No-Fault Case Law

The relevant facts the court considered were that the defendant in this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits breached an agreement by serving the cross-motion and opposition after the extended due date. The main issue before the court was whether the defendant could move for leave to renew its adversary's motion on the basis that its cross-motion and opposition, which was rejected and not entertained, constitutes new facts. The holding of the court was that the defendant's untimely responsive papers, once rejected, constituted a default on the part of the defendant in opposing plaintiff's motion. Even if a motion for leave to renew was appropriate, the defendant failed to meet the criteria for relief under either theory. Therefore, the defendant's motion was denied.

The court considered the fact that plaintiff, a professional corporation, sought to recover first-party, no fault benefits for services rendered to its assignor who was injured in an automobile accident in 2002. It also considered the numerous claims submitted by the plaintiff and the subsequent judgment and stay on entry and execution of that judgment due to miscalculated interest. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled to its requested interest and whether defendant's motion to vacate or modify the judgment and stay enforcement should be granted. The holding of the case was that the motion to vacate or modify the judgment was denied, but the motion for an order staying enforcement was granted. The court also determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to compound interest and that the interest had been tolled as of a certain date due to plaintiff's unreasonable delay in entering the judgment.

The case involved Utica Mutual Insurance Company filing for a default judgment against Michael Andre Lynton for his involvement in a motor vehicle accident. Although the defendant did not answer the complaint, the court had the duty to review and decide if subject matter jurisdiction was present, and if plaintiff's pleadings and proof justified the granting of a default judgment. The court was faced with the issue of whether plaintiff's complaint amounted to "several causes of action" within the court's jurisdictional limits, specifically involving $15,000 for basic no-fault benefits and $6,000 for uninsured motorist benefits. The court referred to a prior case that determined when separate claims are based on a single occurrence, it constitutes one cause of action, and if the same wrongful act causes injury to a person and property, it can be considered distinct causes of action. Ultimately, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims were indeed separate causes of action and did not exceed the court's jurisdictional limits, thus sustaining subject matter jurisdiction and denying the motion for a default judgment, without prejudice to renewal.

The relevant facts the court considered in St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. v New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. were that the plaintiff, who was the assignee of a patient, filed a lawsuit to recover no-fault medical payments against the defendant, an insurance company. The plaintiff appealed a trial court's order which had denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the claim was untimely. A main issue decided was whether the defendant issued timely denials of claim in compliance with the law. The holding was that the plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law while the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact, and, therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint and denied the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The court considered the fact that the plaintiff, Quality Health Products, was seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the defendant, Country-Wide Ins. Co. The main issue decided was whether the defendant timely denied the plaintiff's claims based on lack of medical necessity. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the claim was not denied within 30 days and also failed to show that the basis for the denial was conclusory, vague, or had no merit as a matter of law. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The relevant facts considered by the court in this case included the failure of the defendant to sign and return an acknowledgment of service in a no-fault benefits case. The main issue decided was whether the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service should be granted. The holding of the court was that the service was defective and that the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted, ultimately reversing the lower court's decision. The court emphasized that if the acknowledgment of receipt is not mailed or returned to the sender, the sender is required to effect personal service in another manner, and in this case, the plaintiffs did not do so. Therefore, the service was deemed defective.

The relevant facts of the case involved a dispute between Tri-Mount Acupuncture, P.C., as an assignee of Jerry Savage, and NY Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company regarding first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided by the court was whether the plaintiff's assignor had failed to appear for scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The holding of the case was that the defendant, NY Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff's assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs. As a result, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the initial order, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The decision was made on March 2, 2011.

The case involved an action by plaintiffs to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services, and an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs submitted billing forms, affidavits from their third-party biller, certified mail receipts, and a signed return-receipt card demonstrating that they had mailed the necessary billing documents to the defendant, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue. The defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion, and the defendant's verification requests were deemed insufficient. The court held that the plaintiffs had established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and reversed the order denying the motion for summary judgment.

The relevant facts considered by the court were an action to recover no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract. The plaintiff made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to recover the payments by submitting evidence that the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed and received by the defendant and that the defendant had failed to either pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period. The main issue decided was whether the defendant timely denied the plaintiff's claim, and the defendant was found to have failed to establish timely denial of the claim. The holding of the court was that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint was granted, and the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was denied. The court held that the defendant failed to establish timely denial of the claim, which resulted in preclusion of the defense.

The main issue in this case was whether the responsibility for the payment of first-party benefits should be submitted to arbitration. The defendant argued that its denial of benefits raised an issue of coverage rather than payment, but the court found that any controversy between insurers involving the responsibility or obligation to pay first-party benefits is not considered a coverage question and must be submitted to mandatory arbitration. The court held that the defendant was responsible for the payment of the no-fault benefits for the health services provided by the plaintiff, irrespective of any issues of priority or source of payment. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department affirming the order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, which found that the issue of which insurer is the primary insurer must be submitted to arbitration, was unanimously affirmed with costs.