))
- Flatbush Chiropractic, P.C. v MVAIC (2015 NY Slip Op 51232(U))
- Sheepshead Bay Oral Surgery, PLLC v Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51058(U))
Similar decisions
- Boulevard Multispec Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2008 NY Slip Op 50872(U))A provider's claim against MVAIC was time-barred because a verification request after payment became overdue did not postpone accrual.
- Englinton Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2007 NY Slip Op 50164(U))MVAIC's 30-day period to pay or deny begins upon receipt of claim forms, without awaiting a qualified-person determination.
- Precision Radiology Servs., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 52274(U))MVAIC's summary judgment motion was granted because it established that the provider's action was commenced after the limitations period expired.
- Turnpike Med., P.C. v MVAIC (2011 NY Slip Op 51717(U))An assignor's status as a qualified person does not depend on MVAIC's receipt of written proof that insurance was unavailable.
- Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 08585)A provider that ignored two verification requests was estopped from invoking preclusion based on a follow-up sent three days early.