SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Delores J. Thomas, J.), entered January 24, 2006. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affidavit by a corporate officer of plaintiff, and various documents annexed thereto. The affidavit executed by plaintiff’s corporate officer stated in a conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were plaintiff’s business records. In opposition, defendant argued, in effect, that said affidavit was
vague, and plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. The court below denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to make out a prima facie case. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued. Inasmuch as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s corporate officer was insufficient to establish that said officer possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2006 NY Slip Op 26483 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). In view of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Belen, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Milagros A. Matos, J.), entered June 28, 2005. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by a health care provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affidavit by someone who was either an “employee/shareholder” or an “employee of the company providing billing services for plaintiff,” and various documents annexed thereto. The affidavit stated in conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were plaintiff’s business records. In opposition to the motion, defendant argued, inter alia, that the affidavit failed to lay a proper foundation for the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. Plaintiff appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.

Inasmuch as the affidavit submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion was insufficient to establish that the affiant possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Dan Med. P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Misc 3d , 2006 NY Slip Op 26483 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Belen, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Arlene Bluth, J.), entered November 10, 2005. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The court below denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case because the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s employee was insufficient to establish that said employee possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation to
establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers were admissible as business records. Plaintiff appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.

Inasmuch as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s employee was insufficient to establish that said employee possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; see Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2006 NY Slip Op 26483 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Peter Paul Sweeney, J.), entered October 13, 2005. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affidavit by an employee of plaintiff, and various documents annexed thereto. The affidavit executed by plaintiff’s employee stated in a conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were plaintiff’s business records. The court below denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff’s moving papers failed to allege personal knowledge of the mailing of the claims. Plaintiff appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, defendant raises for the first time that the affidavit by plaintiff’s employee, submitted in support of the motion, failed to lay a proper foundation for the documents annexed [*2]to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. The affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s employee was insufficient to establish that said employee possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Bath Med. Supply, Inc. v Deerbrook Ins. Co., Misc 3d , 2007 NY Slip Op [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists, Jan. 12, 2007]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2006 NY Slip Op 26483 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Weston Patterson, J.P., Rios and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Eileen Nadelson, J.), entered September 28, 2005. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant concedes receipt of the claim forms which are the subject of this action. Defendant’s contention that plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie case because plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of an authenticated assignment is without merit as “the lack of authentication of the assignor’s signature, in and of itself, does not constitute a defect in the absence of any statutory or regulatory requirement for the same” (A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 14, 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). Since plaintiff established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to defendant to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Defendant’s opposing papers indicate that defendant mailed assignor a request that she appear for pre-claim independent medical examinations (IMEs), that assignor received the scheduling notice and failed to appear, that defendant timely sent (11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b]), and assignor received, a follow-up IME scheduling notice, and that assignor again failed to appear. This proof sufficed to warrant the motion’s denial (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Belen, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered May 27, 2005. The order denied the petition to vacate a master arbitrator’s award.

Order modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Upon a review of the record, we find a rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator upholding the arbitrator’s award which denied the petitioner’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207 [1981]). Accordingly, the court below properly denied the petition to vacate the master
arbitrator’s award. However, upon denying the petition, the court was required, pursuant to CPLR 7511 (e), to confirm the award (see Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]).

We note that a special proceeding should terminate in a judgment, not an order (see CPLR 411).

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 26, 2007

—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Martha S. Henley of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under contracts of insurance, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered March 29, 2006, which, upon an order of the same court (Brennan, J.) dated March 13, 2006, granting the motion of the plaintiff Mount Sinai Hospital, as assignee of Salvatore Gigante, for summary judgment on the third cause of action, is in favor of that plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $30,092.49. The defendant’s notice of appeal from the order is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the judgment.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

In support of its motion for summary judgment on the third cause of action, the plaintiff Mount Sinai Hospital, as assignee of Salvatore Gigante (hereinafter Mount Sinai), demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter alia, the requisite billing forms, a certified mail receipt, a signed return receipt card which referenced the patient and forms, and an affidavit of its third-party biller (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 34 AD3d 532 [2006]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 492 [2006]). This evidence demonstrated that the defendant received the no-fault billing and failed to respond within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5). The defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly [*2]granted the motion of Mount Sinai for summary judgment on the third cause of action.

The defendant’s remaining contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Rotundo v S & C Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 255 AD2d 573 [1998]) and, in any event, is without merit (see General Construction Law § 46; William Iselin & Co. v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 117 AD2d 86, 90 [1986], mod 69 NY2d 908 [1987]). Mastro, J.P., Goldstein, Lifson and Carni, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Eileen Nadelson, J.), entered December 19, 2005. The order denied defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness.

Order reversed without costs and defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness granted.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant served plaintiff with a notice to take the deposition of plaintiff, as well as others. After plaintiff filed a notice of trial and certificate of readiness, defendant moved to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness, asserting that, contrary to plaintiff’s representation, discovery was not complete. Although plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s motion, the
court below denied defendant’s motion, noting that the type of discovery sought by defendant was not within “the purview of plaintiff.”

Defendant’s motion to vacate the notice of trial and certificate of readiness should have been granted. It is undisputed that there is an outstanding request for discovery. A motion to vacate a notice of trial should be granted where, as in the instant matter, it is based upon a certificate of readiness which contains the erroneous statement that discovery was completed or waived (see Savino v Lewittes, 160 AD2d 176 [1990]; Hillside Neurology Care P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 127[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50234[U] [App Term, 1st Dept]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Golia, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: February 16, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Eileen Nadelson, J.), entered December 6, 2005. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order modified by denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affidavit by a corporate officer of plaintiff, and various documents annexed thereto. The affidavit
executed by plaintiff’s corporate officer stated in a conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were plaintiff’s business records. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment based upon the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for two independent medical examinations (IMEs). Defendant also argued that the affidavit of plaintiff’s corporate officer was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie case because, among other things, it did not set forth evidence in admissible form. The court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appeals therefrom.

Inasmuch as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s corporate officer was insufficient to establish that said officer possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2006 NY Slip Op 26483 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for [*2]summary judgment was properly denied.

With regard to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, which was premised upon the alleged failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for two IMEs, plaintiff contends that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because defendant’s cross motion did not present sufficient evidence in admissible form. Since defendant did not present an affidavit from someone with personal knowledge establishing that plaintiff’s assignor failed to appear for the IMEs, defendant did not make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., ___ AD3d ___, 2006 NY Slip Op 09604 [2d Dept, Dec. 19, 2006]). Accordingly, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

Weston Patterson, J.P., Rios and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 16, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Gerald Dunbar, J.), entered November 22, 2005. The order granted defendant’s motion to the extent of compelling plaintiff to produce plaintiff’s assignor’s treating physician, Dmitry Nesen, M.D., for a deposition.

Order modified by providing that defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to appear for a deposition is granted to the extent of requiring plaintiff to produce a witness with knowledge of the dates, if any, commencing January 1, 2001 to the present, during which Dmitry Nesen, M.D. was an employee of plaintiff, for a deposition within 60 days
after service of a copy of the order entered hereon; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for an order, inter alia, compelling plaintiff to submit to depositions on the ground that there was an issue as to whether Dmitry Nesen, M.D., the physician who allegedly treated plaintiff’s assignor, was an employee of plaintiff or an independent contractor at the time the treatment was rendered (see generally A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 36 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). The court granted defendant’s motion to the extent of requiring plaintiff to produce Dr. Nesen for a deposition and this appeal ensued.

Inasmuch as it is unclear whether Dr. Nesen was employed by plaintiff when defendant sought such relief, the court erred in compelling plaintiff to produce Dr. Nesen for a deposition (see CPLR 3106 [b]; Doomes v Best Tr. Corp., 303 AD2d 322 [2003]; Schneider v Melmarkets Inc., 289 AD2d 470 [2001]; Zappolo v Putnam Hosp. Center, 117 AD2d 597 [1986]). However, since defendant’s motion sought to compel plaintiff to appear for a deposition regarding Dr. Nesen’s employment status when he
treated plaintiff’s assignor, defendant’s motion should have been granted to the extent of requiring plaintiff to produce a witness with such knowledge for deposition upon oral examination (see Kryzhanovskaya v City of New York, 31 AD3d 717 [2006]).

We note that while the court below relied upon Matter of Haas v Costigan (14 AD2d 809 [1961]), said case does not entitle defendant, at this juncture, to an order compelling plaintiff to produce Dr. Nesen for a deposition since it is both factually and legally distinguishable.
Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Golia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 14, 2007