Law Office of Aloy O. Ibuzor (Duane Frankson of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Marina Josovich, P.C. (Marina Josovich of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (John J. Kelley, J.), entered November 18, 2016, deemed from a judgment of that court entered December 22, 2016 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the November 18, 2016 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,261.90.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs), and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered November 18, 2016, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s cross motion. A judgment was subsequently entered on December 22, 2016, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to defendant’s sole contention, defendant failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on plaintiff’s failure to appear for EUOs, since the initial EUO request to plaintiff had been sent more than 30 days after defendant had received the claims at issue and, therefore, the requests were nullities as to those claims (see [*2]Neptune Med. Care, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51220[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; O & M Med., P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair of counsel), for appellant. Goldberg Miller & Rubin (Harlan R. Schreiber of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered November 9, 2016. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued 30 days after defendant received plaintiff’s claim and plaintiff did not rebut that showing (see DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 129[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). As a result, plaintiff’s cause of action was not timely commenced (see CPLR 213 [2]; DJS Med. Supplies, Inc., 32 Misc 3d 129[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51304[U]).

Plaintiff’s contention that defendant should be collaterally estopped from asserting a [*2]statute of limitations defense lacks merit since, among other things, the Civil Court order upon which plaintiff relies denied a motion by defendant and was not a conclusive final determination (see generally Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 48 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court, as the argument is being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]), and we decline to consider it.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Paul Kenny

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Kevin J. Philbin (Kevon Lewis of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J.), entered March 28, 2018. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole appellate argument with respect to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the denial of claim forms had been properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Rosemarie Montalbano, J.), entered June 18, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). As limited by the brief, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered June 18, 2018 as denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affirmation from the attorney who was to perform the EUOs, which affirmation was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Moreover, a review of the record establishes that the Civil Court [*2]correctly determined that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Petre and Zabokritsky, P.C. (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Rosemarie Montalbano, J.), entered May 11, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion to sever the first cause of action, seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Hajar Abada, from the remaining causes of action and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to sever the first cause of action seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Hajar Abada, from the remaining causes of action. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered May 11, 2018, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion seeking to sever the first cause of action and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the order as denied its motion seeking to sever the first cause of action from the remaining causes of action and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action.

As defendant’s appeal presents no argument with respect to so much of the order as granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action, defendant failed to establish a basis to disturb that portion of the order. In light of the foregoing, defendant’s contention that its motion seeking to sever the first cause of action from the remaining causes of action should have been granted is moot (see Lighting Horizons v Kahn & Co., 120 AD2d 648 [1986]; Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 128[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51720[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Petre and Zabokritsky, P.C. (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Rosemarie Montalbano, J.), entered May 11, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion to sever the first cause of action, seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Hajar Abada, from the remaining causes of action and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to sever the first cause of action, seeking to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Hajar Abada, from the remaining causes of action. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered May 11, 2018, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion seeking to sever the first cause of action and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the order as denied its motion seeking to sever the first cause of action from the remaining causes of action and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action.

As defendant’s appeal presents no argument with respect to so much of the order as granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first cause of action, defendant failed to establish a basis to disturb that portion of the order. In light of the foregoing, defendant’s contention that its motion seeking to sever the first cause of action from the remaining causes of action should have been granted is moot (see Lighting Horizons v Kahn & Co., 120 AD2d 648 [1986]; Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 58 Misc 3d 128[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51720[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Lawrence N. Rogak, LLC (Lawrence N. Rogak of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), entered January 11, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, failed to decide the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the coverage limits of the insurance policy had been exhausted.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it never received the claims at issue and that the coverage limits available under the insurance policy had already been exhausted. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered January 11, 2018, the Civil Court denied both the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment on the ground that defendant had never received the claims at issue, and plaintiff’s cross motion, stating that there was an issue of fact with respect to defendant’s defense that it had not received the claims at issue.

Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the Civil Court erred in failing to decide the branch of defendant’s motion which sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the coverage limits available under the subject insurance policy had already been [*2]exhausted. However, no appeal lies from an order or portion thereof which fails to determine a motion or branch thereof (see Baez v First Liberty Ins. Corp., 95 AD3d 1250 [2012]). Thus, the branch of defendant’s motion which was not addressed by the Civil Court remains pending and undecided (see Fanelli v J.C. Millbank Constr. Co., Inc., 91 AD3d 703 [2012]; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536, 542-543 [1979]).

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Darya Klein of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Moira Doherty, P.C. (Lisa Taranto-Fernandez of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered January 17, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking to compel defendant to serve responses to plaintiff’s discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs) and denied the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking to compel defendant to serve responses to plaintiff’s discovery demands.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, defendant’s proof sufficiently established that defendant had timely mailed the IME scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v [*2]Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.