SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sylvia G. Ash, J.), entered December 15, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant established that its denial of claim forms and verification requests had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also demonstrated that, with respect to plaintiff’s third cause of action, plaintiff had failed to respond to defendant’s verification requests. In opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff did not show that it had sent information responsive to defendant’s requests. Consequently, defendant was entitled to [*2]summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s third cause of action as premature (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2007]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]).

Defendant submitted, among other things, affirmed peer review reports which set forth the factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue in plaintiff’s first, second and fourth causes of action. The affidavit by plaintiff’s treating doctor submitted in opposition to the cross motion failed to meaningfully rebut the conclusions set forth in the peer review reports (see Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52321[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As a result, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first, second and fourth causes of action should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 29, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered June 17, 2011. The order denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), on the ground that the complaint failed to sufficiently establish the transactions that gave rise to the causes of action.

As noted by the Civil Court, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). “The test to be applied is whether the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and whether the requisite elements of any cause of action known to our law can be discerned from its averments” (JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of NY, Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [*2][2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Contrary to defendant’s arguments both in the Civil Court and on appeal, the complaint in this case did state a cognizable cause of action and was sufficient to give defendant notice of the transactions intended to be proved.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sylvia G. Ash, J.), entered January 20, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affirmation from its attorney who stated that upon review of his office file and “knowledge of his office practices and procedures,” plaintiff failed to appear at a properly noticed examination under oath (EUO).

The affidavit of defendant’s attorney was of no probative value as it lacked personal knowledge of the nonappearance of plaintiff. It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment must be supported by an affidavit from a person having knowledge of the facts (CPLR [*2]3212 [b]). A conclusory statement from an attorney which fails to demonstrate his or her personal knowledge is insufficient to support summary judgment (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Piltser v Donna Lee Mgt. Corp., 29 AD3d 973 [2006]; Gomez v Sammy’s Transp., Inc., 19 AD3d 544 [2005]; Spearmon v Times Sq. Stores Corp, 96 AD2d 552 [1983]). To the extent our prior decisions (see e.g. W & Z Acupuncture, P.C. v Amex Assur. Co., 24 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51338[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]) would require a different result, they should no longer be followed.

While a medical provider is required to submit to examinations under oath when requested by the insurer (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), as a condition precedent to payment of a claim, their alleged noncompliance must be established by admissible evidence (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Based upon the foregoing, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered April 30, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to assignor Jeannette Lugaro is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In its respondent’s brief, defendant concedes that it was not entitled to summary judgment [*2]dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Jeannette Lugaro because defendant failed to annex a copy of the peer review report pertaining to such services. However, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment upon this claim because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant’s denial of this claim was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]).

With respect to the remaining claims, for services rendered to assignors Boris Gurevich, Isabel Guaraca and Lydia Best, the affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion for summary judgment established that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) these claims. Defendant annexed to its cross motion papers sworn peer review reports, which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services rendered to these three assignors. As defendant’s prima facie showing was unrebutted by plaintiff, the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claims of these three assignors were properly granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to assignor Jeannette Lugaro is denied.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 20, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), dated December 8, 2009. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claims for $1,045 and $950 and its claim for $1,140 for services rendered January 28, 2008 through February 26, 2008 are denied, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claim for $1,045 is granted to the extent of awarding defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover the sum of $418.99 for services rendered November 12, 2007 through November 29, 2007 upon that claim, and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claim for $950 is granted to the extent of awarding defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover the sum of $380.90 for services rendered November 30, 2007 though December 20, 2007 upon that claim; as so modified, the order is affirmed, [*2]without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for all further proceedings with respect to the unpaid portions of those claims and the remaining claim.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since defendant raises no issue on appeal with regard to plaintiff’s establishment of its prima facie case, we do not pass upon the propriety of the Civil Court’s implicit determination with respect thereto (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]).

The complaint seeks to recover upon claims in the principal sums of $1,045, $950, $1,140 (for services rendered December 27, 2007 through January 14, 2008) and $1,140 (for services rendered January 28, 2008 through February 26, 2008). A review of the record indicates that, with respect to plaintiff’s $1,045 claim, defendant timely (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) paid $418.99 and denied the remaining $626.01, and, with respect to the $950 claim, defendant timely (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16) paid $380.90 and denied the remaining $569.10. These claims were partially denied on the ground that the amount billed by plaintiff exceeded the fees allowed by the workers’ compensation fee schedule. As plaintiff concedes that defendant paid $418.99 and $380.90, respectively, of these claims, the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the paid portion of the claims should be granted. However, as there is an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff is entitled to recover the unpaid portion of these claims, $626.01 and $569.10, respectively, neither party is entitled to summary judgment with respect thereto (see East Coast Acupuncture, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 139[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50344[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]).

With regard to the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon so much of the complaint as seeks to recover upon its $1,140 claim for services rendered December 27, 2007 through January 24, 2008, defendant failed to establish the proper mailing of the independent medical examination (IME) scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16), and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at either of the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]; Excel Radiology Serv., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 138[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50751[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). In light of the foregoing, defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to this claim, and we do not disturb so much of the order as awarded plaintiff summary judgment upon so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon this claim.

With regard to plaintiff’s $1,140 claim for services rendered January 28, 2008 through February 26, 2008, the affidavit of defendant’s no-fault examiner was sufficient to overcome the presumption that a proper mailing had occurred and to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant had received the claim (see Pomona Med. Diagnostics, P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 127[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50447[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). As [*3]a result, neither party is entitled to summary judgment with respect to this claim.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claims for $1,045 and $950 and its claim for $1,140 for services rendered January 28, 2008 through February 26, 2008 are denied, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claim for $1,045 is granted to the extent of awarding defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover the sum of $418.99 for services rendered November 12, 2007 through November 29, 2007 upon that claim, and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claim for $950 is granted to the extent of awarding defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover the sum of $380.90 for services rendered November 30, 2007 though December 20, 2007 upon that claim; as so modified, the order is affirmed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for all further proceedings with respect to the unpaid portions of those claims and the remaining claim.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 20, 2013

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, March 18, 2013

A-Quality Med. Supply v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 485, reversed.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Law Offices of Teresa M. Spina, Woodbury (Lawrence J. Chanice of counsel), for appellant. Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn (Irena Golodkeyer of counsel), for respondent.

{**39 Misc 3d at 25} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, a nonjury trial was held solely with respect to defendant’s defense of lack of medical necessity. Defendant’s witness identified the peer review reports at issue, all but one of which he had authored. He testified, based upon his review of the documentation upon which all of the peer reviews were based, that the supplies at issue were not medically necessary. The Civil Court declined to consider the peer review reports, on the ground that some of them were not dated, signed or notarized, and held, in its posttrial decision, that the peer review reports could not serve as a valid basis for defendant’s denials. The court awarded judgment to plaintiff without consideration of the testimony of defendant’s witness. Defendant appeals and we reverse.

The Insurance Department Regulations require merely that a “copy” of a peer review report be produced to a provider upon written demand (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [b] [4]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 778, 779 [2007]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 779 [2007]). Moreover, the Insurance{**39 Misc 3d at 26} Department Regulations do not prescribe a format for a peer review report. It is only when a peer review report is being submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion that it must be properly sworn or affirmed (see CPLR 3212 [b]; see e.g. BLR Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 141[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50882[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 127[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51843[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Thus, the Civil Court incorrectly held that the peer review reports involved herein were an insufficient basis for defendant’s denial of the claims.

Since defendant’s expert witness testified regarding the factual basis and medical rationale for his opinion that the supplies furnished lacked medical necessity, such testimony should have been considered by the court (Radiology Today, P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51724[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Psychology YM, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 130[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51316[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). In light of the foregoing, and the fact that the court never passed upon the credibility of defendant’s witness, a new trial is required. We note that, at trial, the issue of medical necessity is to be resolved based upon the testimony given by medical experts. A peer review report, unlike a witness, is not subject to cross-examination and is not admissible by defendant to prove lack of medical necessity. Indeed, admission of a peer review report into evidence as part of a defendant’s proof of lack of medical necessity may constitute impermissible bolstering of its expert’s testimony (see generally Cohn v Haddad, 244 AD2d 519 [1997]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered August 10, 2011. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Although plaintiff established that defendant had not paid the claim, plaintiff failed to show that the basis for the denial of the claim was conclusory, vague or lacked merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, [*2]2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Thus, the Civil Court properly determined that plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie case.

In opposition to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of medical necessity, plaintiff submitted an affidavit by its doctor which sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a question of fact as to medical necessity (see Neomy Med., P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 144[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50145[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Quality Psychological Servs., P.C. v Mercury Ins. Group, 27 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50601[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 141[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50441[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 15, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered March 26, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The appeal from the order is deemed to be from a judgment of the same court entered November 3, 2010 dismissing the action (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the order entered March 26, 2010 as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

In Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co. (26 Misc 3d 23, 24-25 [App Term, 2d, [*2]11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), this court held:

“an insurer may use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which a licensed acupuncturist is entitled to receive for such acupuncture services . . . Consequently, since it is undisputed that the instant defendant reimbursed plaintiff pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services rendered by a chiropractor, plaintiff is not entitled to any additional reimbursement.”

In the instant case, defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the amount it had paid plaintiff was the maximum amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services rendered by a chiropractor and that defendant had properly denied the remaining portion of each of the claims at issue. As a result, defendant failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

In view of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 15, 2013

—[*1] Amos Weinberg, Great Neck, N.Y., for appellants.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP, Armonk, N.Y. (Yilo J. Kang and Craig Freiberg of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of claims for no-fault insurance benefits, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Strauss, J.), entered October 4, 2011, which granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration, and dismissed the appellants’ counterclaims.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the petition to permanently stay arbitration, and substituting therefor a provision denying the petition; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellants.

American Independent Insurance Company (hereinafter AIIC) commenced this proceeding to permanently stay arbitration of the appellants’ claims for no-fault benefits on the ground that AIIC is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. Pursuant to CPLR 7503 (b), a petition to stay arbitration may be granted on the limited grounds that a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made or has not been complied with, or that the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by the statute of limitations. In addition, case law recognizes limited instances where arbitration is prohibited on public policy grounds (see Matter of City of New York v Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 NY2d 273, 280 [2000]). Lack of personal jurisdiction is not a basis for granting a stay of arbitration.

In Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Basedow (28 AD3d 766 [2006]) and Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Gutierrez-Guzman (21 AD3d 489 [2005]), upon which AIIC relies, this Court dismissed, on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, so much of the petitions as sought to stay arbitration and to add AIIC as an additional respondent for the resolution of threshold issues. While these cases reinforce the rule that personal jurisdiction must first be obtained over a party before judgment may be entered upon an arbitration award (see Sargant v Monroe, 268 App Div 123, 126 [1944]), the petitioner’s reliance upon them is misplaced. There is a strong public policy favoring arbitration, and courts interfere as little as possible with the freedom of parties to submit their disputes to arbitration (see Matter of Smith Barney Shearson v Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39, 49 [1997]; Shah v Monpat Constr., Inc., 65 AD3d 541, 543 [2009]). Pursuant to CPLR 7503, courts decide threshold issues before compelling or [*2]staying arbitration (see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v Benjamin, 1 AD3d 39, 43-44 [2003]). Here, AIIC has failed to allege, pursuant to CPLR 7503 (b), that a valid arbitration agreement was not made or complied with, that the claim sought to be arbitrated was barred by the statute of limitations, or that public policy precluded arbitration of this matter. Indeed, AIIC failed to provide in the record a copy of the relevant policy of insurance by which the terms and circumstances of arbitration may be reviewed. Contrary to AIIC’s contentions, Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Basedow and Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Gutierrez-Guzman are not controlling, since the issue of personal jurisdiction in those cases arose in the context of an ongoing legal proceeding, where the petitioners sought to add AIIC as a party. Here, in contrast, AIIC seeks to permanently stay an arbitration on jurisdictional arguments outside of the limited grounds recognized by CPLR 7503 and its interpretive case law.

At this pre-arbitration stage, the issue is not whether New York courts have jurisdiction over AIIC, but whether the arbitrator has authority under the terms of the insurance contract to award no-fault benefits to the appellants (see American Ind. Ins. v Gerard Ave. Med. P.C., 12 Misc 3d 1176[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52302[U] [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2005]). Without providing a copy of the policy of insurance, AIIC could not establish that a valid arbitration agreement is not controlling. Our recognition in other cases that New York State courts do not have personal jurisdiction over AIIC does not entitle AIIC to, in effect, a declaration that the arbitrator does not have authority and jurisdiction over AIIC. While personal jurisdiction is required for the exercise of the state’s judicial power over a party, arbitration is a form of dispute resolution almost wholly independent of the court system (see Siegel, NY Prac § 586 at 1050 [5th ed 2011]). “Except for a few basic guarantees, such as the right to be heard and to be represented by counsel at the arbitration, the procedural law of the state is also inapplicable to arbitration, including the rules of evidence” (id. at 1052). In short, personal jurisdiction is not required for arbitration that is controlled by the parties’ agreement. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in granting the petition to permanently stay arbitration on the ground that there was no personal jurisdiction over AIIC.

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the appellants’ counterclaims. The appellants demanded an arbitration, and they may not choose different forums for the resolution of issues or items of damages arising from a single injury (see Roggio v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 66 NY2d 260, 262 [1985]; Cortez v Countrywide Ins. Co., 17 AD3d 508 [2005]). Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered March 1, 2011, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered March 30, 2011 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the March 1, 2011 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,259.69.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the order entered March 1, 2011 as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s cross motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211 and CPLR 3212, to dismiss the complaint. Defendant contended that, pursuant to Roggio v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (66 NY2d 260 [1985]), plaintiff was precluded from litigating its claims for reimbursement of assigned first-party no-fault benefits since plaintiff’s assignor had, prior to this action, elected to arbitrate claims for no-fault benefits which he had not assigned and which arose out of the same accident as was involved in the instant action. Consequently, defendant argued that arbitration was the only proper forum for plaintiff to seek recovery of its assigned no-fault claims. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion, contending that it was not precluded from litigating the instant action since its assignor had assigned his no-fault benefits to it prior to the commencement of the arbitration of the assignor’s claims and since the plaintiff herein was not a party to that arbitration. Plaintiff also cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered March 1, 2011, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion, finding that the motion papers established that the assignment of benefits predated the assignor’s election to arbitrate and that, therefore, the Roggio case was not applicable, and granted plaintiff’s cross motion. Defendant appeals from the March 1, 2011 order. A judgment was subsequently entered awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $2,259.69, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

The Civil Court properly denied defendant’s motion. As the Civil Court correctly noted, [*2]since plaintiff’s assignor had executed the assignment of benefits to plaintiff prior to his commencement of his own arbitration, the holding in Roggio (66 NY2d 260) does not apply here and, thus, plaintiff was not precluded from litigating the claims at issue in this action (see Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 132[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51294[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 21 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 9 Misc 3d 19 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]).

However, the Civil Court should have denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment since the affidavit of plaintiff’s billing supervisor, which was missing several paragraphs, was insufficient to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion papers constituted proof of the fact and the amount of loss sustained (see CPLR 4518 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 21 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered March 1, 2011 as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s cross motion is denied.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 05, 2013