Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova, Esq.), for appellant. Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP (Mitchell L. Kaufman, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered January 24, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that plaintiff and plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order entered January 24, 2014, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

As plaintiff argues, defendant’s moving papers failed to establish that the first EUO scheduling letter defendant sent to plaintiff had been timely, since defendant stated that the letter was sent more than 30 days after defendant had received the claims (see Neptune Med. Care, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51220[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; O & M Med., P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Moreover, defendant’s moving papers did not demonstrate that the claims had been timely denied (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]). In view of the foregoing, defendant failed to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA AND SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: July 14, 2017

Decided on July 14, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered April 9, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that it had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Defendant also demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and, thus, that plaintiff’s action is premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). However, as plaintiff further argues, the affidavit by plaintiff’s owner, submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion, was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123). In view of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this action is premature (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Decided on July 14, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, July 14, 2017

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel) for appellant.

Korsunskiy Legal Group, P.C. (Henry R. Guindi of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In July 2012, plaintiff (the provider) commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor, who had allegedly been injured in a motor vehicle accident that had occurred on August 8, 2011. Defendant (the insurer) failed to timely answer or appear in this action, and instead commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, New York County, against the provider, among others, seeking a declaration that the defendants in that action were not entitled to recover no-fault benefits arising out of the August 8, 2011 motor vehicle accident.

After the insurer defaulted in the instant action, the provider moved for leave to enter a default judgment against the insurer. The Civil Court granted the motion, and a default judgment in the principal sum of $475 was entered against the insurer on March 6, 2013.^[FN*] In July 2013, the insurer moved to vacate the default judgment and to compel the provider to accept its late{**57 Misc 3d at 19} answer. The provider opposed the motion and cross-moved for “summary judgment.” The insurer did not oppose the cross motion. By order entered July 16, 2014, the Civil Court (Devin P. Cohen, J.) denied the insurer’s motion and granted, on default, the provider’s cross motion, stating that “the judgment stands.”

On July 28, 2014, the insurer moved for “summary judgment” dismissing the complaint, contending that the amount due and owing pursuant to the Civil Court judgment had been satisfied, as an order and judgment in the Supreme Court declaratory action had been entered in [*2]the insurer’s favor on July 14, 2014, declaring that the provider, among others, was not entitled to recover no-fault benefits with respect to the motor vehicle accident at issue. The order and judgment further provided that the insurer recover from the various named defendants therein, including the provider, “costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk in the sum of $1,125.” The insurer alleged, in its motion papers, that the judgment in this action had been fully satisfied by virtue of a “partial satisfaction,” resulting from the judgment entered in the Supreme Court declaratory judgment action. Annexed to the motion papers was a document entitled “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment” which had been executed by the insurer’s counsel on July 28, 2014, and which bore the caption of the Supreme Court action. In the alternative, the insurer’s motion sought a “satisfaction of any entered judgment” in the Civil Court, pursuant to CPLR 5020 (c). The provider opposed the insurer’s motion. By order entered April 23, 2015, from which the insurer appeals, the Civil Court denied the insurer’s motion. We affirm.

[1] We initially note that the branch of the insurer’s motion seeking “summary judgment” was inappropriate because a judgment had already been entered against the insurer. However, the insurer also sought, in the alternative, a “satisfaction of any entered judgment” in the Civil Court, based on the judgment in favor of the insurer in the Supreme Court declaratory judgment action. Although reference was made to CPLR 5020 (c) in support of this branch of the insurer’s motion, this provision has no applicability to the circumstances herein. If the insurer was actually seeking the entry of a satisfaction of judgment, the proper way to seek such relief would be by way of a motion pursuant to CPLR 5021 (a) (2). However, in support of its motion, the insurer did not demonstrate that it had filed a partial satisfaction of judgment in the Supreme Court action, in accordance with CPLR 5020 (a). Consequently,{**57 Misc 3d at 20} insofar as the insurer’s motion sought the entry of a satisfaction of judgment in the Civil Court action, such relief was properly denied by the Civil Court.

[2] Notwithstanding the foregoing, it was apparently the insurer’s objective to have a portion of the judgment in the Supreme Court declaratory judgment action fully offset the judgment obtained against it in the Civil Court action. While a court may exercise its “inherent authority to set one judgment off against another” (see Joseph Kali Corp. v A. Goldner, Inc., 49 AD3d 397, 398 [2008]; see also Scianna v Scianna, 205 AD2d 750 [1994]), the granting of such relief rests in the discretion of the court (see Beecher v Vogt Mfg. Co., 227 NY 468, 473 [1920]; Kretsch v Denofrio, 137 App Div 617, 619 [1910]). Assuming, without deciding, that the Civil Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain such an application (cf. Stilwell v Carpenter, 62 NY 639 [1875]), the Civil Court’s determination not to set off the judgments was not an improvident exercise of discretion.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Footnote *:The record indicates that an amended judgment in the principal sum of $475 (and in the aggregate sum of $939.90) was entered on August 15, 2014.

Decided on June 23, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on June 23, 2017

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova, Esq.), for appellant. The Law Office of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered June 10, 2014. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The court found that defendant had demonstrated that the limits of the applicable insurance policy had been exhausted.

Since the insurance policy at issue contains a provision that “[t]he policy and any amendment(s) and endorsement(s) are to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of Georgia,” the substantive law of Georgia applies (see St. Chiropractic, P.C. v Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d 59, 61 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Natural Therapy Acupuncture, [*2]P.C. v . Geico Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 107 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; Bay Med., P.C. v. GEICO Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 145[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52084[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). However, New York’s procedural laws control (see St. Chiropractic, P.C. v Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 53 Misc 3d at 61).

The affidavit of defendant’s underwriter which was submitted in support of defendant’s cross motion was sufficient to provide a foundation for the consideration of the annexed copies of the insurance policy and declaration page, which indicated that the policy had a $10,000 medical payment limit. However, that affidavit and an affidavit by defendant’s claims division employee failed to establish defendant’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint, since the assertions contained therein failed to provide a foundation for the consideration of the annexed printouts—which purportedly show that the $10,000 policy limit had been exhausted—inasmuch as neither affidavit specifically addressed the printouts. Moreover, it is noted that Section 1 of the insurance policy, entitled “Out of State Insurance,” provides that when “the policy applies to the operation of a motor vehicle outside your state, we agree to increase your coverages to the extent required of out-of-state motorists by local law” (emphasis in the original). It is uncontroverted that the accident took place in South Carolina, and defendant provided no information regarding the minimum financial responsibility required by the State of South Carolina. Consequently, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied.

Although the affidavit plaintiff submitted in support of its motion was sufficient to establish that the claim had been timely and properly mailed to defendant, the conclusory statements contained in the affidavit failed to establish that the claim had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

ELLIOT, J.P., PESCE and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, June 23, 2017

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Law Offices of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt of counsel) for appellant.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that, on the court’s own motion, defendant’s notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal from so much of the Civil Court’s order as, in effect, sua sponte searched the record and granted defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted by plaintiff Fresh Acupuncture, P.C., and leave to appeal from that portion of the order is granted (see CCA 1702 [c]); and it is further ordered that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and so much of the order as, in effect, sua sponte searched the record and granted defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted by plaintiff Fresh Acupuncture, P.C. is vacated.

In this action, commenced on April 12, 2013, by three providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant interposed an answer, which asserted, among other things, that the action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Thereafter, defendant moved for partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted by plaintiffs Advanced Wellness Chiropractic, P.C. and Maximum Care Physical Therapy, P.C. upon grounds not at issue here. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment in favor of all three plaintiffs. In opposition to plaintiffs’ cross motion and in further support of defendant’s motion, defendant’s attorney submitted an affirmation in which he argued that, on the basis of an order in a declaratory judgment action in the Civil Court, New York County, entered October 6, 2014, upon the default of plaintiff Fresh Acupuncture, P.C., Fresh Acupuncture is not entitled to receive no-fault benefits for the accident at issue on the ground of the failure{**56 Misc 3d at 100} by Fresh Acupuncture to appear for scheduled examinations under oath. Fresh Acupuncture appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as, upon plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment, in effect, sua sponte searched the record and granted defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted by Fresh Acupuncture.

Insofar as is relevant here, CCA 212-a provides:

“The [Civil Court] shall have the jurisdiction defined in section 3001 of the CPLR to make a declaratory judgment with respect to:

“(a) any controversy involving the obligation of an insurer to indemnify or defend a defendant in an action in which the amount sought to be recovered does not exceed $25,000.”

The Civil Court, New York County, declaratory judgment action was an action by an insurer against a provider and did not involve a “controversy involving the obligation of an insurer to indemnify or defend a defendant in an action in which the amount sought to be recovered does not exceed $25,000.” Thus, the Civil Court, New York County, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the declaratory judgment action (see CPLR 3001; see generally 133 Plus 24 Sanford Ave. Realty Corp. v Xiu Lan Ni, 47 Misc 3d 55, 58 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). To the extent that this court’s decision in Five Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v AutoOne Ins. Co. (27 Misc 3d 89 [2010]) may have held to the contrary, it should not be followed.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and so much of the order as, in effect, sua sponte searched the record and granted defendant partial summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as was asserted by plaintiff Fresh Acupuncture, P.C., is vacated.

Elliot, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Eric M. Wharburg, Esq.), for appellant. Israel, Israel & Purdy, LLP (Ryan B Berry, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered July 6, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to modify, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a) and 5240, a judgment of the same court (Lisa S. Ottley, J.) entered March 3, 2014, following a nonjury trial.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Following a nonjury trial in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court (Lisa S. Ottley, J.) awarded plaintiff a judgment in the principal sum of $2,114.50. The court noted that the parties had stipulated that, among other things, defendant had timely denied the claims at issue. The judgment was entered on March 3, 2014. Eight months later, defendant moved, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a) and 5240, to modify the judgment on the ground that the coverage limits of the insurance policy had been exhausted. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered July 6, 2015 as denied defendant’s motion.

In support of its motion, defendant argued that there are no funds available to pay the judgment because the $50,000 policy limit in basic personal injury protection had been exhausted. Assuming, arguendo, that such contention, if established, would entitle defendant to some form of postjudgment relief (see e.g. CPLR 5015 [a]), we find that, in any event, defendant’s motion papers failed to establish an exhaustion of the coverage limits of the insurance policy at issue, as defendant failed to demonstrate that the policy had been exhausted at the time the claims at issue were deemed complete (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15; Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]). Furthermore, [*2]as defendant has not argued, let alone demonstrated, that there was a technical defect or ministerial mistake in the judgment “not affecting a substantial right of a party” (CPLR 5019 [a]; see Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY 323 [1919]; Chmelovsky v Country Club Homes, Inc., 111 AD3d 874 [2013]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 81 AD3d 700 [2011]), defendant has established no basis to disturb the judgment.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.