Fuld & Karp, P.C. (David Karp, Esq.), for appellant. The Law Office of Printz & Goldstein (Lawrence J. Chanice, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered June 2, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, failed to find, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established certain facts for all purposes in the action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied both motions, finding that there were triable issues of fact.

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the Civil Court, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, should have found, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established certain facts for all purposes in the action. For the reasons stated in 525 EVM, Inc., as Assignee of Dzianis Haiduk v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2017 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2014-1926 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered June 12, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish that defendant’s fee reductions, which were done in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors, were proper. However, this court has held, “as a matter of law, that an insurer may use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which a licensed acupuncturist is entitled to receive for such acupuncture services” (Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23, 24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. De Martini & Yi, LLP (Bryan Visnius, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered June 4, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

We find no merit to plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal with respect to the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first, third and fourth causes of action—which the Civil Court granted on the ground that the underlying claims had been paid in full—that the proof defendant submitted was insufficient to establish the payment of these claims.

However, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the [*2]second cause of action should have been denied. While, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had not received the requested verification, plaintiff correctly argues that the affidavit submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this cause of action is premature (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered June 3, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

There is no merit to plaintiff’s arguments regarding the adequacy of the proof submitted by defendant establishing that it had fully paid plaintiff for the claims at issue.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered June 3, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal with the respect to the first cause of action, the proof submitted by defendant in support of its motion was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant had not received the claim form underlying that cause of action. Consequently, there is no basis to disturb so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action (see Artzel, Inc. v Mercury Cas. [*2]Co., 53 Misc 3d 135[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51437[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

However, plaintiff correctly argues that defendant’s motion papers failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the fees that had been charged by plaintiff for the claims underlying the second cause of action exceeded the amounts permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action is denied.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff, Esq.), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered February 7, 2014. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying defendant’s motion which sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

In its motion, defendant established that initial and follow-up letters scheduling an EUO had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]); that plaintiff had failed to appear on either date (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]); and that the claims had been timely denied on that ground (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion, defendant is [*2]entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Lawrence N. Rogak, LLC, (Lawrence Rogak, Esq.), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 28, 2014. The order granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination on the merits of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for two properly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs).

Plaintiff correctly argues on appeal that defendant failed to establish that it had mailed letters scheduling plaintiff’s assignor’s IME (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Thus, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground relied upon by the Civil Court should [*2]not have been granted. However, defendant’s motion was also based on the additional ground that it had paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule, which branch of defendant’s motion the Civil Court did not decide. Therefore, the matter is remitted for a determination of that branch of defendant’s motion.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations is denied and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion.

PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.