—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (Martha S. Henley and Short & Billy [Skip Short], of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under two insurance contracts, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), entered September 25, 2008, as denied that branch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate so much of a judgment of the same court entered May 15, 2008, as, upon its default in appearing or answering the complaint, is in favor of the plaintiff St. Barnabas Hospital, as assignee of Patrick Bateman, and against it in the principal sum of $4,309.64.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon its default in appearing or answering the complaint must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing or answering, as well as a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 58 AD3d 832, 832 [2009]; Verde Elec. Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 672, 672-673 [2008]).

“A proper denial of [a] claim [for no-fault benefits] must include the information called for in the prescribed denial of claim form (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.4 [c] [11]) and must ‘promptly apprise the claimant with a high degree of specificity of the ground or grounds on which the disclaimer is predicated’ ” (Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d 664, 664 [2004], quoting General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci, 46 NY2d 862, 864 [1979]). However, a timely denial of a no-fault insurance medical claim alone does not avoid preclusion where said denial is factually insufficient, conclusory, vague, or otherwise involves a defense which has no merit as a matter of law (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]).

The defendant insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate), issued a timely denial of claim within 30 days of its receipt of the completed hospital facility form (NYS Form N-F 5) from the plaintiff St. Barnabas Hospital, as assignee of Patrick Bateman (hereinafter the plaintiff) (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [g]; 65-3.8 [c]). Contrary to Allstate’s contention, however, the Supreme Court properly determined that the denial of claim, which incorrectly stated the amount of the claim and gave an invalid reason for the denial (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.3 [d]; 65-3.5 [g]; see also Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln [*2]Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2009]; Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535, 536 [2005]), was fatally defective (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d at 565; Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d at 665; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 226 AD2d 613, 614 [1996]). Thus, Allstate failed to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Allstate’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate so much of a judgment of the same court entered May 15, 2008, as, upon its default in appearing or answering the complaint, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $4,309.64. Skelos, J.P., Covello, Santucci and Balkin, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich J.), entered December 16, 2008, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered January 15, 2009 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the December 16, 2008 order which, inter alia, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $878.67.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant argued, in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and in support of its cross motion for summary judgment, that plaintiff’s claim was untimely because it was submitted more than 45 days after the services at issue were rendered, and that plaintiff’s motion was premature because plaintiff had failed to respond to defendant’s discovery demands. Defendant appeals from so much of the Civil Court’s order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The appeal is deemed to be from the judgment which was subsequently entered (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to defendant’s contention, although plaintiff’s claim was submitted more than 45 days after the services at issue were rendered, defendant waived its reliance on the 45-day rule (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1) as a basis to deny the claim because defendant had failed to communicate to plaintiff, as required by the No-Fault Regulations, that late submission of the proof of claim will be excused where the applicant can provide a reasonable justification for the late submission (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.3 [e]; SZ Med. P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 12 Misc 3d 52 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Further, defendant failed to demonstrate that discovery was needed in [*2]order to show the existence of a triable issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

As defendant’s papers failed to establish any other basis to deny plaintiff’s motion, the judgment in favor of plaintiff is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 23, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered October 8, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to amend the answer to include the defense of fraudulent incorporation and to compel plaintiff to produce its owner, Valentina Anikeyeva, for a deposition.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court granted so much of a motion by defendant as sought leave to amend its answer, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), to assert the affirmative defense that plaintiff was a fraudulently incorporated medical provider (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela (4 NY3d 313 [2005]), and to compel plaintiff to produce its owner, Valentina Anikeyeva, for a deposition. Plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the Civil Court’s order as granted said branches of defendant’s motion.

The Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting defendant’s application for leave to amend its answer in order to interpose the affirmative defense of fraudulent incorporation, in the absence of any showing that prejudice or surprise would result [*2]therefrom (see McCaskey, Davies & Assoc. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 NY2d 755 [1983]; Tomasino v American Tobacco Co., 57 AD3d 652 [2008]; Mackenzie v Croce, 54 AD3d 825 [2008]), and since the proposed affirmative defense was neither devoid of merit nor palpably insufficient as a matter of law (see CPLR 3025 [b]; Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808 [2007]; Hill v 2016 Realty Assoc., 42 AD3d 432, 433 [2007]). Plaintiff’s contention, that the defense of fraudulent incorporation must be asserted in a timely denial of claim form, is without merit (Multiquest, P.L.L.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Misc 3d 37, 38-39 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Moreover, defendant sufficiently demonstrated that the deposition testimony of Ms. Anikeyeva regarding plaintiff’s corporate structure was material and necessary (see CPLR 3101), so as to warrant the granting of the branch of its motion seeking to compel Ms. Anikeyeva’s deposition.

Pesce, P.J., and Steinhardt, J., concur.

Golia, J., concurs in a separate memorandum.

Golia, J., concurs in the result only, in the following memorandum:

While I agree with the ultimate disposition in the decision reached by the majority, I strenuously disagree with the majority gratuitously raising a nonexistent issue, namely that a Mallela defense (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]) may be disallowed if “prejudice or surprise would result therefrom.” This impression was created by the majority in choosing here to excise an important requirement with regard to the law of amending an answer. The actual statement by the Court of Appeals in McCaskey, Davies & Assoc. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (59 NY2d 755, 757 [1983] [emphasis added, citations and internal quotations marks omitted]) is that, “Leave to amend the pleadings shall be freely given absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay.”

Inasmuch as it is inconceivable that a Mallela defense of fraudulent incorporation could ever create prejudice or surprise that resulted directly from the delay in raising such defense, it is clear that such analysis is unwarranted.

To me, it is extremely unlikely that an individual who creates a fraudulent entity for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company would forget that he/she did so and be prejudiced or surprised when it was discovered. Such would be akin to a person running a “Ponzi” scheme deciding to invest in his own firm because it was obtaining such good results.
Decision Date: October 23, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered April 30, 2008. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed without costs and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). The burden then shifted to defendant to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit submitted by defendant sufficiently established that the denial of claim forms were timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). For the reasons stated in Great Wall Acupuncture v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (16 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), it was proper for [*2]defendant to use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive (see AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 17 Misc 3d 41 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, defendant raised a triable issue of fact and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

We decline defendant’s request that we search the record and grant defendant summary judgment (see e.g. New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 832 [2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 23, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered August 1, 2008. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that defendant’s opposition to the motion had raised a triable issue of fact as to medical necessity.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention on appeal, the doctor performing the peer review did not conclude that he had insufficient information upon which to base a conclusion. Instead, the affirmed report raised a triable issue of fact because “the report clearly indicates that the pertinent [treating] physician’s reports and other documentation had been requested and provided for the purpose of conducting a peer review, and the conclusion of lack of medical necessity is based on the peer reviewer’s opinion, in effect, that there was no substantiation in the reports and documents reviewed of medical necessity for the [services] provided” (Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50452[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

We decline defendant’s request that we search the record and grant defendant summary [*2]judgment (see e.g. New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Inc. Co., 39 AD3d 832 [2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 23, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered July 3, 2008. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed without costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court denied defendant’s unopposed motion on the ground that defendant had failed “to show [that] the IME notices were mailed to [the] claimant.”

In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of a manager employed by the independent medical review service retained by defendant to schedule and conduct IMEs, which affidavit sufficiently set forth the standard office practice and procedure for the generation and mailing of IME notices designed to ensure that said notices were properly addressed and mailed (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; cf. Top Choice Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 133[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50230[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). The affirmations and affidavits of the medical professionals who were to perform the IMEs established that plaintiff’s assignor failed to [*2]appear for said IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]; Tuncel v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Consequently, defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 23, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered September 30, 2008, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered November 10, 2008 (see CPLR 5512 [a]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the September 30, 2008 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,693.12.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed without costs, the order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In opposition to the motion, defendant argued, based upon an affirmed peer review report, that the MRIs were not medically necessary. By order dated September 30, 2008, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. After judgment was entered on November 10, 2008, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the September 30, 2008 order. We deem the appeal to be from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]).

On appeal, defendant’s sole contention with respect to plaintiff’s prima facie case is that the affidavit of plaintiff’s billing manager failed to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were admissible as business records. We disagree because the affidavit was sufficient to comply with CPLR 4518 (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). As a result, the burden shifted to defendant to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant established that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims based upon an affirmed peer review report setting forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s opinion that the services provided to plaintiff’s assignor were not medically necessary (see New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 832 [2007]; Quality Health Prods., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51757[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). As a result, defendant [*2]proffered sufficient evidence in admissible form to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to medical necessity (see Velen Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50735[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

To the extent defendant asks this court to search the record and grant it summary judgment, we decline to do so (see e.g. New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst., 39 AD3d 832).

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered August 13, 2008. The order denied plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the trial calendar.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties consented to have the case marked off the trial calendar in March 2007. In August 2008, plaintiff moved to restore the case. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion “with leave to renew upon a proper showing/reasonable excuse as to why plaintiff did not move to restore within one year of the case being marked off the trial calendar.” The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.

An action that has been marked off the trial calendar, whether by consent of the parties or stricken by the court, which is not restored to the calendar within one year, may only be restored thereafter if the plaintiff demonstrates, inter alia, a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable excuse for the delay in moving to restore the case (see Kaufman v Bauer, 8 Misc 3d 60 [App Term, 1st Dept 2005], revd on other grounds 36 AD3d 481 [2007]; see generally Uniform Rules for Trial Courts [22 NYCRR] § 208.14 [c]; Goldstein v Block, 7 AD3d 669 [2004]). Herein, plaintiff failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Thomas D. Raffaele, J.), dated June 20, 2008. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant opposed the motion on the ground that the equipment provided to plaintiff’s assignors was not medically
necessary. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding that there was a triable issue regarding medical necessity. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the affidavits of plaintiff’s president, who was also plaintiff’s custodian of records, were sufficient to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion papers constituted evidence in admissible form pursuant to CPLR 4518 (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). As defendant concedes, any deficiency in plaintiff’s moving papers regarding proof of mailing of the claim forms was cured by defendant’s claim denial forms acknowledging receipt of the claim forms (see Oleg Barshay, D.C., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Accordingly, plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted the statutory claim forms, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]).

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant established that it had timely denied the claims in question based upon affirmed peer review reports setting forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s opinion that the supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignors were [*2]not medically necessary (see New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 832 [2007]; Quality Health Prods., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51757[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). As a result, defendant proffered sufficient evidence in admissible form to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to medical necessity (see Velen Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50735[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Plaintiff’s contention that the peer review reports did not constitute evidence in admissible form was waived since said argument is raised for the first time on appeal (see Dowling v Mosey, 32 AD3d 1190 [2006]; Velen Med. Supply, Inc., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50735[U]; Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Geico Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 145[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51867[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]).

To the extent defendant asks this court to search the record and grant it summary judgment dismissing the complaint, we decline to do so (see e.g. New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst., 39 AD3d 832).

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Rhonda E. Fischer, J.), entered August 11, 2008. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed plaintiffs’ motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ assignor failed to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The District Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that they made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment, and that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because, among other things, defendant failed to prove that it mailed the EUO notices. We disagree.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, defendant established both that the EUO notices were mailed (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]) and that the assignor failed to appear (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Consequently, in light of the foregoing and the fact that plaintiffs’ further [*2]contentions that the EUO notices were defective and that an EUO was not necessary lack merit, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly granted (W & Z Acupuncture, P.C. v Amex Assur. Co., 24 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Even were we to find otherwise, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was properly denied because plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment since the affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ billing manager failed to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiffs’ moving papers were admissible pursuant to CPLR 4518 (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Fortune Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

Molia, J.P., Nicolai and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 06, 2009