Reported in New York Official Reports at Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51620(U))
| Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 51620(U) [65 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on October 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 11, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2018-355 K C
against
Travelers Insurance Company, Respondent.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Aloy O. Ibuzor (Janice A. Robinson of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered September 23, 2015. The judgment, upon a decision of that court dated December 22, 2014, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.
ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision dated December 22, 2014 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered September 23, 2015 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.
At a nonjury trial of this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the only issue to be tried was whether plaintiff had failed to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court dismissed the complaint, finding that defendant had established that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs.
In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court’s opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility [*2](see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492 [1983]; Hamilton v Blackwood, 85 AD3d 1116 [2011]; Zeltser v Sacerdote, 52 AD3d 824 [2008]). Upon a review of the testimony and evidence which was admitted at trial without objection, we find no basis to disturb the Civil Court’s finding.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at AOM Med. Supply, Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51619(U))
| AOM Med. Supply, Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 51619(U) [65 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on October 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 11, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2018-266 K C
against
Hereford Insurance Co., Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair of counsel), for appellant. Goldberg, Miller & Rubin (Harlan R. Schreiber of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), entered October 18, 2017. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations.
For the reasons stated in Allay Med. Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Mills, Keith A. v Metropolitan Gen. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2017-2389 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at Allay Med. Servs., P.C. v Metropolitan Gen. Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51617(U))
| Allay Med. Servs., P.C. v Metropolitan Gen. Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 51617(U) [65 Misc 3d 133(A)] |
| Decided on October 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 11, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2017-2389 K C
against
Metropolitan General Insurance Company, Appellant.
Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Louis L. Nock, J.), entered September 11, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s cross motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).
In its cross motion, defendant established that initial and follow-up letters scheduling an EUO had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]); that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear on either date (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]); and that the claims had been timely denied on that ground (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, the cross motion should have been granted.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51616(U))
| Active Care Med. Supply Corp. v American Tr. Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 51616(U) [65 Misc 3d 133(A)] |
| Decided on October 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 11, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2017-2333 K C
against
American Transit Ins. Co., Respondent.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Daniel J. Tucker (Joshua M. Goldberg of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Mary V. Rosado, J.), entered September 5, 2017. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath, and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated in Allay Med. Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Mills, Keith A. v Metropolitan Gen. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2017-2389 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at Metro Psychological Servs., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 51614(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
American Transit Insurance Company, Respondent.
Law Offices of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt and David Steigbigel of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Daniel J. Tucker (Joshua M. Goldberg of Netanel Ben Chaim of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), dated March 27, 2017. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff filed a notice of trial on January 14, 2016. By notice of motion returnable on June 19, 2016, which was mailed to plaintiff’s attorney on May 11, 2016, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no coverage for the accident at issue. Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order dated March 27, 2017, the Civil Court granted the motion.
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was not untimely under CPLR 3212 (a). CPLR 3212 (a) provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown” (see also Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 651 [2004]). A motion is made when the notice of motion is served (see CPLR 2211; Russo v Eveco Dev. Corp., 256 AD2d 566, 566 [1998]; Chimbay v Palma, 14 Misc [*2]3d 130[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50019[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and when a motion is served upon a party’s attorney by mail, service is complete upon mailing (see CPLR 2103 [b] [2]; Pietrafesa v Canestro, 130 AD3d 602 [2015]). Here, it is uncontroverted that the notice of trial was filed on January 14, 2016 and, thus, the 120-day period expired on May 13, 2016. Since defendant served its motion upon plaintiff’s attorney on May 11, 2016, defendant’s motion was timely.
Plaintiff further contends that what purports to be the insured’s affidavit, which was annexed as an exhibit to defendant’s motion papers, should not have been considered because its notarization was “completely illegible,” and it did not contain a caption. We need not decide this issue since, even if the document were considered, it merely demonstrated that the insured did not operate his vehicle on the day of the accident because he was out of town, and observed no damage to the vehicle upon his return. The affidavit was insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the vehicle was not involved in the accident at issue. As a result, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments lack merit or are unpreserved for appellate review.
Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at Bento Ortho, Inc. v Victoria Ins. Group (2019 NY Slip Op 51613(U))
| Bento Ortho, Inc. v Victoria Ins. Group |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 51613(U) [65 Misc 3d 133(A)] |
| Decided on October 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on October 11, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : MICHAEL L. PESCE, P.J., THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, BERNICE D. SIEGAL, JJ
2017-946 K C
against
Victoria Insurance Group, Respondent.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Hollander Legal Group , P.C. (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered December 20, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath, and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
We find that there is an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s claims were timely denied, as there is a significant discrepancy between the date the bills were sent, as claimed by plaintiff, and the date the bills were received, as claimed by defendant (see Complete Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 37 Misc 3d 133[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52079[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).
Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 11, 2019
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 07265)
| Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 07265 [176 AD3d 834] |
| October 9, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| In the Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C.,
Respondent, v Country-Wide Ins. Co., Appellant. |
Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Thomas Torto and Jason Levine, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Stefan Belinfanti and David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated January 26, 2016, Country-Wide Ins. Co. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated October 21, 2016. The judgment, upon an order of the same court dated October 20, 2016, granting the petition, vacating the master arbitrator’s award dated January 26, 2016, and confirming the original arbitrator’s award dated September 22, 2015, is in favor of the petitioner and against Country-Wide Ins. Co. in the total sum of $8,319.61.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of an additional attorney’s fee to be awarded to the petitioner pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]).
V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter V.S.), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment it rendered to Morris Collins. The carrier, Country-Wide Ins. Co. (hereinafter Country-Wide), denied the claim on several grounds. Country-Wide contended that Collins had not appeared at scheduled independent medical examinations and that V.S. had failed to appear at scheduled examinations under oath. Country-Wide also contended that V.S. was fraudulently incorporated (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]). V.S. submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator accepted Country-Wide’s contention regarding Collins’s failure to appear at independent medical examinations, but rejected Country-Wide’s contention regarding V.S.’s failure to appear at examinations under oath. The arbitrator also rejected Country-Wide’s contention as to V.S.’s alleged fraudulent incorporation, finding that Country-Wide had not met its burden of proof. Accordingly, the arbitrator entered an award for the portion of the claim she found Country-Wide had improperly denied.
On Country-Wide’s appeal to a master arbitrator, the master arbitrator found, as relevant to this appeal, that the original arbitrator’s determination to reject the fraudulent incorporation defense was irrational, arbitrary, capricious, and incorrect as a matter of law. The master arbitrator vacated the original arbitrator’s award and remitted the matter to a new arbitrator on the issue of fraudulent incorporation. V.S. commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the master arbitrator’s award, confirmed the original arbitrator’s award, and entered a judgment accordingly. Country-Wide appeals.
A master arbitrator may not review the facts by weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of witnesses, or making independent findings of fact (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). A master arbitrator’s review powers, however, do include reviewing the facts to determine “whether or not the evidence is sufficient, as a matter of law, to support the determination of the arbitrator” (id. at 212). Here, there is no rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator that the original arbitrator committed an error of law in rejecting Country-Wide’s fraudulent incorporation defense (cf. Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Care Acupuncture, P.C., 162 AD3d 407 [2018]; Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d 885, 886-887 [2017]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court that the master arbitrator’s award should be vacated and the original arbitrator’s award confirmed.
Moreover, as V.S. contends and Country-Wide concedes, V.S. is entitled to an attorney’s fee for this appeal pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j), to be fixed by the Supreme Court (see Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Acupuncture, P.C., 167 AD3d 404, 405 [2018]; Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Care Acupuncture, P.C., 162 AD3d at 408; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 706 [2017]). The matter is therefore remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for that purpose. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Brathwaite Nelson and Christopher, JJ., concur.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 07264)
| Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 07264 [176 AD3d 832] |
| October 9, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| In the Matter of V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C.,
Respondent, v Country-Wide Ins. Co., Appellant. |
Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Thomas Torto, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Stefan Belinfanti and David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated October 10, 2014, Country-Wide Ins. Co. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Larry D. Martin, J.), dated February 6, 2017. The judgment, upon an order of the same court dated September 23, 2015, granting the petition, vacating the master arbitrator’s award dated October 10, 2014, and directing entry of a judgment in favor of the petitioner in the principal sum of $3,650 plus statutory interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements, is in favor of the petitioner and against Country-Wide Ins. Co. in the total sum of $10,469.82.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, the master arbitrator’s award dated October 10, 2014, is confirmed, and the order dated September 23, 2015, is modified accordingly.
V.S. Care Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter V.S.), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment it rendered to Eric Pascal. After the carrier, Country-Wide Ins. Co. (hereinafter Country-Wide), denied the claim, V.S. submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator denied V.S.’s claim, finding that the evidence established that V.S. was fraudulently incorporated (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]). On appeal, a master arbitrator affirmed the original arbitrator’s award, finding that it was not arbitrary and capricious. V.S. then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the master arbitrator’s award, and entered a judgment in favor of V.S. in the amount of the claim for no-fault benefits plus statutory interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements. Country-Wide appeals.
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, V.S. failed to demonstrate any grounds for vacating the master arbitrator’s award. A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). Here, as explained in this Court’s decision and order in Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (176 AD3d 800 [2019] [decided herewith]), since the determination of the master arbitrator affirming the original arbitrator’s award had evidentiary support and was not irrational, it is not subject to vacatur by the courts (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 223-224 [1996]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 167 AD3d 869 [2018]), even if the master arbitrator committed an error of law (see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 535 [2010]; Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d at 223-224; cf. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d 885, 886-887 [2017]). Accordingly, the petition should have been denied and the master arbitrator’s award should have been confirmed. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Brathwaite Nelson and Christopher, JJ., concur.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Bay Needle Care Acupuncture v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 07249)
| Matter of Bay Needle Care Acupuncture v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 07249 [176 AD3d 806] |
| October 9, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Bay Needle Care Acupuncture,
Respondent, v Country-Wide Ins. Co., Appellant. |
Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Thomas Torto, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Stefan Belinfanti and David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated March 18, 2014, Country-Wide Ins. Co. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated July 31, 2015. The judgment, upon an order of the same court dated April 2, 2015, granting the petition, vacating the master arbitrator’s award dated March 18, 2014, and confirming the original arbitrator’s award dated December 13, 2013, is in favor of the petitioner and against Country-Wide Ins. Co. in the total sum of $1,318.91.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of an additional attorney’s fee to be awarded to the petitioner pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]).
Bay Needle Care Acupuncture (hereinafter Bay Needle) is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment it rendered to Kareem Edgar. The carrier, Country-Wide Ins. Co. (hereinafter Country-Wide), denied the claim, and Bay Needle submitted the claim to arbitration. As relevant to this appeal, the arbitrator rejected Country-Wide’s contention that Bay Needle was fraudulently incorporated (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]; Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 150 AD3d 192 [2017], affd 33 NY3d 389 [2019]). The arbitrator stated that he found “no reasonable or credible evidence” establishing the defense, and he found in favor of Bay Needle. On Country-Wide’s appeal, a master arbitrator vacated the original arbitrator’s award and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a new arbitrator. The master arbitrator stated that the evidence of fraudulent incorporation presented by Country-Wide “was substantial.” Bay Needle commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the master arbitrator’s award, confirmed the original arbitrator’s award in favor of Bay Needle, and entered a judgment accordingly. Country-Wide appeals.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the master arbitrator exceeded his power in vacating the original arbitrator’s award after, in effect, weighing the evidence and coming to a different conclusion than the original arbitrator as to what that evidence proved (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). As such, we agree with the court’s determination to vacate the master arbitrator’s award and to confirm the original arbitrator’s award in favor of Bay Needle (see Matter of Jordan v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 309 AD2d 803, 804 [2003]; cf. Matter of Jasser v Allstate Ins. Co., 77 AD3d 751, 752 [2010]).
Moreover, as Bay Needle contends and Country-Wide concedes, Bay Needle is entitled to an attorney’s fee for this appeal pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j), to be fixed by the Supreme Court (see Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Acupuncture, P.C., 167 AD3d 404, 405 [2018]; Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Care Acupuncture, P.C., 162 AD3d 407, 408 [2018]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 706 [2017]). The matter is therefore remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for that purpose. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Brathwaite Nelson and Christopher, JJ., concur.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (2019 NY Slip Op 07246)
| Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 07246 [176 AD3d 800] |
| October 9, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C.,
Respondent, v Country-Wide Ins. Co., Appellant. |
Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP (Thomas Torto, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Stefan Belinfanti and David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated October 10, 2014, Country-Wide Ins. Co. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bernard J. Graham, J.), dated July 31, 2015. The judgment, upon an undated order of the same court granting the petition, vacating the master arbitrator’s award dated October 10, 2014, and remitting the matter to arbitration, is in favor of the petitioner and against Country-Wide Ins. Co. in the total sum of $625.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, the master arbitrator’s award dated October 10, 2014, is confirmed, and the undated order is modified accordingly.
Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter Acuhealth), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment it rendered to Hector Rojos. After the carrier, Country-Wide Ins. Co. (hereinafter Country-Wide), denied the claim, Acuhealth submitted the claim to arbitration. The arbitrator denied Acuhealth’s claim, finding, inter alia, that the evidence established that Acuhealth was fraudulently incorporated and thus not entitled to reimbursement under the No-Fault Law (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 320-321 [2005]).
On appeal, a master arbitrator affirmed the original arbitrator’s award in favor of Country-Wide. Acuhealth then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court determined that a prior Supreme Court determination involving the same parties was entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, the court granted Acuhealth’s petition, vacated the master arbitrator’s award, remitted the matter to arbitration, and awarded Acuhealth costs and disbursements in the sum of $625. Country-Wide appeals.
We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination that Acuhealth was entitled to vacatur of the master arbitrator’s award on the ground of collateral estoppel. The prior decision on which the court relied merely stated that Acuhealth’s petition to vacate a master arbitrator’s award was granted, without indicating on what basis the petition was granted or what issues were being decided and in what manner. Under those circumstances, Acuhealth failed to establish that the issue on which it sought collateral estoppel effect in this proceeding was identical to an issue which was raised and necessarily decided in the prior proceeding (see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349 [1999]; Von Maack v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 140 AD3d 1055, 1056 [2016]).
Acuhealth failed to demonstrate any additional ground for vacating the master arbitrator’s award. “[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]). A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981]). Notably, the master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law (see id. at 211-212; 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [a] [4]). In contrast, the courts “generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur” (Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Spine Americare Med., 294 AD2d 574, 576 [2002]).
Here, since Country-Wide submitted evidence tending to support its fraudulent incorporation defense, it cannot be said that the determination of the master arbitrator affirming the original arbitrator’s award lacked evidentiary support. Nor can it be said that the determination to affirm the original arbitrator, who supported her determination with reasons based on the evidence, lacked a rational basis. Thus, even if it was an error of law to conclude that Country-Wide proved its defense as a matter of law (see Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d 885, 886-887 [2017]), the master arbitrator’s determination is not subject to vacatur by the courts on the mere basis of that error of law (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 223-224 [1996]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 167 AD3d 869 [2018]). Notably, this Court’s decision in Nationwide Affinity, which is contrary to the conclusion of the master arbitrator in this case, was not published until after the master arbitrator’s award was rendered. Moreover, Country-Wide submitted evidence in support of its defense which, while inadmissible, could be considered by the original arbitrator in this case, who, unlike a court deciding a summary judgment motion like that at issue in Nationwide Affinity, was not bound by the rules of evidence (see Matter of Fagan v Village of Harriman, 140 AD3d 868 [2016]).
Accordingly, the petition should have been denied and the master arbitrator’s award should have been confirmed. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Brathwaite Nelson and Christopher, JJ., concur.