Alahverdian Van Leuvan, P.C. (Gerard R. Van Leuvan of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lola Waterman, J.), entered May 21, 2024. The order denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. In support of its motion, defendant argued that the Civil Court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over it because it is an Ohio company which is not authorized to do business in New York, and that it has not filed a statement with the Superintendent of Insurance agreeing that its automobile insurance policies will be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law; that the $5,000 limit of the insurance policy had been exhausted prior to plaintiff’s claims; and that it was not properly served with the summons and complaint. By order entered May 21, 2024, the Civil Court (Lola Waterman, J.) solely addressed, and denied, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). The court found that defendant “failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form.” Specifically, the affidavit by defendant’s director of claims, which was signed and notarized in Ohio, lacked a certificate of conformity, and the insurance policy’s declaration page was not certified and lacked any foundation. The order concluded by noting that “issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York,” and that “This case shall proceed on to trial on the issue of personal jurisdiction.” On appeal, defendant contends that the Civil Court should have granted the branch of its motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to its determination that there were various deficiencies in defendant’s [*2]submissions which required its motion to be denied, the court found that sufficient issues of fact existed “as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York” and, therefore, held that the issue of personal jurisdiction would be determined at trial. We find that this determination by the Civil Court was proper under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant’s remaining contentions either lack merit or are unpreserved for appellate review.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the papers defendant submitted in support of the branch of its motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint failed to demonstrate by admissible proof, as a matter of law, that defendant provided the insured with proper notice of cancellation in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 (1) (a) (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Misc 3d 132[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51006[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). In addition, we note that defendant, in any event, has not demonstrated that the alleged cancellation of the policy was effective with respect to plaintiff’s assignor, who was not the named insured or a member of the insured’s household (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 [2] [a]; [3]; Matter of Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v Kitchen, 46 AD3d 333 [2007]; Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Barnes, 30 AD3d 523 [2006]; Pravel, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Misc 3d 132[A], [*2]2020 NY Slip Op 50457[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 54 Misc 3d 46 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Advanced Med. Care, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50130[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]; GL Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 48 Misc 3d 141[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51239[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek (Kenneth F. Popper of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek (Kenneth F. Popper of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.

For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Alahverdian Van Leuvan, P.C. (Gerard Van Leuvan of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lola Waterman, J.), entered May 21, 2024. The order denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. In support of its motion, defendant argued that the Civil Court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over it because it is an Ohio company which is not authorized to do business in New York, and that it has not filed a statement with the Superintendent of Insurance agreeing that its automobile insurance policies will be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law; that the $5,000 limit of the insurance policy had been exhausted prior to plaintiff’s claims; and that it was not properly served with the summons and complaint. By order entered May 21, 2024, the Civil Court (Lola Waterman, J.) solely addressed, and denied, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). The court found that defendant “failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form.” Specifically, the affidavit by defendant’s director of claims, which was signed and notarized in Ohio, lacked a certificate of conformity, and the insurance policy’s declaration page was not certified and lacked any foundation. The order concluded by noting that “issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York,” and that “This case shall proceed on to trial on the issue of personal jurisdiction.” On appeal, defendant contends that the Civil Court should have granted the branch of its motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to its determination that there were various deficiencies in defendant’s submissions which required its motion to be denied, the court found that sufficient issues of fact existed “as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York” and, therefore, held that the issue of personal jurisdiction would be determined at trial. We find that this determination by the Civil Court was proper under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant’s remaining contentions either lack merit or are unpreserved for appellate review.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak, David Paul Horowitz and Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.), dated May 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, adhered to a prior determination of that court in an order dated October 18, 2022 denying the motion.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and, upon renewal, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). As relevant here, by order dated October 18, 2022, the Civil Court (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.) found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and denials, but denied defendant summary judgment, finding that the affirmation of defendant’s attorney attesting to plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs was insufficient due to the “significant lapse in time” between the alleged no-shows and execution of the affirmation.

Defendant subsequently moved for leave to renew its motion, arguing that, under SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO (76 Misc 3d 134[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]), defendant’s attorney’s affirmation was sufficient to demonstrate plaintiff’s failure to appear. Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.) dated May 15, 2024 as, upon granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew, adhered to its prior determination denying defendant’s [*2]motion for summary judgment, finding that the attorney’s affirmation was “on its face unworthy of belief” as it was executed approximately three years after the purported EUO no-shows.

Contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, defendant’s attorney’s affirmation, “on its face, . . . was not unworthy of belief” (SVP Med Supply, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U], *2; see Brefni Chiropractic Diagnostics, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 Misc 3d 128[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51518[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; MAZ Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]), and was sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs (see SVP Med Supply, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U], *1-2; see also Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [2015]; Brefni Chiropractic Diagnostics, P.C., 2025 NY Slip Op 51518[U]; MAZ Chiropractic, P.C., 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U]; T & J Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Misc 3d 130[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50406[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 141[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

To the extent that plaintiff purports to challenge on appeal the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, such challenge lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and, upon renewal, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.