SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Delores J. Thomas, J.), entered March 7, 2005. The judgment denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award.

Judgment modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Upon a review of the record, we find a rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator upholding the arbitrator’s award which denied the petitioner’s claims for first-party no-fault benefits (see e.g. Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207 [1981]; Matter of Shand [Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442 [1980]). Accordingly, the court below properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. However, upon denying the petition, the court was required, pursuant to CPLR 7511 (e), to confirm the award (see Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]).

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 19, 2007

—[*1] Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Max Valerio of counsel), for appellant.

Marshall & Marshall, Jericho, N.Y. (Craig B. Marshall of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated September 15, 2005, confirming an award of an arbitrator dated June 24, 2005 denying payment of no-fault insurance benefits, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelson, J.), dated June 22, 2006, which denied the petition and granted the respondent’s cross petition to confirm the award of the master arbitrator.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the awards of the master arbitrator and arbitrator are vacated, and the matter is remitted to the arbitrator for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The petitioner, Health & Endurance Medical, P.C. (hereinafter HEM), as assignee, sought payment of no-fault insurance benefits from the respondent, Deerbrook Insurance Company (hereinafter Deerbrook) for medical services provided to an insured by an independent contractor. After arbitration, payment was denied on the ground that HEM was not a provider of health care services within the meaning of the no-fault regulations and, therefore, was not entitled to direct payment of such benefits. That award was confirmed by a master arbitrator. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied HEM’s petition to vacate the award of the master arbitrator. We reverse.

In relevant part, the no-fault regulations provide for direct payments of no-fault benefits to “providers of health care services” (11 NYCRR 65-3.11 [a]). Under the circumstances [*2]of this case, the applicability of 11 NYCRR 65-3.11 (a) was impermissibly raised, sua sponte, by the arbitrator (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.4 [e]). Since the arbitrator never ruled on the only issue raised by Deerbrook relating to the need for the services in question, this matter must be remitted to the arbitrator for a determination of this issue. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered March 23, 2006. The judgment denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award.

Judgment modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Upon a review of the record, we find a rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator upholding the arbitrator’s award which denied petitioner’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits (see e.g. Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207 [1981]; Matter of Adams v Allstate Ins. Co., 210 AD2d 319 [1994]; Matter of Shand
[Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442 [1980]). Consequently, the court below properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. However, upon denying the petition, the court was required, pursuant to CPLR 7511 (e), to confirm the award (see Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]), and we modify the judgment accordingly.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: October 10, 2007

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

Martin, Fallon & Mullé, Huntington, N.Y. (Richard C. Mullé of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (LaMarca, J.), dated January 5, 2007, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action and granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

On or about January 29, 2006, Donald Gjelaj, the plaintiff’s assignor, was involved in a single-vehicle accident on a wet, curved roadway. After the accident, Gjelaj was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Gjelaj sought no-fault benefits under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant. The defendant sent a verification request dated January 31, 2006, to Gjelaj seeking additional information regarding his alleged intoxication. On or about February 10, 2006, Gjelaj responded to the request, including with his response copies of the traffic ticket issued after the accident charging him with driving while intoxicated and Gjelaj’s handwritten statement that he had “not gone to court yet” on the charge. On or about February 16, 2006, the defendant received a copy of the police accident report indicating that Gjelaj was arrested for driving while intoxicated at the [*2]scene of the accident. Within one week after receiving Gjelaj’s response, the defendant sought additional verification regarding Gjelaj’s intoxication from, among others, Arden Hill Hospital, where Gjelaj had been taken after the accident.

In the interim, on or about February 24, 2006, the defendant received a hospital facility form (NYS Form NF-5) from the plaintiff to recover no-fault benefits for services it rendered to Gjelaj, its assignor. By letters dated March 8, 2006, and April 11, 2006, the defendant advised the plaintiff that it was investigating the claim for possible intoxication and waiting for toxicology reports from either Arden or the New York State Police (hereinafter the State Police). On April 19, 2006, the defendant received, by facsimile from Gjelaj’s counsel, a copy of a blood alcohol test (hereinafter the BAC report) taken by the State Police which stated in the subject line Gjelaj’s name and the date of the accident, and reported a blood alcohol level of 0.13. The defendant sent the plaintiff a denial of claim on the ground of intoxication dated April 24, 2006.

When a denial of no-fault benefits rests on the statutory exclusion of intoxication pursuant to Insurance Law § 5103 (b) (2), the regulations promulgated thereunder trigger certain timing and notification requirements that extend the 30-day statutory period within which an insurer must pay or deny a claim (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR former 65.15 [g] [3]). “[W]hen an insurer believes that intoxication may have been a contributing cause to an accident, the insurer is entitled to all available information regarding the insured’s condition at the time of the accident” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 279 [1997], citing 11 NYCRR former 65.15 [g] [7]). Pursuant to 11 NYCRR former 65.15 (g) (7), proof of a claim shall not be complete until the information which has been requested pursuant thereto has been furnished to the insurer by the applicant or the authorized representative.

“Within 10 business days after receipt of the completed application for motor vehicle no-fault benefits . . . or other substantially equivalent written notice, the insurer shall forward, to the parties required to complete them, those prescribed verification forms it will require prior to payment of the initial claims” (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a]). “Subsequent to the receipt of one or more of the completed verification forms, any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the prescribed verification forms” (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]). “The insurer is entitled to receive all items necessary to verify the claim directly from the parties from whom such verification was requested” (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [c]).

The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on its first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits by demonstrating that the prescribed statutory billing forms were mailed to and received by the defendant and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564 [2005]). In opposition, however, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact that the verification requests seeking information regarding Gjelaj’s alleged intoxication were timely and properly sent to, among others, Gjelaj, the plaintiff’s assignor (see Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 AD3d 569 [2005]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [b]; former 65.15 [g] [7]).

In addition, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact through its submission of the police accident report (hereinafter the PAR) that Gjelaj was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that such intoxication caused the accident. The PAR was properly considered by the Supreme Court under the business record exception to the hearsay rule to the extent that it was based upon the [*3]personal observations of the police officer present at the scene and under a business duty to make it (see CPLR 4518 [a]; Yeargans v Yeargans, 24 AD2d 280, 282 [1965]). Based upon the police officer’s personal observations and knowledge, Gjelaj’s vehicle left the roadway and struck a tree, and Gjelaj was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

However, the defendant failed to make out a prima facie showing on its cross motion for summary judgment (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). In the first instance, the defendant was unable to establish, prima facie, that Gjelaj was intoxicated at the time of the accident (see Lynch v Progressive Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 570, 571 [2004]). The result of a blood alcohol test may be admitted on the issue of intoxication in litigation involving an exclusion in a no-fault policy provided that a proper foundation is laid (see Matter of Nyack Hosp. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 139 AD2d 515 [1988]). At bar, the defendant failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of the BAC report by proffering any evidence regarding the care in the collection of Gjelaj’s blood sample and its analysis (see Marigliano v City of New York, 196 AD2d 533 [1993]; Fafinski v Reliance Ins. Co., 106 AD2d 88, 91-92 [1985], affd 65 NY2d 990 [1985]). Thus, while the defendant raised a triable issue of fact regarding intoxication sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s motion, on this record, it cannot establish intoxication as a matter of law. We note in this regard that although the BAC report was inadmissible to establish the defendant’s prima facie case on its cross motion (see generally Beyer v Melgar, 16 AD3d 532, 533 [2005]), the Supreme Court properly considered it in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Phillips v Kantor & Co., 31 NY2d 307 [1972]).

In addition, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that Gjelaj’s alleged intoxication was the proximate cause of the accident (see Lynch v Progressive Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 570, 571 [2004]; Scahall v Unigard Ins. Co., 222 AD2d 1070, 1071 [1995]; North v Travelers Ins. Co., 218 AD2d 901, 902 [1995]; Cernik v Sentry Ins., 131 AD2d 952 [1987]). Since the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposing papers (see North v Travelers Ins. Co., 218 AD2d 901 [1995]; see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Skelos and Balkin, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Jaffe & Koumourdas, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y. for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), entered June 30, 2006, which granted the motion of the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens for summary judgment on the second and third causes of action, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered July 11, 2006, which is in favor of the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens and against it in the principal sum of $6,223.62.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the order entered June 30, 2006, is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for entry of an appropriate amended judgment; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellant. [*2]

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens (hereinafter the plaintiff) established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the second cause of action by demonstrating that the necessary billing documents were mailed to and received by the defendant and that payment of the no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742, 742-743 [2004]). However, in opposition to the motion, the defendant submitted admissible evidence which raised triable issues of fact as to the date on which the plaintiff mailed the no-fault claims to the defendant and whether the verification requests, which would serve to extend the defendant’s time within which to pay or deny the claim, were pending. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant’s request for additional verification tolled the defendant’s time within which to pay or deny the claim (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1], [2]) until it received all of the relevant information requested (see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 27 AD3d 96, 100 [2005], mod 8 NY3d 294 [2007]). Moreover, the affidavit and documentary evidence submitted by the defendant were in admissible form since the affiant stated her basis for knowledge of the facts and laid a proper foundation for introduction of the documents (see Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 34 AD3d 771, 772 [2006]). Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied summary judgment as to the second cause of action.

The evidence submitted by the plaintiff in support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on the third cause of action satisfied its burden of establishing, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742, 742-743 [2004]). While the defendant initially denied that the plaintiff provided it with the requested verification material, it failed to rebut the plaintiff’s showing that the verification material was actually mailed to the defendant. A presumption of receipt was created by the certified mail receipt and the signed return receipt card, each bearing a notation to the relevant medical records, such that the defendant’s denial of receipt of the verification material was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 981, 982 [2007]; Matter of Fodor v MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 34 AD3d 473 [2006]).

Motion by the respondent on appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered June 30, 2006, and a judgment of the same court entered July 11, 2006, to strike pages 18 through 20 of the appellant’s brief on the ground that it improperly raises arguments for the first time on appeal. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated May 31, 2007, the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeals for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is

Ordered that the motion is denied. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Florio and Dillon, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Arlene Bluth, J.), entered December 8, 2005. The judgment denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award.

Judgment modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, affirmed with $25 costs to respondent.

Upon a review of the record, we find a rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator upholding the arbitrator’s award which denied petitioner’s claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits (see e.g. Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54
NY2d 207 [1981]; Matter of Shand [Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442 [1980]). Accordingly, the court below properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. However, upon denying the petition, the court was required, pursuant to CPLR 7511 (e), to confirm the award (see Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Belen, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: October 03, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Ellen M. Spodek, J.), entered May 27, 2005. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affidavit by an employee of plaintiff and various documents annexed thereto. The affidavit executed by plaintiff’s employee stated in a conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were “true and correct cop[ies]
of what was sent to Defendant.” The court below denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case because the affidavit executed by plaintiff’s employee was legally insufficient. Plaintiff appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.

Inasmuch as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s employee was insufficient to establish that said officer possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; see Dan Med., P.C. v New York [*2]Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Belen, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 03, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered March 8, 2006. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment and directed plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer as timely.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, it is undisputed that defendant served an untimely answer and that more than two months later, plaintiff sought and obtained a default judgment. Defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and to compel plaintiff to accept its answer. Defendant’s motion was granted and this appeal by plaintiff ensued.

A plaintiff’s retention of an answer without a timely objection, such as occurred herein, constitutes a waiver of objection as to untimeliness and such a waiver precludes the grant of a default judgment (Wittlin v Schapiro’s Wine Co., 178 AD2d 160 [1991]; Neurology and Acupuncture Service, P.C. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 14 Misc 3d 129[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52517[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; A.M.B. Med., P.L.L.C. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 14 Misc 3d 129[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52519[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; Abernathy v Ali, 3 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50509[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; cf. Celleri v Pabon, 299 AD2d 385 [2002]). Accordingly, vacatur of the “default” judgment was warranted without regard to whether defendant demonstrated a meritorious [*2]defense.

In view of the foregoing, the court below providently exercised its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.

Pesce, P.J., and Rios, J., concur.

Golia, J., taking no part.
Decision Date: October 02, 2007

—[*1] William A. Hecht, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Patricia Hecht of counsel), for appellant.

Lawrence R. Miles, Long Island City, N.Y., for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm an arbitration award, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated December 8, 2005, which denied the petition, granted the respondent’s cross petition to vacate the award, and directed the parties to resubmit, to the Workers’ Compensation Board, the issue of whether the petitioner’s assignor Maher Kiswani was injured in the course of his employment, and to provide notice to all involved parties of any hearing conducted by the Workers’ Compensation Board.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Maher Kiswani, a livery car driver, was injured in an automobile accident when the livery car he was driving struck a tree. Kiswani received medical treatment from Lutheran Medical Center (hereinafter Lutheran), and assigned his insurance benefits to it. Lutheran then sought payment of its medical fees from Hereford Insurance Company (hereinafter Hereford), the no-fault insurance carrier for the livery cab. When Hereford refused to pay, Lutheran demanded arbitration.

After appearing before a no-fault arbitrator, Hereford recommended submitting the question of whether Kiswani was injured in the course of his employment to the Workers’ Compensation Board (hereinafter the Board), and Lutheran voluntarily withdrew its claim before the arbitrator. After a hearing, the Board’s administrative law judge found that Kiswani was not injured [*2]in the course of his employment. Hereford, however, did not receive notice of the workers’ compensation hearing and did not participate in it.

Relying in part on the determination of the administrative law judge, Lutheran again sought to recover no-fault benefits from Hereford at a no-fault arbitration hearing. At that hearing, Hereford argued that it was not given notice of the workers’ compensation hearing and sought to introduce evidence that Kiswani was injured during the course of his employment. The arbitrator precluded Hereford from introducing the evidence because the issue had already been decided by the Board. The arbitrator awarded Lutheran the no-fault benefits, and the determination was confirmed by a master arbitrator. The Supreme Court vacated the arbitration award, holding that Hereford should have been given notice of the workers’ compensation hearing, and directed the parties to resubmit the employment issue to the Board, with notice to all involved parties of any hearing held by the Board. We affirm.

The Supreme Court properly vacated the arbitration award because Hereford should have been notified of the workers’ compensation hearing. Where a party, such as Hereford in this case, is not afforded an opportunity to participate in a hearing before the Board, it is not bound by the Board’s determination (see Liss v Trans Auto Sys., 68 NY2d 15 [1986]; Mohn v Smith, 271 AD2d 662 [2000]; Matter of Wofsy v Dial Car, 211 AD2d 52 [1995]).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Florio and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

D’Ambrosio & D’Ambrosio, P.C., Irvington, N.Y. (John P. D’Ambrosio of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault insurance benefits under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), dated November 13, 2006, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

This case has its genesis in a one-car accident which occurred on February 3, 2006 and which resulted in serious injuries to the driver. At that time, the vehicle was insured under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter Progressive). According to the police accident report, the driver of the car was cited for unsafe speed and driving while intoxicated.

Following the accident, the driver was transported to Westchester Medical Center (hereinafter the Hospital), where she remained until March 3, 2006. On March 14, 2006 the Hospital sent a hospital facility form (form N-F5) and a form UB-92 to Progressive, by certified mail, return receipt requested, seeking no-fault benefits in payment of the hospital bill. As per the return receipt, Progressive received these forms on March 16, 2006. [*2]

In support of its motion for summary judgment on the complaint, the Hospital submitted evidentiary proof that Progressive did not pay or deny the claim for no-fault medical payments within 30 days of receipt of the claim, as required by 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (c). However, the evidence submitted by Progressive in opposition to the motion, and in support of its own cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, established that Progressive timely sought additional verification regarding the issue of the driver’s alleged intoxication at the time of the accident, and that such information was never received (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [b], [c]; 65-3.8 [g]; cf., Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274 [1997]). Under such circumstances, where there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the Hospital provided Progressive with the required information, the Hospital’s claim for payment was premature. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Progressive’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338 [2002]) Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Florio and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.