December 27, 2004

New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 09609)

https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/new-york-hosp-med-ctr-of-queens-v-clarendon-natl-ins-co-2004-ny-slip-op-09609/

Court
Appellate Division, Second Department
Decided
December 27, 2004
Citation
2004 NY Slip Op 09609 · 13 AD3d 596
Posture
Default or vacatur
Outcome
Provider prevailed
Issues
Defaults and vacatur
Cite as
New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 13 AD3d 596 (2d Dept 2004)

Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.

Summary

Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.

The insurer's motion to vacate its default judgment was denied on appeal because it failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the order, insofar as appealed from, and reinstated the providers' judgment for no-fault benefits. The court relied on the reasonable-excuse and meritorious-defense requirements of CPLR 5015 (a) (1), without describing the insurer's proffered excuse.

Reported in New York Official Reports at New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 09609)

New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co.
2004 NY Slip Op 09609 [13 AD3d 596]
December 27, 2004
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 23, 2005
New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens, as Assignee of David McNeal, et al., Appellants,
v
Clarendon National Insurance Company, Respondent.

—[*1]In an action to recover no-fault benefits, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated February 10, 2004, as granted the defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered July 11, 2003, upon its failure to appear or answer the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is denied, and the judgment is reinstated.

It is well settled that a defendant seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering a complaint must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Glibbery v Cosenza & Assoc., 4 AD3d 393 [2004]; Kaplinsky v Mazor, 307 AD2d 916 [2003]). The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment since the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default. Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Schmidt, Crane and Skelos, JJ., concur.

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