April 30, 2026

KN Acupuncture, PC v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50620(U))

Headnote

MVAIC established available insurance coverage through insurance information entered in an uncertified police report. The Civil Court, Kings County, granted MVAIC summary judgment, denied the provider's cross motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. The report's entries reflecting production of statutorily required identification, registration and insurance documents were admissible under the business-records exception, unlike subjective verbal accounts of accident causation. The court relied on Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 311 (10), 312, 319 (3) and 600, and 15 NYCRR 32.12, distinguishing Yassin v Blackman. The provider offered no admissible rebuttal to the showing that the vehicle was insured. Available coverage made it unnecessary to decide MVAIC's additional defense concerning receipt of a notice of intent to make a claim.

Reported in New York Official Reports at KN Acupuncture, PC v MVAIC (2026 NY Slip Op 50620(U))

KN Acupuncture, PC v MVAIC
2026 NY Slip Op 50620(U)
Decided on April 30, 2026
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Sandra E. Roper, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Digest-Index Classification: Evidence—Hearsay Evidence—Business Records Exception–Uncertified Police Report

KN Acupuncture, PC, a/a/o GRACE PENA, Plaintiff(s),

v

MVAIC, Defendant(s).

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on April 30, 2026

Index No. 733156/20

The Rybak Firm PLLC, Brooklyn, for Plaintiff.

Law Office of Jaime E. Gangemi, New York, for Defendant.

Sandra E. Roper, J.

[*1]

Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Papers

Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed 1-2

Cross-Motion and Affidavits Annexed 3 – 4

Answering Affidavit 5

Replying Affidavits 6

Exhibits

Other

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s argument in reliance on Yassin v Blackman (188 AD3d 62, 65-68 [2d Dept 2020]) is misplaced as distinguishable from this instant matter. Rather, Defendant established that the vehicle involved in the alleged accident was insured at the time of the alleged accident notwithstanding that the police accident report was uncertified. The uncertified police accident report which is deemed as admissible business record exception to the hearsay rule in part, where the entrant police officer and the declarant both must comply with respective statutory duty to enter and to declare pursuant to legal compulsion under penalty of criminal law, the production of the driver’s license, registration card and insurance card. Production of these statutorily mandated facially trustworthy documents are significantly distinguishable from a police officer’s entry of a declarant’s impeachable and subjective verbal statement as to facts of versions of causation or defense of the accident as in Yassin. Such verbal statements entered in the uncertified police report are impeachable, inadmissible hearsay and it fails as a business record exception to the hearsay rule, requiring a certified police report. Thus, an uncertified police report may be considered a quasi-[*2]hybrid business record exception to the hearsay rule: fails as to declarant’s verbal statements which must be certified for admissibility; yet upheld for entries of the presentation of facially trustworthy statutory documents pursuant to the legal compulsion under penalty of criminal law, which does not have to be certified for the admissibility exclusively of those entered statutorily mandated facially trustworthy documents (see Eagle Ins. Co. v Olephant, 81 AD2d 886 [2d Dept 1981]; see also Hochhauser v Elec. Ins. Co., 46 AD3d 174 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Balboa Ins. Co. v Alston, 141 AD2d 364, 364-365 [1st Dept 1988]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 311 [10]; VTL § 312; VTL 319 [3]; VTL 600; 15 NYCRR 32.12).

Thus, Defendant satisfied its burden for judgment as a matter of law. Upon which, the burden of rebuttal shifts to Plaintiff, which failed to proffer admissible evidence to satisfy its burden to rebut that vehicle was insured. This finding of insurability of the vehicle obviates deliberation for Defendant’s further defense regarding failure to have received a Notice of Intent to Make a Claim.

For the foregoing reasons, this matter is dismissed with prejudice based on available insurance coverage.

This constitutes the decision and order of The Court.

DATE April 30, 2026

HON. SANDRA E. ROPER

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