The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Goldstein & Flecker (Lawrence J. Chanice of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Michael Gerstein, J.), entered April 13, 2018. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a judgment upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and granted defendant’s cross motion to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a default judgment is granted and defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a judgment upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and granted defendant’s cross motion to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer.

A defendant seeking to open a default in answering based on an excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see Matter of Gambardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494 [2000]).

While a claim of law office failure may be accepted as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005), the claim must be supported by a “detailed and credible” explanation of the default (Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479 [2004]; see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Preferred Trucking Serv. Corp., 42 Misc 3d 88 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Upon a [*2]review of the record, we find that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer, as defendant failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a reasonable excuse for its default (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc., 67 NY2d at 141).

“In order to be entitled to enter a default judgment upon a defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint, a plaintiff must submit evidence of service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant, evidence of a viable cause of action, and evidence of the defendant’s default in appearing or answering (see CPLR 3215 [f]; L & Z Masonry Corp. v Mose, 167 AD3d 728, 729 [2018]; Clarke v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 150 AD3d 1192, 1194 [2017]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Kuldip, 136 AD3d 969, 970 [2016])” (Glanz v Parkway Kosher Caterers, 176 AD3d 686, 688 [2019]). Here, plaintiff satisfied these requirements.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a default judgment is granted and defendant’s cross motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer is denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on November 6, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Aloy O. Ibuzor (William P. Kleen of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered February 28, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through ninth causes of action and denied the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon those causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through ninth causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, that it had not received the claims underlying the second, third, and sixth through ninth causes of action, and that with respect to the fourth and fifth causes of action, plaintiff had not complied with a condition precedent to coverage because he had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered February 28, 2018, the Civil Court, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through ninth causes of action and denied the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon those causes of action.

The affidavit of defendant’s claims litigation representative established that defendant had [*2]not received the claim forms underlying the second, third, and sixth through ninth causes of action. However, in opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from plaintiff’s owner, which affidavit was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that those claim forms had been timely mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; see also Compas Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 146[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50307[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether those claims were timely submitted to defendant.

Plaintiff correctly argues that defendant failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the fourth and fifth causes of action based on plaintiff’s failure to appear for EUOs, as the initial EUO request had been sent more than 30 days after defendant had received the claims underlying those causes of action, and, therefore, the request was a nullity as to those claims (see Neptune Med. Care, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51220[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; O & M Med., P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). However, plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on these causes of action, as the proof submitted in support of its motion failed to establish either that the claims had not been timely denied or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second through ninth causes of action are denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on November 6, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Serpe, Andree & Kaufman (Jonathan H. Kaufman of counsel), for appellant. D’Ambrosio & D’Ambrosio, P.C. (James J. D’Ambrosio of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Phillip Hom, J.), entered February 15, 2019. The order denied a petition, brought pursuant to CPLR 7510, to vacate an arbitration award and granted a cross petition to confirm the arbitration award.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Petitioner, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, commenced this proceeding, pursuant to CPLR 7510, to vacate an arbitration award in favor of respondent, Hereford Insurance Company, dismissing petitioner’s claim for intercompany reimbursement of no-fault benefits that petitioner had paid to its insured as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Respondent filed a cross petition to confirm the award.

Petitioner’s exhibits, attached to its papers in support of its petition, included a police report, which set forth the license number for each driver, the plate number and the state of registration for each vehicle, and the name of the driver of the second vehicle, Hector Moran. After paying no-fault benefits for claims ranging from December 19, 2012 through July 2015, petitioner commenced an action against Moran on December 22, 2015 seeking reimbursement of [*2]the no-fault benefits it had paid and asserted therein that Moran was uninsured. Moran defaulted. On November 28, 2017, Moran moved to vacate the default, asserting that he had insurance coverage. On January 19, 2018, respondent sent petitioner an email admitting that it had insurance coverage for Moran for the date of loss and requesting that petitioner withdraw its lawsuit against Moran. On January 21, 2018, petitioner filed an intercompany reimbursement notification and, on February 6, 2018, it commenced mandatory arbitration against respondent and discontinued its action against Moran.

Following an arbitration hearing on April 5, 2018, the arbitration panel ruled in favor of respondent, on the ground that most of petitioner’s claims were untimely. The arbitration panel denied the claim for services rendered in July 2015 on the ground that petitioner had failed to properly document that payment. Petitioner appeals from a Civil Court order entered February 15, 2019 denying petitioner’s petition to vacate the arbitration award and granting respondent’s cross petition to confirm the arbitration award, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled but conceding that the dismissal of the July 2015 claim by the arbitration panel was proper.

“While judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511, an award that is the product of compulsory arbitration, such as the one at issue in this case, must satisfy an additional layer of judicial scrutiny—it must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious” (Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of NY, 144 AD3d 1160, 1160-1161 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Travelers Cos., Inc., 159 AD3d 982 [2018]). “Moreover, with respect to determinations of law, the applicable standard in mandatory no-fault arbitrations is whether ‘any reasonable hypothesis can be found to support the questioned interpretation’ ” (Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d 40, 46 [2015], quoting Matter of Shand [Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442, 454 [1980]).

Petitioner’s papers in support of its petition to vacate the arbitration award show that petitioner had in its possession a document dated December 3, 2015 titled “Registration Record Expansion,” a printout containing, among other things, Moran’s insurance policy number. The arbitrators could have formed a “reasonable hypothesis” (Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d at 46) that this document indicates that, prior to filing its action against Moran, petitioner knew, or should have known, that Moran was insured.

Petitioner contends that, by filing its action against Moran, the three-year statute of limitations (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 89 NY2d 214) on its claims against respondent were tolled, even though respondent had not been served or named in that action. Matter of Brua Cab Corp. v Royal Indem. Co. (275 AD2d 778 [2000]) and Matter of Brinks, Inc. v Commercial Union Ins. Co. (217 AD2d 620 [1995]), cited by petitioner, are inapplicable, as the subsequent arbitration cannot be related back to an action filed against a different party.

The arbitrators’ determination that petitioner was not entitled to reimbursement for the benefits it had paid was not arbitrary or capricious. There is ample support in the record for the arbitrators’ finding that the statute of limitations had expired prior to petitioner’s commencement of its arbitration against respondent. “[E]ven assuming that the arbitrator might have misapplied applicable law . . . the arbitrator[s’] award was . . . supported by a ‘reasonable hypothesis’ and was not contrary to what could fairly be described as settled law” (Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 18 AD3d 762, 763 [2005], quoting Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 89 NY2d at 224).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

We note that a proceeding to vacate or confirm an arbitration award is a special proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 4, and must terminate in a judgment rather than an order (see CPLR 411).

ALIOTTA, P.J., SIEGAL and TOUSSAINT, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: October 30, 2020

Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Bryan Rothenberg of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered February 1, 2019. The judgment, entered pursuant to an order of that court entered November 21, 2018 granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denying a cross motion made by defendant on August 25, 2011 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and rejecting a “cross” motion made by defendant on July 27, 2016, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,670.32.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered November 21, 2018 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the “cross” motion made by defendant on July 27, 2016 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The parties’ attorneys subsequently entered into a stipulation setting forth a motion schedule, which adjourned the return date of the motion to December 22, 2011 and provided, among other things, that all opposition papers and cross motions must be served on or before September 22, 2011. On August 25, 2011, in accordance with the foregoing schedule, defendant 21st Century served a cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the [*2]complaint, arguing that it had timely denied the claims on the ground of material misrepresentation in the procurement of the insurance policy. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s cross motion in the Civil Court.

Before the Civil Court ruled on the motion and cross motion, 21st Century commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, and plaintiff herein appeared in that action. On December 19, 2011, the Supreme Court signed an order to show cause, which, among other things, temporarily stayed pending and future lawsuits by the instant provider and assignor, among others. By order entered May 29, 2012, the Supreme Court continued the stay pending the determination of the declaratory judgment action. By order entered May 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted 21st Century’s motion for summary judgment. A judgment entered February 4, 2016 in the Supreme Court declared that 21st Century has no duty to provide coverage for specified collisions, including the incident herein, or for any claim for no-fault benefits arising out of those collisions. The judgment and orders with notices of their entry were served on the provider’s attorneys.

On July 22, 2016, based upon the declaratory judgment, defendant served what it denominated as a “cross” motion, with a return date of November 1, 2016, seeking an order in the Civil Court denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, granting defendant’s summary judgment motion dismissing the complaint, granting defendant leave to amend its answer to include the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata and deeming the amended answer served. By order entered November 21, 2018, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s August 25, 2011 cross motion on the ground that defendant’s answer had not asserted the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata, and found that the action had been “erroneously stayed.” The Civil Court further stated that it rejected defendant’s “additional cross motion,” served on July 27, 2016, as untimely under the parties’ motion schedule and “improper in violation of the one motion rule.” Defendant appeals from a judgment entered February 1, 2019 pursuant to the November 21, 2018 order, awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,670.32.

Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, defendant’s failure to raise the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata in its answer was understandable and excusable since the declaratory judgment action had not been filed in the Supreme Court at the time defendant answered the instant complaint. Similarly, the order and judgment in the declaratory judgment action were not rendered until after defendant had cross-moved for summary judgment on August 25, 2011. Thus, as defendant argues, it had no reason to raise those affirmative defenses in the answer (see Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

Whether defendant’s July 27, 2016 papers be deemed a motion with a return date of November 1, 2016 or a “cross” motion, in either case, its July 27, 2016 papers served as a vehicle to introduce the Supreme Court’s orders and the declaratory judgment entered in favor of 21st Century, of which this court takes judicial notice (see Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate [*3]Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13 [2009]; Matter of Khatibi v Weill, 8 AD3d 485 [2004]; Renelique, 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U]). “While it is true that multiple motions for summary judgment in the same action . . . are looked upon with disfavor, more than one motion is permissible where[, as here,] the subsequent motion is based upon newly discovered evidence or the moving party can demonstrate other sufficient cause for granting the motion” (Inter-Power of NY v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 259 AD2d 932, 933 [1999]). Consequently, under the particular circumstances presented herein, the Civil Court, for judicial economy, should not have rejected defendant’s 2016 “cross” motion and should have taken judicial notice of the declaratory judgment. In light of the declaratory judgment, defendant’s 2016 “cross” motion should have been granted under the doctrine of res judicata, as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in the present action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court’s judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).

Accordingly, the judgment entered February 1, 2019 is reversed, the order entered November 21, 2018 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the “cross” motion made by defendant on July 27, 2016 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

WESTON, J.P., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: October 30, 2020

Hollander Legal Group , P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent-appellant (no brief filed).

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered November 19, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from by defendant, denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claim forms for services provided to Pia Daniels on March 22, 2016, March 28 to April 7, 2016, April 25, 2016, April 25 to May 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, and the claims for services provided to James Stokely. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from by plaintiff, made implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in defendant’s favor.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claim forms for services provided to Pia Daniels on March 22, 2016, March 28 to April 7, 2016, April 25, 2016, April 25 to May 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, and the claims for services provided to James Stokely are granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant [*2]moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely denied the claims based upon plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered November 19, 2018 as denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claim forms for services provided to Pia Daniels on March 22, 2016, March 28 to April 7, 2016, April 25, 2016, April 25 to May 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, and the claims for services provided to James Stokely. Plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the Civil Court’s order as, upon denying the aforementioned branches of defendant’s motion, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that the only issue remaining for trial was whether defendant’s attorney was present at the scheduled EUOs. In support of its cross appeal, plaintiff argues that the Civil Court’s implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in favor of defendant should be vacated as an issue of fact exists because defendant failed to establish that it possessed objective reasons for requesting the EUOs.

Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s attorney was present at the time for which the EUOs were scheduled to be held, and that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Furthermore, with respect to plaintiff’s cross appeal, “as this court has repeatedly stated, defendant was not required to set forth objective reasons for requesting EUOs in order to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment” (Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Servs. v GEICO Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 138[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51684[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). In opposition to the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claim forms for services provided to Pia Daniels on March 22, 2016, March 28 to April 7, 2016, April 25, 2016, April 25 to May 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, and the claims for services provided to James Stokely, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claim forms for services provided to Pia Daniels on March 22, 2016, March 28 to April 7, 2016, April 25, 2016, April 25 to May 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, and the claims for services provided to James Stokely are granted.

WESTON, J.P., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on October 30, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, October 30, 2020

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Selina Chin and David M. Gottlieb of counsel) for appellant.

Law Office of Goldstein, Flecker & Hopkins (Lawrence J. Chanice of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a corporate provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services rendered to plaintiff’s assignor in 2009, defendant moved for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant argued that plaintiff professional corporation could not enforce its claims because its sole shareholder had been legally disqualified from rendering professional services upon the revocation of his chiropractic license on June 28, 2010. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Initially, it is noted that defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 was made after issue had been joined. Generally, such a motion must be made “before service of the responsive pleading is required” (CPLR 3211 [e]), although “[w]hether or not issue [*2]has been joined, the court, after adequate notice to the parties, may treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment” (CPLR 3211 [c]). While it is uncontested that the Civil Court did not notify the parties that it was treating the motion as one for summary judgment, an exception to the notice requirement is applicable here, as defendant’s motion exclusively involved “a purely legal question rather than any issues of fact” (Mihlovan v Grozavu, 72 NY2d 506, 508 [1988]; Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 320 [1987]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50095[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). All the relevant facts are undisputed. Consequently, as the sole issue was the application of the Business Corporation Law, it was proper for the Civil Court to, in effect, treat defendant’s motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment “without first giving notice of its intention to do so” (Four Seasons Hotels, 127 AD2d at 320).

Pursuant to Business Corporation Law §§ 1509 and 1510, when professionals lose their license, they are required to sever{**70 Misc 3d at 28} their ties with the professional service corporation. If the professional does not sever those ties, section 1509 grants the professional service corporation the authority to force the professional to do so, and failure to enforce this requirement constitutes a ground for forfeiture of the professional service corporation’s certificate of incorporation and its dissolution. Section 1510, among other things, directs the professional service corporation to repurchase the professional’s shares within six months of his disqualification. None of these requirements is self-executing.

Here, the professional has not complied with section 1509 and the professional service corporation has not repurchased his shares pursuant to section 1510, so the professional remains the corporation’s sole shareholder. No one has moved for forfeiture of plaintiff’s certificate of incorporation or its dissolution. Despite revocation of its shareholder’s professional license, plaintiff continued to exist and is entitled to wind up its affairs and seek to recover no-fault benefits for the services it rendered to its assignor prior to June 28, 2010 (see A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 145[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50154[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Kipor Medicine, P.C. v GEICO, 28 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51247[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; see e.g. A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Travelers Indem. Co., 26 Misc 3d 69 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]).

The case of Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (15 Misc 3d 9 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) is distinguishable. In that case, the death of the doctor who was the sole officer, director and shareholder of a professional service corporation required the dismissal of its appeal because no one remained with authority to prosecute the action. Here, however, the sole shareholder is alive and continues to have authority to act for the professional corporation as “an administrator, whose role is to preserve the value of, and prevent loss to, the [professional service corporation]” (Eastern Star Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 41, 43 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]), rather than as a member of the profession from which he has been barred.

Section 1510 directs plaintiff to take actions that it concededly failed to do. It does not hold, however, that such a violation makes otherwise valid contracts unenforceable or that the{**70 Misc 3d at 29} corporation’s debtor should be entitled to withhold payment for services legally rendered. Consequently, there is no bar to plaintiff’s pursuit of reimbursement for services rendered to its assignor.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Aliotta, P.J., Siegal and Toussaint, JJ., concur.

Hollander Legal Group , P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Karina Barska of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered July 30, 2018. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely denied the claims based upon plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered July 30, 2018, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s cross motion.

Where, as here, no other verification request is outstanding (see Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50258[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), the 30-day period for an insurer to pay or deny a claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]) based upon a failure to appear for an EUO begins to run on the date of the second EUO nonappearance, when an insurer is permitted to conclude that there [*2]was a failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Chapa Prods. Corp. v MVAIC, 66 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Veraso Med. Supply Corp. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 146[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51696[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Defendant asserted that the assignor had failed to appear on September 9, 2016, October 4, 2016, and November 1, 2016. As defendant did not deny the claims until November 14, 2016, which was more than 30 days after the second failure to appear, for the EUO scheduled for October 4, 2016, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint because defendant did not demonstrate that it is not precluded from raising its proffered defense (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]). Furthermore, as defendant raises no issue with respect to plaintiff’s establishment of its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we do not pass upon the propriety of the Civil Court’s determination with respect thereto.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., SIEGAL and TOUSSAINT, JJ., concur.